

HISTORY OF MYSORE

(1399-1799 A.D.)

INCORPORATING THE LATEST EPIGRAPHICAL, LITERARY AND
HISTORICAL RESEARCHES

BY

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
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PREFACE

THIS Volume deals with the period 1704-1766, commencing with the accession of Kanṭhīrava-Narasarāja Wodeyar II and ending with the death of Krishnarāja Wodeyar II. It contains five appendices and a separate index for the convenience of general readers and scholars.

BANGALORE, }
5th July 1945. }

C. HAYAVADANA RAO.



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THE year 1704 which witnessed the death of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar in the plenitude of his power and glory, forms a turning-point in the evolution of the kingdom of Mysore.

A retrospect and a prospect.

It marks the end of the continuous course of her political development during a critical period extending well nigh to a century from Rāja Wodeyar's acquisition of Seringapatam in 1610, and the beginning of a new epoch, the tendencies and factors of which were successively to affect her integrity and independence. Centralisation, the crowning achievement of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, far from liberating forces of disintegration and disorder—as is not infrequently the case with absolute monarchies—gradually tended to yield place to a new order of things aiming at the representation of monarchical interests on the one hand

and the maintenance of traditions of settled government on the other. So rich indeed was the legacy of the earlier period (1610-1704) that, despite political cataclysms outside the kingdom and revolutions within, it was bound to form the fundamental basis and influence the course of the subsequent history of Mysore.

On the death of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar, Kanṭhīra-
 Birth, accession,
 etc., of Kanṭhīra va. Narasarāja Woḍeyar II, his only son (by Dēvājamma) succeeded to the kingdom of Mysore, being installed on the throne on November 30, 1704,¹ in his thirty-first year (b. December 27, 1672).² Kanṭhīra, however, unfortunately suffered from the disability of being born deaf and dumb.³ Yet, brought up and educated as he was under the fostering care of his illustrious father, he is credited with having displayed remarkable powers of intelligence and wisdom which he was known to be possessed of.⁴ Kanṭhīra, at the same time, was fortunate in that he had the active assistance of Tirumalaiyangār, Prime Minister of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar, who, true to the latter's behests, remained at the helm of affairs of State till his own death in 1706.⁵ Little is known concerning the immediate successor in office of

1. *Annals*, I. 155: *Tāraṇa, Mārgaśīra śu.* 15. The *Mys. Dho. Pār.* (I. 59, II. 57), however, is to be understood as merely referring to the formal succession of Kanṭhīra on November 17 or 18 (*Tāraṇa, Mārgaśīra śu.* 1, 2), i.e., a day or two after Chikkadēvarāja's death, but his actual installation does not seem to have taken place till about a fortnight after the latter event in the light of the *Annals*.
2. *Mys. Dho. Pār.*, II. 56, I. 58 (compared): *Parīdhāvi, Pushya* *ba.* 4; see also *Annals*, l.c.
3. *Annals*, I. 157; also *Manucci* in Appendix I—(3). Wilks (I. 241) refers to Kanṭhīra as "Canty Reva Raj, the Mook Arsoo" (*Mūkarasu*), the dumb king.
4. See *Annals* (I. 151-154), which also records the traditional story of how, under the miraculous influence of a Brāhman, Kanṭhīra was enabled to speak once in his fifth year and remained silent thereafter. Cf. *Ancient India*, p. 305, where S. K. Aiyangar interprets this as "the pretence of a supernatural intervention" under which Kanṭhīra's succession was brought about by Tirumalaiyangār.



Kaṅṭhīrava-Narasarāja Wodeyar II, 1704-1714.



Tirumalaiyangār, though there is a tradition⁶ that Singarārya, his younger brother, held the post for some years after 1706. The guiding hand of Dēvājamma, dowager queen of Chikkadēvarāja, was another element of strength to Kanthīrava in the early years of his reign.⁷ Among the officers of the late regime, Karaṇika Lingannaiya, one of the councillors of Chikkadēvarāja, is said⁸ to have left Seringapatam on a pilgrimage to Benares early in Kanthīrava's reign, his son (also named Lingannaiya) being appointed a *Pradhān* in his place.

Almost simultaneously there are indications of the rise to prominence of the members of the Kaḷale Family as Daḷavāis of Mysore and of their steady influence on the administration of the kingdom. The House of Kaḷale, whose origin and early history we have elsewhere traced,⁹ begins to claim our attention in an increasing measure from 1705 onwards. Matrimonial alliance with the Mysore Royal Family and the regular furnishing of a *Daḷavāi* (Commander-in-chief) to the Mysore army in conformity with the solemn pact entered into between the two houses about the close of Rāja Wodeyar's reign--these, as indicated,¹⁰ had become the cardinal features in the policy of Kaḷale towards Mysore already during the period 1660-1704. Mallarāja IV (1679-1719), eldest son of Daḷavāi Kumāraiya, continued to be the ruling chief of Kaḷale during Kanthīrava's reign in Mysore. Dāsarājaiya of Dēvarāya-durga, the last of the Daḷavāis of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, remained in office till March

5. Wilks, l.c.; also *Editorial Introduction* to the *C. Vam.*, *C. Vi.* and *A. V. C.* (pp. 2-3).

6. See *Editorial Introduction* to the *Mitra. Gō.*, p. 2.

7. See *Raj. Kath.*, XI. 488, where Dēvachandra speaks of Kanthīrava as having placed the administration in the hands of his mother Doḍḍamma and the Daḷavāis for a period of nine years. The reference here is obviously to Dēvājamma, dowager queen of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, and to the members of the Kaḷale Family.

8. *Annals*, I. 156.

9. *Ante*, Vol. I, Chs. X and XVI.

10. *Ibid.*

1705,¹¹ when he was succeeded by Basavarājaiya of Kaḷale, a cousin of Mallarāja IV and grandson of Mup-pina-Kāntaiya.¹² Basavarājaiya was father-in-law also of Kaṇṭhīrava, having given his daughter Chaluvājamma in marriage to the latter.¹³ He held office till November 1708¹⁴ when he was succeeded by Nanjarājaiya II, a nephew of his.¹⁵ Nanjarājaiya served Kaṇṭhīrava till about February 1714 when Virarājaiya (son of Daḷavāi Dodḍaiya by Gauramma), another grandson of Muppina-Kāntaiya and cousin brother of Basavarājaiya, became the Daḷavāi of Mysore.¹⁶ This systematic succession to the office of Daḷavāi from among the members of the Kaḷale House during the period, significantly points to it as an active element in the governance of the kingdom.

The period of Kaṇṭhīrava's rule in Mysore is covered by the last years of the reign of Aurangzīb and the early phase in the decline and fall of the Mughal Empire.¹⁷ The death of Aurangzīb in February 1707—two years after the accession of Kaṇṭhīrava—was followed by civil wars and disputed successions. Centrifugal tendencies began gradually to manifest themselves under

11. *Mys. Dho. Pār.*, I. 70; see also and compare authorities noticed in Appendix I—(1).

12. *Ibid.*; also *K. A. V.*, pp. 17-18, and Table XIII.

13. *Ibid.*, I. 65; *Annals*, I. 166. It would seem from these sources that Basavarājaiya of Kaḷale was otherwise known as Kallahajji Basavarājaiya, probably because he, as a member of the Kaḷale Family, originally resided in Kallahajji, a village situated in the same taluk as Kaḷale (see *List of Villages*, 111). See also under *Domestic life*, for details about Chaluvājamma.

14. *Ibid.*, I. 70; also Appendix I—(1).

15. *Vide* Appendix I—(1); also Table XIII.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Vide*, for general references on this section, J. Sarkar, *Aurangzīb*, V. chs. LI-LVII; Grant Duff's *History of the Marathas* (Edwards's edition), I. chs. XI-XVII; Irvine, *Later Mughals*, I. chs. I-IV; Briggs, *Nizam*, I. chs. II-III; Wilks, *Mysore*, I. 231-233, 243-249 (with f.n.); Satyanatha Aiyar, *Nayaks of Madura*, chs. XII-XIII; *C. H. I.*, V. 73-75; Burhan's *Tuzak-i-Wāḷajāhi*, I. 58-68 (Text); *Ke.*, N. V., X. 174-175, vv. 11-14, etc.

his immediate successors, Shah Ālam I (Bahadūr Shah, 1708-1712) and Farruksiyar (1713-1719). The Mahrattas set about asserting themselves as a political power under Shāhu (1708-1748), son and successor of Sambhāji at Satāra. Early in 1713, Asaf Jāh (Chin Kilich Khān, 1671-1748), lately Subādār of Oudh under Shah Ālam I, established himself in, and became the founder of, Hyderabad as Viceroy of the Deccan and Faujdār of the Karnāṭak (the *Carnatic* of European writers), under the title of *Nizām-ul-mulk*, received from Farruksiyar. The government of the Mughal Karnāṭak (including Pāyanghāt and Bālaghāt and the *Subādāri* of Sīra) with head-quarters at Arcot was, under Aurangzīb, successively in the hands of Zūlfikar Khān (1690-1700) and Daud Khān (1700-1708). On the recall of Daud Khān to Delhi to lead the army during the civil war which brought about Shah Ālam's succession (1708), Sādatullā Khān, of the Nawāyat community of the Arabs, succeeded to the government of the Mughal Karnāṭak as his (Daud Khān's) Dewān and Faujdār. Sādatullā Khān was eventually recognised as the Nawāb of the Karnāṭak (1708-1733), receiving the formal appointment at the hands of Nizām-ul-mulk in 1713. With Amīn Khān (the "Ammin Caun" of the *Fort St. George Records*¹⁸), formerly "a great favourite" of Zūlfikar Khān, in charge of the *subāh* of Sīra ("Chirpy country") under him, Sādatullā became more or less an independent ruler of the Karnāṭak at Arcot, exercising imperial authority over the southern provinces of the Mughal Empire. Among the local powers, Madura, in the throes of dissolution under Mangammāl

18. *Desp. Eng.* (1711-1714), p. 27, para 32; *Despatch* dated December 22, 1711. Since the *Despatch* seems to speak of Mysore as situated in the neighbourhood of "Chirpy country," the latter has to be identified with Sīra which was under Mughal control since Khāsim Khān's time (1687-1695). Manucci refers to Sīra as "Sirpi" [*Vide* Appendix I—(3), l.n. 5].

(1689-1706) and Vijayaranga Chokkanātha (1706-1732), and Tanjore under Shāhji II (1687-1711) and Sarfoji (1712-1727), by no means friendly towards each other and towards Mysore since Daḷavāi Kumāraiya's siege of Trichinopoly (1682), continued as tributaries of the Mughal Empire ever since Zūlfikar Khān invaded them (1691, 1694). The kingdom of Ikkēri in the north-west of Mysore, under Hiriya-Basappa Nāyaka I (1697-1714), was slowly recovering from the wars with Mysore after the truce of c. 1700, and expanding at the expense of the Nawāb of Savanūr, the Mughal representative. Among the European nations in India, the French at Pondicherry and the English at Madras were carrying on their commercial concerns with varying degrees of success, although, during the period, the prospects for the former under the successors of Francois Martin (1674-1706) were not so promising as those for the latter.

Although Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar had, as related in an earlier chapter, by his systematic policy succeeded in maintaining the integrity and independence of Mysore as a bulwark against the Mughal Empire in the north, the wealth of the kingdom never ceased continually to attract the attention of the Imperial Mughal. Indeed, shortly after the accession of Kanṭhīrava, Aurangzīb, then engaged in his struggle with the Mahrattas in the Deccan, found in him a ruler more inclined "to live in peace and amity" than embroil himself in war.¹⁹ Further, if Manucci is to be believed,²⁰ Aurangzīb was evidently misinformed about the correct relationship between Kanṭhīrava and Chikkadēvarāja, and made it a pretext for a war of aggression against Mysore. Early in 1705, we learn,²¹ he put forward a claim to take possession of the kingdom and set about preparing for a campaign against

19. See Manucci in *Storia Do Mogor*, quoted in Appendix I—(3).

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

Mysore, seeking at the same time the assistance of the rulers of Tanjore and Trichinopoly. About the middle of 1705, Daud Khān, the Mughal lieutenant in the Karnāṭak, acting under the orders of Aurangzib, proceeded to the south, exacting large sums of money as tribute from the latter chiefs. Foreseeing a similar fate for Mysore, Kanṭhīrava began to "make ready to resist" the Mughal with his vast army. Before the close of the rainy season of 1705, however, he found it expedient to treat with Aurangzib offering "his Majesty fifteen millions of rupees and five elephants, promising, in addition, to double his annual tribute, on condition that he was not interfered with." The transmission of the tribute promised was, however, intercepted by a body of Mahratta horse. In September (1705) the Mughal fell ill, and, shortly after his recovery at the end of the rainy season, impatient at the delay in the receipt of the money proffered, he forwarded violent threats to Kanṭhīrava. Meanwhile, Aurangzib's attention having been concentrated on the reported news of risings in Northern India, his design against Mysore was frustrated and he rather reluctantly retreated with his army to Ahmadnagar, hard pressed by the Mahrattas everywhere. In April 1706, Kanṭhīrava, profiting by Aurangzib's difficulties and the lingering state of the Mughal army in the Karnāṭak, succeeded in taking back possession of the amount which he had had to preserve in the fort of Sira. Though Aurangzib thus never succeeded in realizing his cherished ambition of reducing Mysore, the first trace of a seeming submission on the part of Kanṭhīrava to the Mughals in 1705 meant a prelude to their future attacks on his kingdom.

The years 1706-1710 were years of peace and quiet in Mysore. About November 1710, however, Daḷavāi Nanjarājaiya II marched against Baiche-Gauḍa, the

Northern advance
of Mysore, 1710-1711.

Morasa Chief of Chikballāpur, and laid seige to the place. The precise cause of this proceeding is not known, though it seems probable that Nanjarājaiya anticipated trouble to the kingdom of Mysore from the Pālegārs of the north under the troubled conditions in the Karnāṭak-Bālaghāt. However that may have been, in December he succeeded in reducing Chikballāpur, capturing valuables from the camp of Baiche-Gauḍa and levying annual contribution on him in token of his submission.²² In January 1711, Nanjarājaiya, proceeding further, reduced the Pālegār of Doḍballāpur, settling the tribute due by him.²³ In March, he advanced against Sīra putting the Muhammadans to rout;²⁴ and in April, he subdued the Pālegār of Miḍagēsi fixing a contribution on him.²⁵ These activities resulted in the extension of the sphere of influence of the kingdom of Mysore over a greater part of the Chikballāpur country as far as the Mughal *subāh* of Sīra.

Meanwhile these movements of the Mysore arms had evidently roused the attention of Sādatullā Khān, the Nawāb in charge of the Mughal Karnāṭak. About August 1711, he joined Amīn Khān, Subādār of Sīra, against Mysore,²⁶ with whose army he had engagements of varying degrees of success in the tract of country between Bangalore and Sīra.²⁷ In October, Sādatullā proceeded as far as Trichinopoly to exact tribute from the southern princes, no less "to compose the differences . . . among themselves."²⁸ The *Fort St. George Records*²⁹ of the time speak of

Further relations
with the Mughals,
c. August 1711-
February 1713.

22. *Mys. Dho. Pār.*, II. 50-53; *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 32; *Annals*, I. 156-157; cf. *Wilks*, I. 241, and S. K. Aiyangar, *Ancient India*, p. 305; see also Appendix I—(1), for a further critical notice of the authorities.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Desp. Eng.* (1711-1714), I.c.; also f.n. 29 *infra*. 27. *Wilks*, I. 247.

28. *Desp. Eng.* (1701-1702 to 1710-1711), p. 138, para 44: *Despatch* dated October 20, 1711.

29. *Ibid.* (1711-1714), pp. 7, 20, paras 81, 43: *Despatches* dated in August and October 1711. *Wilks*, I.c., calls this "a contribution war," and assigns it roughly to 1712.

Sādatullā Khān's "war with the king of Misore" (Mysore, then ten days' journey off to the westward of Madras) as obstructing "the inland trade of Madrass" and keeping down "the price of goods," and refer to the impossibility of "quiet in the Empire till a more active Prince is on the throne," obviously hoping for a better successor of Shah Ālam to the Mughal Empire. In December 1711, Sādatullā Khān "returned to Arcot having obliged the king of Misore to pay 5 lack [lakhs] rupees."³⁰ According to the *Sādat-Nāmāh*,³¹ a manuscript history of Sādatullā Khān, however, Sādatullā was encamping at Dēvanahallī, waiting for the payment of the contribution agreed upon by Mysore, when he received the appointment of the Nawāb of the Mughal Karnāṭak from Nizām-ul-mulk (January 1713). The contribution, referred to, appears therefore to have been promised by Mysore but not actually paid by her. Sādatullā renewed the war with Mysore shortly after. A *Fort St. George Despatch*, dated February 4, 1713,³² referring to him (Sādatullā), says, "Our Suba is at present engaged in a war with the Misore people, very prejudicial to the trade of these parts, the roads into the country being impassable, so that little or no broad-cloth goes off at present, nor indeed any other sort of goods. We hope the fate of the Empire will soon be decided and that we shall have some active men to govern in these parts, till when trade cannot flourish." Evidently, during the last years of Kanthirava's reign (1713-1714), it would seem, Mysore put up a stout opposition to the pretensions of the Nawāb of the Karnāṭak to exact tribute from her, and this had its repercussions on the commercial interests of the English East India Company in South India.

30. *Ibid*: see *Despatch* cited in f.n. 18 *supra*; cf. *Wilks*, l.c., referring to "a very moderate contribution."

31. Referred to by *Wilks* (I. 247-248, f.n.).

32. *Desp. Eng.* (1711-1714), p. 114, para 13.

From inscriptions we learn that Kaṇṭhīrava was ruling Mysore seated on the jewelled throne
 Kaṇṭhīrava's Rule. in Seringapatam.³³ In the actual work of government he had the active assistance of the Daḷavāi and the officers. While the administration was conducted in the traditional manner, the institutions of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar were continued with regularity and vigour. Among the officers of Kaṇṭhīrava, Chaluvaiya of the Kaḷale Family was the Superintendent of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbaḷi-Vichāra-Sīme*; Haridāsaiya was a *Chāvaḍi-Manēgār* and Channakrishṇa-Paṇḍita was the chief ministerial officer (*samastādhikāra chamatkārīṇā*) in charge of the Salem country.³⁴

Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism continued to be popular in Mysore during the reign. Kaṇṭhīrava was himself a devout Vaiṣṇava,³⁵ being well-known for his predilections to God Lakshmīkānta of Kaḷale³⁶ and for his services to God Varadarāja of Kānchi.³⁷ While he continued the gifts and charities of his predecessors,³⁸ he is, in particular, credited³⁹ with having sanctioned the construction in his name of a temple to God Bindu-Mādhava in Mēlkōṭe and made grants of villages and lands for services to Gods

33. See *E.C.*, IX Bn. 118 (1705), l. 6; *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295 (1716), v. 58. The expressions actually used in these records are: *Śrīraṅga-paṭṭanaḍa simhāsanaṛūḍharāgi*; *tasmin Paścīmarangarāja-nagari simhāsanaḍhīśvarē*. Cf. S. K. Aiyangar, l.c., referring to Kaṇṭhīrava "as having reigned rather than ruled for nine years and passed away," etc., for which there is no evidence.

34. *Vide* references under *Gifts, grants and literary progress*.


35. See *E.C.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295 (1716), vv. 51, 58; III (1) Sr. 64 (1722), l. 109: *Vishṇu pādāravinda*; *Śrī-Nārāyaṇa pādū-pankajayugī*.

36. *Vide* references under *Gifts, grants, etc.*, below.


37. See *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 100 (1724), ll. 142-145, where Krishṇarāja I (1714-1732) alludes, in general, to the pious services of his father (Kaṇṭhīrava II) to God Varadarāja of Kānchi.

38. *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 33; *Annals*, I. 157.

39. *Annals*, I. 157-158.



Śrī-Lakṣmīkāntasvāmi Temple, Kalale.



Śrī-Venkaṭēśvarasvāmi Temple, Fort, Bangalore—A front view.

Gangā-Viśvēśvara and Gōpālakrishṇa set up by Karaṇika Lingaṇṇaiya in Karikallu (Kaṇṭhīrava-samudra), and for endowments of *agrahāras* to Brāhmins. Among the extant records of Kaṇṭhīrava's reign (some of which, especially the *nirūpas*, bear his signature *Śrī-Kaṇṭhīrava-Narasarāja*), a lithic one, dated July 24, 1705,⁴⁰ registers his grant of the village of Kottanūr in Goṭṭegere, for the offerings and illuminations to God Venkaṭēśvara newly set up in the fort of Bangalore during Chikka-dēvarāja's reign. A *nirūpa* dated July 23, 1707,⁴¹ addressed to Chaluvaiya, records his grant of a village yielding 100 *varahas*, for food offerings and the keeping of a light in the temple of God Lakshmīkānta in Kaḷale. Another (*c.* 1708),⁴² addressed to Haridāsaiya, authorises him to collect all taxes due from the village Uppinahalli and its hamlet Sōrekāyipura, and with it to defray the expenses necessary for the food offerings and maintenance of a light in the same temple. A third, dated April 18, 1711,⁴³ is an order issued by Kaṇṭhīrava to Chaluvaiya, to celebrate the annual car festival of God Lakshmīkānta in the village of Kaḷale by getting the customary free supply, from the villagers of the *hōbli*, of all the articles necessary for the purpose (such as pandals, hangings, betel leaves, vegetables, cocoanuts, flowers, etc.).

Kaṇṭhīrava had two queens (wedded in May 1693), Chāmma, daughter of Lingarāja
 Domestic life. Wodeyar of Yeḷandūr, and Chaluvā-
 janmma, daughter of Daḷavāi Basava-
 rājaiya of Kaḷale.⁴⁴ Chaluvājanmma is depicted in
 inscriptions as an ideal lady,⁴⁵ and is mentioned as

40. *E.C.*, IX Bn. 118: s. 1627, *Pārthiva, Śrāvāṇa* ba. 1, Tuesday.

41. *M. A. R.*, 1928, pp. 53-54, No. 47: *Sarvajit, Śrāvāṇa* su. 6. See also *Ibid.*, 1910-1911, p. 55, para 181, briefly referring to this record and those cited in f.n. 42 and 43 *infra*.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55, No. 48.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 53, No. 46: *Khara, Vaisakha* su. 11.

44. *Mys. Dh. Pār.*, I. 65; *Annals*, I. 166; see also f.n. 13 *supra*.

45. *E. C.*, III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 119-121; 100, ll. 46-49.

“Chalvājamāmbā of the noble Kaḷale Family.”⁴⁶ By her Kaṇṭhīrava had a son by name Krishṇarāja (b. 1702),⁴⁷ who became the heir-apparent to the throne of Mysore and is referred to as *Krishṇa-Yuvarāja* in contemporary literature.⁴⁸

Seringapatam, during the reign of Kaṇṭhīrava, continued to be a flourishing centre of social and public life. The spring festival (*vasantōtsava*) of God Ranganātha there, had acquired a reputation and a popularity which was unique.⁴⁹ Another flourishing town of importance was Vāmalūr (modern Ōmalūr, in the Salem district), under the jurisdiction of Kaṇṭhīrava, whose citizens were learned in the Vēdas, Smṛtis and Śāstras (*sarva nigama smṛti śāstra vidyāḥ*) and skilled in prose and poetical composition (*sarvēpi hṛdya ghaṭikāśata-gadyapadyāḥ*), and whose cultural activities included, among others, disputations in Śāstras (*śāstrē vādaḥ*), expounding of the sacred tradition (*nikhilāmnāya ninadaḥ*), playing on the lute (*vinā vādaḥ*) and display of talents in poetry, philosophy and dialectics (*kavītāyā vivaraṇam, vēdāntōktiḥ paramata dhvamsana vidhiḥ*).⁵⁰

46. *Ibid.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, vv. 59-60 :

Chalvājamāmbēti bhuvi prasiddha
... mahita Kaḷile-vamśōtpanna-vallī.

47. *Mys. Dho. Pār.*, II. 57; *Annals*, I. 156, 158; also *E. C.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, v. 61; III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 121-123; 100, ll. 49-51.

48. See *Anangaviṣaya-Bhāṇaḥ*, Prologue, p. 3. For details about the work, *vide* under *Literary progress* below.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55 (Text). From the *Śringārārājatilaka-Bhāṇaḥ* (p. 30), we learn that the last year in which the vernal festival was celebrated in Seringapatam was 1718 (*Vīṭamṭi*). For particulars about this work, *vide* Ch. III below.

50. *Ibid.*, Prologue, pp. 1-2. *Vāmalūr* (now spelt Ōmalūr): A village in the present Salem district; Deputy Tahsildār's head-quarters; 10 miles north-west of Salem; on the bank of the *Sarabhanga-nālī*; formerly a petty chieftainship; has an old Śiva temple with inscriptions and the remains of a fort; also called Walmera; derived from Vāma—Śiva, and ūr—village, lit. Śiva's abode. The place is well known for the manufacture of utensils from pot-stone (*Lapis ollaris*).

Of particular interest and significance from the point of view of literary, and no less social, life of the times is the *Anangavijaya-Bhāṇaḥ* (c. 1710-1712)⁵¹ by Śivarāma-krishṇa-Kavi—of Gautama-gōtra and son of Nārāyaṇa by Rangāmbikā—a resident of Vāmalūr.⁵² It is a dramatic piece in Sanskrit, intended to be enacted before a highly cultured and learned audience from far and near, assembled at Vāmalūr, on the occasion of the spring festival (in April-May) of the local God Vijaya-rāghava, a festival said to have been stopped for some time but revived by Channakrishṇa-Paṇḍita, chief ministerial officer of Kanṭhīrava, under the orders of Krishṇarāja, son of Kanṭhīrava and heir-apparent (*Yuvarāja*) to the throne of Mysore.⁵³ The play begins with invocations to Śiva and Ananga (Manmatha), followed by the prologue (*prastāvanā*) pointing to the time, place, authorship and the circumstances under which it was written, as mentioned above. The theme of the work is, as the name itself indicates, erotic, being centred round the love and union of two imaginary characters, Śringāra-bhūshāmaṇi, the hero and principal interlocutor, and Kanakalatā, the heroine, supposed to be the daughter of a courtesan by name Śringāramanjari.⁵⁴ A considerable portion of the play is devoted to an ideal delineation, through the principal interlocutor, of the life and manners of the times during spring, with special reference to the predominant erotic sentiment,⁵⁵ and to the occasional pillorying of prostitution as an evil caused by the growth of wealth and luxury in contemporary society.⁵⁶ The play is written in a highly ornate style and in the diction known as *Drākshāpāka*. The poet calls it a modern work

51. Ms. No. 12, 431 of the *Des. Cat. Sans. Mss.* (Vol. XXI) in the *Mad. Or. Lib.* The page references cited here are from an authenticated copy of this Ms., obtained from the Library.

52. Pp. 4-5, 94.

53. P. 3.

54. Pp. 7-8, 89-93.

55. Pp. 8-93.

56. See, for instance, pp. 39-41, 59.

(*ādhunika grantha*), with a happy association of allusive language and figures of speech.⁵⁷ Altogether, the *Anangaviṣaya-Bhāṇa* occupies a prominent place in the literature of the period. It is an index of the popularity of *bhāṇa* as a form of dramatic entertainment to the cultured classes early in the eighteenth century, and bears testimony to the prosperity of the kingdom of Mysore under the immediate successor of Chikkadēvarāja

Woḍeyar. Another work, perhaps affording an important indication of the activities of the court of Kaṇṭhīrava during the period, is the chronicle in

The *Mysūru-Dhoregaḷa-Pūrvābhūdaya-Vivara*, c. 1710-1714.

Kannāḍa entitled *Mysūru-Dhoregaḷa-Pūrvābhūdaya-Vivara*,⁵⁸ an account of the rise of the early kings of the Woḍeyar dynasty of Mysore and of the political development of the kingdom under them. The work, as it has come down to us, is of anonymous authorship,⁵⁹ and is written up in a *kaḍatam*. The obverse pages⁶⁰ of the manuscript begin with invocation to Gaṇēśa, and embody details relating to the genealogy, traditional history and succession of the early rulers of Mysore (c. 1450-1714), their dates of birth and death, their accession and regnal years and their queens and consorts, the names of Daḷavāis and their periods of office under the respective rulers, and the conquests and annexations during the reign of Rāja Woḍeyar (1578-1617). The reverse pages⁶¹ are devoted, in the main, to the enumeration of the territorial acquisitions of the rulers down to Kaṇṭhīrava II (1704-1714). They also not infrequently repeat

57. Pp. 3, 5-6.

58. No. 18-15-37—*Kaḍatam*; *Mad. Or. Lib.* Wilson refers to this work as *Maīsūr-Arasu-Pūrvābhūdaya* (*Des. Cat. Mack. Mss.*, pp. 329-330).

59. See Appendix I—(2), for a detailed critical notice of the generally accepted view that Nagara-Puṭṭaiya-Paṇḍit is the author of the Ms.

60. Pp. 1-82. The obverse and reverse portions of the *Kaḍatam* are referred to in this work as parts I and II for convenience of citations. Cf. *Wilks*, I. Preface, pp. XXI-XXII.

61. Pp. 1-59. Cf. *Wilks*, l.c.

the earlier details connected with the births and regnal years of the kings, and contain, at the end, a succession list down to Krishnarāja I (accession, 1714). The dates in the manuscript are generally given in terms of the cyclic year. A very ingenious, but quite intelligible, method of chronological computation, however, is found adopted in the part of the work which deals with the conquests and acquisitions under the rulers.⁶² Not only is the usual cyclic year pertaining to each event mentioned, but the number of years which actually transpired between the date of the event and that of the compilation of the chronicle is invariably recorded side by side. Thus, working on this basis, we find that the earliest date of compilation from which the acquisitions are computed backwards is 1710.⁶³ Next we get the years 1711 and 1712.⁶⁴ The latest events referred to in the manuscript are the acquisitions during 1711-1712, the death of Kanthirava and the accession of Krishnarāja I (1714).⁶⁵ Since the chronicle is an undated one, an examination of these internal data enables us to fix the chronological limits of its compilation between 1710-1714.⁶⁶ From the manuscript it appears also obvious that its anonymous author was a contemporary of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, who, probably in conformity to the directions of the latter, actually prepared it during the reign of Kanthirava.⁶⁷ The *Mysūru-Dhoregaḷa-Pūrvābhyaḍaya-Vivara* is written in a colloquial prose

62. I. 72-82, II. 1-48. See also and compare *Wilks*, l.c.

63. See, for instance, I. 74-75, where the acquisition of Arakere by Rāja Wodeyar is referred to as having taken place in *Sarvārī*, 110 years ago. *Sarvārī* corresponds to A.D. 1600. Adding 110 to 1600 we get 1710, obviously the earliest date for the compilation of the chronicle. For other instances, see I. 79-82, II. 12-15.

64. See I. 72-78, II. 1-11, 16-48.

65. See II. 49-54, 57, 59, I. 59.

66. Cf. *Wilks*'s date, 1712-1718 (I. Preface, p. XXII); *Wilson*'s date, 1718 (l.c.); also *Kar. Ka. Cha.* (III. 4) which speaks of the work as having been written in s. 1635 (A.D. 1718), without, however, citing the relevant text.

67. See II. 59, where the chronicler refers to Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar thus: *Namma āḍida mahāsvāmi Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyarayyanavaru*. *Wilks* (*Ibid.*, pp. XXII-XXIII) also records a genuine tradition current in his

style. Its contents are, however, more of historical than literary interest. It is, perhaps, the earliest available manuscript containing something like a recorded history of the rise and fortunes of the Ruling House of Mysore. It embodies facts and data which are verifiable and workable as also a chronology of events, which is fairly reliable.⁶⁸ But it is by no means complete or even safe for the facts it chronicles as an authority. The synchronisms recorded in the manuscript are sometimes dubious and defective.⁶⁹ Occasionally it gives currency to loose traditionary tales and stories—particularly on the period down to 1638.⁷⁰ Again, there is at times vagueness and confusion in respect of genealogical and other details.⁷¹ Used with caution, however, the value of the work as a source of information for the history of the Rulers of Mysore down to 1714, is not inconsiderable.

Kaṇṭhīrava-Narasarāja Wodeyar passed away on February 18, 1714,⁷² in his forty-second year, his queens not observing *sati*.⁷³

Death of Kaṇṭhīrava, February 18, 1714.

time in regard to the Ms., thus: "A short time before the real compilation of this document, the Raja Chick Deo Raj, who died in 1704, had directed an extensive collection to be made of historical materials, including all inscriptions then extant within his dominions, which were added to a library already reported to be voluminous: the above-mentioned work is probably one of the memoirs prepared in conformity to his directions, but it appears to have been presented to his successor . . ."

68. Cf. Wilks (*Ibid.*, p. XXIII) who refers to the work as "a brief but correct record of events up to the year 1712," and regrets that it is "a mere chronicle of events" after 1610, etc.—a position due, apparently, to his want of thorough acquaintance with the manuscript in the original.

69. See, for instance, I. 3-13. For details, *vide* Vol. I, Ch. V, f.n. 13 and 47.

70. See, for instance, I. 45-51. For details, *vide* Vol. I, Appendix IV—(2).

71. See I. 1-2, 53, 56-58, II. 23, 55, 56, 58-59, etc.

72. *Mys. Dho. Pār.*, I. 59: *Vijaya, Phālguna sū.* 15, Thursday; see also *Annals*, I. 158; cf. *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 34; *Wilks*, I. 248, and *Rāj. Kath.*, XII, 488.

73. *Annals*, I.c.

Though not possessed of the exceptional personal capacity and talents of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, and despite the infirmities he suffered from, it must be said to

the credit of Kanṭhīrava that he was able to preserve the glorious traditions of his predecessors. Indeed, the kingdom of Mysore, under the rapidly changing conditions of the times in Southern India, retained its vitality and financial soundness as a foremost power, which profoundly impressed contemporary observers like the astute Manucci.⁷⁴ The popularity of Kanṭhīrava's rule is, perhaps, significantly echoed in records⁷⁵ which speak of him thus: "Having divided the whole of his kingdom into four parts, the first he gave to the Brāhmans, the second to the Gods, the third as gifts of merit, and retaining the fourth part for himself, he ruled the world—Kanṭhīravēndra. In every village, during his reign, there was the distribution of good food and daily festivals and worship in temples; and on every road were there groves and watersheds." Yet there were already signs in Kanṭhīrava's reign of new forces at work, foreshadowing a decline in the power of the central authority, thus opening the way for the self-aggrandizing zeal of crafty military leaders and adventurers.⁷⁶

74. *Vide* Appendix I—(3).

75. See *E.O., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295 (1716), vv. 56-57; III (1) Sr. 64 (1722), ll. 110-114.

76. Compare S. K. Aiyangar (*Ancient India*, p. 305) who makes the sweeping assertion that "in this reign alone, the reins of government slipped perceptibly out of the hands of the sovereign into the hands of the Dalawāys," etc. But see Wilks (I. 241) who maintains that "the vigour and regularity of the late long reign (*i.e.*, Chikkadēvarāja's) continued for several years to be perceptible in the administration" of Kanṭhīrava. The decline in the power of the king was, it has to be conceded, as gradual as the rise of the Dalavāis.

CHAPTER II.

KRISHNARĀJA WODEYAR I, 1714-1732.

Birth and accession—The ascendancy of the Kalale Family—Political affairs: General tendencies—Mysorean advance on Belur, c. 1723-1724—Karnatak politics—Mughal attack on Seringapatam, 1724—Mahratta attack on Seringapatam, 1726—Mysorean advance on Magadi, etc., 1728—Krishnaraja's Rule: General administration—Religion: Sri-Vaishnavism; Religious toleration—Gifts, Grants, etc.—Social life—Literary activity—Ramayanam-Tirumalarya: The *Copper-plate grants*, 1716, 1722 and 1724—Kalale Viraraja: The *Sakala-Vaidya-Samhita-Sararnava*, c. 1714-1720; The *Andhra-Vachana-Bharatamu*, 1731—Channaiya: Commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Padmini-Parinaya*, c. 1720-1724—Chaluvamba: The *Tulakaveri-Mahatmya*, c. 1720; The *Varanandi-Kalyana*, etc., c. 1725-1730—Other writers: Balavaidyada-Chaluva: The *Ratna-Sastra* and the *Kannada-Lilavati*, c. 1715-1720; Rangaiya: The *Kaveri-Mahatmya*, c. 1730—Domestic life: Queens, etc.—Death of Krishnaraja Wodeyar, March 5, 1732—Reflections.


KANTHĪRAVA-NARASARĀJA Wodeyar II was succeeded by his son and heir-apparent Krishnarāja Wodeyar I, installed on the throne of Mysore on March 3, 1714.¹ He is more familiarly known as Dodḍa-Krishnarāja Wodeyar.² A boy of twelve years of age

Birth and accession.

1. *Annals*, I. 159: *Vijaya*, *Phalguṇa* ba. 13. The *Mys. Dho. Pār.* (II. 57), however, is, as usual, to be understood as merely referring to the formal succession of Krishnarāja on the day following Kāṭhīrava's death, i.e., on February 19, 1714 (*Vijaya*, *Phalguṇa* ba. 1). But his actual installation does not seem to have taken place till about a fortnight after the latter event in the light of the *Annals*.
2. *Ibid.*, I. 158-164; *Raj. Kath.*, XII. 488-489. Wilks spells the name as "Dud Kishen Raj" (I. 248); S. K. Aiyangar refers to him as Dodḍa-Krishna-Rāja "in contradistinction to one of his successors of the same



Krishnarāja Wodeyar I, 1714-1732.



that he was at the time of his accession (b. March 18, 1702),³ the reign of Krishṇarāja, during and after the period of his minority, was marked by the ascendancy in the court of Mysore of the Kaḷale Family, to which his own mother, the dowager queen Chaluvājamma, belonged. Among her kinsmen, Chaluvaiya—grandson of Timmarāja Wodeyar II and son of Krishṇaiya Urs—lately Superintendent of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbali-Vichāra-Sīme* under Kaṇṭhīrava, not only became the ruler of Kaḷale (1719-1735) in succession to his cousin Mallarāja IV⁴ but also rose to the position of *Sarvādhikāri* (chief executive officer) of Krishṇarāja.⁵ He was practically the head of the administration of Mysore during c. 1714-1724, while Daḷavāi Virarājaiya, son of Doḍḍaiya of Kaḷale and the last of the Daḷavāis of Kaṇṭhīrava, also continued to hold the office of Commander-in-chief.⁶ The latter is further referred to by a contemporary of his as the establisher of the Kaḷale dynasty and as the sincere well-wisher of the king of Mysore.⁷ The interests of Kaḷale in Mysore were further secured by the marriage of the daughters of Chikke Urs, Chaluvaiya and Chikka-Kāntaiya—all members of the Kaḷale Family—to

name" (*Ancient India*, p. 305). Inscriptions and literary sources mention him as "Krishṇarāja Waḍeyaraiya," "Krishṇendra," "Apratima-Krishṇarāja," etc. In one—only one—contemporary record, however, his name occurs as "*Doḍḍa-Krishṇarāja Waḍeyaraiyanavaru*" (see *E.O.*, II SB. 249 of 1723).

3. *Mys. Dho. Pār.*, II. 57: *Chitrabhānu*, *Chaitra* su. 1, Wednesday; *Annals*, I. 158; see also Ch. I, f.n. 47.

4. *K. A. V.*, ff. 33; also Table XIII.

5. See *Beḷ. Go. Cha.* (c. 1780) of Ananta-Kavi (VI, 87), referring to Chaluvaiya as "*Sarvādhikārada Cheluvaiya*" under Krishṇarāja; also f.n. 10 *infra*. Wilks (I. 252) refers to *Sarvādhikāri* ("Serv Adikar") as an officer who "presided over revenue and finance."

6. *Annals*, I. 159. The period of office of Virarājaiya, according to this source, was 10 years, 2 months and 18 days, from the last year of the reign of Kaṇṭhīrava II (February 1714) down to *Kṛādhī, Jyēṣṭha* ba. 1 (May 27, 1724).

7. See Channaiya in the *Padmīnī-Pariṇaya* (III, 297): *Kaḷileya vamsādāhāraku; Mahisārīleyanmagati hita nenisi*.

Krishnarāja in 1716 and 1718.⁸ In May 1724, Dēvarājaiya, eldest son of Virarājaiya by Channājamma (Channamāmbā), succeeded his father as the Daḷavāi of Mysore.⁹ About the same time, Nanjarājaiya III (of Bellūr), son of Daḷavāi Kaḷale-Basavarājaiya by Mīnākshamma and cousin of Dēvarājaiya, became the *Sarvādhikāri* in succession to Chaluvaiya, the latter having probably retired to his humble rôle of the chief of Kaḷale during his old age.¹⁰ Throughout the latter part of Krishnarāja's reign, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya and Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya conducted the affairs of State, acting ostensibly in accordance with the wishes of their master but really aiming at securing all power for themselves.¹¹

The reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar in Mysore synchronised with the period of deepening crisis in South India consequent on the decline and fall of the Mughal Empire under the successors of Aurangzīb—Farruksiyar (1713-1719) and Muhammad Shah (1719-1748).¹² About 1717, four years after the founding of Hyderabad by Nizām-ul-mulk (1713), a process of systematic subinfeudation of the Mughal Deccan followed. The entire

8. *Annals*, I. c.; see also under *Domestic life* below.

9. *Ibid*; also Tables XI-XIII; cf. S. K. Aiyangar, *o.c.*, p. 306.

10. The exact date of Nanjarājaiya's accession to office is not known from the available sources. It would, however, appear from one authority (*Annals*, I. 162) that he was prominent in Mysore during the latter part of Krishnarāja's reign. Since Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya himself succeeded his father in May 1724 (*vide* f.n. 6 and 9 *supra*), we would not be far wrong in fixing Nanjarājaiya's accession also almost simultaneously, Chaluvaiya having probably proceeded to Kaḷale on the retirement of Daḷavāi Virarājaiya from Mysore. The latest available date for Chaluvaiya in Mysore is 1723 (see *Beḷ. Go. Cha.*, VI, 87, with *E.C.*, II SB. 249; also f.n. 66 *infra*). For details about the genealogy of Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya, *vide* Tables XI and XIII.

11. *Annals*, I. 162; see also and compare *Wilks*, I. 251, and S. K. Aiyangar, I. c.

12. *Vide*, for general references on this section, authorities cited in Ch. I. f.n. 17; also G. S. Sardesai, *Main Currents of Maratha History*, pp. 99, 102, 125-126, etc.

country above and below the *ghāṭs*, known till then as Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Bālaghāṭ and Pāyanghāṭ, south of Hyderabad, came under his control, with the general designation of Karnāṭak-Hyderabad. The term Bālaghāṭ began hereafter to denote the tracts included both in what originally constituted Bijāpur-Bālaghāṭ and in the newly formed Karnāṭak-Hyderabad-Bālaghāṭ, the latter comprising the large belt of territory possessed respectively by the Paṭhān chief of Cuddapah and by Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe, nephew of Śāntaji-Ghōrpaḍe, who, profiting from the convulsions of the times, had established a Mahratta power at Gooty. The authority of Sādatullā Khān who till 1717 had retained charge of both the Karnāṭaks, was thereafter confined only to the Nawābship of Arcot in the Pāyanghāṭ. A portion of the Karnāṭak-Hyderabad-Bālaghāṭ was split up into three fiefs (namely, Savaṇūr, Cuddapah and Kurnool), each being placed under a Paṭhān chief designated as Nawāb, subject to the authority of the Nizām. The Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Bālaghāṭ was likewise placed under a Nawāb directly responsible to the Nizām, with head-quarters at Sīra, Amīn Khān, the former incumbent, being confirmed in the charge.¹³ The Nizām was thus fast becoming absolute master of the Deccan, finding in the rise of the Mahratta State under Pēshwa Bālāji Viśvanāth (1714-1720) and Bāji Rao I (1720-1740)—during the nominal rule of Shāhu at Satāra—a contending factor in the situation. While the semi-independent southern states of Madura and Tanjore were struggling for their existence under the disruptive forces of the times, and the English and the French striving for the estab-

13. See and compare *Wilks*, I. 233-235, 248-249. According to him (I. 249), Amīn Khān was appointed to the government of Karnāṭak-Bijāpur at Sīra about 1714. But from a *Fort St. George Despatch* (*Desp. Eng.*, 1711-1714, p. 27, para 32), it is obvious that he was in charge of Sīra already by December 1711. Perhaps by 1714 he had been confirmed as the Nawāb of that *subāh*.

lishment of their commercial interests in South India, considerable confusion prevailed in parts of central and southern Karnāṭak, where the local chiefs (Pāḷegārs) were disunited and trying to assert themselves. The only power of some importance in that region, however, was Ikkēri under Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka II (1715-1739), son and successor of Hiriya-Basappa Nāyaka I, who was by no means friendly towards Mysore despite the truce of the previous reign.¹⁴ Situated as it was on the outskirts of the sphere of influence of the Nizām and the Mahrattas, Ikkēri was not only a starting-point for the operation of the ambitious schemes of these powers but also became, as ever, a buffer state and a hotbed of intrigue and diplomacy.

Throughout the first part of the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, the kingdom of Mysore enjoyed perfect peace and security.

Mysorean advance
on Bēlūr, c. 1723-
1724.

About 1723-1724, however, her attention was directed towards the affairs of Bēlūr. Its chief Venkaṭādri Nāyaka having become insane, Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka of Ikkēri removed him and set up in his place Gōpāla Nāyaka, brother of Venkaṭādri. At this, the latter's agent conducted negotiations with Mysore, seeking to re-establish Venkaṭādri himself in Bēlūr. A contingent of the Mysore army proceeded thither, but in the meanwhile Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka, forestalling this move, despatched his forces towards Bēlūr, and, in the action which followed at Aigūr and Koḍlipet, not only succeeded in beating off the Mysore arms but also ensured the accession of Gōpāla Nāyaka.¹⁵

14. See *Ke. N. V.*, X. 180-181, vv. 33-38, referring to Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka contemplating hostility against Mysore (in 1717) in combination with the chief of Chitaldrug, the futility of his scheme, etc.

15. *Ke. N. V.*, X. 188, v. 69; also XI. 212-213 (f.n. 1), for details. According to this source, the Mysore army was commanded by a general named Subbarāya of Koṇanūr, and the Ikkēri army by Channavitrappa of Rāya-pāḷya.

This reverse apart, affairs in the Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Bālagḥāṭ had been, in the meanwhile, heading towards a crisis. Under the arrangement effected by the Nizām about 1717, the pretended right of the Mughal to levy tribute from Mysore had been transferred from Sādatullā Khān, Nawāb of Arcot, to Amīn Khān, Nawāb of Sīra. Aware of the riches of Mysore, and jealous of the dismemberment of his own command, Sādatullā Khān not only entered into a secret combination with the Paṭhān chiefs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savaṇūr, and Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe of Gooty, to wrest the rich prey from Amīn Khān,¹⁶ but also, it would seem,¹⁷ systematically intrigued against the latter to secure the succession of his own dependent Abdul Nabi Tāhīr Khān to the Nawābship of Sīra. Amīn Khān, apprised of the designs of Sādatullā, advantageously allied himself with Mysore and became a source of alarm to the Nizām. Early in 1724, the Nizām, we are told,¹⁸ communicated with Sōmasēkhara Nāyaka of Ikkēri, desiring him to remove Amīn Khān from the charge of Sīra and establish Tāhīr Khān in his place. Sōmasēkhara Nāyaka despatched the Ikkēri forces under Subādār Rōhīle Lingappa of Gangankōṭe, against Sīra. Encamping in the neighbourhood of Kandīkere and Chiknāyakanahallī in the Mysore territory, Lingappa gave battle to the Mysoreans who had proceeded to the assistance of Amīn Khān. After putting them to rout amidst considerable slaughter in their ranks, Lingappa marched further and invested the

16. *Wilks*, I. 249 (with f.n.), relying on the testimony of Budder-u-Zemān Khān, a connection of Sādatullā Khān's family.

17. *Wilks* (l.c.) speaks of the appointment of Tāhīr Khān, as the Nawāb of Sīra, "many years afterwards" (i.e., after Sādatullā Khān's attack on Mysore in 1724), "as the tardy result of Sādatulla Khan's incessant endeavours to recover the government of Sera." But see *Ke. N. V.* and *Desp. Eng.* cited *infra*.

18. *Ke. N. V.*, X. 188-189, vv. 70-71; also 196 (f.n. 1). Mirza Ādam Khān of this source is to be identified with Amīn Khān of other sources.

fort of Sīra. On June 23, 1724 (*Krōdhi*, *Āshāḍha śu.* 13) he succeeded in reducing it and establishing Tāhir Khān as the Nawāb of Sīra.¹⁹

The succession of his dependent Tāhir Khān to the government of Sīra was the prelude to the furthering of Sādatullā Khān's design against Mysore. For this enterprise he appears to have secured the active support of the Nizām also. Indeed a *Fort St. George Despatch*²⁰ speaks of the latter as having ordered both Sādatullā Khān and Abdul Nabi Tāhir Khān "to attack the king of Misore" [Mysore]. Towards the close of 1724, Sādatullā Khān, with Subādār Lingappa of Ikkēri at the head of the forces of the confederates (*viz.*, Nawābs of Sīra, Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savaṇūr, and Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe of Gooty), marched on towards Mysore and stood before the gates of the Seringapatam fort.²¹ The allies, we learn,²² at first sustained some reverses

19. *Ibid.*, X, 189.

20. *Desp. Eng.* (1719-1727), pp. 112, 116, paras 11, 75: *Despatch* dated February 11, 1725, reporting news of the previous year.

21. *Wilks*, l.c.; also *Ke. N. V.*, l.c. The *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (84) and the *Annals* (I. 160) also place this event in 1724 (*Krōdhā*). Cf. S. K. Aiyangar, o.c., p. 807.

22. *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 34-35. According to this source, the confederates, including Dewān Sādullā (Sādatullā) Khān and Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe, were defeated by Krishnarāja on the very first day of their siege of Seringapatam, and many in their ranks lost their noses and were slain on the field. They were therefore obliged to raise the siege and retreat in panic. The *Annals* (l.c.), however, refers to the siege only by Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe on behalf of Sādullā Khān of Arcot, and speaks of the heavy fire from the fort of Seringapatam causing havoc in his army, and of its repulse and pursuit, with loss of noses and ears of the soldiery and of valuables in the camp, etc. With slight differences, the two authorities are agreed that the confederate army at first sustained some reverses during the siege of 1724. This victory of Krishnarāja is also echoed in an interpolation of the *Kaṭale Copper-plate grant* (1716) thus: *Siddōji pramukha Mahārāṣṭra-nyāpāla jāla ripu jayaika ūla* . . . (see *E.O.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl.* Vol. Nj. 296, p. 152, prose passage). For a detailed notice of the record, see under *Gifts, grants, etc.*, and *Literary activity* below. Compare S. K. Aiyangar, o.c., pp. 806-807. His assertion that "the elaborate copper-plate grants which dwell at great length on the other virtues of Krishnarāja make no mention of any such victory," etc., is hardly warranted by an examination of all the available records

owing to the heavy cannonade from the bastions of the fort. However, they persisted and soon proved a formidable combination for the Mysore arms to cope with. The officers at Seringapatam accordingly found it expedient to buy off the confederacy and save the situation. A crore of rupees, it is said,²³ was the amount stipulated by Sādatullā Khān who, having distributed sixty lakhs (at twelve each) among the confederates, appropriated the rest for himself and retired from Seringapatam. The *Keladi-Nripa Vijayam*²⁴ merely alludes to Mysore as having bought off the enemy for a heavy price, including cash and jewels. A *Fort St. George Despatch*²⁵ likewise speaks of "the king of Misore" as having "paid great sums to compound the war" and of Abdul Nabi Tāhir Khān and Sādatullā Khān as having been subsequently "forced to pay much [to the Nizām] for arrears of tribute and keeping their places, which made them extort moneys from all the trading people under them . . .," thereby prejudicing "the country's trade."

No sooner was one trouble overcome than another presented itself. In 1726 (*Parābhava*), Pēshwa Bāji Rao I, with a view ostensibly to reassert the Mahratta power over the south, proceeded on an expedition into the Karnāṭak, with a large army under Futte Singh Bhōnsle.²⁶ After raising his exactions from Ikkēri,²⁷ he

Mahratta attack on
Seringapatam, 1726.

of Krishnarāja, while his identification of Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya, composer of this record and of Sr. 64 (1722) and 100 (1724), with the minister Tirumalaiyaṅgār "who must at least have lived up to 1729," is incorrect. For particulars about Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya, see Vol. I, Ch. XIV of this work.

23. *Wilks*. I. 250.

24. X. 189, v. 71. This work even credits Subādār Rōhile-Lingappa with having been duly honoured with presents by the Nizām ("Chiklis Khān") for the successful termination of the war against Seringapatam.

25. *Desp. Eng.* (1719-1727), p. 135, paras 104 and 105; *Despatch* dated January 26, 1727, reporting the events of 1724-1727.

26. *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 35; *Annals*, I. 160.

27. *Ke. N. V.*, X. 190-191, vv. 79-80.

eventually appeared before Seringapatam demanding a contribution. In the action which followed, however, Bāji Rao, we are told,²⁸ found himself outmanœuvred by the heavy firing from the magazines of the fort, and, sustaining considerable loss of men in his army, retreated from the place in dismay, with the remark that it was a sheer impossibility for sword-fighters like the Mahrattas to withstand the matchlockmen of Seringapatam which appeared to him to be nothing short of a "city of canons" (*firangi-pattana*)

Two years later, Mummāḍi Kempa-Virappa-Gauḍa of Māgaḍi (Kempe-Gauḍa IV, 1705-1728) began to show signs of hostility towards Mysore. On October 12, 1728 (*Kilaka, Āṣṛīja ba. 5*), Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya successfully blockaded the fort of Māgaḍi, compelling the chief to surrender.²⁹ The hill-fort of Sāvan-durga—with the accumulated treasures of ages—was next reduced.³⁰

28. *Mys. Raj. Cha.*, l.c., *Annals*, l.c.; cf. Wilks (I. 250) speaking of Bāji Rao as levying at the gates of Seringapatam, in 1726, "a contribution, the amount of which is not stated"; also S. K. Aiyangar (*o.c.*, p. 307) referring to the Pēshwa as having been "bought off by Krishṇa Rāja." Grant Duff, however, writes: "No particulars of this campaign have been discovered; but it appears by a letter written twelve or thirteen years afterwards by Bajee Rao to his brother that they [the Mahrattas] lost a number of men without gaining advantages which had been anticipated . . . From his former sentiments and these symptoms of disapprobation expressed in the letter alluded to, it may be inferred that Bāji Rao had objected to the expedition, but upon his return to Satara he found more serious reasons of dissatisfaction in the measures pursued by the Pratinidhi . . ." (*History of the Marathas*, I. 367) [*Italics ours*]. G. S. Sardesai (*o.c.*, p. 114) refers incidentally to Bāji Rao I's incursion into the Karnāṭak, 1725-1726.

29. *Ibid.*, 35-36; *Annals*, l.c.; also *Śiva-Gīte*, I, 12; *Kakudgiri-Māhātmya*, I, 7; *Śivabhakta-Vilāsa-Darpaṇa*, I, 11 [for accounts of these works, vide Ch. XII]; *E.C.*, IV (2) Yd. 58 (1741); *M. A. R.*, 1923, No. 58 (1744); *E.C.*, III (1) TN. 63 (1749)—referring to Dēvarājaiya's subjugation and annexation of Miḍagēṣi, Māgaḍi and Sāvan-durga (Sāvandi) as the Daḷavāi of Krishṇarāja I. An inscription from the *Mackenzie Collection* (Ms. No. 18-15-20, p. 66) refers to the grant of the village of Bukka-sāgara to the temple of Ranganātha of Seringapatam by Dēvarājaiya on the conquest of Māgaḍi. See also and compare *Wilks*, I. 250-251.

30. *Wilks*, I. 251; also literary and inscriptional references cited above.

The principality of Māgaḍi, with its dependencies, was absorbed in the kingdom of Mysore; Kempa-Virappa was with his family taken prisoner and sent to Seringapatam where he ended his last days in the state prison.³¹ Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya proceeded as far as Ratnagiri and Salem, securing the allegiance of the chiefs of those places.³² These activities tended to replenish the treasury at Seringapatam, drained as it had been during 1724 and 1726.³³

Inscriptions and other sources point to Krishnarāja
 Krishnarāja's Rule: Woḍeyar as a young ruler seated on the
 General administration: jewelled throne in Seringapatam (*ratna-simhāsanārūḍharāgi*).³⁴ In some of
 his records he refers to himself as *Karnāṭaka-Chakravarti*, and to his right to the possession of the kingdom and throne of the Karnāṭaka country (*svakiya Karnāṭakarājya; Karnāṭa simhāsana*).³⁵ Evidently he retained the claims of his predecessors to the sovereignty of the Karnāṭak. The administration was conducted along traditional lines, though all power was being actually wielded by the Councillors (*sāmājikar*) including the *Sarvādhikāri* and the *Daḷavāi*. Among the officers of the reign, Subbā-Paṇḍit was a *Pradhān*;³⁶ Venkaṭapataiyya was a junior accountant in the treasury (*bokkasadalihu puttā-karaṇika*);³⁷ Channaiyya was in charge of the household of Daḷavāi Vīrarājaiya (*sēnādhīśa-grhādhyaksha*);³⁸

31. *Ibid*; also *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 36.

32. *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, l.c.; *Annals*, l.c.

33. *Wilks*, I. 250.

34. See references cited under *Gifts, grants, etc.*, and *Literary activity* below.

35. *E.C., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295 (1716), vv. 6, 81, and p. 152 (prose passage); III (1) Sr. 64 (1722), ll. 172-173 and 692.

36. *Ibid*, Sr. 200 (c. 1720); also referred to in *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 141 (1734), from which it would appear that he continued to make grants during Chāmarāja's reign (1732-1734), though he was not then actually in office.

37. *Ratna-Śāstra*, VI, 11. This Venkaṭapataiyya seems to have been quite distinct from Pradhān Venkaṭapataiyya of Krishnarāja II's reign.

38. *Padmīni-Parīṇaya*, I, 42.

Apramēya-Hebbāruva and Krishṇaiya were *Pārupatya-gārs* of the *Dēvasthāna-Sīme*, and Gōpālarājaiya was Superintendent of the *Mysūru - Nagarada - Hōbaḷi-Vichāra-Sīme*.³⁹ The administrative institutions, revenue rules and regulations of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar remained practically unchanged. Among the additions said to have been made during the reign of Krishṇarāja were the institution of two more departments for collecting tax on cattle (*Bāla-terige-Chāvaḍi*) and presents and benevolences (*Kāṇike-Chāvaḍi*), and the ordering of a survey of all the temple lands to effect an equitable distribution of the bounties of the government.⁴⁰

The popularity of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism as the religion of the Mysore Royal House reached its zenith during this reign. Krishṇarāja was as staunch a Śrī-Vaiṣṇava by faith and profession as his grandfather Chikkadēvarāja

Religion :

Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism.

39. *M. A. R.*, 1912, p. 53, para 129; 1910-1911, p. 55, para 132.

40. See Capt. Read in *Bāramahal Records* (1792), I. 139-140, para 11. Read refers to these terms as *Balagour Chavadi* ("for collecting a tax upon horned cattle") and *Canky Chavadi* ("for assessing all the *atavany* and *kandachar* lands a third or fourth part of their produce on account of their having considerably improved since given in grant"). The reference here is obviously to *Bāla-terige* and *Kāṇike*, terms which occur in the records of Krishṇarāja I's reign [see *E. G., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295 (1716) and 296 (1720), pp. 151-153 (I. 23); III (1) Sr. 64 (1722), I. 674, and 100 (1724), I. 165]. R. Narasimhachar interprets *Bāla-terige* as "taxes on children" (*M. A. R.*, 1914-1915, p. 64, para 110), and Dr. R. Shama Sastri as "taxes on animals with tails" (*Ibid.*, 1923, No. 6, pp. 41-44). Although we are not in a position to know the exact nature of this tax, there are two circumstances in support of the position that it was levied on tailed animals, i.e., on cattle, as distinguished from sheep and goats (*kuri-terige*, *ādu-terige*): one is the precedent set up by Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, namely, levying of a tax on cattle sold (*ḍanakaru-māridḍakke-sunka*); the other is the survival of the custom of collecting a fee on cattle during fairs in the local parts of Mysore. *Bāla-terige* appears thus to have been synonymous with, or a shortened form of, *ḍanakaru-māridḍakke-sunka* (vide article entitled *Two Centuries of Wodeyar Rule in Mysore*, in the *Q. J. M. S.*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 471-472, f.n. 122). The *Bāla-terige-Chāvaḍi* continued to be an active department in Mysore even during Haidar's regime, 1761-1782 (see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 93). *Kāṇike* generally means presents and benevolences which may include also an additional levy on scheduled tax as suggested by Read's explanation.

Wodeyar.⁴¹ He was ever devoted not only to his family God Nārāyaṇa of Mēlkōṭe⁴² but also to the Vaishṇava deities at Seringapatam, Kaḷale, Tirupati and Kānchi.⁴³ A disciple as he was of Śrīnivāsa-Yatīndra, the *Parakāla-Guru*,⁴⁴ he is said to have invited him from Tirupati to the capital city and accepted from him the credentials of Śrī-Vaishṇavism.⁴⁵ As a true Bhāgavata, he used strictly to observe fasting and breaking the fast.⁴⁶ One of his queen-consorts, Chaluvāmbā (Chaluvājamma), was, we learn, likewise an ardent Vaishṇavite, devoted to Gods Yadugiri-Nārāyaṇa and Venkaṭēśa (of Tirupati), and to the *Parakāla-Guru*.⁴⁷ Inscriptions, again, refer to Krishṇarāja as the establisber of the Śrī-Vaishṇava faith (*Śrī-Vaishṇavamata-pratiṣṭhāpaka*) and the chief king of the Śrī-Vaishṇavas (*Śrī-Vaishṇava nṛpāgrāh*).⁴⁸ Of the Śrī-Vaishṇavas he was evidently a friend and favourite. Yet he was tolerant of other sects and creeds flourishing in the kingdom. Indeed a lithic record⁴⁹ refers to him as having been a skilful means for protecting the six *darśanas* (or schools) of philosophy (*shaḍdarśana*

Religious toleration.

41. See *E.C., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, vv. 73-75; III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 143-147, and 100, ll. 61-62. These passages are similar in point of style and subject-matter to those in the records of Chikkadēvarāja [*i.e.*, *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 14; *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, My. 115, etc.], which is significant.

42. *Ibid*, III (1) Sr. 64, l. 149; also 100, l. 68: *Yādavāchalapatēḥ kulānāyakasya Nārāyaṇasya*; also see under *Gifts, grants, etc.*, below.

43. *Vide* references under *Gifts, grants, etc.*

44. *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 162, 694-695: *Śrīnivāsa-Yatīndrasya kṛpayā pari puṣṭayā; Śrīnivāsa paramahamsa parivrājaka pravaraṅghri saraśīruha-sāndra makaraṇḍa-rasāśvāda samvārḍhita bhṛīṅgarājānam*.

45. *Annals*, I. 163. This must have been in or about 1722, in the light of Sr. 64 (1722) referring to the *Guru* as above.

46. *Ibid*; also *Mys. Raj. Cha.*, 86.

47. See her own work, *Varanandī-Kalyāṇa*, I, 1, VII, 141-143. For details about this production, *vide* under *Literary activity* below.

48. *E.C., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, p. 152 (prose passage); III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 198, 692-693; also ll. 162-163—referring to Krishṇarāja as shining with the prosperity of the Śrī-Vaishṇavas (*Śrī-Vaishṇava śriya Krishṇarājēndrōti virājatē*).

49. *Ibid*, II SB, 249 (1723).

samrakshana vichakshaṇōpāya). His grants were made to all the three sects of Brāhmins—Smārthas, Mādhvas and Śrī-Vaiṣṇavas—while he was equally solicitous towards Śaivism and Jainism.⁵⁰

Numerous were the gifts made by Krishnarāja Wodeyar alike to institutions and individuals in Gifts, grants, etc. and outside the State. Services in the Vaishnava temples engaged his constant care and attention. In particular, it is interesting to learn, he presented a silver pot to the temple of Nārāyaṇasvāmi at Mēlkōṭe,⁵¹ a gold ornament to the Channakēśavasvāmi temple at Bēlūr,⁵² and a gold-plated umbrella, two silver vessels and a silver-plated elephant *vāhanam* to the temple at Tirupati.⁵³ He also caused to be made for the principal shrine (of Śrī-Nārāyaṇasvāmi) at Mēlkōṭe a crown set with precious stones (*navaratna-kirīṭa*), and for Sampatkumāra, the processional image of the God, a jewelled coat (*ratna-kanchukam*).⁵⁴ At Kaḷale, we further learn, he got the temple of Lakshmīkāntasvāmi repaired, with addition of *vimāna*, *maṇṭapa*, *prākāra* and *gōpura*; endowed it with vehicles, ornaments and a pretty and durable car (*ratha*), and, for the performance of daily services to the God, settled learned and deserving Vēdic scholars in the newly formed and

50. *Vide* references under *Gifts, grants, etc.*, below; cf. S. K. Aiyangar, *o.c.*, p. 305. We have also an interesting reference to an alleged obstruction to the *Jainōtsavam* in the Hāssan street of Śravaṇa-Belagoḷa, caused by the Vira-Śaivas, to the king's (? Krishnarāja's) holding a judicial enquiry into the matter at Seringapatam on the representation of one Puṭṭaiya (a relation of Appaiya, a well known Jain who had been formerly mint-master of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar), and to the dispute being settled by him (the king) in favour of the Jains, etc. (see *Bel. Go. Cha. of Ananta-Kavi*, VI, 138-134).

51. *E.C.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Sr., 291.

52. *M.A.R.*, 1910-1911, p. 55, para 132.

53. *Ibid.*, 1908, p. 5, para 21. The inscription on the *vāhanam* is dated s. 1648 (1726). See also *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64 (1722), ll. 693-694, referring to Krishnarāja as a devotee serving at the feet of the Presiding Deity of Tirupati (Śrī-Vēṅkaṭāchala nīdāsa Śrīnivāsa charaṇāravinīda karuṇa-vīdhāyaka kainkaryā dhaurēyam).

54. *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 149-150; also 100, ll. 68-70.

well-furnished *Kaḷale agrahāra*, also named *Apratima-Krishṇarāja-samudra*.⁵⁵ He is also credited⁵⁶ with having got constructed *maṇṭapas* near the pond at Mēlkōṭe both in his name and in the name of his mother Chaluvājamma, and with having given away seven villages in the Paramatti-sīme, yielding 600 *Kaṇṭhīrāyi varahas*, for the conduct of daily and periodical services in the Venkaṭa-ramaṇasvāmi temple at Tirupati. Among the extant records of the reign (most of which, especially the copper-plate grants, bear the king's signature, *Śrī-Krishṇarāja*) the *Kaḷale copper-plate charter*, dated April 1, 1716,⁵⁷ records the grant by Krishṇarāja of 43 *vrittis* in Kasavinahalli, Sūranahalli and other villages, for the maintenance of Vēdic scholars of three sects settled in the newly formed *Kaḷale agrahāra* (*Apratima-Krishṇarāja-samudra*), above referred to. A *nirūpa* of Krishṇarāja, dated in 1717 and addressed to Kaḷale Mallarājaiya,⁵⁸ directs him to employ ten paid servants, on a salary of four *varahas* each, for guarding the Lakshmīkāntasvāmi temple at Kaḷale. A lithic record, dated May 14, 1717,⁵⁹ registers a grant by Krishṇarāja of 3,600 *varahas*—being the income from twelve villages in the Vīrabhadra-durga-sīme—for the expenses of conducting a service to God Kānchi-Varadarāja through the agency of Aḷagiya-Manavāḷa-Rāmānuja-Jiyar. Another, dated in 1718,⁶⁰

55. *Ibid.*, Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol., Nj. 295, pp. 147-148. Cf. *Annals*, I. 161.

56. *Annals*, I. 161-162.

57. *E.O.*, Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol., Nj. 295 (*M.A.R.*, 1910-1911, pp. 55-56, paras 132-133): *Durmukhi, Chaitra* va. 5, Sunday. Of the six villages referred to in the record, three were granted in 1716, on the occasion of the king's marriage with the Kaḷale Princess (Dēvājamma, daughter of Chikke Urs), and the remaining three on a subsequent occasion, i.e., on the birth of a son to him (see p. 151). For further particulars about the grant, see under *Literary activity*—*Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya*. Cf. *Annals*, I. 161.

58. *M.A.R.*, 1914-1915, p. 64, para 109.

59. *M.E.R.*, 1928, No. 233: s. 1639, *Hēviḷambi, Aḷlika Jyēṣṭha* su. 15 (a record from Papparappatti, Dharmapuri taluk—on a slab set up in front of the Varadarāja-Perumāl temple).

60. *I. M. P.*, II. 1216, Sa. 118: s. 1640. See also *Ibid.*, 1221, for another lithic record—a damaged one—of Krishṇarāja from Salem (No. 142), datable between 1719-1728.

refers to Krishṇarāja as having got built the temple of God Gōpāla at Taḷi in Salem district. A *nirūpa* of Krishṇarāja, dated in 1719,⁶¹ refers to the grant of Tūbinakere in Amritūr-sthaḷa as a *sarvamānya* (rent-free) to Venkaṭa-Varadāchārya, son of Kanchi Tātāchārya. Another, dated in 1720 and addressed to Chaluvaiya of Kaḷale,⁶² directs him to allow the lands of the local Lakshmīkāntasvāmi temple to be irrigated from the *Krishṇarāja-sāgara* tank newly built by him. A copper-plate charter, dated November 3, 1720,⁶³ registers the grant by Krishṇarāja, on the application of Dāsarājaiya of Biḷuguli, of the village of Gōṭikere—otherwise named Narasimhapura—in Suragiri-sīme, for the offerings and services of God Lakshmī-Narasimha of Suragiri-durga (Dēvarāya-durga). A *nirūpa* of Krishṇarāja, dated in 1722,⁶⁴ refers to the purchase of Kempana-pura by Chaluvaiya and the grant of the same to the Kaḷale temple. The *Toṇḍanūr Copper-plate grant*, dated December 11, 1722,⁶⁵ records the formation by Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar, on the occasion of lunar eclipse, of two *agrahāras* of well-furnished houses (around the temples of Lakshmī-Nārāyaṇa and Yādava-Nārāyaṇa-Vasanta-Gōpāla of Toṇḍanūr, south of Mēlkōṭe), named *Yādavapuri-Toṇḍanūr* and *Chalva-dēvāmbudhi* (the latter after his mother Chaluvājamma), and the settlement therein of Vēdic scholars (of the three sects of Brāhmans) with 112 *vrittis* distributed among them. A lithic record, dated November 14, 1723,⁶⁶ registers a visit of Krishṇarāja to Śravaṇa-Belagoḷa

61. *M. A. R.*, 1912, p. 58, para 129. 62. *Ibid.*, 1910-1911, p. 55, para 182.

63. *E.C.*, XII Tm. 47: s. 1642, *Śarvārī, Kārtika su.* 15, Thursday.

64. *M. A. R.*, 1910-1911, p. 55, para 182.

65. *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64: s. 1644, *Śubhakṛit, Mārgasīra su.* 15, Tuesday. For further particulars about the record, see under *Literary activity—Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya. Cf. Annals*, I. 161-162.

66. *Ibid.*, II SB. 249: s. 1621, *Śubhakṛit, Kārtika ba.* 13, Thursday. *Ś.* 1621 here is an error for s. 1645 (*Śubhakṛit*). The *Bel. Go. Cha.* of Ananta-Kavi (VI, 88-90) also contains an account of the visit to Śravaṇa-Belagoḷa of Krishṇarāja, on the occasion of the completion of the pond (known as

and his grant of some villages as rent-free, for the *Jina-dharma* of the place and for the worship and festivals of Gōmatēśvara (*Gummatasvāmi*), as well as the village of Kabāle (Kabbālu), for the upkeep of the feeding house situated near the *Chikkadēvarāja-kalyāṇi* (pond). A *nirūpa* of Krishṇarāja, dated in 1724,⁶⁷ relates to the grant of a village of the revenue value of 200 *varahas* in the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbaḷi-Vichāra-Sīme* to the Lakshmīkāntasvāmi temple at Kaḷale. A copper-plate charter from the Kanchi-maṭha at Tonḍanūr, dated December 30, 1724,⁶⁸ alludes to the visit to Seringapatam of a Śrī-Vaiṣṇava scholar by name Rāmānuja-Yati-Saumya-Jāmātri from Kānchi, and records how Krishṇarāja, having heard from him the glory of Hastigiri (Kānchi), not only confirmed the gifts of his father Kaṇṭhīrava and of his mother and grandmother (Chaluvājamma and Dēvīramma) to God Varadarāja (the Presiding Deity of the place), but also made his own grants for offerings to the shrine at the three seasons and the *Vaiśākha* festival, and for the provision of *maṇṭapas*, groves, ponds, etc., together with twelve villages in the neighbourhood of Vīrabhadra-durga in the Karimangala country. Another, belonging to about 1725,⁶⁹ relates to the formation by Krishṇarāja of an *agrahāra* for the Brāhmins south of the Kapilā river, and the bestowal of gifts on them severally, to provide for the worship of Śrīkaṇṭhēśvara at Nanjangūd.

Chikkadēvarāja-kalyāṇi) by Appaiya. It speaks of the king as having made to the latter (Appaiya) a rent-free grant of the village of Kabbālu yielding 1,000 *varahas* (*sāvira varahada svāstyā*), for the upkeep of a feeding house for the Jains. During the visit, Krishṇarāja, we are told, was accompanied by Sarvādhikāri Chaluvaiya, Daḷavāi (?) Dēvaiya and Doḍḍamma (Dēvīramma, grandmother of Krishṇarāja) and other ladies of the Royal household.

67. *M. A. R.*, 1910-1911, p. 55, para 132.

68. *E.C.*, III (1) Sr, 100: s. 1646, *Krōdhi, Pushya* ba. 11, Wednesday. For further particulars about the record, see under *Literary activity*—*Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya*.

69. *Ibid.*, TN. 61. This record is undated. A considerable portion of it is found to contain passages from Sr. 14, 64, 100, etc.

The capital city of Seringapatam, during the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, was at the height of its glory and prosperity. Its wealth was proverbial. Despite external troubles arising from the disruptive tendencies of the times, social solidarity was preserved intact, and peace and security prevailed in the kingdom which was teeming with large, fertile and populous villages watered by tanks, ponds and other water-courses. Mēlkōṭe, Toṇḍanūr and Kaḷale were among the flourishing centres of cultural activities and resorts of scholars learned in Vēdas, Śāstras, Śrauta and Smārta ritualism, Vēdānta and Drāviḍa-Prabandha; Toṇḍanūr, in particular, seems to have been also the pontifical seat of Śrinivāsa-Yatindra, the *Parakāla-Guru* and preceptor of Krishnarāja Wodeyar.⁷⁰ A number of sale deeds and other records of the reign evidence the liberal outlook of the king and the subjects in matters affecting social and religious well-being.⁷¹

Literature and learning—sacred and secular—flourished under Krishnarāja Wodeyar. Of him, we glean a picture as a person of taste and culture, frequented by the learned and taking a keen interest in the appreciation of music and literature.⁷² The influence of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism and the tendency to write works in simpler style for popular edification, continued in the main to dominate

70. See texts of *H.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64 and 100, and *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, for details; also f.n. 44, 55, 57, 65 and 68 *supra*.

71. See, for instances, *I. M. P.*, II. 1208, Sa. 54 (1714); *H.C.*, V (1) and (2) Bl. 29 (1717); *Salem D st. Manual*, II. 137-140 (1717); *H.C.*, XII Tm. 46 (1719) and 48 (1720); *M. A. R.*, 1910-1911, p. 55, para 182 (1720); *H.C.*, IV (2) Kr. 30 (1722); III (1) TN. 59 (1725), IX Kn. 19 (1726), etc. The last mentioned record, a lithic one, refers to the reigning king as *Chamarāja Waḍeraiya*, an error for *Krishnarāja Waḍeraiya*.

72. See *H.C.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, v. 5; III (1) Sr. 64, l. 108; *Tulakavēri-Mahātmya* (of Chaluvāmbā), ff. 1 (prose passage), etc. The expressions *vibudha sevitam*, *vividha vibudhan paritrāyan*, *nikhila vibudha jēgiyamāna*, *vidvadgarishtha*, etc., applied to Krishnarāja in these sources, are significant. See also *Annals*, I. 162.

the literary activity of the times. Haḷagannaḍa was being fast displaced by Hosagannaḍa as the medium of expression, particularly in prose.

By far the most important writer of the reign was the famous Śrī-Vaiṣṇava scholar Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya—a former contemporary of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar—whose attainments and earlier works we have elsewhere referred to.⁷³ He composed the *Kaḷale Copper-plate grant* (1716), *Tonḍanūr Copper-plate grant* and the *Kanchi-maṭha Copper-plate grant* (1724) of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, the second one, in fifteen plates, being perhaps the longest record extant of the rulers of the Mysore Wodeyar Dynasty.⁷⁴ These documents, as we have noticed, relate to the grant of *agrahāras* and villages by Krishṇarāja Wodeyar. They are written in Sanskrit and Kannaḍa, poetry and prose; and are closely modelled on the *Seringapatam Temple Copper-plate grant* (1686) and the *Dēvanagara Copper-plate grant* (c. 1686-1690) of the reign of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar. They usually begin with an elaborate poetical account of the traditional origin of the Ruling House of Mysore and of the succession, achievements, etc., of the rulers of the Dynasty down to Krishṇarāja. Then follow details connected with the grants and the donees, this portion containing also prose passages in Kannaḍa. The poetical portion of each inscription is written in the high-flown *kāvya* style and embodies verses, most of them being evidently borrowals from earlier copper-plate grants (such as *Seringapatam* 14) and some being Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya's own. In the case of the *Tonḍanūr* record, however, it is found to contain verses borrowed both from the works of Tirumalārya, Prime Minister of

Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya.
The *Copper-plate grants* 1716, 1722 and 1724.

73. *Ante*, Vol. I, Ch. XIV.

74. *E.C., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, and III (1) Sr: 64 and 100.

Chikkadēvarāja and from those ascribed to the latter.⁷⁵ In two of these documents, the tendency to interpolate is also noticeable. Thus, the Kaḷale grant speaks of a gift made subsequent to 1716,⁷⁶ while the Toṇḍanūr record refers to an additional grant made in August 1729 (*Saumya, Bhādrapada*).⁷⁷ All these records close with an indication of the name and attainments of the composer (Rāmāyaṇam-Tirumalārya), and with the signature of the king in Kannaḍa as *Śrī-Krishṇarājaḥ*. Excellent specimens of *kāvya* style as they are, these records, literary flourishes apart, are of considerable importance and value as sources for the reconstruction of the history of the early rulers of Mysore down to Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar I.

In Virarājaiya of Kaḷale, Daḷavāi of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar during 1714-1724, we next find an accomplished scholar of the times, skilled in composing works in Sanskrit, Telugu and Kannaḍa languages among others.⁷⁸ Early in his life he had been, we are told,⁷⁹ well trained and educated in poetical and dramatic lore, rhetoric, grammar, logic, and the sciences of medicine and archery. He was well-known also for his liberality and piety.⁸⁰ In his name has come down to us the

*The Sakala-
Vaidya-Samhitā-
Sārāṇava*, c. 1714-
1720.

75. See *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64, pp. 55-56 (Text), quoting from the *A. V. C.*, *C. B.*, etc.

76. *Ibid.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 295, pp. 151-152 (Text), referring to an additional grant of three villages on the occasion of the birth of a son to Krishṇarāja, and recounting the latter's titles. Since one of these titles in this portion of the record (p. 152) echoes Krishṇarāja's victory over Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe in 1724, the interpolation appears to have been made subsequent to that date, *i.e.*, about the same time as the additional grant. See also f.n. 22 and 57 *supra*.

77. *Ibid.*, III (1) Sr. 64, l. 668.

78. *Āṇḍhra-Va. Bhā.*—*Sabha*, p. 347, and *Bhishma*, p. 130 : *Gīrvāṇāṇḍhra-Karṇāṭakāḍi nānā bhāṣhā kāvya rachana chatura*.

79. *Sakala-Vaid. Sam.*, p. 4 : *Elameyol kāvya nāṭakālankāra vyākaraṇa tarkāyurvēda dhanurvēda muntāda samasta vidyangaḷum kattu*.

80. See *Padminī-Parinaya* (of Channaiya), I, 29-34 ; *Āṇḍhra-Va. Bhā.*—*Sabha*, p. 348, and *Bhishma*, p. 131 ; also *M. A. L.*, 1923, No. 58 (1744).

Sakala-Vaidya-Samhitā-Sārārṇava (*Virarājōkti-Vilāsa*),⁸¹ a compendium in Kannāḍa on medicine. Although the work is an undated one and there is nowhere any reference in it to Virarāja's connection with Krishnarāja Wodeyar of Mysore, it would seem from the text that it was written at a time when Virarāja had risen high in his lifetime as a member of the Kaḷale Family.⁸² Further, as the Daḷavāi of Krishnarāja, Virarāja, as we shall see, was also a patron of letters. We would not therefore be far wrong in fixing the work between c. 1714-1720, the period of Krishnarāja's minority.⁸³ The introductory chapter in the treatise is written in a mixture of old and new Kannāḍa—poetry and prose.⁸⁴ It begins with invocations to Mahēśa, Paśchimaraṅga (Śrī-Ranganātha of Seringapatam) and Śrī-Rāma. Then we have verses in praise of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar and of Doḍḍaiya of Kaḷale (Daḷavāi of Chikkadēva and father of Virarāja). Next follows a picturesque account of the exploits of Daḷavāi Doḍḍaiya (Doḍḍendra) over the Mahrattas under Dādaji, Jaitaji, Nimbaji and others, during the reign of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar (i.e., c. April 1682)—by way of echoing the meritorious services rendered by the Kaḷale Family to the Mysore Royal House. Then Virarāja speaks of his own attainments and qualifications for writing a prose treatise (*ṭiku*) on Āyurvēda, indicating also the importance of the science and the scope of his work. The succeeding sections of the text deal with the preliminaries of the Āyurvēdic profession (such, for instance, as examination of the pulse, tongue and urine; the humours—*Prakriti-lakṣhaṇam*; physicians and patients; examination of diseases in general; conditions governing healthy life,

81. Pub. Mys. Or. Lib. Kannāḍa Series, No. 19 (Vol. I), Mysore, 1932.

82. *Sakala-Vaid. Sam.*, p. 10: *Kaḷaleya puravarādhīsvaramum lokamam tanna jasadim belaguva Śrī-Virarāja-bhūpalam virāchisidam.*

83. Cf. *Kar. Ka. Cha.* (III. 9), roughly fixing Virarāja in 1720.

84. *Vide pp.* 1-10; see also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 9-11.

etc.),⁸⁵ and with the subject-matter proper, namely, treatment of diseases in their various forms.⁸⁶ This part of the work is written in colloquial Hosagannāḍa prose, occasionally interspersed by Telugu passages. The principal source of information for Vīrarāja is, as he tells us,⁸⁷ the *Mahāsamhita-dugḍha-ratnākara*. Among ancient writers on Āyurvēda, he refers to Ātrēya-Muni and Trivikrama-Paṇḍitāchārya.⁸⁸ Among earlier texts he shows some acquaintance with the *Bhōjarāja-Samhite* and the *Vaidyakalpataru*.⁸⁹ There seems reason to believe that a considerable portion of Vīrarāja's treatise was written in collaboration with contemporary scholars in Āyurvēda.⁹⁰ The *Sakala-Vaidya-Samhitā-Sārārṇava* is primarily an Āyurvēdic text intended, as Vīrarāja himself tells us,⁹¹ for popular benefit (*lōkahitārthavāgi*). The incidental references in it to the pedigree, etc., of Vīrarāja are, however, of some importance to us as bearing on the rise of the Kaḷale Family and the Mahratta invasion of Seringapatam (1682). Vīrarāja has also

The *Āndhra-Vachana - Bhāratamu*, 1781.

immortalised himself by his *Āndhra-Vachana - Bhāratamu* — *Sabha-Parvamu* (1781), in 120 chapters, and *Bhīshma-Parvamu*, in 117 chapters (including the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in 18 chapters) — a prose version of the great Epic in Telugu, of considerable charm and rare literary merit.⁹² It begins with invocation to God Śrī-Vēṇugōpāla of the Lakshmīkāntasvāmi temple at Kaḷale.

85. Pp. 11-63.

86. Pp. 63-425, dealing with 169 varieties of treatment for diseases from fever down to diabetes.

87. P. 4, v. 16.

88. See pp. 217, 349, 392 (in connection with consumption and diabetes, and preparation of pills), and 18, 24 (in connection with the humours and types of diseases).

89. See pp. 25, 257 and 394 (in connection with the efficacy of fasting, hiccup and special types of diabetes).

90. See pp. 4 (v. 16) and 10; also *Rāj. Kath.*, XI. 397.

91. P. 10.

92. Pub. by Mr. N. K. Venkatesam Pantulu, M.A., L.T., Anantapur, 1928, 1936. The *Sabha-Parvamu* was completed on *Sādhārāṇa, Māgha śuk. 5* (see first verse on p. 346), which corresponds to January 31, 1781

The colophons,⁹³ relating to the pedigree, etc., of Virarāja, are in the main similar to the references in the *Sakala-Vaidya-Samhitā-Sārāṇava*. The work bears the impress of Virarāja's individuality to a considerable extent, although it is by no means free from interpolations, particularly by one Tupākula Ananta-Bhūpāla, son of Krishṇa-Bhūpāla of Chandragiri.⁹⁴ Altogether a unique contribution to the Telugu literature of the early part of the eighteenth century.

Another writer of note during the period was Channaiya (*Chennayānka, Chennayāmātya*), household officer of Daḷavāi Virarājaiya and a protégé of the latter. He seems to have been a resident of Bēlūr, and refers to himself as the grandson of Channappaiya of Hoysala-Kannaḍa-Kula and Gārgyasa-gōtra, a devotee of Śiva (*Śiva-pūjā niratanu*) and a disciple of Krishṇānanda-Guru.⁹⁵

Commentary on
the *Bhagavad-Gītā*
and the *Padmini-Parinaya*, c. 1720
1724.

Channaiya wrote a commentary in Kannaḍa on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*,⁹⁶ a work composed at the instance of Virarāja and with the consent of a scholar byname Venkaṭa-Krishṇārya of Āndhra-Vamśa and Kāśyapa-gōtra.⁹⁷ The commentary, as it has

(see *Ind. Eph.*, VI. 264). It was evidently a product of the period of Virarāja's retirement in Kalale (from 1724 onwards). From his reference to and description of the Chōḷa country in the work (see pp. 101-108), Virarāja seems to have, in his earlier years, accompanied his father Doḍḍaiya to the south during Daḷavāi Kumāraiya's expedition to Trichinopoly (1680-1682)—*Ante*, Vol. I, Ch. XI, for details. The *Bhīṣma-Parvamu*, however, is undated, though it appears to have been completed subsequent to 1731. Mss. of both the *Parvams* in palm-leaf were first discovered by Mr. Venkatesam at Negapatam in April 1906 (see *Editorial Introduction to the Sabhā.*, p. iv).

93. See *Sabhā.*, pp. 347-348; *Bhīṣma.*, pp. 180-181.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 349; *Ibid.*, p. 220. See also *Editorial Introduction to the Sabhā* (pp. vii-xi) and the *Bhīṣma* (pp. vi-viii).

95. See his commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, ff. 1, and *Padmini-Parinaya*, I, 42-44.

96. Ms. No. 147.—P. L.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*

97. See col. to ch. and ff. 1: *Chennayānkamu* . . . Venkaṭa-Krishṇārya-
bīdhāna śāstrajñānaramataviḍiḍu . . . Śrī-Virarājendraṇim nēmisī
. . . Kannaḍa bhāṣheyim vistarisida . . . *Bhagavad-Gītā vyākhyāna*.

come down to us, is incomplete and stops at the end of the fifteenth chapter. It begins with invocations to Gaṇeśa, Krishṇānanda-Guru and God Channakēśava of Bhāgyapura (? Bēlūr).⁹⁸ Then follows an introduction referring to Kaḷale Vīrarāja, Daḷavāi of the king of Mysore (Krishṇarāja), as the author's patron, and the circumstances under which the work came to be written. The commentary is a model of intelligible Hosagannaḍa prose style. Another work written by Channaiya at the instance of Daḷavāi Vīrarājaiya is the *Padmini-Parinaya*,⁹⁹ a Kannada poem in three cantos and eighteen chapters, dealing with the marriage of God Śrī-Venkaṭeśa of Tirupati with Padmini as told in the *Varāha-Purāṇa* (*Vārāha-Purāṇada kathe*). Each chapter begins with invocations to Channakēśava and Lakshmi and praise of Śiva, Brahma and Gaṇeśa among other deities. The introductory chapter refers as usual to the rule of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar of Mysore in Seringapatam, and contains details about the pedigree of the poet's patron (Daḷavāi Vīrarāja of Kaḷale), with particulars about the poet himself. The poem is written in the popular *Sāṅgatyā* metre. Both the commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and the *Padmini-Parinaya* are undated works. Yet, from internal evidence, they are assignable to c. 1720-1724, i.e., the latter part of the period of office of Kaḷale Vīrarāja as Daḷavāi of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar. Both, again, help to indicate the ascendancy of the Kaḷale Family in Mysore during Krishṇarāja's reign.

Of perhaps greater interest to us is the circumstance that Chaluvāmbā of Kaḷale, one of the queen-consorts of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar, was herself a cultured lady,

Chaluvāmbā.

98. ff. 1: *Bhāgapura vara nivāsanāda Śrī-Channakēśava*. Bhāgapura or Bhāgyapura here is perhaps identical with Bēlūr, whose presiding deity is Channakēśava. Bhāgyapura occurs also in the *Padmini-Parinaya* (ff. 89) of the same author. See also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 12.

99. Ms. No. A. 115—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*; see also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 12-14.

gifted with literary and poetical talents. She was a grand-daughter of Daḷavāi Doḍḍaiya of Kaḷale and daughter of Kānta-nriṇa,¹⁰⁰ identical with Chikka-Kāntaiya, younger brother of Daḷavāi Virarājaiya.¹⁰¹ In her name has come down to us a prose version in Kannaḍa of

the *Tulākāvērī-Māhātmya* (c. 1720),¹⁰² also called *Chaluvāmbikā-Vāṇī-Vilāsa*, a work in thirty chapters, dealing

with the merits of the birthplace of the river Cauvery as told in the *Āgnēya-Purāṇa*. The work begins with invocations to Kṛṣṇa, Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa and Vēdānta-Guru, followed by the pedigree, etc., of Kṛṣṇarāja Wodeyar and Chaluvāmbā. The text of the *Māhātmya* is written in colloquial Kannaḍa. There seems, however, reason to believe that a greater part of it was actually composed by a Śrī-Vaiṣṇava scholar by name Śrīnivāsa, son of Venkaṭārya of Maudgalya-gōtra, and passed in Chaluvāmbā's name.¹⁰³ Chaluvāmbā has also written the

The Varanandī-Kalyāṇa, etc., c. 1725-1730. *Varanandī-Kalyāṇa* (c. 1725-1730),¹⁰⁴ a poem in seven chapters in the *Sāṅgatyā*

metre, describing the well-known traditional story of the marriage of Varanandi, daughter of the Pādshah of Delhi, with the deity Chaluvārāya-svāmi of Mēlkōṭe, during Śrī-Rāmānujāchāryar's time (12th cent.). The work begins with invocations to God Venkaṭēśa and Parakāla-Guru. The poetess speaks of it as an epic, written with the assent of the Parakāla-Guru in polished, pure and sweet Kannaḍa.¹⁰⁵ So direct

100. See *Tulākāvērī-Māhātmya*, ff. 2; also Table XII.

101. See *Annals*, I. 159; also Table XIII.

102. Ms. No. 18-3-6—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*; see also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 25.

103. See verse from a Ms. of the work, quoted in the *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 25, f.n. 1.

104. Ms. No. 80—P. L.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*; see also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 22-25.

105. See ff. 1 and 2, vv. 4-5: *Parakāla-Guruvānujēyōḷu . . . virachisi kṛtīga pēḷuvēnu | Unnati vāḍēdāchagannaḍādinivāta . . . varṇakāḍi.*

is her treatment of the subject that her personality and devotion to Vishṇu appear prominently throughout the poem. Included in the *Varanandī-Kalyāṇa* are songs by Chaluvāmbā in praise of the presiding deity of Tirupati.¹⁰⁶ Lucid and thoroughly intelligible, the works of Chaluvāmbā, as a whole, testify to the steady influence of Śrī-Vaishṇavism on the Mysore Royal Family during c. 1720-1730.

Among other writers of the reign, Bālavaidyada-
 Other writers: Chaluva, grandson of Rāmāvdhāni
 Bālavaidyada- and son of Venkāvdhāni of Chik-
 Chaluva. nāyakanahalli (*Chikkanāyakanapura*),
 wrote in Kannāḍa the *Ratna-Śāstra* (c. 1715)¹⁰⁷ at the
 instance of Venkaṭapati, junior accountant in the
 treasury of Krishṇarāja at Seringa-
 patam. This is a poem in six parts of
 one hundred verses, composed in the

The *Ratna-Śāstra*
 and the *Kannāḍa-*
Līlāvatī, c. 1715-1720.
Vārdhika-shatpadi metre. It begins with invocations to
 Gaṇēśa, Śārada and Channakēśava, and with details as to
 the poet's ancestry, etc. The *Ratna-Śāstra* treats in an
 interesting manner of the nine kinds of precious stones
 (*navaratna*), with reference, among others, to the names,
 find-places, species, merits and defects, and characteris-
 tics of artificial stones (*kr̥trimada ratunagaḷu*). It seems
 to testify to the wealth of the capital city during the
 early part of Krishṇarāja's reign. Another work written
 by Bālavaidyada-Chaluva is the *Kannāḍa-Līlāvatī* (c.
 1715-1720),¹⁰⁸ a poetical treatise in Kannāḍa, also in the
Vārdhika-shatpadi metre, on arithmetic and mensura-
 tion. Rangaiya, a protégé of Daḷavāi
 Dēvarājaiya, wrote, at the instance of
 the latter, the *Kāvēri-Māhātmya* (c.

Rangaiya. The
Kāvēri-Māhātmya,
 c. 1730.

106. See ff. 170-218: *Venkaṭāchala-Māhātmya lālī pada*, *Ammanavara mēla lālī pada*.

107. Ms. No. B. 69—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*; see also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 8-9.

108. *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 6-8.

1730),¹⁰⁹ a Kannada poetical piece in the *Bhāminī-shaṭ-paḍi* metre.

Dēvājamma, daughter of Chikke Urs of Kaḷale, was the principal queen of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, married to him in March 1716.¹¹⁰
 Domestic life :
 Queens, etc.

Krishṇarāja had also eight junior queen-consorts (*aṣṭa-mahishiyaru*), to whom he was wedded in November 1718.¹¹¹ Four of these latter belonged to the Kaḷale House, while the others came from the Arasu families of Mūgūr, Kottāgāla and Hullahalli.¹¹² The *Toṇḍanūr Copper-plate grant* (1722) mentions Dēvājamma as the senior queen of Krishṇarāja (*Dēvājammēti mahishī prathamā*) and refers to the eight royal queens of his (*aṣṭa-mahishyah*), in the name of each of whom, we are told, he caused to be repaired the eight sacred pools of the Yadu mountain (Mēlkōṭe).¹¹³ Chaluvāmbā (Chaluvājamma), daughter of Chikka-Kāntaiya of Kaḷale, appears to have been by far the most favourite consort of Krishṇarāja, and, as we have seen, figures prominently in literature. Krishṇarāja, however, had no children, the only male child born of his senior queen Dēvājamma having died in its infancy (at the end of six months).¹¹⁴ Among other members of the Royal Family, Dēvīramma (Doḍḍamma) and Chaluvājamma, grandmother and mother respectively of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, lived on during the reign and were pious Vaishṇavites. The *Toṇḍanūr Plate* (1722) speaks of Krishṇarāja as having caused *agrahāras* to be established and Vaishṇava temples to be repaired in the names of these royal ladies;¹¹⁵ the *Kanchi-maṭha Charter* (1724), elsewhere referred to, alludes to their gifts to God

109. *Ibid.*, 37-38.

110. *Annals*, I. 159; see also and compare *Rāj. Kath.*, XII. 488-489.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.*

113. *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 165-168.

114. *Annals*, l.c. It must be this child whose birth is referred to in the *Kaḷale Copper-plate grant* (see f.n. 57 and 76 *supra*).

115. *E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 170-172.

Varadarāja of Kānchi.¹¹⁶ Another important member of the Royal Family who lived during the reign was Kempa-dēvājamma (Dēvājamma), daughter of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar and aunt of Krishnarāja. A lithic record, dated October 17, 1718,¹¹⁷ registers a gift by her of a new car for the festival of God Kīrti-Nārāyaṇa at Talakāḍ. From the point of view of domestic life, it is interesting to learn that on August 5, 1717, Krishnarāja Woḍeyar issued a *nirūpa* to the members of the eighteen Arasu families, permitting them to enter into matrimonial relations with the family of Channarāja of Salem, a descendant of Timmarāja of Gaṇaganūr.¹¹⁸ This was obviously in pursuance of the earlier legislation of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar relating to the Arasu families, which was maintained intact.

Krishnarāja Woḍeyar passed away on March 5, 1732,¹¹⁹ in his thirtieth year, his queens not observing *sati*.¹²⁰

Death of Krishnarāja Woḍeyar, March 5, 1732.

Krishnarāja Woḍeyar was, as he appears from the materials available to us, a pious, humane and tolerant ruler, a staunch Śrī-Vaiṣṇava and a liberal patron of arts and letters.¹²¹ Yet, dominated as he had been by

Reflections.

116. *Ibid.*, Sr. 100, ll. 146-149. The reference to "*namma ammanavaru Chaluṣvājammanavaru Dēvīrammanavarugaḷu*" here is to the mother and grandmother of Krishnarāja I in the light of Sr. 64 (l.c.). Rice's interpretation of the passage as referring to Krishnarāja's own grandmother Dēvājammāmbā, his junior grandmother Dēvīramma and his mother Chaluṣvājamāmbā [see *B.C.*, III (1), p. 29, translation] does not seem to be in keeping with the text.

117. *Ibid.*, TN. 18: *Viḷambi, Kārtika* su. 5, Friday.

118. *Annals*, I. 163; cf. *Wilks*, I. Preface, p. xxiv.

119. *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 36: *Virōdhikṛit, Phalguṇa* ba. 5, Sunday; also *Annals*, I. 164, and *Rāj. Kath.*, XII. 489. Wilks (I. 251) places the accession of Chāmarāja (successor of Krishnarāja) in 1731, tacitly assuming Krishnarāja's death in that year; S. K. Aiyangar (o.c., p. 307) also adopts the same date. This assumption, however, requires revision.

120. *Annals*, l.c.

121. *The Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (l.c.) and the *Annals* (I. 162), in particular, speak of Krishnarāja's solicitude alike towards his subjects and beasts

the powerful interests of the Kaḷale Family both during and after his minority, his reign saw the definite beginnings of decline in the power of the central authority and the rise to prominence of his relations and trusted councillors (the *Daḷavāi* and the *Sarvādhikāri*) as active elements in the administration of Mysore.¹²² The kingdom of Mysore under him, it has to be set down to his credit, continued to retain much of its vitality and vigour, although it had begun to feel the effects of the decline and fall of the Mughal Empire.

and birds under his protection. The *Toṇḍanūr Copper-plate grant* (1722) refers in eloquent terms to Krishṇarāja's gifts and acts of charity, and tells us that while he ruled, "all his subjects receive good food, handsome raiment, perfumes, golden ornaments and *chāmaras*, etc." [*E.C.*, III (1) Sr. 64, ll. 152-156.] Cf. *Wilks*, I. 251.

122. Cf. *Wilks*, l.c. His observations on, and characterization of, Krishṇarāja are rather overdrawn and not borne out by the materials on record.

CHAPTER III.

CHĀMARĀJA WODEYAR VI, 1732-1734.

Birth, accession, etc.—Ministerial irresponsibility, March-December 1732; the *Coup d'état*, c. January 1733—The independent rule of Chamaraja Wodeyar, January 1733-June 1734—Gifts, grants, etc.—Social life—Literary activity: The *Sringararajatilaka-Bhanah*, c. 1733-1734—Domestic life—Foreign affairs: General tendencies and factors—Mysore and Malabar, 1733-1734—Internal affairs: The *First Revolution* in Seringapatam, June 1734; deposition of Chamaraja Wodeyar, June 10, 1734—Reflections.

ON THE death of Krishnarāja Wodeyar I without issue, direct descent in the main line of the Ruling House of Mysore, branching off from Muppina-
Dēvarāja Wodeyar, came to an end.
Birth, accession, etc.

The late king had, however, desired his principal queen Dēvājamma to adopt Chāmarājaiya (son of Dēvarāja Urs of Ankanahalli), a kinsman of his aged twenty-eight (b. 1704), and install him as ruler in succession to himself.¹ Accordingly, soon after the demise of Krishnarāja, Dēvājamma sent for Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya (younger brother of Dēvarājaiya) and other

1. *Annals*, I. 164-165. The date of birth of Chāmarāja, according to this source, is *Tārāṇa* (1704). Wilks refers to the successor of Doḍḍa-Krishnarāja Wodeyar as "Cham Raj" of the Hemmanahalli ("Hemmanhully") branch, and speaks of his (Chāmarāja's) having had "scarcely attained his eighteenth year" at the time of his accession (I. 251-253). Dēva-chandra only writes of Chāmarāja as a lad of eighteen of the Mysore Royal Family (*Rāj. Kath.*, XII. 489). The *Mys. Raj. Cha.* (36) merely refers to him as a descendant of Krishnarāja I. Compare also S. K. Aiyangar (*Ancient India*, p. 307) who refers to Chāmarāja as being "connected but remotely with the ruling family." The authority of the *Annals* seems, however, more acceptable here, being obviously based on earlier succession lists and other documents of the eighteenth century.



Chāmarāja Wodeyar VI, 1732-1734.



officers of State, and directed them to give effect to her husband's wishes. Forthwith these councillors invited Chāmarājaiya with royal honours to the capital city. At Paśchimavāhini, on his way thither, they accorded him a reception, expressing their intention of making him king if he would but rule in conformity with the behests of the dowager-queen. After thus exacting a solemn oath from the heir-elect that he would abide by their injunctions, they conducted him to the court of Seringapatam on March 7, 1732 (*i.e.*, on the third day after Krishnarāja's death). He was next invested with regal powers, being finally adopted, and installed on the throne of Mysore, by Dēvājamma on the 19th of the same month (*Parīdhāvi, Chaitra śu. 5*).² Chāmarājaiya, the adopted son of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, thus became the ruler of Mysore under the name Chāmarāja Wodeyar (VI), the earliest available document referring to him as such being a lithic record dated October 22, 1732.³

The first nine months of Chāmarāja Wodeyar's reign constitute a period of what might be called the beginning of ministerial irresponsibility in Mysore, which in later years assumed alarming proportions. True to his pledge, Chāmarāja, during this period, conducted the

2. *Ibid.*, 165-166. The *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (l.c.) speaks of the formal accession of Chāmarāja on March 7, 1732 (*Virodhikrit, Phalguṇa ba. 7*), *i.e.*, on the third day after Krishnarāja's death. The *Rāj. Kath.* (l.c.) merely assigns him a period of three years' rule (1732-1734). See also and compare Wilks (l.c.) who places the accession of Chāmarāja roughly in 1731; S. K. Aiyangar (l.c.) closely follows Wilks. The authority of the *Annals*, as explained in f.n. 1 *supra*, is preferred here. For particulars about the early career, etc., of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, *vide* Ch. IV, f.n. 6.

3. *E. O.*, IX Mā. 37: s. 1654, *Parīdhāvi, Kārtika śu. 15*, Friday [The week-day here seems apparently a misreading or a scribal error for Sunday, on which the *Paurṇamī* actually fell (October 22, 1732)—see *Ind. Ep.*, VI. 267]. Chāmarāja Wodeyar is referred to in this record (ll. 3-7) thus: *Śrīmadrājādhirāja rājaparamēśvara prauḍha pratāpa apratīma-vīranarapati Mahīśūra ratna-simhāsanārādharāda Chāmarāja Wodeyairaiyanavarū*. For further particulars about the inscription, see text of f.n. 12 *infra*.

affairs of State under the guidance of the dowager-queen supported by the powerful ministerial party headed by his own councillors Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya. All power and authority was being actually wielded by the two latter (members of the Kaḷale Family) who, having reduced Chāmarāja to the position of a titular ruler, began systematically to aggrandize all powers unto themselves. Out of the annual revenue dues of the kingdom, we learn, they used to appropriate 3,000 *varahas* (at 1,000 *varahas* each) for each administrative unit, and went about acquiring by this means valuable landed property all over the country. Their control soon extended over even the demesne or Palace lands from which they began to claim half the Government share of produce. At the same time, offices came to be bestowed by them on persons recommended by their favourite servants for a mere consideration. It was not, however, till about the close of 1732 that Chāmarāja Wodeyar, having realised the gravity of the situation, and evidently apprehending trouble to himself, resolved to shake off his dependence on these councillors by removing them from office and appointing men of his own choice in their places.⁴ On the secret communication of this news, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, we are told,⁵ proceeded to queen Dēvajamma and, affecting all humility, alleged that the new king, her adopted son, had been not only effecting unjust economies in respect of certain items of expenditure in the Palace household, but also contemplating the dismissal of trusted councillors like himself with a view to their substitution by men of his own selection. He also cautioned her not to listen to representations to the contrary of Chāmarāja in the matter, and sought her permission to devise a scheme whereby Chāmarāja's efforts could be counteracted. Too credulous to probe into the

4. *Annals*, I. 166-167; cf. *Wilks*, I. 253.

5. *Ibid.*, 167.

intricacies of the situation, the queen, it is added,⁶ desired Dēvarājaiya to do what seemed expedient to him.

The *Coup d'état*,
c. January 1733. Meantime, the details of the plot having been disclosed to Chāmarāja

Wodeyar, he forthwith removed both Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya and Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya from the offices they held, and appointed in their place Dēvaiya, a Brāhman, and Vira Seṭṭi, a Vaiśya. This bold counter-stroke, so sharply delivered, was followed by other changes effected equally quickly in the personnel of the administration. Gōpīnāthaiya (Gōpīnātha-Paṇḍit) became the Pradhān, while one Kanṭhīravaiya, Kaḍūr Chikkaiya, Nāraṇappa and Śivanappa were made councillors. This done, Chāmarāja Wodeyar began his independent rule about January 1733.⁷ The *Fort St. George Records* of 1733⁸ may be taken to echo the course that internal history took in Mysore about this time when, referring to the death of the "Raja of Mysaur [Mysore]" (i.e., Krishnarāja I), they speak of his country as being "in great trouble" and "confusion."

The new régime set to work with vigour combined with circumspection. Young and energetic, Chāmarāja Wodeyar soon proved himself a just ruler personally supervising the affairs of government, regulating the finances and continuing to maintain the traditions of his predecessors.⁹ Among the other officials of his time, Kumāra Dēvappaiya represented at head-quarters Chikkaiya, the king's executive officer in charge of the Coimbatore sime,¹⁰ while Śrinivāsa-Prabhu

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*, 167-168; see also and compare *Mys. Raj. Cha.*, 36; cf. *Wilks*, l.c., and S. K. Aiyangar, *o.c.*, p. 308.

8. *Desp. Eng.* (1727-1733), p. 113, para 10; *Despatch* dated January 13, 1733; *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1733), p. 13; *Council's Proceedings*.

9. *Annals*, I. 167-168; cf. *Wilks*, I. 253-254.

10. See *M.E.R.*, 1925, App. A. P. 10, No. 16 (1733); also f.n. 13 *infra*.

was the chief officer of Seringapatam, the capital city.¹¹

The earliest available record of the reign of Chāmarāja Woḍeyar is, as already referred Gifts, grants, etc. to,¹² a lithic one dated October 22,

1732, which registers his gift of a village to the Goddess Chāmunḍēśvari. A private copper-plate charter from Coimbatore, dated June 22, 1733,¹³ refers to his rule. A similar record from Venkaṭaiyana-chaṭra, dated September 30, 1733,¹⁴ also belongs to his reign, though his name is not found specifically mentioned in it.

The period of independent rule of Chāmarāja Woḍeyar is, perhaps, best reflected by the contemporary work *Śringārarājatilaka-Bhāṇaḥ*¹⁵ (c. 1733-1734) which refers¹⁶

Social life. to him as the son of Krishṇarāja governing the kingdom of Mysore from the capital city of Seringapatam, also known as *Karivaradarāja-pura* (after the presiding Śrī-Vaiṣṇava deity Ranganātha or Karivarada of the place). The city was, during the reign, a flourishing centre of social and cultural life, adorned with richly decorated and beautiful mansions (*nilaya, saudha*), and inhabited by contented and pious families whose members were known for their attainments in sacred lore, philosophy, logic, grammar and music (played on instruments like

11. See *Śringārarājatilaka-Bhāṇaḥ*, p. 3; also f.n. 20 *infra*.

12. *Vide* f.n. 3 *supra*. A portion of the text of this record relating to the details of the gift (ll. 9-12), as published in the original, is irretrievably lost.

13. *M.E.R.*, 1925, l.c.: K.Y. 4834, s. 1657, *Pramāḍīcha*, Āṇi 23, Friday. The *śaka* date as given in this Tamil record is an error for 1655. See also f.n. 10 *supra*.

14. *E. C.*, IV (2) Ch. 139: s. 1655, *Pramāḍīcha*, *Aśvīja śu.* 3, Sunday.

15. Ms. No. 12,708 of the *Des. Cat. Sans. Mss.* (Vol. XXI) in the *Mad. Or. Lib.* The page references, cited here, are from an authenticated copy of this Ms., obtained from the Library.

16. See Prologue, pp. 1-3: *Kriṣṇarāja nṛpōdara vasudhābādhī sudhakarasya rajasrī Chāmarāja rājanyasya; Mahīśūra maṇḍalākhaṇḍala Chāmarāja rājanyakara pālita Śrīranganagara śimā.*

the lute, tabour, etc.), and whose normal activities extended to the study and exposition of the *Vēdas* and the *Śāstras* and display of talents in dialectics and literature, and of proficiency in lute and the fine arts (like sculpture, etc.).¹⁷ Avināśīśvara, the author of the *Śringāra-rājatilaka-Bhāṇaḥ*, describes himself as a disciple of one Śēshādri-Guru. He belonged to a learned family, being the grandson of Īśvara (of Vandavāśi-kula and Ātrēyasa-gōtra) and son of Śrī-Rāma by Venkaṭāmbā, Śrī-Rāma having been celebrated as an expert scholar in *Sūrya-Siddhānta* and other sciences (*Sūrya-Siddhāntādi samasta śāstra pravīṇaḥ . . . Śrī-Rāma viduṣhaḥ*).¹⁸

Like the *Anangavijaya-Bhāṇaḥ*, noticed in an earlier chapter,¹⁹ the *Śringārarājatilaka-Bhāṇaḥ* of Avināśīśvara, above referred to, is a dramatic piece in Sanskrit, intended to be enacted before a cultured audience on the occasion of the vernal festival of God Śrī-Ranganātha of Seringapatam, a festival which had been, we are told, stopped for some time but revived by Śrīnivāsa-Prabhu, chief officer of Chāmarāja Wodeyar, under Royal orders.²⁰ The play begins with invocations to Gaṇēśa, Īśvara and Manmatha, followed by the prologue (*prastāvanā*) pointing to the time, place, authorship and the circumstances under which it was written, as detailed above. The theme of the work is, as the name itself indicates, erotic, centring round the love and union

17. Pp. 1-2: *Vēda vēdānta tarka śabda mīmāṃsādi . . . vīṇā mṛdanga nināda; śāstrēvā . . . paramata-dhvaṃsam . . . vīṇā vādah . . . nigama śīrō vighrahaḥ . . . sāhityasya prakāṣanamalam śilpa-vidyā vinūdaḥ.*

18. Pp. 4, 81.

19. Ante Ch. I: see under *Literary progress*.

20. P. 3: *Chāmarāja rājanyasyājñayā sakalādhikāra dhurandharēṇa svāmī kāryānta chitta vrittinā . . . Śrīnivāsēna tēnaiva nāmṇā prakhyātēna prabhuṇā . . . chirakāla parihṛta mahōtsavasya pūjita rājīva jātādi rājarājasya Karivaradarājasya svāmīnaḥ punarabdhhyate nūтана Vasantōtsavaḥ; also p. 5: Sabhyāśoka bahu sārājnāḥ.*

of two imaginary characters Madhuparāja—hero and principal interlocutor—and Santānamālā, the heroine. The major portion of the play is devoted to the painting of an idealized picture, portrayed through the principal interlocutor, of the life and manners of the times, especially as seen about the season of the Spring (April-May), when Cupid is said to sway human passions.²¹ There are characteristic touches here and there, in the play, which hold up to us, as if in a mirror, the social laxities of the day. The growth of the social evil is painted for us in no uncertain manner. If unequal marriages contributed something towards this unfortunate result, there is no doubt that increase of wealth and luxury added their quota to it.²² That is the impression that this little play produces on us. Even more piquantly suggestive in the same direction is another, but still longer, dramatic piece of this period (namely, the *Anangavijaya-Bhāṇaḥ*). Similar in point of methodology, style and diction to the *Anangavijaya-Bhāṇaḥ*, the *Śringāra-rājatilaka Bhāṇaḥ* illumines what is otherwise obscure in this reign. It should certainly have appealed to the popular imagination of the time as we see it described in the play itself as a means of popular entertainment (*sakalajana-manōranjakam . . . rūpakama-bhinavam*).

Chāmarāja Wodeyar had three consorts, one of whom having been married to him before his accession and the other two in May 1732.²³ Dēvājamma (perhaps identical with Dēvājamma, daughter of Nanjarājaiya of Śūlagiri, referred to in the *Annals*²⁴), one of these consorts, made the gift of a gold necklace (*bhaṅgārada kaṇṭhābharana*) to the Goddess Svarṇāmbikā (Honnāmbikā) in the temple of Gangādhareśvara at Śivaganga, in

21. Pp. 6-31.

23. *Annals*, I. 164-165.

22. See pp. 11-13, 16, etc.

24. I. 165.

or about October 1732.²⁵ Chāmarāja had, however, no issue.²⁶

During the period covered by the reign of Chāmarāja Wodeyar in Mysore, thus far sketched, there prevailed considerable disquiet and confusion in South India, particularly in the Karnāṭak.²⁷ The deaths of the Nawābs of Cuddapah and Kurnool and of Vijayaranga-Chokkanātha of Madura in 1731-32 had plunged these parts in civil wars and disputed successions. In Tanjore, Tukōji (1728-1735) had succeeded Sarfōji (1712-1727) as the ruler, though he had not yet been formally acknowledged by the Mughal. The authority of the Nāzimate of Arcot over the south was very feeble owing to the long sickness of Nawāb Sādatullā Khān in his last days. Since 1732 Mahratta raids had been a regular feature of the times in the Karnāṭak and parts of the kingdom of Mysore, including Adoni (Ādavāni), Nārāyaṇa-Peṭṭah and Bangalore (the "Vengalour" of the *Fort St. George Records*), affecting the commercial interests of the English East India Company in Southern India.²⁸ *The Fort St. George Records*²⁹ of the time speak of these raids as impeding and obstructing the inland trade of the country,

25. See *E. C., Bangalore Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nl. 123. The actual expressions used in the inscription (ll. 1-6) on the medallion (*paḍaka*) of the necklace are:

*Śrī Śivagange Svarṇāmbike ammanavarige Mahiśūra samsthānada Chāmarāja Waḍeyaravara dharmā-patniyavarādānthā Dyāvāja amma-
niyavara sēvārtha.*

Since we have a lithic record of Chāmarāja Wodeyar, dated October 22, 1732, registering a gift of his in the Māgaḍi taluk, Bangalore district (see f.n. 3 and 12 *supra*), this gift, in the Nelamangala taluk of the same district, appears also to have been made by his consort in or about October 1732, evidently during a Royal tour.

26. *Annals*, l.c.

27. *Vide*, for general references on this section, *Desp. Eng.* (1727-1733), pp. 113, 115, paras 10, 22; *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1733), p. 13; (1734), p. 3. For specific references, see *infra*.

28. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1733), p. 13; (1734), p. 3: *Council's Proceedings*.

29. *Ibid*; also *Desp. Eng.* (1727-1733), p. 113, para 10: *Despatch* dated. January 13, 1733.

particularly the sale of broad-cloth and woollen goods. In January 1733, there were already expectations of Nizām-ul-mulk proceeding to the south to settle it.³⁰ Meanwhile affairs in Malabar had been tending to a crisis. As far back as 1727, Cunhi Homo, Prince Regent of the kingdom of Cotata³¹ in the country of "Colastree" (or Kolattiri)³² in Malabar, undertook to reduce to obedience the Moors³³ of the family of Ali Rājah³⁴ of Cannanore. Hard pressed by the

30. *Desp. Eng.* (1727-1733), pp. 113, 115, paras 10, 22: *Ibid.*

31. *Cotata*: Cotiote, Kottāyatt (Mal.), adjectival form of Cōṭṭāyam. Cōṭṭāyam forms the northern division of Travancore, divided into 11 taluks; has more than a third of the population of the whole of the Travancore State; former head-quarters of the Cōṭṭāyam rājas; now almost wholly inhabited by Syrian Christians, who form a thriving community. It is the entrepôt of all the trade to and from the Madura country to Aleppy. The taluk of Cōṭṭāyam is bounded on the north by Chiracal and originally formed part of the country of the Chiracal rājas, with whom the Travancore rājas are connected. This relationship continues to be recognised to the present day. Adoptions from the northern Kolattiri (Chiracal) family are common on failure of heirs in the Travancore ruling family (*Madras Manual of Administration*, III. 230).

32. *Colastree* (or *Colastry*): Portuguese form of Colattiri (Kolattiri) or Colatnāḍ. Its rāja was known as the Colattiri Rāja, the chief who ruled over *Colam* (Kollam), North Malabar. He was called *Colasvarāpam* or the Colattiri Rāja. Colattiri means holy ruler of Colam (Kollam) or North Malabar. His dynasty was known as Colam (Kollam), Colastry, Colatnāḍ, or North Malabar. The Colattiris were the agents of the Perumāls who had their head-quarters at Tiruvānjikulam in Cochin. Their jurisdiction extended over lands around Collam (Kollam) as the title signifies. On the departure of the last of the Perumāls to Mecca, they became independent. They are now respectively the Chiracal rājas in Malabar and the Travancore rulers.

33. *Moors*: the Moplahs (or Māpiḷlas) are referred to in the *Fort St. George Records* by this name; supposed descendants of Arab immigrants on the West Coast. The Arab settlers were originally patronised by the Zāmorin of Calicut which, by their enterprise, became—prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in 1498—a great entrepôt of the trade between East and West. At about that time, the Zāmorin had become the ruler of nearly the whole of the country forming the West Coast.

34. *Ali Rājah*: The Moplah chief of Cannanore. The descendant of the old Sultāns of Cannanore, who goes by this name, resides here. Cannanore belonged to the Chiracal rājas—also called Colattiri rājas—and was formerly their residence. There was a quarters there called Cannanore with 390 Nambudiri homes, all of which have now become extinct. The Moplahs occupied it and their ruling family goes by the name of Ali Rājah.

enemy, the latter were induced to apply for help to the neighbouring kingdom of Ikkēri (the "Bednure" or "Canara" of the *Tellicherry Letters*), a sea-power, between whom and Cotata a strict peace had been observed for many years. Roused by the aggressions of Cotata on the borders of his country, Sōmasēkhara Nāyaka II of Ikkēri (1715-1739), in April 1730, espoused the cause of the Moors and despatched his forces against Malabar under his general Raghunāthaiya (the "Ragounat," "Regounatt," "Ragonatt" of the *Letters*). The Prince of Cotata, foreseeing the futility of contending with his opponents, patched up a peace with the Moors but found himself unable to arrest the progress of the arms of Ikkēri (the "Cannarees" of the *Letters*), who were bent upon seizing an exceedingly rich pagoda called Tāliparambat,³⁵ situated near Mount Delly.³⁶ In January 1732, he allied himself with the Zāmorin of Calicut and surrounded the enemy. The latter, however,

35. *Tāliparambat*: A place of pilgrimage in Chiracal taluk, Malabar district; so called after the chief temple of Colatnād; head-quarters of a Deputy Tahsildār; 18 miles from Cannanore; has three ancient temples known as Kanniyanangād, Tāliparamba and Trichambaram. It is situated on the river of the same name (Tāliparamba), which, rising from the lower slopes of Western Ghāṭs, passes through Tāliparamba; the main branch is here joined by one from the east, and the two together spread out into an extensive sheet of water. Bending slightly to the north and passing under a ruined fort of Colattiri, the united streams then suddenly turn at Payyangādi, due south, and run parallel to the sea till they meet the Billiapatam river—referred to below—united to which they force themselves a passage to the sea through the sand shoals thrown up by the littoral currents. A large tract of fertile garden has been formed by the continuous action of the littoral currents damming up the mouth of this river. The river is about 51 miles in length. The main branch is navigable at all seasons for boats as far as the lower slopes of the Ghāṭ mountains.

36. *Mount Delly*: Lit. Rat-Hill; also called *Saptasāila* or seven hills. Portuguese travellers styled it Mount D'Eli; hence the corruption into Delly. A detached hill forming a prominent landmark, visible 27 miles at sea. There are creeks on either side, the junction of which make it an island. Once a noted place for pirates. This was the first Indian land seen by Vasco da Gama. A project for the construction of a harbour here was abandoned on account of expense. The modern fort was built on a bluff projecting into the sea by the Portuguese.

succeeded in putting their opponents to rout and pursuing their conquests as far as Billiapatam river,³⁷ where they raised a fortification. In October, the Prince was obliged to sue for peace with Raghunāthaiya, not only agreeing to pay an annual contribution to the chief of Ikkēri but also permitting him to build three forts in Malabar in return for securing his help in the reduction of the Moors of Cannanore, who had even attempted his assassination.³⁸ On the conclusion of this peace, the course of politics in Malabar assumed a new turn. Cannanore became the objective of the Prince of Cotata. Early in January 1733 the combined armies marched on thither and, on the 8th, began operations by making a vigorous attack on the southernmost fort of the Moors called Codallay, from which the allies were repulsed with loss. This was, however, followed by the siege of Cannanore itself, towards the close of January. The Moors put up a stout opposition, giving the struggle the colour of a religious war in consequence of one of their priests—highly revered amongst them—having been put to death

37. *Billiapatam river*: Otherwise known as Neytarpoya river; rises with the Lakshmanatūrtha and the Pāpanāsi in the Brahmagiri hills in the Kiggaṇṇāḍ of Coorg where it is called the Barapoḷe. It flows for several miles in almost a straight line and then westwards through the Malabar district into the Arabian Sea; unites with the Tāḷiparamba river at the port of Billiapatam. Its upper course lies amid deep gorges and wild forest scenery, one of its tributaries falling over a perpendicular rock of great height, forming a cascade near Coḍiyāl Coffee Estate.

38. *Letters. Tellī*. (1732-1733), p. 61: *Letter* dated July 19, 1733; also pp. 7-8: *Letter* dated December 11, 1732. The name of Raghunāthaiya—spelt as “Ragounat,” etc., in the *Tellicherry Letters* noticed above—is mentioned in the list of officers of Śōmaśākhara Nāyaka II of Ikkēri (1715-1739), as given in the *Ke. N. V.* (X. 196, f.n. 1). This work, however, has no detailed account of the Nāyaka’s relations with Malabar, beyond the reference to his confinement of certain English factors whom he had found to be intriguing with the Nairs (X. 188, v. 67: *Durūlaraha Nāyīmārara nuru kūḍisi kuhakageyyutiha kumbaḷeyavara sāmantarannure piḍitarisute durgadoḷagankeyam māḍisidam*). Cf. *Impl. Gaz.* (XVII. 57) which refers to the invasion of the country of Kolattiri, and the imposition of fines on the northern division, by the Rāja of Ikkēri or Bednūr in 1736. In the light of the *Tellicherry Letters*, above cited, we have to infer that the relations of Ikkēri with Malabar began as early as 1730.

by the troops of Ikkēri.³⁹ The siege (of Cannanore) was protracted during 1733-1734 and became complicated by the Anglo-French-Dutch rivalry on the West Coast on the one side and the troubled internal state of Malabar on the other. In particular, the aggressions of the well-organized and promising sea-power of Ikkēri in the Malabar country and her long presence in Cannanore became a source of suspicion and alarm alike to the local princes and the English factors at Tellicherry, whose pepper trade (for which they had acquired special privileges from the Nair rulers of Cotata, Calicut and other places) was being considerably affected in consequence. Since January 1733, it accordingly became the key-note of the policy of the English to devise measures—in their own interests, no less than in the interests of their rivals, the French—for drawing off the Prince of Cotata from his ally by endeavouring to effect a peace with the Moors, to organize all the country powers (including the Moors) into a confederacy headed by the Prince, to lead them in expelling from Malabar the army of Ikkēri regarded as the common enemy, and to secure French support for the project by means of a treaty.⁴⁰ In 1733, sanguine in the expectations of assistance from the English, a confederacy of local powers (including the Zāmorin, the Heads of Tāliparambat, etc.), led by the Prince of Cotata, began to work actively against Ikkēri. At the same time the

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 19-21, 26-27 and 40: *Letters* dated November 21, 1732, January 3, 14, 24, and February 22, 1733.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 8, 14, 20-23, 27-30, 33, 36-41, 45-46, 49-50, 52, 57-59, 62-63, 68-70: *Letters* dated November 21, December 11, 1732, and January 3, 10, 14, 24, February 9, 13, 22, 28, March 13, April 3, 8, May 29, June 20, July 19, and September 15, 1733. "The French first settled at Calicut in 1698. In 1726 they obtained a footing at Mabe . . . The English established themselves in 1664 at Calicut, in 1683 at Tellicherry, and in 1684 at Anjengo, Chotwai and other commercial factories. Tellicherry became their chief entrepôt for the pepper trade and so rapid was the extension of their power and influence that in 1737 the English factors mediated a peace between the Princes of Kanara and Kolattiri. They obtained the exclusive privilege of purchasing the valuable products of the country, namely, pepper, cardamoms and sandal wood." (*Impl. Gaz.*, l.c.).

position of the latter in Malabar was becoming critical in the extreme on account of the fatigue, expense and hazard of the siege of Cannanore, the futility of her negotiations with the English for concluding a peace with the Moors and the pressure of Nizām-ul-mulk on her. Apprised as she was of the real intentions of her ally (the Prince of Cotata) and of the country powers and the English, there was every prospect of Ikkēri withdrawing herself from the siege and entering on an intensive campaign of carrying fire and sword in the Malabar country.⁴¹

The course of affairs in Malabar, thus far described, had its repercussions on Mysore under Chāmarāja Wodeyar, referred to in the *Tellicherry Letters* of the time as "the King of Misure [Mysore], an inland power" and "a profest enemy of the Carnatick Rajah [Sōmaśekhara Nāyaka II of Ikkēri]." ⁴² Already towards the close of the reign of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, as we have seen, ⁴³ Mysore had shown a tendency to advance in the direction of Malabar and made an impression on the ruling chiefs of that region as a power to reckon with. Accordingly, about February 1733, the Prince of Cotata, in his project against Ikkēri, sought the assistance of Mysore in horse and foot "who," it is said, "have been long expected." ⁴⁴ Early in February, "a party of men, with some of the ministers of the King of Misure . . . were come into the King of Cotata country, offering such a force of horse and foot as might be thought sufficient to compell the Cannarees [Ikkērians] to leave the Mallabar cuntry, and in consideration of which a very considerable

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37, 39, 41, 45, 49, 52, 55, 59, 69 and 71: *Letters* dated February 13, 28, March 13, April 3, 8, May 19, June 20 and September 15, 1733.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 33: *Letter* dated February 9, 1733. The reference to the professed enmity between Mysore and Ikkēri is in keeping with the position of the local sources, developed in the earlier chapters of this work.

43. *Ante*, Vol. I, Ch. XI.

44. *Letters. Tellī.* (1732-1733), p. 49: *Letter* dated April 3, 1733.

sum of money was demanded by them from the Heads of the Pagoda of Talliperumbutt.”⁴⁵ By March, “the King [of Mysore] had agreed to joyn the confederacy, and to furnish one thousand horse and five thousand foot, which with the forces of the countrey could not fail of producing success.”⁴⁶ By April, “one thousand horse and a number of foot” were expected on the confines of the dominions of Cotata.⁴⁷ Since May, “through the application made by the Heads of the Pagoda Talliparambutt, five hundred horse and two thousand foot of the Misure forces” were actually in the King of Cotata’s country, with an expectation of an additional reinforcement of 500 horse and 3,000 foot, whose services had been engaged from the first of April for “twenty-five thousand pagodas of thirteen and a half fanams each per month.”⁴⁸ In October 1733, contrary to the articles of their treaty with the English, the French at Mâhe attempted, through M. Louet, “concluding a peace between the Cannarees and Moors” with views presumably “of grasping the pepper trade about Agar and Billiapatam to themselves.”⁴⁹ Their activities, however, were counteracted by the English who only found in the Dutch a serious competitor demanding from the Moors the delivery to them of the fort of Codallay.⁵⁰ These developments, it would appear, told heavily on the Prince of Cotata who, by December 1733, had begun to show signs of apathy in his design against Ikkēri and, “for want of a due confidence in his confederates,” we are told, was “busy in robbing them of what money he could,” giving trouble to the English and plundering the

45. *Ibid.*, p. 33: l.c.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 45: *Letter* dated March 12, 1733; also *Telli. Cons.* (1732-1733), p. 47: *Letter* dated March 6, 1733.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 52 and 56: *Letters* dated April 3, 8 and May 19, 1733.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 57 and 62: *Letters* dated May 29 and July 19, 1733.

49. *Ibid.* (1733-1734), pp. 2-3, 7 and 17: *Letters* dated October 31, December 6 and 29, 1733.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 7: *Letter* dated December 6, 1733.

merchants of his country.⁵¹ At the same time, there prevailed a belief that the Mysore forces were being secretly engaged in the interests of Raghunāthaiya of Ikkēri.⁵² Though the situation seemed favourable for the expulsion of Ikkēri from Malabar, by January 1734 the confederacy itself began to dwindle away owing primarily to the Prince's jealousy of the country powers, their fickleness, and the covert removal by the Heads of the Tāliparambat, of the greatest part of their treasure lodged in the Cotata country.⁵³ During January-March, disappointed in his expectation of financial assistance from his confederates (particularly the Heads of Tāliparambat), the Prince of Cotata was in the utmost straits, unable to meet the heavy arrears due to the Mysore forces in his country, who had been kept inactive since May 1733. He began, therefore, systematically to put off the issue.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, French intrigues with the Prince and with Raghunāthaiya continued to be active, adding to the concern of the English.⁵⁵ Early in April 1734, the situation in Cotata became serious. The Mysore troops, in the language of the *Letter from Tellicherry*,⁵⁶ "became so impatient that they marched inland to a small fortress where he [the Prince] had retired to, pressing for their pay; but the (? they) Mallabar like fired on them, and the country flocking to his assistance, they made a disorderly retreat to the bazar of Cotata, with the loss of severall of their men, and not thinking themselves safe there, they exprest a contentment to depart, being permitted so to do, and advanced up to the Hills, where the passages are very narrow and difficult to ascend, many of them were . . . picked off by a party of the King's people, and what little they had saved taken from them."

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8: l.c.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 8: l.c.; also p. 13: *Letter* dated December 27, 1733.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21, 23: *Letters* dated January 9 and 17, 1734.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 23 and 45: *Letters* dated January 17, February 23 and April 8, 1734.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 23: l.c.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 45: l.c.

Though the alliance of the Ruling Prince of Cotata with Mysore—on which there is so far very little light from the Mysore side—was thus an ill-fated one, it is of considerable interest to us throwing as it does sidelights on the kingdom of Mysore, during the period of the independent rule of Chāmarāja Wodeyar (1733-1734), as an important inland military power figuring in the complicated foreign politics of the times. It was, however, about two months after the return of the Mysore army from the Malabar country that an event of far-reaching consequences took place in the capital city of Seringapatam, to which we have necessarily to advert now.

However just and beneficial was the independent rule

Internal affairs: of Chāmarāja Wodeyar since January

The First Revolution in Seringapatam, June 1734.

1733, his domestic policy during the period tended to become a source of trouble to himself. Under the liberal but ill-controlled management of the dowager-queen, there were opportunities for reckless expenditure in the Royal household. Chāmarāja Wodeyar attempted to minimise them, consistently with economy and expediency. This naturally resulted in considerable discontent among the officials in the personal service of the dowager, before whom they began to ventilate their grievances in a manner prejudicial to Chāmarāja. The queen took them at their word, being confirmed in her innocent belief by the previous allegations of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya against Chāmarāja Wodeyar. The situation proved eminently advantageous to all the three officers of the former regime (namely, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, Sarvādhi-kāri Nanjarājaiya, and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya) who, smarting under their recent removal from office and believing Chāmarāja to be in the full know of all their doings, were driven to the necessity of organizing a plot to subvert his rule.⁵⁷ One night, about June 1734,

⁵⁷ *Annals*, I. 168. Compare this source (cited here and in f.n. 58-61 *infra*).

we are told,⁵⁸ they covertly made their way to the camp of the Mysore army outside the Seringapatam fort, and approached Jamādār Gulām Haidar Ali (uncle of the future Nawāb Haidar Ali Khān Bahadūr) and other military officers, then serving under Mallarājaiya of Maddagiri. Having won them over by their ill-gotten wealth, and holding out to them better prospects in their own employ, they incited them, by fair words, to have their dues disbursed to them by the Seringapatam Government and quit the service of Chāmarāja Wodeyar. Shortly after, a contingent of 2,000 horse and 6,000 foot, on the disbursement of their pay, left the Mysore army and encamped at a distance of about three miles from the capital. On receipt of this news, Dēvarājaiya raised a loan of rupees two lakhs from a local merchant by name Jagannātha Dās and advanced it to the soldiery, requiring them to be ready for the emergency. It was the custom of the times for the Mysore army, runs the narrative,⁵⁹ to proceed on a march every Friday to the parade ground, at a distance of about six miles from the fort of Seringapatam, to conduct military exercises. One Friday (*i.e.*, on June 7, 1734), Daḷavāi Dēvaiya, as usual, led on the major portion of his forces outside the fort. At this long-expected opportunity, the ex-Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya gave the signal for his mercenaries to assemble, blocked up the return passage of the Mysore troops by posting his own guards over the main entrance to the fort, and, accompanied by an armed retinue, made a sally into the capital city and stood before the very gates of the Palace. Astounded at these developments, continues the account,⁶⁰ Chāmarāja Wodeyar, unarmed and helpless, sent word to Dēvarājaiya explaining the course of affairs leading to his

with the authorities noticed in f.n. 61 *infra*. The circumstances connected with the revolution of 1734 in the kingdom of Mysore are described in the *Annales* with a genuineness of local knowledge and a depth of insight into human nature, which it is hard to ignore.

58. *Ibid.*, 169.

59. *Ibid.*, 169-170.

60. *Ibid.*, 170.

misunderstanding with his former councillors and promising, in all humility, to govern the kingdom solely with their consent, if they would only desist from their proceedings. But all his importunities were in vain. Determined to push matters to the extreme, Dēvarājaiya, with the aid of an elephant named *Rāmabāṇa*, dashed to pieces the principal gate (*āne bāgilu*) of the Palace and, having secured his position at the entrance, sent in a jamādār by name Nāgōji Rao. Then were the insignias of state wrested from Chāmarāja Wodeyar and placed on the throne. And on June 10, 1734 (*Ānanda, Jyēṣṭha* *ba.* 5), the narrative concludes,⁶¹ Chāmarāja was formally deposed and despatched with his family under an escort to the prison of Kabbāl-durg—not far from Seringapatam—where, under the dreadful insalubrity of the climate, he passed away not long after. His departure from the capital city, which was agonizing in the extreme judging from the bitter curses he is said to have pronounced on his captor Dēvarājaiya, was followed by the arrest and imprisonment of the seven councillors of his choice, including Daḷavāi Dēvaiya, Sarvādhikāri Vira Setṭi and Pradhān Gōpīnāthaiya.

Thus disappears from history Chāmarāja Wodeyar in his thirtieth year, after a reign of but two years and three months—the first nine months under the sway of the councillors of the Kalale House and the next eighteen in

Reflections.

61. *Ibid.*, 170-171. The *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (36-37) contains a very brief but rather suspicious account of Chāmarāja Wodeyar's rule. This work generally extols the Daḷavāis of the Kalale Family and would maintain that Chāmarāja himself resigned the kingship, having, under the evil influence of his new councillors, misgoverned for a period of two years and three months. It has not a word about the conduct of the members of the Kalale House and the king's deposition by Dēvarājaiya. On the other hand, even the *Rāj. Kath.* of Dēvaachandra (XII. 489) would have it that the differences between the Daḷavāis and the king led to the confinement, and subsequently death, of Chāmarāja at Kabbāl-durg. See also and compare Wilks, I. 253-255, and S. K. Aiyangar, *o.c.*, p. 308.

an independent capacity. The promising young ruler that he was, considerable pathos centres round his deposition, in bringing about which the conduct of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya cannot but be adjudged treacherous and disloyal to a degree. There is little doubt that Chāmarāja proved himself to be of too independent a turn of mind to consent accepting for ever the position of a titular king, intended for him by the all-powerful, ambitious and self-seeking members of the ministerial family. Without ignoring the accusations of his enemies,⁶² there is reason to believe that Chāmarāja was both imprudent in the measures he adopted to obtain control of the sovereignty and ill-advised in the administrative policy he chalked out for himself immediately he asserted his independence. For one thing, he left at large the ministers whom he had displaced. Next, the zeal he displayed for economy was misplaced as it helped the dismissed councillors to make common cause with the dowager who was none too pleased with him. The unpopularity to which he was subjected was fanned to flame by the old ministers, who thus found means to regain their lost power. Yet his character was not devoid of merit, nor did his Government deserve the contempt of his people or the curses of his ministers. From the story of his rule, as narrated above, we are informed of his impatience at the unworthy conduct of his advisers ; of the uncommon plenty of the times ; of the peaceful social life led by the people ; of the flourishing character of the capital city of Seringapatam, and of his desire to rule manfully as a king rather than continue to be a craven in perpetual tutelage and under the eternal control of his selfish ministers. And we know, too, from other and authentic sources that he maintained the army in a well-organized state, able indeed to go to the aid of a neighbouring chief in a time of distress.

62. See f.n. 61 *supra*.

The pathetic end of Chāmarāja's life shows that he could not have gained the love, much less the confidence, of his adoptive mother, the dowager-queen. She carried out, no doubt, the wish of her husband, and probably was not unwilling to allow him (Chāmarāja) to take a passive share in the administration. But the new king attained soon maturity of judgment; the maternal yoke became increasingly grievous; and the control of the ministers both irritating and unbearable. He liked to listen to men of his own age, who probably desired not so much to share his pleasures as his power. Their arguments convinced him of his right, their praises of his ability to reign; and he made up his mind to reward the good-will of his adoptive mother by decreeing her virtual deposition. But her ambition, if not her vigilance, easily disconcerted his rash projects; and a similar, if not more severe, punishment was retaliated on him and his advisers. A powerful conspiracy was formed for her own restoration, and the erstwhile ministers faithfully kept the secret above a year, till the time arrived for its easy execution. Shortly after the return of the forces from Malabar, they found their opportunity. They cajoled the army into acceptance of their evil designs, seized the king, made him dismount the throne on which they had put him, and transported him to the deadly hill-fortress from which he was never to return. In the heart of the dowager (who, of course, belonged to the same family as Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya and his colleagues), ambition had stifled every sentiment of humanity and filial love; and she seems to have even tacitly given her consent to the decree of the secret council that Chāmarāja should be removed from the throne and rendered incapable of it. The unhappy prince lingered a while with his wife—joint captives in Kabbāldurg, escape from which was impossible—oppressed by the queen and forgotten by his subjects. His disappearance was, as we shall

see, the signal for another adoption and the setting up of an infant on the throne, who could neither control the ex-ministers come back to power, nor stand in the way of what they desired to do. The conduct of the queen was evidently justly reprobated by her people, who would not submit themselves to her personal rule and naturally welcomed the change brought about. Nor did she, in her credulity, realize the extent of her crime, a crime which can only be paralleled, if at all, in the history of royal crimes, to that of Irene, the queen of the Romans and mother of Constantine VI (780-797). The men whom she had joined not only ruined her reputation but subverted the State itself. They had set an example which was destined to have consequences far too serious both to themselves and to the country at large. It opened the way to ambitious adventurers aiming at the throne, and hypocrisy, ingratitude and avarice gaining the upper hand in the counsels of the State to its utter detriment. In short, the Kalale Family had come to assert itself and became the arbiter of the destiny of the kingdom of Mysore.

CHAPTER IV.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766.

The *Dalavai Regime* in Mysore, 1734-1759: Birth, accession, etc., of Krishnaraja—Character of the new government—Political affairs: General tendencies and factors—*First Phase*: 1734-1739: Mysorean advance on Malabar and the South, 1735-1737—Relations with the Mughals: Mughal advance on the South, 1732-1736—Mysore, the objective of the Mughals, 1736—Their advance on Seringapatam, c. September-December 1736—Action at Kailancha, January 1737; Mughal reverses—Internal affairs, 1734-1739—*Second Phase*: 1739-1746—Retrospect of affairs: The Mughals and the Mahrattas in South India, 1737-1740—The Mahratta conquest of Trichinopoly, 1740-1741—Deccan and Karnatak politics, 1741-1744; Renewed Mughal-Mahratta struggles—The Hindu cause in Southern India (from 1736)—The Mahratta conquest of Trichinopoly (1741) and after—Trichinopoly, the southern objective of Mysore, c. 1735-1745—Mysore and Malabar, 1745-1746—*Third Phase*: 1746-1748—General political situation, 1745-1748—Karachuri Nanjarajaiya's expedition to Dhara-nagar, c. May-July 1746—His siege of Devanahalli, c. August 1746-April 1747—Renewed Mughal advance on Mysore; Nasir Jang in Seringapatam, July-October 1747—The short-lived Hindu reaction in Southern India, 1748.

THE *coup de grace* of June 10, 1734 resulted in making Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya practically master of the situation in Seringapatam. With a view ostensibly to promote the interests of the Ruling House of Mysore but really to ensure the predominance of himself and of other members of the Kaḷale Family over the administration of the State, he next represented with


The *Dalavai Regime* in Mysore, 1734-1759.

affected humility to the dowager queen Dēvājamma, the desirability of bringing about the succession of the six-year old child (b. 1728) of her kinsman Chāme Urs of Chikkana-halli, whom she had adopted under the name of Chikka-Krishnarāja Woḍeyar as early as October 8, 1731.¹ Having secured her formal consent to his proposal, Dēvarājaiya had the heir-elect brought with royal honours to Seringapatam and installed him on the throne of Mysore on June 15, 1734 (*Ānanda, Jyēṣṭha* ba. 10),² the fifth day after the deposition of Chāmarāja Woḍeyar. The new ruler thus chosen to fill the place of Chāmarāja is generally known in the chronicles as Immaḍi-Krishnarāja Woḍeyar (Krishnarajarāja Woḍeyar II) and more familiarly as Chikka-Krishnarāja Woḍeyar. Inscriptions and literary works, however, only mention him as Krishnarāja, the earliest record referring to him as such being a copper-plate charter from the Salem district, dated in 1734 (s. 1656).³

1. *Annals*, I. 172-173. The date of birth of Krishnarāja, according to this source, is *Kṛlaka* (1723). Wilks (I. 255-256) refers to the successor of Chāmarāja Woḍeyar as "Chick Kishen Raj," and speaks of him as "an infant of a younger branch." The *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (87) vaguely refers to Immaḍi-Krishnarāja as a son of dowager queen Dēvājamma of Kaḷale. The *Rāj. Kath.* (XII. 489), however, is to some extent in agreement with the *Annals* when it mentions him as her five-year old adopted son. Compare also S. K. Aiyangar (*Ancient India*, p. 308) who merely refers to the nomination of "an infant three years old." The authority of the *Annals* is, as usual, preferred here as the more specific on the accession question.
2. *Ibid.*, 173. The *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (l.c.) speaks of the installation of Krishnarāja on June 10, 1734 (*Ānanda, Jyēṣṭha* ba. 5), i.e., on the same day as Chāmarāja's deposition by Dēvarājaiya. This is impossible unless we take it to refer to the formal accession. In the troubled conditions in which the Royal household found itself by the deposition, Krishnarāja's installation must be held to have actually taken place after a short interval of four days, in keeping with the *Annals*. The *Rāj. Kath.* (l.c.) tacitly assumes that the accession came off in 1734; Wilks (l.c.) places it roughly in 1734, and S. K. Aiyangar (o.c., p. 309) also adopts the same position.
3. See *I. M. P.*, II. 1226, Sa. 202. For details about the document, *vide* under *Grants and other records* in Ch. XII.



Krishnarāja Wodeyar II, 1734-1766.



Throughout the greater part of Krishnarāja's reign—both during and after his minority—the affairs of the State, under the arrangements effected by Dēvarājaiya, were, in general, conducted by the latter himself as *Daḷavāi* (1734-1758),⁴ in collaboration with his cousin brother Nanjarājaiya III as *Sarvādhikāri* (1734-1739)⁵ and his own younger brother Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya IV,⁶ at first possibly as a colleague of his (1734-1739) and afterwards as *Sarvādhikāri* and junior *Daḷavāi* (1739-1759)—the three brothers being assisted by Venkaṭapataiya, a Brāhman of Kannambādi (*Kaṇṇapuri*) as *Pradhān* under them (1734-1755).⁷ *Daḷavāi* Dēvarājaiya held, in addition, the charge of the principality of Kaḷale also (1735-1758), in succession to Chaluvaia (1719-1735).⁸ All real power in Mysore during 1734-1759 was wielded by these members of the Kaḷale Family, whence the period becomes conspicuous in the politics of the

4. *Annals*, I. 174; see also and compare *Wilks*, I. 256-257, and S. K. Aiyangar, *o.c.*, p. 308. *Wilks* (I. 257) speaks of Dēvarājaiya ("Deo-Raj") as "being upwards of fifty" in 1734. For further references to Dēvarājaiya and his colleagues in contemporary sources, *vide* Chs. VI-XIII. For the genealogical position of the members of the Kaḷale Family, *vide* Tables XI-XIII.
5. *Wilks* (I. 256) writes of Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya ("Nunjeraj") as having been "in the vigour of middle life" in 1734.
6. Referred to as "Nandi Raj, Dalaway," etc., in the *Fort St. George Records* and other foreign sources for the period 1751-1761 (cited in Chs. VI-XI). *Wilks* (I. 257) speaks of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya ("Kerachoorj Nunjeraj") as "of about thirty years of age" in 1734. We have no means of knowing the exact official position of this Nanjarājaiya during the reigns of Krishnarāja I (1714-1732) and Chāmarāja VI (1732-1734), although, as the younger brother of *Daḷavāi* Dēvarājaiya, he appears to have wielded considerable power and influence under them. *Karāchūri* literally means the hand and dagger, and denotes a word and a blow according to the English proverbial idiom (*Wilks*, I. 257, *f.n.*). It is an epithet pointing to Nanjarājaiya as a man of dashing spirit and positive expressions, which profoundly impressed his European contemporaries (see, for instance, in Chs. VI-VIII). Cf. *Wilks*'s characterization of him (I. 257).
7. *Wilks* (I. 256) refers to him as "Venkataputty of Caniam baddy, Perdhan." For particulars of Venkaṭapati's genealogy, etc., *vide* Ch. XIII.
8. *K. A. V.*, ff. 33; also Table XIII.

kingdom as the *Daḷavāi Rēgime*. The interests of Kalāle in the court of Mysore were, as usual, further strengthened by the marriage of Dēvājamma, daughter of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, to Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar in 1746 when he attained his majority.⁹

The period of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar's reign in Mysore (1734-1766) is for the most part synchronised by a most momentous epoch in the history of Southern India during the decline and fall of the Mughal Empire.¹⁰ Under the nominal rule of Muhammad Shah (1719-1748) and his successors at Delhi, the Nizām, as the imperial representative of the Mughals, was becoming virtual master of the Deccan and the Karnāṭak. Both during and after the rule of Shāhu at Satāra (1708-1749), the Mahrattas under Pēshwas Bāji Rao I (1720-1740) and Balāji Bāji Rao (1740-1761) were dominating the political situation from Poona, their imperialistic designs in India being a source of anxiety to the Nizām. The Nawābs of Arcot and Sira in the Karnāṭak, theoretically subject to the suzerainty of the Nizām, were more or less independent, levying contributions from the country powers within their immediate jurisdiction. Among these, however, the kingdom of Ikkēri, under Sōmaśēkhara Nāyaka II (1715-1739) and his successors, held her own, though exposed to constant Mahratta attacks. In the far south, the kingdoms of Madura and Tanjore were being torn asunder by internal dissensions, the former, in the throes of her dissolution, offering a tempting ground to the ambitions of the Nawāb of Arcot. Civil

9. See under *Domestic life*, in Ch. XIII. Wilks also (I. 260) makes mention of this marriage.

10. *Vide*, for general references on this section, Briggs, *The Nizam* (Vol. I); Duff, *History of the Marathas* (Vol. I); Kincaid and Parasnis, *History of the Maratha People* (Vol. III); C. H. I. (Vol. V); Wilks, *Mysoor* (Vol. I); Ke. N. V. (Chs. X-XII); Satyanatha Aiyar, *Nāyaks of Madura* (Ch. XIV); *Tanjore Dist. Gaz.* (Vol. I); Burhan's *Tuzak-i-Walājahi* (Part I), etc.

wars and disputed successions were the order of the day, and there was a general scramble for power in the Karnāṭak and South India as between the Nawāb, the Mahrattas and the Nizām. The situation became complicated by the Anglo-French commercial rivalry in India. In particular, the tendency of these European nations to take part and intervene in the affairs of local powers—a tendency which, as we have shown, seemed to manifest itself for the first time in Malabar in 1733—became more pronounced from 1748 onwards, especially during the period covered by the governorship of M. Dupleix, Godeheu and de Leyrit at Pondicherry (1742-1759), and of Thomas Saunders (1750-1755) and George Pigot (1755-1763) at Madras, and by the Indian careers of their Company's generals like La Bourdonnais and Law, de Bussy and Lally, Boscawen and Robert Clive, Stringer Lawrence and Coote (1746-1761).

During the early years of Krishnarāja's reign, Daḷavāi *First phase:* Dēvarājaiya had had to direct his attention to the affairs of Malabar. 1734-1739. Hostilities between the Prince of Mysorean advance on Malabar and the Cotata and Sōmasēkhara Nāyaka II South, 1735-1737. of Ikkēri continued unabated, ever since the return of the Mysore troops from Malabar to Seringapatam (April 1734) under the humiliating circumstances detailed in the last chapter. About May 1735—towards the close of the very first year of Krishnarāja's accession—a contingent of the Mysore army, consisting of two to three thousand horse and more than twenty thousand foot, advanced on Malabar,¹¹ probably by way of retaliation. The troops entered the Zāmorin's territory and between May and July reduced a considerable portion of it, meeting little opposition

11. *Telli. Cons.* (1734-1735), pp. 81-82: *Consultations* dated May 8 and 19, 1735; see also and compare *Letters. Telli.* (1734-1736), p. 13: *Letter* dated June 16, 1735.

from him.¹² By November, they had proceeded as far as Penany in the west and the kingdom of Madura in the south.¹³ The incursions of Mysore in these regions continued to be active till about the middle of 1736,¹⁴ and there seemed prospects of her being secretly induced to rejoin the Prince of Cotata against Ikkēri in 1736-1737,¹⁵ when affairs of more immediate concern began directly to press on the kingdom of Mysore.

As indicated in the preceding chapter, since 1732, there prevailed considerable distraction in the Karnāṭak and South India. The kingdom of Madura in the far south, in particular, was passing through troubled times under Minākshi, queen and successor of Vijayaranga-Chokkanātha (1706-1732).¹⁶ On the death of the latter without issue in 1732, Minākshi adopted a boy named Vijaya-Kumāra, coming from a collateral branch of the Nāyaka family of Madura; and attempted to secure popular recognition of her rule. She was, however, opposed by Bangāru-Tirumala, father of the adopted son, and Daḷavāi Venkaṭāchārya, who

Relations with the
Mughals:

Mughal advance
on the South, 1732-
1736.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Letters. Tellī.* (1734-1736), p. 29: *Letter* dated November 17, 1735 *Penany*: Identified with Ponnāny (from *Pon-gold*; *nānyam*-coin, the Arabic cash which was first circulated by Arab and Iranian merchants); situated at the mouth of the Ponnāny river, the longest river which discharges into the Arabian Sea in Malabar proper; taluk head-quarters, 186 miles S. W. of Bangalore; important sea-port between Cochin and Calicut; nearest port to Pālghāṭ gap; once proposed terminus of Madras Railway; the Moplah high priest lives here; centre of Muhammadan education on the west coast, possessing a religious college which confers degrees; the population supports itself by fishing and trade, having numerous *puttimars* which ply to Sūrat, Arabia, Bombay, Madras and even as far as Bengal, exporting principally pepper, betel, rice, cocoanuts, iron and very fine timber sent down the river from the *ghāṭs*. The Ponnāny taluk is the southernmost in the Malabar district.

14. *Letters from Fort St. George* (1736), pp. 51-52; *Letter* No. 80, dated September 6, 1736; see also *Tellī. Cons.* (1737-1738) p. 52: *Consultation* dated December 26, 1737.

15. See *Tellī. Cons.* (1737-1738), p. 111: *Consultation* dated May 20, 1738.

16. *Vide*, on this section, *Nāyaks of Madura*, pp. 232-234; *Wilks*, I. 271-273; *G. H. I.*, V. 117; *Haid. Nam.* (1784), ff. 3, and *Tuzak*. (1751), pp. 6-78, 82. See also *f.n.* 35 and 69 *infra*.

formed an alliance to depose her. Meantime, in the Karnāṭak, Nawāb Sādatullā Khān (1708-1733) died, and was succeeded by his nephew Alī Dōst Khān (1733-1740) to the Mughal Nizāmat of Arcot. In 1734, about a year after his accession, Nawāb Alī Dōst Khān, ostensibly to intercede on behalf of Mīnākshi (who is said to have sought his help) but really to reduce the kingdoms of Madura and Tanjore, despatched an army to the south under his only son Safdar Alī and one of his sons-in-law Chandā Sāhib (Husain Dōst Khān). The forces marched on to Trichinopoly, where, after protracted negotiations, Chandā swore by the *Korān* to safeguard the interests of Mīnākshi as ruler of Madura and guarantee her undisputed possession of Trichinopoly in return for, it is said, a crore of rupees promised by her. The queen having, however, in the meanwhile formally reconciled herself with Bangāru-Tirumala, sent him and his son to Madura; and Safdar Alī and Chandā Sāhib returned to Arcot. In due course, the faction kept up by Bangāru against the queen became more active, and Chandā Sāhib had to pay a second visit to Trichinopoly early in 1736. He treacherously usurped all power, capturing Mīnākshi. The latter, disappointed, took poison and died; Nāyaka rule in Madura became extinct, and Bangāru sought refuge in Śivaganga. Master of Trichinopoly, Chandā took possession of Madura and Diṇḍigal, placing two of his brothers, Sādak Sāhib and Baḍē Sāhib (Zainullābdīn Khān), over those places. By the middle of 1736, the authority of the Nawāb of Arcot—as a Mughal representative, independent of the Nizām—seemed to extend over a greater part of Southern India, with the exception of Mysore.

Mysore had remained a thorn in the side of the Nawāb. During 1735-1736, her army was, as we have seen, active in Malabar and the south, and was even

Mysore, the objective of the Mughals, 1736.

engaged with the kingdom of Madura,¹⁷ apparently taking advantage of the internal dissensions there under Mīnākshi. Partly alarmed by these movements and partly attracted as usual by the imagined riches of Mysore, Nawāb Alī Dōst Khān concerted an attack on her about August 1736, and moved on with his forces thither early in September.¹⁸ The weakness and frivolity of the then Nawāb of Sira, Tāhir Khān, who asserted a nebulous claim to extort contributions from Mysore, also contributed to this end.¹⁹

The invading army, an exceptionally large one,²⁰ was in the main commanded by two brothers by name Khāsim Khān and Murād Khān.²¹ Between September-December 1736, it passed through the Karnāṭak-Pāyanghāt, ravaging the countryside and

Their advance on
Seringapatam,
c. September-December
1736.

17. *Vide* letter cited in f.n. 13 *supra*.
18. *Letters from Fort St. George* (1736), l.c.; see also and compare *Wilks*, I. 257.
19. *Wilks*, I. 257-258. These "contributions" sought to be levied and "pēshkāsh" demanded had behind them no lawful right to justify them. Neither the right of conquest nor the right created by agreement as evidenced by a treaty was, or could be, invoked in favour of them. They were wholly predatory in character and often the payment, if any actually made, was a payment made to buy off an inconvenient disturber of the peace of the country, who had no other objective but to obtain some booty, if he could, from the countries through which he passed. It is necessary to note this fact, as the indiscriminate use of words of this kind—"contribution," "tribute," "pēshkāsh," etc.,—in some of the older writers has a tendency to create impressions of political subordination as between the States claiming and paying them, which are far from being correct. The fundamental point is that the Mysoreans, the Mahrattas and the Mughal representative (real or so-called) were each of them fighting for supremacy in the South during this period and they asserted their claims in varying forms and recorded, as they thought, their success in varying degrees.
20. The contemporary Kannaḍa work *Saundara-Kāvya* (c. 1740) of Nūronḍa (V, 6) refers to the Mughal army of the Nawāb as having been made up of one *akshaukhini*, which, of course, has to be taken to mean a large and well-equipped force. For an account of this work, *vide* under *Literary activity* in Ch. XIII. See also and compare *Wilks*, I. 258.
21. *Sarind. Kāv.*, V, 13, VIII, 96. According to this work (V, 9-15), even Dōst Ali is said to have taken part in the expedition, along with Sikandar Khān, Ambar Khān, Ibrāhim Khān, Abdul Nabi Bahadūr Khān, Chānd Khān, Dilāvar Khān, and others. See also *Wilks*, l.c.

reducing Baiche-Gauḍa of Chikballāpur, and finally, marching past Hoskōṭe and Bangalore, encamped on the extensive field of Kailancha (*Kailanchada viśāla-bīḍu*), not far from Channapaṭṇa.²² At this news, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya set about making grand preparations for the defence of Seringapatam, ordering a general mobilisation of the forces from the 84 administrative units (*gaḍi*).²³ Meanwhile an agent (*niyōgi*) from the Nawāb's camp, we learn,²⁴ advised the authorities in Seringapatam to make peace with the invader and save the situation, but he received a stern reply to the contrary and was obliged to retire from the capital city.

Early in January 1737, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, with Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya as second in command, marched on at the head of a well-equipped army, to oppose the enemy.²⁵ Passing through the plain of Maṇḍya, he halted on the banks of the Shimśā at Maddūr, from where he arranged through experienced scouts (*ballida kaḷḷa-baṇṭaru*) to study the situation. On receipt of their report, he resumed his march and advanced in the direction of Channapaṭṇa. Splitting up the vanguard of his army (*chūni bala*) into convenient divisions, he next proceeded towards Kailancha, and from a vantage ground directed Nanjarājaiya to keep watch and ward in the camp. It was night. The sound of war-drums and trumpets accompanied by the flash of torches (*divaṭige*,

22. *Ibid.*, V, 16-29. Kailancha is an extant village, head-quarters of a *hobli* of that name in Closepet taluk, Bangalore district (see *List of Villages*, 22).

23. *Ibid.*, 30-50.

24. *Ibid.*, VI, 28-36.

25. *Vide*, on this section, *Ibid.*, VI, 38-78, VII-X. The introductory portion of a Ms. of the Telugu work *Śivabhaktavilāsam* (c. 1740) of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, also refers to Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya's signal victory over Khāsīm Khān, Murād Khān and other generals (*Sēnādhitvara Dēva bhāvibhūḍu Kāsīm Khāna māḍyan Murād khānadyudbhāṭa yāvanādhi pula sangrāmambu sangūlchi* . . .). For further reference to the work, *vide* under *Literary activity* in Ch. XIII. See also and compare *Wilks* (I. 258-259) who too places the event in 1737.

panju) from the camp of the Mysore army, attracted the attention of the enemy who sent in a party to reconnoitre the position. Next morning, on their return, a portion of the Nawāb's army, on the pretext of securing fodder (*kabāḍada nevadoḷu*), began to move in the opposite direction, to the utter surprise and excitement of their opponents. But the Mughals, in the height of their conceit, soon went off their guard (*yachchara maradu mūgarvadi barutire*). The vigilant Mysore troops turned forthwith upon them, effecting casualties in their ranks. And this became the signal for war. Roused to a pitch of fury, the main army of the Nawāb rushed on to the scene and began hostilities. Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya was equal to the occasion. He put up a stout opposition, leading the entire forces under his own command. So adroitly did he conduct the manœuvre that the Mughals, fighting in a disorderly mode from the backs of elephants and horses, soon proved a poor match for the well-organized body of trained swordsmen of Mysore. The result was that on the very first day Dēvarājaiya was able to strike panic into the advancing troops and cause considerable slaughter among them, capturing an elephant. Nevertheless, the Nawāb's generals continued to hold the field. Next day, they despatched an agent to Dēvarājaiya warning him of the consequences of a severe action. Dēvarājaiya, however, scoffing at this ruse of the enemy to force a peace on him, ordered the advance of the Mysore army under his brother Nanjarājaiya. The latter, seated on an elephant and surrounded by a select retinue of the junior members of the Kaḷale Family (*Kaḷile paṭṭada dhore dhoregaḷa makkaḷu*), directed the operations of the day, himself fighting bow and arrow in hand. The Mughals also

Mughal reverses.

resumed their position and fought desperately, presenting a united front. However, the superior tactics of the swordsmen on

the Mysore side told heavily upon them. Nanjarājaiya himself had a tough hand-to-hand fight with Bāramalla, whom he slew on the field; Murād Khān, Khāsīm Khān, Sikandar Khān and Bahadūr Khān were among other generals who fell dead on the field; the remnant of the Arcot army was put to rout amidst great loss, and the Mysoreans made prize of several horses and elephants in their camp. With the spoils of war thus obtained, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, accompanied by Nanjarājaiya, returned to Seringapatam, where, in honour of the victory, a grand *Durbār* was held shortly after.

All through the period 1734-1739, the internal affairs of Mysore were being managed in their own interests by Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya and his colleagues, who took full advantage of the minority of Krishnarāja and the weakness and credulity of the dowager queen Dēvājamma.²⁶ Jobbery and nepotism assumed an ascendancy in their administration, which was extraordinary even for those times. Civil and military posts (like those of Amildār, Śīrastēdār and Killēdār), during these years, were disposed of by Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya in favour of the nominees proposed by Dēvarājaiya and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya on the sole recommendations of the corrupt officials in their personal employ. Further, the trio used to appropriate for their private use at two to three thousand *varahas* out of the public revenues of each administrative unit (*gaḍi*), besides claiming a special share (*panya*) out of the produce of demesne or Palace lands. Their example was followed by their own servants who, in turn, appropriated at 100 to 200 *varahas* from the receipts of each division. Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya had his own share of the revenues, ranging from 500 to 1,000 *varahas* per unit.²⁷ As head of the

26. *Annals*, I. 174-175.

27. *Ibid*; see also and compare *Wilks*, I. 256-257. There is not even a whisper of this aspect of administration of the Daḷavāis in the *Mys.*

departments of revenue and finance, Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya profited most by this system of organised speculation and fraud. Having, however, already passed the prime of his life and having no issue, he, as a pious Hindu, was, in his last days, we are told,²⁸ overcome by qualms of conscience, and desired to dispose of his temporal effects for his eternal benefit. Accordingly, when he knew that his end was drawing near, it is stated,²⁹ he arranged to place before the young king, his nominal master, two lakhs of *varahas* and set apart another half a lakh for his own obsequies and for the maintenance of his wife Chandāyamma. At the same time, he also, it is added,³⁰ represented to both the king and the dowager, that no credence need be placed in the Mahrattas, that Venkaṭapataiya of Kannambāḍi was to be appointed *Karanika* of the *Ubhaya-chāvaḍi* and not confirmed in the office of *Pradhān*, that hostilities with the Mughals (*i.e.*, the Nawāb of Arcot) were to cease, and that, of the two brothers Muhammad Šābās Šāhib and Haidar Alī Khān—then serving under Katti Gōpālarāja Urs at Bangalore³¹—the younger, Haidar Alī, was to be appointed to the charge of 50 horse and 100 foot, cautioning that he (Haidar) was not to be entrusted with more power, as it might eventually betoken trouble to the State. In 1739 (*Siddhārthi*), Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya died in Seringapatam, and was succeeded by Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya at the instance of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya.³² The two brothers became henceforward the virtual dictators of the kingdom of Mysore, actively representing

Rāj. Cha. (40), which, on the contrary, merely eulogises Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya as a servant devoted to the cause of Krishnarāja Wodeyar (*Daḷapati mahārājāsri Dēvarājaiyanavarū Krishnarāja Wodeyaraiyanavarū kāryakke atyuttamarāgi*). For a critical notice of this work, *vide* Ch. III, f.n. 61.

28. *Ibid.*, 175; see also and compare *Wilks*, I. 256.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, 175-176.

31. For particulars about the early career and rise of Haidar, *vide* Ch. X.

32. *Annals*, I., 176.

Krishnarāja, and taking part in the foreign politics of the times.³³

The fortunes of Mysore from 1739 onwards become so inextricably bound up with the general course of affairs in the Karnāṭak and Southern India, that it is necessary to start with a retrospect of the latter.³⁴

Second Phase:
1739-1746.

Retrospect of
affairs:

The Mughals and
the Mahrattas in
South India, 1737-
1740.

Alī Dōst Khān, Nawāb of Arcot, never recovered from the shock of the disastrous defeat he sustained at Kailancha in 1737. Since 1736, Chandā Sāhib, his son-in-law, was becoming almost independent in the South as master of the *subāh* of Trichinopoly.³⁵ In 1738, taking advantage of the internal troubles which prevailed in Tanjore since the death of Tukōji (1728-1735), he, accompanied by his brother-in-law Safdar Alī, invaded that kingdom, shutting up its then ruler Saiyājī powerless in his capital.³⁶ Already in April 1739, the Mahrattas, profiting by the absence of Nizām-ul-mulk (Asaf Jāh) from the Deccan, were expected to carry on their incursions into the Karnāṭak, including the "Misore [Mysore] country."³⁷ Early in 1740, a Mahratta army, consisting

33. The mention of "King of Misore [Mysore]" in the diplomatic literature for the period 1740-1755 (cited in this Ch. and in Chs. VI-VIII) is to be understood to refer to the reigning king Krishnarāja Wodeyar II, as represented by the Dalavāi brothers Dēvarājaiya and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya.

34. *Vide*, for general reference on this phase, *Wilks*, I. 273-282; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 3; *Tuzak.*, pp. 70-72, 82-83; *C.H.I.*, V. 118-119; T. Wheeler, *History of Madras*, pp. 551-556, 571-581, 599-603; *Tanjore Dist. Gaz.*, I. 44-49, etc. For specific references, see *infra*.

35. *Tuzak.*, p. 72. The real name of Chandā Sāhib, according to this work (pp. 69-74), was, as mentioned above (see p. 73), Husain Dōst Khān, the former being a surname of his denoting that he was a person of attractive features (*Chandā*-from Skt. *Chandra*, Moon, to please, gladden; Persian, *Chānd*, from Skt. *Chandra*; cf. *Chānd-Bibi*, moon-like lady). An alternative derivation suggested is from *Alexander*, of which the popular form is *Sikandar*, of which *Chand* is said to be a shortened form. Cf. *Mal. Chandiy*, and *Scot. Sandy*, which are well-known abbreviations of the name *Alexander*.

36. *Di. A. Pi.*, I. 64.

37. *Letters to Fort St. George* (1739), p. 81: *Letter* No. 84 dated April 4, 1739.

of more than 40,000 horse under the command of Futte Singh and Raghuji-Bhōnsle,³⁸ proceeded on an expedition to Arcot to collect the *chauth*.³⁹ In May, the aged Nawāb, hard pressed by the enemy and disappointed by the tardy movements of his son Safdar Alī—then with the main army at Trichinopoly—defended himself gallantly at the head of 3,000 horse and foot, and was killed at the pass of Dāmalcheruvu.⁴⁰ The town of Arcot was plundered by the Mahrattas and the country became a prey to anarchy and confusion. Meantime news was afloat that Nāsir Jang, second son of the Nizām, was marching southward at the head of 125,000 horse, detaching 10,000 under the command of Nawāb Amīn Khān with instructions “to seize the passes leading to the kingdom of Misore [Mysore],” “to prevent the Mahrattas’ escape.”⁴¹

In June 1740, Safdar Alī, who succeeded his father as the Nawāb of Arcot (1740-1742), appeared on the scene and concluded peace with the Mahrattas, consenting to pay the *chauth*.⁴² The Mahrattas, however, agreed to leave the province on condition of being paid a sum of money.⁴³

38. *Sel. Pub. Cons.* (1740), p. 51: *Letter* No. 67 dated July 9, 1740; cf. *Tuzak.*, p. 72.

39. *Tuzak.*, l.c.; cf. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 3; *Count. Corres.* (1740), p. 12 (cited in *C. H. I.*, V. 118, f.n. 2).

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73; also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; Wheeler, o.c., pp. 555-556 (quoting letter dated May 12, 1740). Dāmalcheruvu (the “Damalcherue,” “Damalcherri” of Persian and English sources) is a village in Chandra-giri taluk, Chittoor district, Madras, 19 miles north of Chittoor. So called after a large tank—more correctly Tāmara-Cheruvu, the Lotus Tank. By this Pass, which is at the entrance of the valley leading to Kallūrgāṭ, Śivāji made his first descent upon the Karnāṭak (1677). During Haidar’s invasion of the Karnāṭak in 1780-81, it formed the main route for supplies for his troops.

41. *Cal. Mad. Rec.* (1740-1744), p. 49: *Letter* No. 169, received June 13, 1740; also *Count. Corres.* (1740), p. 19: *Letter* No. 43 dated June 13, 1740.

42. *Tuzak.*, p. 73.

43. *Letters from Fort St. George* (1740), pp. 30-31: *Letter* No. 52 dated June 13, 1740; also *Sel. Pub. Cons.* (1740), p. 50: *Letter* No. 52 of the same date.

Safdar Alī paid them in part but was under great difficulty as to how to raise the rest.⁴⁴ However, shutting himself up in Vellore, he made them quit his territory a short distance from Arcot ;⁴⁵ and attempted to make good the stipulated amount from the taluks of the Karnātak-Pāyānghāṭ.⁴⁶ Further, he demanded from Chandā Sāhib the portion of the *chauth* assigned for Trichinopoly, but Chandā refused to comply.⁴⁷ Aggrieved at this, Safdar Alī, early in July, secretly turned against him the Mahrattas, then on their way to Bālaghāṭ.⁴⁸ The Mahrattas, by now reinforced by a contingent of 20,000 horse under Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe, passed through the kingdom of Mysore, raising contributions.⁴⁹ And finally, about the middle of October, they encamped at Trichinopoly.⁵⁰ Before commencing hostilities, they appear to have attempted to square up matters with Chandā Sāhib who, in the first instance, we are told,⁵¹ sought to bargain with them for rupees seven lakhs. However, as we shall see in the sequel,⁵² the conflicting claims and interests of local powers which were at work, stood in the way of their settlement with him. Accordingly, about the end of December 1740, the Mahrattas laid siege to Trichinopoly. Chandā was obliged to seek the help of his brother Baḍē Sāhib. Early in 1741, the latter marched on with the troops of Diṇḍigal, Madura, Tinnevely and other parts, to Chandā's succour; he was, however, intercepted by the Mahrattas and was, in the confusion which followed during a pitched battle near Koḍuttalaṃ, slain with his younger brother Sādak

44. *Ibid.*45. *Ibid.*; also *Tuzak.*, l.c.46. *Tuzak.*, l.c.47. *Ibid.*; cf. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; Wheeler, o.c., p. 578.48. *Ibid.*49. *Letters from Fort St. George* (1740), pp. 41-42: l.c.; also *Sel. Pub. Cons.* (1740), p. 51: l.c.; and *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 59: *Letter* No. 209 dated July 9, 1740.50. *Ibid.*, p. 69: *Letter* No. 110 dated October 20, 1740.51. *Count. Corres.* (1740), p. 47: *Letter* No. 116 dated December 5, 1740; cf. Wheeler, o.c., pp. 578-579; also *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 117: *Letter* No. 443, received December 15, 1740.52. *Vide* under *The Hindu Cause in Southern India*, below.

Sāhib and several of his men.⁵³ On March 25, 1741, the Mahrattas, after a siege of three months, succeeded in escalading the walls of the Trichinopoly fort and taking possession of it.⁵⁴ In vain did Chandā Sāhib treat for terms agreeing to pay "a sum of twelve lakhs of rupees to the Mahrattas, on condition that he should be allowed to return [to the fort] in safety."⁵⁵ But he was, with his eldest son Abīd Sāhib and two others, taken prisoner by Raghuji, and was, shortly after, conveyed through Mysore to Satāra, along with 40,000 Mahratta horse.⁵⁶ Murāri Rao-Ghōrpaḍe of Gooty, nephew of Śāntaji-Ghōrpaḍe, was for the time being placed with 4,000 horse in charge of Trichinopoly fort as its Governor, and the rest of the Mahratta army marched home through Gingee and Mysore during April-May.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, in Poona, Pēshwa Bāji Rao I had died, being succeeded by his son Bālāji Bāji Deccan and Karnāṭak politics, 1741-1744. Rao (1740); and Nizām-ul-mulk had returned to the Deccan in time to crush a rebellion raised by his son Nāsir Jang (1741). In October 1742, Nawāb Safdar Alī was put to death by poison by Ghulām Murtazā Alī Khān, another brother-in-law of his. In the confusion and turmoil which followed in Arcot, Ghulām Murtazā ruled for six months, when he was succeeded nominally by Saiyid Muhammad (Sādatullā Khān II), the ten-year old son of Safdar Alī, as Nawāb.⁵⁸ In January 1743, Nizām-ul-mulk, taking advantage of this state of affairs, marched on to the south with Nāsir Jang, leaving his deputy, Nawāb

53. *Tuzak.*, pp. 73-74; *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; cf. Wheeler, *o.c.*, pp. 579-580.

54. *Di. A. P.*, I. 161; cf. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; Wheeler, *o.c.*, p. 580.

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 159: *Letter* No. 126 dated April 8, 1741; also *Sel. Pub. Cons.* (1741), p. 59: *Letter* of the same date.

57. *Ibid.*, also p. 162: *Letter* No. 136 dated April 16, 1741; *Desp. Eng.* (1741-1742), p. 14: *Despatch* of the same date; *Sel. Pub. Cons.* (1741), pp. 59 and 62: l.c.; also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

58. *Tuzak.*, pp. 80 and 111; cf. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

Sirājud-daula Anwar-ud-dīn, in charge of the *subāh* of Hyderabad.⁵⁹ After securing the submission of petty chiefs, he entered the town of Arcot unopposed (February), and appointed his general Khwāja Abdullā Khān to the charge of that *subāh*.⁶⁰ Proceeding further, he encamped with his whole army (consisting, it is said,⁶¹ of 70,000 horse and foot) before the fort of Trichinopoly and laid siege to it for six months.⁶² In the meantime, Bābū

Renewed Mughal-Mahratta struggles.

(Bāpūji) Nāyak, a Mahratta *sardār*, acting under the advice of the Pēshwa, had advanced on the Deccan at the head of a lakh of horse to collect the *chauth*, and been routed with heavy loss by Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn (c. February-March).⁶³ About July-August, however, the Pēshwa himself in great wrath ordered the collection and despatch of an army of three lakhs of foot to the Deccan.⁶⁴ At this news, Nizām-ul-mulk, finding the fort of Trichinopoly impregnable, made peace with Murāri Rao.⁶⁵ On the latter's evacuation of the place in August, the Nizām retraced his steps, accompanied by Khwāja Abdullā who left behind him at Arcot a deputy, Khwāja Nimatullā Khān, a relation of his.⁶⁶ The Nizām was, however, on his way home, encircled by the Mahrattas, and was only rescued by the timely arrival of Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn who forced the Pēshwa to conclude peace with his master (Nizām) and retire dropping his claim to

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43. According to this work (pp. 38-42), Anwar-ud-dīn was in charge of the Nizāmat of Chicācole, Rājbandar and Masulipatam under Asaf Jāh before his appointment by the latter to the *subāh* of Hyderabad.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

61. *Di. A. P.*, I. 214.

62. *Tuzak*, l.c.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47. Bāpū Nāyak figures in later history. He was a Brāhman military officer of the time. There is a street named after him in Kumbakōṇam town, where he seems to have established himself.

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 48 and 83.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 83-84. There is an air of suspicion centring round Murāri Rao's evacuation of Trichinopoly. Probably he was won over by the Nizām, which, as we shall see, perhaps accounts for why the Ghōrpaḍes later made common cause with the Mughals against the Mahrattas under Bābū Nāyak in the struggle for supremacy in the South.

the *chauth* (c. January-March 1744).⁶⁷ In March 1744, Khwāja Abdullā Khān, the Nawāb designate, was, on the very day of his journey to Arcot, found dead in his *chauki* (a raised seat).⁶⁸ In his place the Nizām appointed Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn and the latter reached Arcot in April 1744. With the accession of Anwar, followed by the assassination of Saiyid Muhammad, the rule of the Nawāyat family of the Nawābs of Arcot practically came to an end, and that of a new dynasty owning direct allegiance to the Nizām began.⁶⁹

Alongside of these developments, the restoration of Hindu rule in Trichinopoly had become a live issue in Southern India ever since the capture of the place by Chandā Sāhib and the extinction of the Nāyaka régime in Madura (1736). Of this movement, Bangāru-Tirumala, father of Vijaya-Kumāra (the adopted heir-elect of Mīnākshi, last of the Nāyaka rulers of Madura), was evidently the prime figure. He was assisted by Saiyāji, the Rājah of Tanjore (1738-1740).⁷⁰ Saiyāji, deeply resenting the injuries he had sustained from Chandā Sāhib in 1738,⁷¹ seems to have allied himself with Bangāru about June 1740, and sought the aid of his kinsmen, the Mahrattas—then near Arcot—to put an end to the Muhammadan domination in Trichinopoly. The Mahrattas were, however, as we have seen, turned on Trichinopoly by Nawāb Safdar Alī, primarily for the realization of part of their *chauth*. And they found the situation in Trichinopoly complicated by the conflicting interests of local powers on the one side and Chandā Sāhib on the other. At the same time, the cause of Bangāru-Tirumala suffered by the deposition of Saiyāji and

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-51.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 51; also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-57, 110-111. The earlier Nawābs of Arcot, according to this source (p. 82), had direct relationship with the court of Delhi and had no connection with the Nāzims of the Deccan (i.e., the Nizām).

70. *Tanjore Dist. Gaz.*, I. 46.

71. *Ibid.*

the succession of his brother Pratāp Singh (1740-1763) to the *masnad* of Tanjore. Bangāru, therefore, appears to have turned for help to the Maravas and the Tonḍa-mān chief. A letter, received in Madras on December 15, 1740,⁷² speaks of these latter as collecting "5,000 horse and 40,000 foot" and designing "to make the son of Caut Rajah (of Trichinopoly family) King." Indeed, it was with the assistance of these confederates, among others, that Raghuji-Bhōnsle, the Mahratta leader, was, we learn,⁷³ able to carry the siege of Trichinopoly to success in March 1741.

The Mahratta conquest of Trichinopoly which thus took place, proved, however, to be more a temporary occupation than a permanent acquisition. For, no sooner was Chandā Sāhib captured and sent away to Satāra than the Mahrattas were faced with the task of reviving Hindu rule, and reconciling conflicting interests, in Trichinopoly on the one hand and, on the other, of fulfilling their obligations to Nawāb Safdar Ali after the collection of their *chauth*. According to a letter dated April 8, 1741,⁷⁴ "Raghoji Bhonsle is negotiating with Ramanayya and Govindayya [agents, probably, of Bangāru-Tirumala], with a view to restore the old Hindu family." According to another, dated April 16,⁷⁵ "Trichinopoly will either be restored to the old Rajah's family or be placed under a Maratha." According to a third, of the same date,⁷⁶ "It was for a time uncertain what the Morattas [Mahrattas] would do with Tritchanopoly [Trichinopoly]. There were several bidders for it." The Mahrattas, however, we further learn,⁷⁷ "were

72. *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 177: *Letter* No. 443. The son of Caut Rajah, referred to in this document, seems obviously to be Vijaya-Kumāra, son of Bangāru-Tirumala, in the light of the context.

73. *Di. A. Pi.*, I. 161.

74. *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 159: *Letter* No. 126.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 162: *Letter* No. 136.

76. *Desp. Eng.* (1741-1742), p. 14, para 63.

77. *Ibid.*

most inclined to put in the next heir of the late Queen [Minākshi]" but "he could not give them security for the money he offered." It was on such considerations as these that they found it expedient to appoint Murāri Rao temporarily as Viceroy at Trichinopoly, "till the Sou Rajah [Shāhu Rājah] should give further orders"; "would not suffer the place to be plundered, when they took possession of it"; and, at the time of their returning home, "left orders with the Viceroy [Murāri Rao], to pay the same tribute to Arcot which had been actually paid by the Kings and Queens of Tritchanopoly."⁷⁸ Although the cause of the Nāyaka family of Madura suffered considerably under these circumstances, the position of Murāri Rao at Trichinopoly since April 1741 was by no means safe. Indeed little is known as to how he discharged the obligations to Safdar Alī, imposed on him by the Mahratta leaders. But there are indications that Safdar Alī, as the Nawāb of Arcot, apprehended trouble to himself from a possible combination of Chandā Sāhib, the Nizām and the Mahrattas against him, especially as he had not been confirmed in his Nawābship by "patent" from the "court" of the Imperial Mughal.⁷⁹ This was enough to induce him in May 1741 to engage himself "in some treaty with the King of Misore [Mysore] to dispossess the Morattas of Tritchanopoly."⁸⁰ Thereupon Murāri Rao wrote⁸¹ to Robert Benyon, Governor and President of the Council at Fort St. George, Madras (1735-1744), "desiring to be supplied with ammunition and warlike stores." His request hardly met with any response, as the English at this time, in the language of the *Fort St. George Despatch* of the day,⁸² understood "so little of the language

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 203: *Letter No. 288* dated September 26, 1741; also *Desp. Eng.* (1741-1742), p. 39, para 18: *Consultation* dated January 18, 1742.

80. *Desp. Eng.*, p. 15, para 68: *Despatch* dated April 16, 1741; also *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, l.c.

81. *Ibid.*

82. *Ibid.*

of this country" and had "such bad interpreters" about them, that they were "very little capable of forming any judgment of the politicks and interests of the several princes, for which reason it is a maxim with us to have as little to do with any of them as possible." The menace of Safdar Ali's projected invasion of Trichinopoly received, however, a death-blow from the troubled state of affairs at Arcot (since 1740),⁸³ which led to his own death in October 1742.

The situation affected adversely the Hindu cause in Southern India. The death of Safdar Ali and the confusion which followed in its train in Arcot, left the Karnāṭak and South India open to the ambitions of the Nizām. Trichinopoly became, as it were, a bone of contention between the Mahrattas and the Nizām. After its evacuation by Murāri Rao in August 1743, it passed into the *subāh* of the Deccan under the control of the Nizām and within the immediate jurisdiction of the Nawāb of Arcot.⁸⁴ The cause of Bangāru-Tirumala became a forlorn one. During the Nizām's siege of Trichinopoly (February-August 1743), he paid him a visit in the vain hope of obtaining his favour and assistance. Subsequently, Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn was directed by his master, the Nizām, to take kindly care of Bangāru. According to the *Pāṇḍyan Chronicle*, he is said to have been poisoned by Anwar-ud-dīn while residing in Arcot as his pensioner. His (Bangāru's) son returned to Śivaganga and we hear little of him for some time.⁸⁵ Trichinopoly during Anwar-ud-dīn's Nawābship of Arcot (1744-1749) was placed at first under his second son Muhammad Mahfūz Khān and later under his third son Muhammad Ali (Hadrat-i-Alā)—afterwards Nawāb Muhammad Ali Wālājāh—the city itself being named by the latter as *Natharnagar*

83. *Tuzak.*, pp. 75-80.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71, f.n. 1.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

after a Muslim saint, a Sayyid by name Hadrat Nathar Wali.⁸⁶

Mysore had her own interests in the struggle centring round the restoration of Hindu rule in Madura and Trichinopoly. As we have seen in the earlier chapters,⁸⁷ Trichinopoly became the objective of her southern expansion as early as 1642, and this, side by side with the gradually growing claim of her rulers to the sovereignty of the Karnāṭaka country, formed the pivotal point of her political development throughout the greater part of the latter half of the seventeenth century—a position which was keenly contested from time to time

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 127-135. *Trichinopoly*: About 210 miles from Mysore *via* Kārūr and Hāsānūr. The fight for Trichinopoly which looms so large in the history of this period and later enters into the epoch of Anglo-French alliances and warfare in the south of India, marks the transition from the period of Hindu rule to that of the British in it. By its situation, its antiquity, its sacred character, its fame as the capital of the Madura Nāyakas, and its size and population, it has ever been considered a place of great importance. When the Hoysalas of Mysore first penetrated into the South (13th-14th cent.), they fixed it as their southern capital. The Chōjas made it one of their first capitals before they moved on to Tanjore. The Nāyakas transferred their capital to it from Madura in 1660. Possession of Trichinopoly which was prized by the contending parties of the period (*i.e.*, the Mysoreans, Mahrattas and the Mughal representatives), came to be considered as possessing the key to the Karnāṭak denoting the whole of Southern India in the old Vijayanagar imperial sense of the term. The fight for it was accordingly a fight for the supremacy of the South. If this central fact is remembered, we understand why the fight for supremacy was concentrated on its possession. The city takes its name from the holy rock (*Tiru-sila*) which dominates it for miles around. Previous to the demolition of the ramparts in 1845, the rock formed the citadel of a large fort one mile long by half a mile wide. Now, only the fortifications of the rock remain. The rock is of syenite, 600 feet above the alluvial plain from which it rises, and is a very striking object viewed from a distance. The ascent to it is partly by steps cut in the rock itself. Upon it is a temple dedicated to Śiva, whence the phrase *Tiru-sila*, "Holy Rock." Near the Teppakulam is pointed the house occupied by Robert Clive. Chandā Sahib who was put to death in 1752 by Mānāji (Mānakji), the commander of the Tanjore forces, in alliance with the English, lies buried at the shrine of Nathar, which perhaps belongs to the time of the invasion of Mālik Kāfur (1810). It was evidently built out of the materials gathered from older Hindu structures which probably occupied its site.

87. *Ante*, Vol. I, Chs. VIII, X and XI.

by the competing claimants of the period (such, for instance, as the Nāyaks of Madura and Ikkēri, the Deccan states of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa, and the Mahrattas), and attended with varying degrees of success for Mysore. During the general convulsions of the period 1704-1734, however, this southern objective of hers receded for a time to the background, but, as indicated in an earlier connection,⁸⁸ began to assert itself during 1735-1736 when the Mysore army was engaged in incursions into Malabar and Madura. Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya's signal victory over Nawāb Alī Dōst Khān (of Arcot) at Kailancha in 1737, while it tended to check the latter's pretensions to authority over Mysore, left the field open for Mysorean ambition in the south. But, in the meantime, Chandā Sāhib had taken possession of Trichinopoly and brought Nāyaka rule in Madura to an end (1736). Before, however, Dēvarājaiya could take effective steps against Chandā, he was evidently disturbed by the activities of the Mahrattas in Arcot, their exaction of contributions from Mysore and their encampment before Trichinopoly (June-December 1740). The destruction of Chandā Sāhib with the help of the Mahrattas, ostensibly for the restoration of Nāyaka rule in Trichinopoly but really for the eventual absorption of that place in the kingdom of Mysore as a strategic point in the south, had become the ulterior motive of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya in regard to the affairs of Trichinopoly, about December 1740. Indeed, according to a letter dated December 5, 1740,⁸⁹ "the King of Misore [Mysore] offered the Morattas [Mahrattas] fifty lakhs of rupees, if they will kill Chanda Sahib or take him prisoner and resettle the gentue [Hindu] government in the kingdom of Trichinopoly." The Mahrattas, however, as we have seen, carried on the siege of Trichinopoly (1740-1741)

88. *Vide* f.n. 13 and 17 *supra*.

89. *Count. Corres.* (1740), p. 47; *Letter No. 116*; also *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 117; *Letter No. 443*, cited in f.n. 72 *supra*.

more inclined to the cause of the Nāyaka family of Madura and its adherents (the Maravas and the Tonḍamān chief) than acceding to the overtures of either Chandā Sāhib or Mysore. The Mahratta conquest of Trichinopoly (1741) appeared as if, for the time being, to frustrate the southern objective of Mysore. Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, however, steadily kept his watchful eye on the place, which, perhaps, accounts also for why, in May 1741, Nawāb Safdar Alī (of Arcot) was, as above referred to,⁹⁰ induced to seek the help of Mysore against the Mahrattas. The death of Safdar Alī in October 1742 seemed to affect the interests of Mysore in Trichinopoly and those of the Nāyaka family there. In January 1743, therefore, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya found it expedient to reiterate his claim on Trichinopoly and attempted to take it with the assistance of Nizām-ul-mulk, then in Cuddapah, with a lakh of foot, on his way to Arcot.⁹¹ Accordingly, about this time, it became the latter's design "to put the Raja of Misore [Mysore] in possession of Trichinopoly on [the Rājah] paying a crore of rupees."⁹² Dēvarājaiya—who, as we know, represented the king of Mysore during this period—was, however, obviously not in a position to pay this heavy price or even half of it,⁹³ the finances of the kingdom having already suffered considerably from the contributions levied by the Mahrattas in 1740. The interests of

90. *Vide* text of f.n. 80 *supra*.

91. *Desp. Eng.* (1743-1746), p. 3, item No. 56; also *Cal. Mad. Rec.*, p. 359: *Letter No.* 24 dated January 27, 1743.

92. *Ibid.*

93. This transaction is, perhaps, best, though incidentally, alluded to by Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya in *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 28: *Letter No.* 48 dated March 12, 1753—Daḷavāi to Saunders. According to him, the Nizām (in 1743) had "agreed to give the fort" of Trichinopoly to Mysore "for 50 lakhs of Rupees" and sent a message to the latter through Vinnāji-Pant ("Vinnazey Pant"), but the authorities in Seringapatam "did not then care to accept it." Vinnāji-Pant (or Vinnāji-Paṇḍit) figures in later history as well. He belonged to a village called Patchūr, near Jālārpēt, the M. & S. M. Ry. junction.

Mysore, and no less the cause of the Nāyaka family of Madura, were again affected when Trichinopoly—after its siege by the Nizām and its evacuation by Murāri Rao (1743)—was, as we have noted, included within the immediate jurisdiction of Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn of Arcot in 1744.

Nevertheless, Trichinopoly, as the southernmost limit of expansion of the kingdom of Mysore, tended in an increasing measure to engage the attention of Dalāvāi Dēvarājaiya and his brother Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, especially after the final disappearance of Bangāru-Tirumala (of the Nāyaka family of Madura) from the arena of South Indian politics (c. 1744). Meanwhile, the Mahrattas, after their Deccan reverses (1743-1744), had been active in the south, being evidently alarmed by Murāri Rao's evacuation of Trichinopoly (August 1743). Towards the close of 1744, Pēshwa Bālāji Bāji Rao despatched again to the Deccan a Mahratta army of two lakhs of horse, commanded for the second time by Bābū Nāyak.⁹⁴ The recovery of Trichinopoly became the definite objective of the Mahrattas and the frustration of it the key-note of Nizām-ul-mulk's policy. Accordingly, the Nizām desired Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn (of Arcot) to put up a stout opposition to the Mahrattas with the help of all the Karnāṭak chiefs and allies.⁹⁵ In December 1744, Anwar-ud-dīn marched against Bābū Nāyak at the head of 65,000 horse, being joined also by his third son Muhammad Alī from Hyderabad.⁹⁶ Before commencing hostilities, however, Anwar-ud-dīn attempted to pacify the Mahrattas by offering them "a sum of money" but they were found "to demand Trichinopoly."⁹⁷ Thereupon, in January 1745, Anwar-ud-dīn engaged Bābū Nāyak in a week's action at Basavāpaṭṇa (*Baswapatan*)

94. *Tuzak.*, pp. 111-112.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113; *Mad. Desp.* (1744-1755), p. 9: *Despatch dated* February 15, 1745. See also f.n. 100 *infra*.

97. *Mad. Desp.*, l.c.

and put him to rout amidst great loss.⁹⁸ "The Nawwāb," in the words of the contemporary chronicler Burhan,⁹⁹ "followed him [Bābū Nāyak] up to Trichinopoly. There again for the second time the pursued one opposed him. The Nawwāb exhibited great bravery in fighting and pursuing the enemy. The enemy offered battle for the third time at the *maydān* of Baswapatan and tried to fight with all his strength. After three days and three nights he was routed with his friends and defeated with his companions. In short, according to his wont, he ran away." About March-April 1745, the Nawāb returned triumphantly to Arcot.

In this struggle with Bābū Nāyak, Mysore, along with the chiefs of Cuddapah, Kurnool, Savaṇūr, Sira and Ikkēri, and with Muzaffar Jang (Hidāyat Muhiyud-dīn-Khān)—grandson of Nizām-ul-mulk—then *jahgīrdār* of Adoni, made common cause with Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn by furnishing a quota of nine thousand horse.¹⁰⁰ Evidently it was as much in the interests of Mysore as in those of the Nizām and the Nawāb that Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya found it expedient to safeguard Trichinopoly against the Mahrattas.

During the latter part of the year 1745, after the return of the Mysore troops from the action (against the Mahrattas) at Basavāpaṭṇa, the situation in Malabar seemed to engross the attention of Dēvarājaiya. By 1737

Mysore and Malabar, 1745-1746.

98. *Tuzak*, pp. 118-114; see also the *Ke. N. V.* (XI, vv. 39-40), which places the event in *Raktākshi*, *Pushya* (January 1745). Basavāpaṭṇa is the head-quarters of an extant *hōblī* of that name in Channagiri taluk, Shimoga district (see *List of Villages*, 138).

99. *Ibid.*

100. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113. The numerical strength of the forces assembled on the occasion amounted, according to this source, to 65,000 horse, 45,000 being the number raised by the local powers (*viz.*, Cuddapah, 3,000; Kurnool, 2,000; Savaṇūr, 1,500; Sira, 1,500; Bednūr or Ikkēri, 6,000; Mysore, 9,000; Adoni, 22,000), and 20,000 by Anwar-ud-dīn and Muhammad Ali at 12,000 and 8,000 respectively. Apparently by a slip, the total is set down as 69,000 on p. 113 of the text.

the siege of Cannanore—referred to in the preceding chapter—had been raised, and the English factors at Tellicherry mediated a peace between the rulers of Cotata and Ikkēri, by which they obtained the exclusive privilege of purchasing the valuable commodities of Malabar, namely, pepper, cardamoms and sandalwood.¹⁰¹ Since then, the English found themselves faced with the rivalry of the French at Māhe and the Dutch at Cannanore on the one side and, on the other, with the persistent opposition and hostility of the Moors (Moplahs) of Cannanore (then in alliance with the Dutch), with whom they came into a rupture during August-September 1745. The local powers in Malabar, such as the chiefs of Kolattiri and Pālghāt and the Zāmorin of Calicut, were hostile and divided among themselves, viewing with alternate friendliness and suspicion the activities of the European powers.¹⁰²

There are indications, and it is significant, that, between October 1745 and May 1746, the Mysore army was active in Malabar, supporting the chief of Pālghāt against the Zāmorin of Calicut. A letter, dated October 24, 1745,¹⁰³ refers to “the war the Samorine [Zāmorin] was engaged in with the King of Mysure [Mysore], between whose forces there had lately been a great battle near Pallycata-cherry [Pālghāt-cherry], in which the Samorine got the better and obliged the Mysure army to retreat two leagues.” Another, dated November 3,¹⁰⁴ speaks of the Zāmorin’s “war with an ally [chief of Pālghāt] of the King of Meysure’s, with whom they have had three battles, in the first of which the Samorine had the victory but lost the others and eighty men.” A third,

101. *Impl. Gaz.*, XVII. 57.

102. *Telli. Cons.* (1737-1738), p. 52: *Consultation* dated December 26, 1737; (1745-1746), pp. 20, 26-30, etc.: *Consultations* dated September 27 and October 5-9, 1745.

103. *Ibid.* (1745-1746), p. 42: *Consultation* dated October 23, 1745.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 51: *Consultation* dated November 4, 1745.

dated December 7,¹⁰⁵ refers to the illness of the Zāmorin and "the ill-success of the war with the King of Meysure." On February 6, 1746, the Zāmorin died.¹⁰⁶ Hostilities with Mysore continued under his successor who, in a letter received at Tellicherry on May 23, 1746,¹⁰⁷ writes of the king of Mysore as having despatched a body of horse and foot towards Pālghāt and ravaged his country, and of his (Zāmorin's) having sent his officers and troops to put them to rout; and speaks of the expedition as having entailed a heavy expense on him, preventing the payment of his dues to the English.

In 1746, Krishnarāja Wodeyar, as mentioned already, attained his majority and was wedded to Dēvājamma, daughter of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya. From hence, Nanjarājaiya began to play a leading rôle in the affairs of Mysore as the junior Daḷavāi, his elder brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, already advanced in age, having retired from active military life and taken up the direction of the revenue and finances of the kingdom.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile political situation in the Karnāṭak and the Deccan had been tending towards a crisis. Since the repulse of Bābū Nāyak, the Mahratta *sardār*, in 1745, considerable disorder prevailed in central and northern Karnāṭak (*Bālaghāt*) where Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn's authority was little recognised. With the exception of the *subāh* of Sīra under Nawāb Dilāvar Khān, successor of Tāhir Khān (since c. 1740), there was practically no master over a greater part of the country from the Tungabhadra up to the limits of the kingdom of Mysore.¹⁰⁹ The settlement of this tract and keeping the Pēshwa in touch with its affairs—as a delegate of Shāhu from Satāra—was

105. *Ibid.*, p. 75 : Consultation dated December 10, 1745.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 110 : Consultation dated February 7, 1746.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 167 : Consultation dated May 23, 1746.


108. *Vide* references cited in Ch. XII ; see also and compare *Wilks*, I. 259.

109. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXV, *Letter* No. 29 dated September 29, 1746.



NANDI RAJA.

Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, Daḷavāi and Regent of Mysore, 1739-1759.



engaging the attention of the Mahrattas encamped in this region.¹¹⁰ Between 1745-1747 Bābū Nāyak was again active in the Karnāṭak. Early in 1747, his agent Śankrāji-Pant, proceeding from Hanumanta-sāgar, took possession of the forts of Bēgūr and Yeliyūr with the help of the Bēḍas ("Berads").¹¹¹ Bābū Nāyak had had his eye on Seringapatam also,¹¹² but, hard pressed as he was by the forces of Anwar-ud-dīn and his allies (*i.e.*, the Ghōrpaḍes, the Nawāb of Sīra and Mysore), he was obliged to retire from the Karnāṭak (May 19, 20).¹¹³ Almost simultaneously (March-May 1747), Nāsir Jang, appointed as Nawāb of the Karnāṭak, was on his way to the south, armed with full authority by his father Nizām-ul-mulk to collect alleged arrears of contribution (*pēshkāsh*) from Arcot, Sīra, Mysore and Tanjore among other places.¹¹⁴ Early in October 1747, having partially succeeded in his object, he hastily retraced his steps, alarmed by news of his father's illness at Aurangābād.¹¹⁵ On June 19, 1748, Nizām-ul-mulk died.¹¹⁶

About the middle of 1746, Nanjarājaiya proceeded on an expedition to Dhārānagar (Dhārāpur, in the present Coimbatore district) in the south-east. A pretender, set up by the turbulent elements, had occupied

Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya's expedition to Dhārānagar, c. May-July 1746.

110. *Ibid.*

111. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 42 (c. February 1747?). Bēgūr and Yeliyūr are places situated in Dēvanahaḷli taluk, Bangalore district (see *List of Villages*, 11-12). Hanumanta-sāgar is a village in Nelamangala taluk (*Ibid.*, 17). The text actually refers to Bēgūr and Yeliyūr as "Bedoor and Yeloor in the territory of Shrirangapatam."

112. *Ibid.*; see also f.n. 113 *infra*.

113. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXV, *Letter* No. 65 dated May 27, 1747. The Mahratta reverses of May 1747 are, perhaps, further echoed in the *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* (43) when it speaks of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya as having repulsed with heavy loss Futte Singh and Bābū Rao (Bābū Nāyak), on their approach to Seringapatam. If we are to accept this source, then the repulse referred to must be held to have occurred shortly after Nanjarājaiya's successful termination of the siege of Dēvanahaḷli (April 29, 1747), described below.

114. *Di. A. P.*, III. 432, IV. 6, 44, 70, 125, etc.

115. *Ibid.*, IV. 168.

116. *Wilks*, I. 285-286 (*Editorial note*).

the town and was harassing the inhabitants.¹¹⁷ Nanjarājaiya put him down with a strong hand and, restoring order, returned to Seringapatam by the end of July,¹¹⁸ in time to face the situation at Dēvanahallī (in the present Bangalore district).

Profiting by the unsettled conditions of the times in the Karnātak, Range-Gauḍa, the Morasa chief of Doḍballāpur, had taken possession of Dēvanahallī (*Dēvanapura*) with the aid of the Mahratta and Mughal troopers, and become a source of trouble to his neighbours.¹¹⁹ Early in August, Nanjarājaiya marched on thither at the head of a strong contingent.¹²⁰ At Bangalore he was joined by a detachment under Śābās Sāhib and his younger brother Haidar Alī Khān, then serving under Katti Gōpālārāja Urs.¹²¹ Dēvanahallī was closely besieged by the Mysoreans for nearly nine months (c. August 1746-April 1747).¹²² And they were assisted also by the allies of Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn, namely, Subhau Rao-Ghōrpaḍe, brother of Murāri Rao-Ghōrpaḍe, and Dilāvar Khān of Sīra, at the head of 700 and 1,000 horse respectively.¹²³ To prevent the Mahrattas from making common cause with Range-Gauḍa and frustrate

His siege of Dēvanahallī, c. August 1746-April 1747.

117. *Kakud. Māhāt.*, I, 10; also *Nanjarājayaśas. Chām.*, III, ff. 13-18. For details about these works, *vide* under *Literary activity* in Ch. XIII.

118. *Ibid.*; see also and compare *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 43, and *Wilks*, I, 259.

119. *Kakud. Māhāt.*, I, 11; see also and compare *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 2-3), which refers to the chief as Nārāyaṇa-Gauḍa, perhaps another name of Range-Gauḍa.

120. *Ibid.*, 12-13; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 2.

121. For particulars about Haidar's services on the occasion, *vide* under *Early career and rise of Haidar Alī* in Ch. X below.

122. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 3; *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXV, *Letter* No. 65, and Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 42—cited in f.n. 113 and 111 *supra*. According to these sources, the siege of Dēvanahallī lasted for about nine months during *Akshaya* and *Prabhava* (1746-1747). See also f.n. 126 *infra*. The *Annals* (I. 178) places the event roughly in 1746 (*Akshaya*). *Wilks* (I. 261) and Dēvachandra (*Rāj. Kath.*, XII. 490), however, assign the siege to 1749, for which there is no evidence.

123. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l.c.

their getting a permanent foothold in the north of Seringapatam, became the common objectives of the confederates. Nevertheless, the Gauḍa defended himself gallantly against the combination, and sought reinforcements from the Mahratta general Bābū Nāyak, then active in the Karnāṭak.¹²⁴ Bābū despatched 2,000 horse to the succour of Dēvanahalli,¹²⁵ but, on April 29, 1747, even before the arrival of this detachment, Nanjarājaiya had succeeded in taking the fort.¹²⁶ Range-Gauḍa was captured and deprived of all power.¹²⁷ He concluded a truce (*karlu*) with Mysore, by which he managed to obtain his release.¹²⁸ Eventually he went over to his cousin at Chikballāpur;¹²⁹ Dēvanahalli was absorbed in the kingdom of Mysore, and Nanjarājaiya returned to Seringapatam, where he was, as a mark of this exploit, honoured with the emblems of Hanuma and Śarabha standards (*Kapi-dhvaja*, *Śarabhānkita-dhvaja*) by king Krishnarāja.¹³⁰

In July 1747, hardly two months after Nanjarājaiya's return from Dēvanahalli, Nāsir Jang appeared with his army before Seringapatam, demanding payment of alleged arrears of contribution due.¹³¹ Even earlier, about March, his father Nizām-ul-mulk, we learn, had pretended to lease out Seringapatam for rupees seventy lakhs,¹³² and the king of Mysore apprised "that in default of payment of the amount, not only would it be collected by force, but the province would be laid waste in such manner as the Nizām might think fit."¹³³ Nāsir Jang's demand,

Renewed Mughal
advance on Mysore.

Nāsir Jang in
Seringapatam, July-
October, 1747.

124. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXV, *Letter* No. 65, cited *supra*.

125. *Ibid.*

126. *Ibid.* The actual date on which the fort was taken by the Seringapatam forces was, according to this contemporary source, *Prabhava, Vaisākha* *su.* 1 (April 29, 1747).

127. *Kakud. Māhāt.*, I, 14.

128. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; also *Kakud. Māhāt.*, l.c.; cf. *Annals, Rāj. Kath., Mys. Rāj. Cha. and Wilks*, l.c.

129. *Ibid.*

130. *Kakud. Māhāt.*, I, 15.

131. *Di. A. Pi.*, IV, 125, 131: *Notes* dated July 18 and 29, 1747.

132. *Ibid.*, III, 432: *Notes* dated March? 1747.

133. *Ibid.*

however, did not meet with any response, and the country was ordered to be ravaged.¹³⁴ Thereupon the authorities at Seringapatam conducted negotiations for nearly two months.¹³⁵ Nāsir Jang, in the meanwhile, is said¹³⁶ to have encamped at Tonṇūr, not far from Seringapatam, and amused himself on the large tank there, giving it the name of *Mōti-Talāb* ("Lake of Pearls"), which it still retains. Ultimately, in or about October, he was bought off for twenty-one lakhs, and retired.¹³⁷

The death of the Nizām in June 1748 seemed immediately to affect his ambitious scheme of bringing the whole of the Karnāṭak and Southern India under his control as the Mughal Vizier of the Deccan, and to have its own repercussions on those regions. Indeed, while it threw open the south to the Mahrattas, it tended for a time to keep alive the movement for the revival of Hindu rule in Trichinopoly under Vijaya-Kumāra, son of Bangāru-Tirumala (of the Nāyaka family of Madura), a movement in which Mysore was, as usual, equally interested. For, on August 5, 1748, news was afloat that¹³⁸ "the Marathas are marching with 10,000 horse through Mysore. The people of Tanjore and Mysore, the Tondiman and the Maravan went to recover Trichinopoly from the Muhammadans and establish there Kattu Rāja's son. Srimushnam, Vriddhachalam and other places are to be added to Tanjore, and the territories lately conquered by the Muhammadans are to

134. *Ibid.*, IV. 181: l.c.

135. *Ibid.*, IV. 181, 168 and 175: *Notes* dated July 29, and October 11 and 20, 1747. At first, it was reported, "thirty lakhs of rupees" were offered as against Nāsir's demand of "fifty lakhs of pagodas"; then it was reduced to "twenty-five lakhs"; and finally to "twenty-one lakhs".

136. *Wilks*, I. 260.

137. *Di. A. Pi.*, IV. 175: l.c.; cf. *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, l.c.; *Rāj. Kath.*, XII. 489-490; and *Wilks*, I. 259-260.

138. *Ibid.*, V. 176: *Notes* dated August 5, 1748.

be restored to their former owners. They are raising troops to attack Trichinopoly." Again, on the 12th of the same month, it was circulated that¹³⁹ "the Maravas, the people of Tanjore, Mysore and others, joining together, mean to release Ramanayyan, Konappayyan's son, who is in prison at Tanjore, and capture the fort of Trichinopoly." By the 18th, however, we are told,¹⁴⁰ nothing was heard "about the plan of the above peoples against Trichinopoly." Evidently the movement seems to have slowly receded to the background under the stress of the crisis that was being rapidly reached in Southern India about this time.

139. *Ibid.*, 192: *Notes* dated August 12, 1748.

140. *Ibid.*, 210: *Notes* dated August 18, 1748.

CHAPTER V.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*)

The European Nations in India : The Portuguese—The Dutch—The Danes—The English—The French—The evolution of their Indian policy : (a) down to 1746—(b) 1746-1758—Its repercussions on the south of India, with special reference to Mysore.

AS INDICATED in the previous chapter, events were happening about this time—*Circa* 1748—which brought to the forefront certain foreign nations who had settled at different intervals of time since 1500 A.D. at

The European
nations in India.

various points on the Eastern and Western seaboard of India. Chief among these were the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Danes, the French and the English. The

The Portuguese. Portuguese were the first modern European nation to found a settlement in India. Vasco da Gama landed at

Calicut on 22nd August 1498. Cabral established a factory at Calicut in 1500 and took Goa in 1506 and plundered and burnt in 1510 Calicut, ill-requiting the hospitality he had received at the hands of the Zamorin. Through the aid of fire-arms, which the Portuguese were the first to introduce into India, they overcame Indian opposition with ease. Within a century of their arrival, they explored the Indian Ocean as far as Japan and established footholds at Mangalore, Cochin, Ceylon, Diu, Goa and Negapatam. Their object was trade and they were content when they secured it. For nearly a century, they monopolised the whole of the profitable trade of the Indian seas and they astonished Europe with the colossal fortunes they amassed. But they were violent in their methods, ungrateful towards their benefactors, indulged

in slave trade which encouraged traffic in children, intolerent in religious matters and unconcerned in the welfare of the people amidst whom they settled. They maintained their political power by fanning the mutual jealousies and enmities they found existing between the local potentates. Their cupidity proved their destruction. "The Portuguese," wrote Alfonzo De Souza, their Governor, in 1545, "entered India with the sword in one hand and the crucifix in the other; finding much gold, they laid aside the crucifix to fill their pockets, and not being able to hold them up with one hand—they were grown so heavy, they dropped the sword, too; being found in this posture by those who came after, they were easily overcome." Apart from the evil effects that the growth of wealth and luxury produced on them, their fall was hastened first by the destruction of Vijayanagar, with which they had built up a lucrative trade in horses, and then by the gradual decay of that Empire after the death of Venkaṭa I (1586-1614), who was the last sovereign of that dynasty to befriend them. When, in 1608, the Dutch secured a footing at Devanapaṭṇam (Cuddalore), Venkaṭa promptly intervened on behalf of the Portuguese and barred their further progress there, saying that the Portuguese were "better friends than the Dutch." More conciliatory in their methods and better supported by their home government, the Dutch, however, succeeded in supplanting the Portuguese in the Eastern seas, taking their colonies and burning their ships. But their glory was short-lived. The siege and capture of their settlement at Hugli in 1632 under Shāh Jahān's orders may be reckoned to have sealed the fate of the Portuguese in India. By about the end of Aurangzīb's reign, they cease to be a factor in the history of India.¹

1. Their only possessions to-day in India are Goa, Diu and Dāman, all of them situate on the west coast of India. Of these, Goa is 250 miles

The Portuguese thus fell before the Dutch. The

The Dutch. Dutch first occupied various places in the Eastern Archipelago, where they were firmly settled about 1598. They

then founded settlements on the Eastern Coast of Southern India, from the beginning of the 17th century. They first pitched upon Pulicat, then the head-quarters of a Vijayanagar governor and a great entrepôt of trade. They obtained a *cowle* to settle there in 1606, about which time Portuguese influence declined at the court of Venkaṭa I. The advantage of this settlement will be apparent when it is remembered that its sea-borne commerce was mainly with the Straits Settlements, in which the Dutch were already interested. They next opened settlements at Sadras, Palcole, Cuddalore and other places on the East Coast and one at Sūrāt on the West Coast, in 1616. They had also factories at Agra, Patna and Ahmadabad. They also established themselves at Chinsurah and Hugli in 1675. The Dutch were essentially a nation of traders, more so than even the English. They prospered so long as they stuck to their commercial pursuits. They met their fate when they tried to meddle in the politics of the country. This came about after nearly a century of quiet trade in this land. Shortly after the great

S.S.E. of Bombay. Taken by Albuquerque in 1510, it reached its height of prosperity by the end of the 16th century. It was deserted in 1759 and left to the decay in which it has since lain. Its buildings are in ruins, their sites are covered with cocoanut plantations and the streets overrun with grass. The new capital is Nova Goa (or Panjim), nearer the sea, on the Mandavi, 8 miles from its mouth. Diu is a seaport, 180 miles north-west of Bombay, off the south coast of Kathiawar. Once a city of 50,000 souls, it has sunk in importance now, it possessing not more than 15,000 inhabitants, mostly fishermen. It has been in Portuguese hands since 1535 and stood a famous siege in 1545. Dāman is a port in the province of Guzerat, on the Gulf of Cambay, 100 miles north of Bombay. It has magnificent teak forests included in the *pargana* of Nagar-Havili. The port stands at the mouth of Dāman-Gangā, a deep and navigable stream, with a bar at its mouth. Dāman has been in Portuguese hands since 1558.

victory that the English won at Plassey under Clive (1756), the Dutch endeavoured to help Mīr Jāfar, the Nawāb of Bengal. Mīr Jāfar chafed under the control of his new masters and secretly induced the Dutch at Chinsurah to help him with troops. They landed troops from Batavia and raised more locally and picked up a quarrel with the English at Calcutta. Though England and Holland were at peace then, Clive resolved upon immediate action. Colonel Forde and Captain Wilson attacked the Dutch by land and sea, and defeated them. The decisive battle was fought at Biderra between Chandranagore and Chinsurah on 29th November 1759, and the Dutch were utterly routed. With this, the Dutch disappear from the Indian political field.

The Danish East India Company was formed in 1616.

The Danes. They first established themselves at Tranquebar in 1619 with the goodwill of Raghunātha Nāyaka, the ruler of

Tanjore. Fifty-six years later, in 1675, the Danes settled at Serampore, near Calcutta. The Governor's first residence was a mud hut and he had neither horse, foot, nor guns to protect him. A factory was built at Serampore in 1755, the Danish flag being hoisted on it on October 8 of that year. During the American War, Serampore saw the hey-day of its existence. Having restricted themselves entirely to trade, the Danes never came into any conflict with the country powers. Twice taken by the English in 1801 and 1808, the Danes sold their settlements to the British Government in 1845 for a monetary consideration of Rs. 12 lakhs. The Danish East India Company ceased to exist about 1815.

The English founded a settlement at Masulipatam in

The English. 1607; at Pettapoli (Peddapalli), now called Nizāmpatam, in 1611; and in 1616, they opened factories at Calicut and Cranganore, on the West Coast, with the permission

of the Zāmorin. Three years later, in 1619, they obtained a footing at Pulicat as well, by the side of the Dutch, and for some time traded on joint account with them. Before then, they had opened a factory at Sūrāt in 1612, and in the year following at Gogra, Ahmadabad, Cambay and Ajmere, all these being connected with Sūrāt. Mughal countenance was sought to be obtained by the despatch of embassies. Though Hawkins failed in 1609, Sir Thomas Roe was more successful. His stay of three years at the Mughal Court ended, in 1618, in the grant of a *firman* by Shāh Jahān for the factory at Sūrāt and Jahāngīr's general *firman*. In 1620, factories were set up at Agra and Patna. The mutual jealousies of these European nations were such that each tried to outbeat the other for securing the Eastern trade to itself. Thus, the Portuguese attacked the English in 1620 but were defeated by Captain Shillingel and, in 1622, the English joined the Persians in attacking the Portuguese, from whom they took Ormuz. In the following year, Dutch jealousies ended in the massacre of the English at Amboyna for an alleged conspiracy to take possession of the castle there (27th February 1623). As a result of this unhappy incident, the English at Bantam—which had been erected into a Presidency in 1618—suggested the expediency of concentrating their attention on the trade of the Coromandel Coast. Accordingly, in 1626, a factory was established at Armagon, 70 miles north of Madras. But this did not prove successful and a settlement was made at Madras in 1639. Meanwhile, in 1634, Shāh Jahān, contemporaneously with the expulsion of the Portuguese, granted a *firman* by which the trade of the whole of Bengal was opened to the English. A factory was established at Pippli, near the mouths of the Hugli, and in 1644 at Hugli itself. Bombay was secured in 1688, the Company purchasing it from King Charles II, to

whom it had been presented in 1661 by the Portuguese as a dowry of his queen Catherine of Braganza. The English restricted themselves to trade for nearly a century from their establishment at Madras and Hugli. It was only about 1748 that they began to enter the political arena in India.

The French made unsuccessful attempts to trade with the East about 1537. In 1615, they obtained a charter extending the monopoly of the French to trade in India during a period of 12 years. They first established themselves at Sūrat, but soon left it capturing Trincomalee from the Dutch. Driven from thence, in 1672 they took San Thomé, near Madras, from the Dutch, but lost it again, two years later, to the same nation. Meanwhile, in 1672, they had obtained on lease a place called Pullicherry, near Cuddalore, and a few French merchants had located themselves there. On the loss of San Thomé, Francois Martin, an officer of this factory, moved on with some sixty of his countrymen and established himself at Pullicherry in 1674 and began to erect fortifications in it. This place later became known as Pondicherry.² About the same time, in 1673, Chandranagore was occupied. It was largely developed by Dupleix while its Governor. On the death of Martin in 1706, he was succeeded by one Lenoir, who walked in his predecessor's footsteps. M. Dumas took over from him and converted Pondicherry into an attractive place to those who visited it. He it was that made friends with Dōst ALI, the then Nawāb of Arcot, and Chandā Sāhib, his son-in-law, and inspired confidence

2. "Pullicherry" later became "Pondicherry." The Muhammadans still pronounce it as "Pullicheri." The name "Pullicheri" occurs frequently in the Madras Consultation Books. It was evidently an insignificant village inhabited by Pallis, an agricultural community tracing their descent from the Agnikulas of Purāṇic tradition, with a few fishermen's huts and a shrine dedicated to Gaṇapati, which still stands in the present town.

in French power and state-craft. He may be said to have been the first to conceive of a French Empire in India. His policy was, in its essence, to use Indians themselves to subdue their country for France. He strengthened the fortifications of Pondicherry; raised a force of 12,000 Europeans; and a force of 5,000 Indians whom he armed and drilled in the European manner, thus bringing into existence the first sepoy corps known to India. But for the active aid he gave Dōst Alī and Chandā Sāhib, the Mahrattas would have occupied the Karnāṭak. Already a terror to the Mughal Emperor at Delhi, they would have become equally a terror to the Nawāb of Arcot and the foreign settlers in the South. Dumas, however, by the timely help he rendered to Dōst Alī, averted this possible contingency. The Mughal Emperor, in recognition of this service, conferred the title of "Nawab" on Dumas and the command of 2,000 horsemen as a guard. Dumas was also officially made an officer of the Mughal Empire. It is recognition of this sort that enabled the foreign settlers in later days to successfully claim neutrality as between contending parties, while all the while they were helping one side or the other with men or money and not infrequently with both. Dumas was succeeded in October 1741 by Joseph Francis Dupleix,³ a merchant who rose eventually to the dignity of Marquis and who, if his countrymen had favoured, would have made France supreme in India. He grasped the cardinal points in the policy of Dumas and gave tangible effect to them. He was not only an ambitious man but also a talented politician, with an inborn genius for leadership. How he befriended first Anwar-ud-dīn and then Chandā Sāhib, his rival; how he then was joined by Muzaffar Jang, the rival of Nāsir Jang in the Subādārship of the Deccan; how he had

3. Joseph Dupleix: 1697-1763. Governor of Chandranagore and then of Pondicherry (1741-1754, when he was recalled to France).

Nāsir Jang assassinated; how he next got proclaimed Muzaffar Jang Subādār of the Deccan and Chandā Sāhib Nawāb of the Karnāṭak; how he tried to take Trichinopoly into which Muhammad Alī, son of Anwar-un-dīn, had thrown himself; and how in doing so he sought to befriend Mysore by promising Trichinopoly to her⁴—show his capacity as much for diplomacy as for organization. But he failed and with him all idea of a French Empire in India vanished for ever. The French Company—*Compagnie de l'Inde*—came to an end in 1769 and to-day Pondicherry, Chandranagore, Māhe, Karaikal and Yanon are the only possessions left for France in India.

Though the European companies trading in the East were organized as peaceful commercial concerns, from the beginning they so built their factories that they could be secure from attacks, both from the local powers and from each other. Their proprietors as traders refused to countenance expenditure on fortifications. But trade cannot flourish without security. Some of the settlements were accordingly even fortified. The Dutch set the example. Thus Armagon was fortified, it being the first fortified settlement held by the English in India. It mounted 12 guns. "Dansborg" at Tranquebar was a rudimentary fortress in charge of 20 men and a few cannons. Fort St. George at Madras, though comparatively a small place when first erected, was likewise fortified. Pondicherry as first built was similarly fortified with three round towers and a bastion, the whole armed with thirty-two guns. When Martin rebuilt the settlement in 1701, he erected a regular fort in it called Fort Louis, which was a perfect pentagon in form with five bastions at the five angles.⁵ But

4. *Vue* Ch. VI below.

5. It was finished in 1706. See M. Julien Vinson, *Les Français dans l'Inde* (Lerousse, Paris, 1894); also Forrest, *Cities of India*, p. 330. It

fortifying their factories did not mean militarising their establishment any more than the fighting they occasionally indulged in to defend their settlements against a wandering Nawāb or an unfriendly Pālegār could be termed as war. Both by instinct and interest, the first European settlers desired peace. The local powers would not permit them to be anything other than traders, and their own superiors in their homelands did not allow them to invest their funds on the maintenance of an army or add to the expenditure on fortifications. In this, as in other matters, the English, who eventually displaced the Dutch everywhere in the South as the Dutch did the Portuguese in their own time, took a leaf out of the books of the Dutch. The Dutch as a commercial nation did not encourage any kind of warfare. They kept to the counter, the weighing scales and the measuring yard. A Josiah Child, who in 1686 declared war against Aurangzīb and sent out an expedition to take Chittagong, was an exception that proved the rule. The character of the make up of that expedition indubitably shows how much city men in those days distrusted professional soldiers. The expedition consisted of six hundred soldiers and they were sent under the command of subalterns! The Company sent out instructions that the captains and other superior officers should be supplied from the civil servants in India. It is no wonder that the expedition failed, there being no trained officers to command the men. But it was characteristic of the times that the Company did not think it safe to have soldiers by profession in any post higher than that of lieutenant. In this they followed the Dutch whose

was called Fort Louis evidently after Saint Louis to whom the Capuchin Chapel in the settlement was dedicated under the guidance of Father Louis, its builder. The French King and Crusader, St. Louis, who died at Carthage in 1270, is the name-father of the Byrsa Hill in that ancient city, now a suburb of Tunis. He is Louis IX of French History and was canonised by Boniface VII in 1297.

policy in most matters the English had been imitating. "We observe," wrote the Court of Directors to their Agent and Council at Madras on 28th September 1687, "in the book containing the Dutch methods, sent to us by Mr. Yale, not much more than what some of us understood before of their affairs; but, as there appears in this great wisdom, and policy, so since that time they have much bettered their constitutions, and refined their politics, and created many kinds of incomes, to increase their revenues, which they thought not of when these papers were first digested, some thirty years since. However, we recommend to you the frequent reading and consideration of what is contained in these papers, which the oftener you read, the more you will discover the wisdom of those persons who discovered those methods." Such admiration could not but lead to direct imitation. In keeping strictly to trade and avoiding warfare and collisions of every kind with the country powers, the English thus were admonished to follow the Dutch example. Similarly in regard to keeping the military—even in the restricted cases in which they had to act on the defensive when attacked—they were for following the Dutch "method" as the Directors termed it. "Their (the Dutch) having all lieutenants," the Directors remarked, "in their garrisons to command their companies, and a major without a company to command under their governor, we may imitate in due time; but think it not proper at present, until your civil power be as well established and obeyed at Fort St. George, as theirs is at Batavia." They thus were not only for "imitating" the Dutch in this matter but also like the Dutch, desired to see that the "civil power" was "well established" before they thought of seeking to be a military power. The fact of the matter is that the Directors were essentially commercial men and they were averse to allowing their agents in India developing a taste for

military adventures. Not only this. Their attitude was in keeping with their national spirit. Ever since the days of Cromwell's Protectorate, the English people have abhorred a standing army, and have treated trained soldiers as a menace to the State. The City of London was primarily Parliamentary and Puritan in character and it disliked the fall in public life that followed the Protectorate, more especially as affecting the military. The merchants of London who traded with the East were naturally no friends to a profession which they looked on as inimical to liberty, to religion and to trade. When they could not avoid having soldiers of their own, they were determined on having as few of them as possible and to keep these few as much as possible in their own hands. It could not be said that they were not justified in this view. The men who in those days agreed to go to India were, for the most part, undoubted adventurers. And these were, once they reached India, open to the worst temptations. Thus, in 1694, one Dr. Blackwell was suspected to have agreed to betray Fort St. David, Cuddalore, to a country power if he was enabled to carve out for himself an independent Governorship. Similarly, in 1761, a Captain Carlson, commanding at Chittapet (Chetput), went over with his forces to Haidar Ali. If there was thus reason on the side of the Directors in keeping the rise of military spirit in check, the circumstances in India were such that but for such a policy on the part of the Directors, their agents in India would have pursued a course which would have, at least in the initial stages when they were still essentially traders, ended in entanglements for them with the local country powers, from which there would have been no escape. As it was, the English in India—especially in the Madras region—were compelled to deviate from the strict injunctions of their masters. The immediate events that made them do this was the turn

that affairs took in Madras about the year 1744, when Krishnarāja Wodeyar II had been on the throne for just ten years. The first of these events was the breaking out of war between England and France in that year, a war that had its repercussions on India. Though the English had been established at Madras⁶ for nearly a hundred years by then, they had not taken any steps to protect themselves against possible attack from the French at Pondicherry. On the other hand, they applied to the Nawāb of Arcot to keep the peace within the territories subordinate to him. The French at Pondicherry—a well-fortified place between 1706 and 1741—addressed the self-same Nawāb to keep away from any such self-imposed task. The result was the French besieged Fort St. George and took it. This happened in September 1746.

The English at Madras were compelled to move down South to Fort St. David, from where they carried on their trade. They felt keenly the loss of their chief settlement

(b) 1746-1758.

and at once began to raise troops, and that may be justly said to be the beginnings of the Madras Army. The troops they raised were European cavalry, artillery, and infantry and Indian infantry. The first Indian cavalry were raised in 1784, and Indian artillery (as a separate corps) in 1805.⁷ The European cavalry never rose—partly on account of the expense involved and partly because of the opposition of the Nawāb whose main arm was cavalry—above the strength of a squadron, and even these were not maintained for more than a few years. The first sepoy levies were poor in discipline and poorer

6. Fort St. George at Madras was founded in 1639; it was captured by the French in 1746.

7. See W. J. Wilson, *History of the Madras Army* (1882), Vols. I to IV; P. J. Begbie, *History of the Services of the Madras Artillery* (1852); *Historical Record of the B. I. Co.'s First Madras European Regiment* (1848).

in equipment. They were armed with matchlocks, bows and arrows, spears, swords, bucklers, daggers, or other similar weapons they could get hold of. They were bodies of various strength, each under the command of its own chief, who received the pay of the whole body and disbursed it to the men. Not infrequently these chiefs owned the arms carried by the men and recovered from each man a small sum for the use of the weapons. The system worked well, as the salary was regularly paid and dismissal was felt to be a real punishment. Despite the fact that the French had succeeded in training Indians for military service and had found them amenable to discipline, the English at Madras for a time—between 1746-1758—neglected them and preferred any other material they could recruit. Thus it is that we find in the earliest period of the history of the Madras Army all kinds of nationalities enlisted in it. Thus there were European adventurers of all nations, the refuse of their respective nations; Topasses and Coffres;⁸ Arabs, Rajputs and Hindustānis from Bombay; and slaves imported from Madagascar. A change was necessitated in 1758, when the Madras troops were all absent in Bengal, and the fear of a war against the French made them resolve to recruit people in the South of India, with what results the history of the Madras sepoy has proved to perfection. That was no doubt due to improvement in equipment and discipline, and to better pay and better officering; but it must be held that the material itself was good and that it needed but capable handling and shaping.

These changes in the outlook of the English at Madras brought on by the vicissitudes of time, made them enter into the politics of the country powers and make alliances with them whether they liked it or not. It

Its repercussions on the south of India, with special reference to Mysore.

8. *Coffres*: Negroes who were brought to India from the Cape, Guinea, or Madagascar.

was during the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar II in Mysore (1734-1766) that these changes occurred and the fact that it is so is specially worthy of note. Mysore as the State nearest to Madras came into contact with it at the very beginning of her troubles with her neighbours. It could not avoid doing so because of its past, a past which was full of connections with the South, with Madura, Dindigal and Trichinopoly. It was a period too of trouble everywhere in the South. The Nizām claimed the South as the representative of the Mughal Emperor; his sons and grandsons disputed the overlordship as between themselves; the two foreign nations, the French and the English, by reason of their national propensities and interests, took opposite sides in these disputed successions; and each of these nations had great men on their sides. Dupleix and Bussy on the one side; Saunders, who has not yet come into his own, Clive (who was discovered by Saunders) and Lawrence on the other, are names which have become famous in Indian History. All these belong to this period. In Mysore itself, while the reigning king was a minor, his ministers and generals were men who had been brought up in the traditions of the past and aimed at the subjection of the whole of the South of India to Mysore, a tradition which was later unquestioningly accepted by Haidar, who even improved on it. They were not to blame for this, for, since the break-up of the Vijayanagar Empire, South India knew only Mysore as an organized kingdom with a conscious aim and will of her own; with an objective which made an irresistible appeal; and with a power which could help to carry it through. Mysore had a claim too for being the leader in reconstructing life and polity in the South, as her connection with the Vijayanagar kingdom had been continuous and unbroken since the middle of the 14th century. Sanctified by age-long association, her claim to supremacy over the South seemed

incontrovertible. Nor were the older disputants in a position to make a bold stand against her during the period of Krishṇarāja's reign. The Nāyaka of Madura had broken down in his power and prestige. The Nāyaka of Ikkēri was not interested in the South. Sōmasēkhara Nāyaka II, who held sway between 1715-1739, was engrossed in extending his kingdom nearer home. His son and successor Basappa Nāyaka II (1739-1754) was murdered and his adoptive mother Virammāji was insecure in her seat and fell an easy prey to Haidar in 1763, three years before the close of the reign of Krishṇarāja II. Then, as regards the Mahrattas, Bāji Rao I, who died in 1740, had been succeeded by Bālāji Bāji Rao, the third Pēshwa. Though in 1741 Siddōji-Ghōrpaḍe took Trichinopoly, Murāri Rao-Ghōrpaḍe, who was put in charge of it, vacated it in 1743. By 1750, Bālāji Bāji Rao had consolidated his authority, made Poona his capital and had become the head of the Mahratta Confederacy. But his ambitions were centred northwards. He occupied the Punjab in 1758 and renewed the invasion of Upper India in 1760 to achieve supremacy over the North. The Mahratta power had by then reached its zenith. Sadāśiva Rao Bhao, who was guiding its affairs, had an organized and well-paid army, with a large train of artillery; but he failed at Pānipat in 1761. This ambition northwards left the South to take care of itself for the time being, and it was during the interval covered by the period 1752-1755, that Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, the Daḷavāi of Krishṇarāja II, made the bold attempt at securing Trichinopoly for Mysore by any means open to him.⁹ If Murāri Rao, the Mahratta representative, had behaved as he should have done and kept his word, and if the king of Tanjore had not turned hostile, the Hindu cause in the South would have fared better and the history of India during this momentous period would have proved different.

9. *Vide* Chs. VII-VIII below.

CHAPTER VI.

KRISHNARĀJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*)

Fourth Phase: 1748-1751: Chanda Sahib's activities in the Karnatak, 1748-1749—His activities continued, 1749-1750—*The Karnatak War of Succession*, 1750-1751—Period of peace and security in Mysore, 1748-1751—*Fifth Phase*: 1751-1755: The contest for the Nawabship of Arcot and Trichinopoly (down to 1751); Chanda Sahib vs. Muhammad Ali—The contest continued, 1751-1752—The contest renewed, 1752-1755—Foreign politics of Mysore, 1751-1755—Mysore's part in the contest for the Nawabship of Arcot and Trichinopoly, 1751-1752: Trichinopoly, the objective of the Dalavais—Southern movements of Karachuri Nanjarajaiya—Progress of the Mysoreans and Murari Rao—Their services to Muhammad Ali and his allies during the contest—Muhammad Ali's attitude towards Mysore.

WE may now revert to the activities of Chandā Sāhib whom we left a prisoner in the hands of the Mahrattas at Satāra in 1741.¹ In

Fourth Phase: 1748, Chandā Sāhib obtained his release with the assistance of the

Chandā Sāhib's activities in the Karnāṭak, 1748-1749.

French (under M. Dupleix) at Pondicherry, and through the mediation of his own Dewān Śēshagiri Rao.² About this time, northern Karnāṭak—included in the *subāh* of Adoni under Muzaffar Jang, son of Mutuwussil Khān and grandson (i.e., daughter's son) of Nizām-ul-mulk—was distracted by the internecine quarrels of the chiefs

1. *Vide*, for general references on this section, *Wilks*, I. 282-303; *C. H. I.*, V. 126-128, 134; *Tanjore Dist. Gaz.*, I. 46-47; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 3-4. For specific references, see *infra*.

2. *Di. A. P.*, IV. 124-125; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 3.

of Harapanahalli and Chitaldrug, the former of whom was backed up by the rulers of Ikkēri (Bednūr), Rāyadurg and Savañūr.³ Chandā Sāhib, however, on his way to the south, espoused the cause of Hiriyā-Medekere Nāyaka (1721-1749), chief of Chitaldrug,⁴ and in February 1749 took part in the battle of Māyakonda, in which his eldest son Abīd Sāhib and the chief lost their lives.⁵ Chandā followed up this reverse to Adoni. In May, Muzaffar Jang himself proceeded with Immaḍi-Kastūri-Rangappa Nāyaka (1749-1754), son and successor of Medekere Nāyaka, and laid siege to the fort of Santebennūr, but was repulsed with loss by Basappa Nāyaka II of Ikkēri (1739-1754).⁶ Indeed, Muzaffar Jang's authority seemed to be little recognised in this part of the Karnātak during the very first year of Nizām-ul-mulk's death (1748) and the succession to the Nizāmate of the Deccan of Nāsir Jang (1748-1750).

At this juncture, Chandā Sāhib, well posted with the state of affairs in the country since 1741, not only promised to establish Muzaffar in the *subāh* of Adoni for, it is said, a crore of rupees,⁷ but also, with a view to secure for himself Arcot and Trichinopoly from Nawāb

His activities continued, 1749-1750.

3. *Ke. N. V.*, XI, vv. 10-12, 48-53, etc.; see also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. According to the latter source, Medekere Nāyaka of Chitaldrug fought against the chiefs of Harapanahalli, Rāyadurg, Savañūr and Bednūr, on behalf of Murāri Rao (of Gooty). Probably most of the local chiefs, about 1748-1749, resented the pretensions of Murāri to the *chauth* of the Karnātak.

4. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

5. *Ke. N. V.*, XI, v. 49 (f.n. 1). The event is dated in this work in *Vibhava, Phalguṇa* (February 1749). Cf. Wilks's date, March 1748 (I. 285, f.n.), for which there is no evidence. See also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; *Di. A. Pi.*, VI. 102, 185-186: *Notes* dated June 29, and September 28, 1749. Māyakonda is the chief village in a *hobli* of that name in Dāvanagere taluk, Chitaldrug district (see *List of Villages*, 169).

6. *Ibid.*, vv. 51-52 (f.n. 2). The event is dated in this work in *Śukla, Jyēṣṭha* (May 1749). Cf. *Tuzak.*, pp. 186-187, referring in a general way to the affairs of Chitaldrug and Bednūr.

7. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 4.

Anwar-ud-dīn, infused him (Muzaffar Jang) with hopes of being eventually made the master of the whole of the Karnāṭak-Pāyanghāt.⁸ About July 1749, he further succeeded in exacting a tribute of rupees two and a half lakhs from the chief of Ikkēri for Muzaffar,⁹ and then marched on with the latter towards Arcot. Having in the meanwhile enlisted the services of a French contingent from Pondicherry, Chandā, in July, gave battle to Anwar-ud-dīn at Āmbūrgadh (Āmbūr). On August 3, Anwar-ud-dīn was, during negotiations for peace, treacherously attacked and slain.¹⁰ And Chandā, formally proclaimed as Nawāb of Arcot by Muzaffar Jang, proceeded with him to Pondicherry. During September-October, it became his (Chandā's) ambition "to conquer all the countries from Mysore up to the Narbada and rule as the Nizam did formerly"; and in this view the occupation of Trichinopoly and Tanjore was his immediate objective.¹¹ In November, he marched with the French troops under M. d'Auteuil against Trichinopoly but he soon diverted his attention towards Tanjore, from whose ruler Pratāp Singh (1740-1763) he sought to exact a large tribute as the new Nawāb of Arcot. The siege of Tanjore was protracted for three months but Chandā was compelled to raise it and retire to Pondicherry in February 1750, alarmed by the news of Nāsir Jang's march from the Deccan to the Karnāṭak with an English detachment and a large army (drawn from various parts of the country), to contest the claims of his nephew Muzaffar Jang to the succession to the Karnāṭak.¹²

8. *Tuzak.*, pp. 187-188; cf. *Di. A. Pi.*, VI. 186: l.c.

9. *Di. A. Pi.*, VI. 107-108: *Notes* dated July 2, 1749; cf. Dodwell (*Ibid.*, 108, f.n. 1, and *Introduction*, p. VI) in the light of *Ke. N. V.* and other sources cited *supra*.

10. *Tuzak.*, pp. 141-147; also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

11. *Di. A. Pi.*, VI. 215: *Notes* dated October 6, 1749; also 174, 210-211: *Notes* dated September 20, and October 5, 1749.

12. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

In April, however, Nāsir Jang, having caused panic to Muzaffar's allies near Valudavūr, took him prisoner to Arcot, where he lay inactive during the next six months.

The Karnāṭak War of Succession, 1750-1751.

In November, shocked by the rapid occupation by the French of Tiruvaḍi, Viḷḷupuram and Gingee, Nāsir proceeded to lay siege to Pondicherry and was, on the night of December 16, surprised and slain on the field of battle at Dupleix-Fathabad, by the intrigue of his Dewān Shāh Nawāz Khān and the treachery of the Nawābs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savaṇūr.¹³ In January 1751, Muzaffar Jang, forthwith recognised by Dupleix as the Subādār of the Deccan, set out thither, accompanied by de Bussy, Dupleix's lieutenant. On February 14, however, a conspiracy of the Nawābs at Rāchōṭi (Rāyachōṭi) cost his life. Thereupon Salābat Jang, third son of Nizām-ul-mulk, established himself with Bussy's help as the Subādār at Hyderabad (1751-1761), and Basālat Jang, a brother of Salābat, became Nawāb of Adoni. These developments tended to brighten the prospects of Chandā Sāhib in South India and to increase the prestige of his ally Dupleix (at Pondicherry) as the Governor of all India south of the Krishṇā.


The years 1748-1751 were years of peace and security in the kingdom of Mysore. All through this period, Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya was, with his elder brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, at the height of his power in Seringapatam,¹⁴ steadily keeping his eye on the south.¹⁵

Period of peace and security in Mysore, 1748-1751.

13. *Ibid.*

14. See *Nanjarāja-Yasōbhāṣaṇam* and other works of the period, noticed under *Literary activity* in Ch. XIII.

15. See *Di. A. Pi.*, VII, 406 (*Notes* dated October 16, 1750), referring to the Mysorean offer of assistance to the grandson of Changamala Dās and great-grandson of Vijayarāghava Nāyaka—who had taken refuge in Mysore—to recover the kingdom of Tanjore from the Mahrattas (*i.e.*, Pratāp Singh, 1740-1763), etc.





Mons. Dupleix.

The only event of note during these years, however, was the despatch of a contingent to Arcot under Barakki Venkaṭa Rao (1750) to take part in the *Karnāṭak War of Succession* (1750-1751).¹⁶

To resume the general trend of affairs.¹⁷ With the
Fifth Phase: accession of Salābat Jang to the Subā-
 1751-1755. dārī of the Deccan (February 1751),

The contest for the
 Nawābship of Arcot
 and Trichinopoly
 (down to 1751).

Chandā Sāhib vs.
 Muhammad Ali.

political situation in South India assumed a new turn, and the question of succession to the Nawābship of Arcot and Trichinopoly came to the forefront. On the one side, Chandā Sāhib, who, as we have seen, was formally proclaimed as Nawāb of Arcot by Muzaffar Jang (August 1749), began to contest keenly the possession of Trichinopoly also, raising his pretensions to both the places as a representative, and relation, of the *Nawādyats*, to which community the early Nawābs of Arcot (1708-1744) belonged. On the other, Muhammad Ali, third son of Nawāb Anwar-ud-dīn (1744-1749), put forward his claims to succession to the Nawābship on the alleged ground of his appointment by Nāsir Jang and of his subsequent confirmation under a *firman*, real or supposed, from the Mughal Emperor Ahmad Shah (1748-1754). The cause of Chandā was espoused by the French (under M. Dupleix, Governor of Pondicherry, 1742-1754) who were favourites of the Nawāyat Nawābs of Arcot, and that of Muhammad Ali by the English (under Thomas Saunders, Governor of Fort St. George, Madras, 1750-1755), with whom he and his father Anwar-ud-dīn had maintained friendly relations since 1744, assisting them against their rivals, the French, during the period of the *War of Austrian Succession* in India (1744-1748),

16. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. For details of services of this contingent on the occasion, see under *Rise of Haidar Ali* in Ch. X below.


17. *Vide*, for the general references on this section, *Wilks*, I. 303-387; *C. H. I.*, V. 119-124, 128-184; *Tanjore Dist. Gaz.*, I. 47-48, etc.

especially during La Bourdonnais' capture of Madras (1746) and Admiral Boscawen's siege of Pondicherry (1748). Since that war which terminated with the treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle* (1748), these two commercial nations were nominally at peace in India but were really finding in the internal turmoils and dissensions of the times (particularly among the local powers of South India) an opportunity for war, in so far as it would conduce to their own interests. To Dupleix, however, belongs the credit of definitely initiating the policy of an European nation taking part in the affairs of Indian princes "as allies, not as principals" as the first step in any project of territorial expansion in the East, and, as indicated already, he made an admirable beginning in this direction, in the battle of Āmbūr (1749). This apart, the fortunes of Muhammad Alī in the Karnāṭak, during 1749-1751, were at a low ebb. He shut himself up in the fort of Trichinopoly and appears to have entered into a protracted negotiation with Dupleix at Pondicherry, professing to renounce his claims on Arcot, and consenting to the eventual evacuation of Trichinopoly in favour of Chandā Sāhib. In reality, however, Muhammad Alī was, all the while, only gaining time to complete an offensive and defensive alliance with the English, Murāri Rao, the Mahratta chief of Gooty, and the kingdom of Mysore, against his rival. The accession of Salābat Jang to the Subādāri of the Deccan in February 1751 seemed to revive his hopes of a favourable settlement of his cause at the hands of the latter who belonged to the very branch of the family by which he (Muhammad Alī) claimed to have been appointed as Nawāb. Accordingly, from this time onward, Muhammad Alī found himself engaged in contending with Chandā Sāhib for the Nawābship of Arcot on the one hand, and, on the other, in maintaining against him his own position in Trichinopoly.

Hostilities commenced in May 1751 when a detachment of English troops under Captain Gogens set out from Madras to support Muhammad Ali, and Dupleix, finding that he had been tricked by the latter, despatched in his turn a contingent under d'Auteuil in aid of Chandā Sāhib, to capture Trichinopoly. The auxiliary armies appeared before the city in July and September, respectively. Towards the close of 1751, Chandā and the French—now commanded by Jacques Law—deceived a second time by the renewed negotiations of Muhammad Ali and his allies, invested Trichinopoly. Law, however, was able to achieve little success beyond intercepting the passage of provisions to the fort. In the meanwhile, the cause of Muhammad Ali seemed rapidly to gain ground. By the end of the year, he had succeeded in enlisting the support of the rulers of Mysore and Tanjore and of Murāri Rao of Gooty on his side, while the English, acting as his allies, had struck a serious blow at French prestige by Captain Clive's siege and capture of Arcot (September-October), one of the most memorable diversions that history records of. Nevertheless, Chandā Sāhib and Law continued the contest for Trichinopoly, taking up their stand in the island of Śrīrangam. In April 1752, Muhammad Ali secured a large convoy and the services of additional detachments of English troops under Major Stringer Lawrence and Captain Clive, who set to work to block up Law in Śrīrangam. Dupleix, seeing this imminent danger, despatched reinforcements under d'Auteuil who, however was forced to surrender at Valikondapuram on June 9. Three days later Law was himself taken prisoner with all his troops, and this was followed by the capture and treacherous execution of Chandā Sāhib at the hands of Mānāji, the Tanjorean general in the employ of Muhammad Ali.

For the time being, the cause of Muhammad Alī thus seemed to triumph. But his allies, the English, during 1752-1754, found themselves drawn into an open conflict with the French under Dupleix who, despite the reverses of 1751-1752, successively upheld the claims of Razā Sāhib (1752-1753), second son of Chandā Sāhib, and of Ghulām Murtazā Khān (1753-1754), Killedār of Vellore and a son-in-law of Nawāb Alī Dōst Khān (1733-1740), to the Nawābship of Arcot, as against those of Muhammad Alī. At the same time, the latter's pretensions to Trichinopoly also received a severe check in a fresh, though protracted, struggle for that place (1752-1755) by the Mysoreans who, for reasons which will be explained in the sequel,¹⁸ had with Murāri Rao seceded from his (Muhammad Alī's) coalition and been obliged to seek an alliance with the French against him (1752-1753). To the French and the English, the war on the Arcot question became an unceasing business in the south, which they were constantly advised by their respective home governments to put a stop to. To that end, a conference of representatives of these powers was held at Sadras between January 21-25, 1754, at which the English demanded of the French recognition of Muhammad Alī as "the Nabob of the Carnatic," while the French emphasised the authority of the Subādār of the Deccan as a factor of paramount consideration on the point at issue. The conference was marked by acrimonious discussions in regard to the validity of the titles of respective candidates of the powers to the Nawābship; it eventually proved a failure and war was renewed with vigour. In August, Dupleix, whose Indian policy was never wholly approved by the French

8. *Vide* Chs. VII—VIII below.





Nawāb Muhammad Ali Wālājah.

government, was recalled and M. Godeheu succeeded to the Governorship of Pondicherry (1754-1755). In September, Godeheu, in strict accordance with the instructions of his superiors, concluded with Governor Saunders of Madras a provisional agreement—afterwards confirmed by an eighteen months' peace—by which the French and the English were to suspend their arms in the south for a period of three months as and from October 11. All through this period Muhammad Ali was in great straits, firmly adhering to his alliance with the English. It was not, however, till August 21, 1755 that he made his formal entry into the fort of Arcot as the English East India Company's "Nabob," having been recognised as such by M. Godeheu also in December 1754.

During 1751-1755, the kingdom of Mysore figured prominently in the affairs of South India.¹⁹ As the chief executive officer of the State (*Sarvādhikārī*), Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya played in behalf of Krishnarāja Wodeyar a leading role in the foreign politics of the times, while his elder brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya continued to manage the internal administration from the capital city of Seringapaṭam.²⁰

19. Cf. *Wilks*, I. 309-387. His treatment of the affairs of Mysore pertaining to this period is, as may be expected from his avowed object, governed more by considerations of the general course of Anglo-French history in South India than by the realities of the issues involved from the Mysore standpoint. The sources now available to us and referred to here and in Chs. VII-VIII below, however, enable us to interpret and appraise the whole subject independently of Wilks to a considerable extent.

20. Most of the political and diplomatic documents of the period (1751-1755), noticed below, make formal mention of the "King of Misore [Mysore]," though the foreign affairs of the State were, according to them, actually in the hands of Daḷavāi Nanjarājaiya, referred to as "Dallaway Nandi Raj" (see also, on this point, Ch. IV, f.n. 33). It is further to be noted that Nawāb Muhammad Ali Wālājāh is generally referred to in these records by his father's name "Aneverdy Khan [Anwar-din]."

The course of events in South India during 1748-1751,

Mysore's part in the contest for the Nawābship of Arcot and Trichinopoly, 1751-1752:

Trichinopoly, objective of the Daḷavāis.

sketched above, appears to have enabled the Daḷavāi brothers, as early as May 1751, to concentrate their attention on the south of Mysore and to station a detachment of 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot at Diṇḍigal (an earlier acquisition of the kingdom),²¹ with a view to safe-

guard her southern frontier and, if possible, to advance on Trichinopoly as circumstances might require. The acquisition of Trichinopoly was still the objective of Mysore an expansion in this region. It dominated as much the military as the diplomatic policy of Nanjarājaiya and his brother. Unless we bear this cardinal fact in our mind, we are not likely to understand the motives that guided them in their dealings with the foreign protagonists of the rival Nawābs and Nizāms. Nanjarājaiya, as we shall see, tried to promise aid to both in turn, and all the while his eye was on Trichinopoly and how to get hold of it for Mysore. Trichinopoly was the key to the Karnāṭak and he held fast to the view that it should be gained, whatever may happen. On its possession depended, in his view, the supremacy of Mysore over the south of India. Almost simultaneously it became the key-note of Dupleix's policy to enlist the support of the rulers of

21. *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII. 1: *Notes* dated May 3, 1751. Wilks (I. 387) speaks of the acquisition of Diṇḍigal by Mysore in 1745, though we have so far no independent evidence on the point. The probabilities are in favour of the view that the place was absorbed into the kingdom of Mysore during the convulsions which followed the extinction of Nāyaka rule in Madura (1736). *Diṇḍigal*: As a strategical point of great natural strength, commanding the Passes between Madura and Coimbatore, its possession was always keenly contested. Between 1623 and 1659, it was the scene of many encounters between the Bijāpur, Mysore and Madura troops. The Mysorean troops besieged it in 1625, in Tirumala Nāyaka's reign. In 1736, Chandā Sāhib stormed it. Taken by Mysore between 1736-1745, it was in 1755 garrisoned by Haidar, and used as a base by him for annexing Madura and Coimbatore. As the gate to Coimbatore faces the south, in Haidar's hands it proved a great obstacle to the operations of the English at Trichinopoly and Madura.

Mysore and Tanjore and the seventy-two Pālegārs of the Trichinopoly country, on the side of Chandā Sāhib.²² About July, Mysore responded to Dupleix's invitation by sending Vakīls Gōpāla Dās and Narasinga Dās to the Governor of Pondicherry.²³ These activities attracted the attention of the English at Madras, whose Governor, Thomas Saunders, on August 23, wrote²⁴ to the king of Mysore, persuading him to join the side of Muhammad Ali against Chandā, and cautioning him against the motives of the French in regard to Mysore. In the meanwhile, Muhammad Ali, hard pressed by Chandā Sāhib at Trichinopoly, had sent his Vakīl Śēshagiri-Pant to the court of Seringapatam and entered into an agreement (*karāru*) with the authorities there, to cede the fort and country of Trichinopoly to Mysore as the price of her assistance to him in raising the siege of the place (Trichinopoly).²⁵ In part execution of that agreement, a detachment of Mysore horse and foot was to proceed to Muhammad Ali's immediate relief early in September,²⁶ while the English continued to press Mysore to support the claims of Muhammad Ali to the Nawābship of Arcot.²⁷ By September 6, the expected detachment under the command of Vīraṇṇarāj and Barakki Venkaṭa Rao, marching from Diṇḍigal, arrived within 30 *kos* of Trichinopoly,²⁸ finally reaching Karūr on

22. *Ibid.*, 5 : Notes dated May 24, 1751.

23. *Ibid.*, 21-22 : Notes dated July 8, 1751.

24. *Count. Corres.* (1751), p. 54 : Letter dated August 23, 1751—Saunders to King of Mysore.

25. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 5; see also and compare *Fr. Corres.* (1752), p. 32 (*Correspondence* dated February 18, 1752), which speaks of Muhammad Ali as having undertaken to surrender Trichinopoly and its dependencies to Mysore "in consideration of an annual pension of eight lakhs of Rupees which this Raja [of Mysore] has promised to allow him." The authority of the local source is preferred here. For an explanation of the motives of Mysore underlying her agreement with the Nawāb, see Ch. VII below.

26. *Count. Corres.*, p. 56 : Letter No. 117, dated August 29, 1751—Nawāb to Saunders.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 57 : Letter No. 120, dated September 5, 1751—Saunders to King of Mysore.

28. *Ibid.* : Letter No. 121, dated September 6, 1751—Nawāb to Saunders.

the 14th.²⁹ By the 24th, Mysore had further provided Muhammad Ali with financial help to the extent of Rs. 80,000,³⁰ and on the 29th Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya set out with the main army from Seringapatam,³¹ after subsidising, and settling matters with, Murāri Rao of Gooty who was to join him with 5,000 horse at Trichinopoly.³²

About the middle of October 1751, Nanjarājaiya reached Śrīrangam,³³ where, for nearly two months, he awaited the arrival of Murāri Rao. From there he exchanged also friendly letters with the Governor of Madras, assuring him of his support to Muhammad Ali.³⁴ Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali was eagerly expecting further supplies in men and money from Mysore,³⁵ and Chandā Sāhib, having crossed the Cauvery and the Coleroon, had encamped round the fort of Trichinopoly and was on bad terms with Mysore, menacing her safety.³⁶ At the same time, Dupleix had been alarmed by recent developments. In September, letters of Englishmen from Trichinopoly to Fort St. David about the non-arrival of the Mysore army had been intercepted at Pondicherry, and Dupleix, foiled in his objective, criticised the action of Mysore in joining Muhammad Ali, threatening to invade her and seize her fortresses if she assumed the offensive against the French or helped

29. *Ibid.*, p. 58 : *Letter* No. 124, dated September 14, 1751—Saunders to Nawāb.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 61 : *Letter* No. 129, dated September 24, 1751—Nawāb to Saunders.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 65 : *Letter* No. 140, dated October 20, 1751—Mysore Vakil to Saunders.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, p. 66 : *Letter* No. 141, dated October 20, 1751—Daḷavāi to Saunders.

34. *Ibid.*; also *Ibid.*, p. 70 : *Letter* No. 152, dated November 1, 1751—Saunders to Daḷavāi.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 62 : *Letter* No. 133, dated October 5, 1751—Nawāb to Saunders ; pp. 63-64 : *Letter* No. 136, dated October ? 1751, and p. 69 : *Letter* No. 150, dated November 1, 1751—Nawāb to Saunders.

36. *Vide* f.n. 33 *supra*; also *Di. A. P.*, VIII. 53-59, 67 : *Notes* dated September 14 and October 11, 1751.

Muhammad Ali.³⁷ But the Mysorean Vakīl Narasinga Dās at Pondicherry had been directed to declare that no help would be sent from Mysore to Muhammad Ali and that the troops (of Mysore) had marched "only as a measure of precaution."³⁸ Further, in November, while Muhammad Ali and the English were becoming impatient at the delay in the arrival of the allied troops (of Tanjore, Mysore and Murāri Rao) to the relief of Trichinopoly, Nanjarājaiya, obviously to gain time and be on the safe side, offered Chandā Sāhib and the French promises of his assistance.³⁹ He proposed through his Vakīl an agreement with Chandā, the terms of which were, that both the parties were to remain mutual friends; that that part of the Trichinopoly country which had remained long in the possession of Mysore, was not to be interfered with; that the Pālegārs who had joined Mysore were not to be molested; and that for the maintenance of 2,000 horse and 5,000 foot (of Mysore) who were to remain constantly with Chandā, the latter was to assign lands adjoining the Mysore territory, yielding rupees three lakhs annually.⁴⁰ Chandā Sāhib on his part, seeing that Nanjarājaiya was the stronger party, consented to these terms, promising not to molest any Pālegār except him of Toreyūr (Turaiyur), and assigning Soṇḍikoppam and certain countries seized by Toṇḍamān in satisfaction of the last clause.⁴¹ Dupleix not only approved of this negotiation but also, as desired by Chandā, directed a letter to be written to Nanjarājaiya to the effect "that he would fulfil Chanda Sahib's agreement."⁴²

37. *Di. A. Pi.*, 57-58: *Notes* dated September 14, 1751.

38. *Ibid.*, 58-59: *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*, 69: *Notes* dated November 8, 1751; cf. Dodwell's *Editorial note* (l. c.) with reference to the sequence of events developed above.

40. *Ibid.*, 69-70: *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, 70-71: *Ibid.*

At last, however, towards the close of November, Progress of the Murāri Rao, with Katti Gōpālarāja Mysoreans and Urs from Bangalore, proceeded with a Murāri Rao. large army towards Arcot, to join Nanjarājaiya at Śrīrangam.⁴³ Early in December, the combined force, consisting of 10,000 horse (including the 5,000 horse of Murāri) and 50,000 foot, resumed its march in the direction of Trichinopoly.⁴⁴ Disappointed at this news, Chandā Sāhib despatched a detachment of his troops to intercept the progress of the Mysoreans and Murāri.⁴⁵ An action took place at Krishnarājapuram, in which Mahbūb Sāhib and Saiyid Yākūb, officers commanding Chandā's detachment, were taken prisoners, and the allied forces advanced on Karūr.⁴⁶ About the close of December, Chandā Sāhib attempted again to intercept the latter, but Abdul Wāhab Khān, under instructions of his elder brother Muhammad Alī, was able successfully to lead one-half of the forces (including 3,000 Mahrattas) by a separate route towards Trichinopoly, leaving Chandā to contend with the other half.⁴⁷ By January 25, 1752 Nanjarājaiya and Murāri Rao had joined Muhammad Alī,⁴⁸ and the remaining troops by

43. *Press List* (1750-1754), p. 312: *Letter* No. 2049, dated December 2, 1751. In the light of other sources, the reference to "the Mysore King's brother" in this record is obviously to Katti Gōpālarāja Urs of Beṭṭadakōṭe, afterwards father-in-law of Krishnarāja Wodeyar II (see under *Domestic life* in Ch. XIII below). Of course, the relationship is incorrectly indicated in the document. See also *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1752), pp. 25-26, where Katti Gōpālarāja Urs is referred to as "Gopāl Rauze, the King's brother," who commanded at Trichinopoly; and p. 66, where he is mentioned as the brother of [Nanja] Rāja! Immaḍi-Krishnarāja Wodeyar had no brothers, nor had Nanjarājaiya a brother by name Gōpālarāja besides his elder brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya.

44. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 5.

45. *Ibid.* 46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*; see also *Count. Corres.* (1751), p. 80: *Letter* No. 174, dated December 10, 1751—Nawāb to Saunders (referring to the Nawāb's despatch of Abdul Wāhab Khān to meet the Mysoreans and Murāri Rao).

48. *Mad. Desp.* (1744-1755), p. 148: *Despatch* dated January 25, 1752.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 150: *Despatch* dated February 15, 1752; see also *Di. A. Pi.*, 93: *Notes* dated February 13, 1752.

February 15.⁴⁹ Thereupon Chandā Sāhib raised the siege of Trichinopoly and retired to Śrīrangam.⁵⁰

During the last phase of Chandā Sāhib's contest for the possession of Trichinopoly (February-June 1752), the Mysoreans and Murāri Rao distinguished themselves as allies of Muhammad Alī and the English. In particular, they actively assisted in Captain Clive's blockade of Law in Śrīrangam (April-June),⁵¹ while a detachment of Mysorean and Mahratta troops under Barakki Venkaṭa Rao co-operated with the English at Samayavaram and Koyilāḍi in intercepting the passage of provisions to the camp of Chandā and the French (May),⁵² and during Clive's attack on d'Auteuil at Valikonḍapuram (June).⁵³ They were, on the whole, of considerable service to their allies in the course of events leading to the surrender of Law and Chandā Sāhib at Śrīrangam (June).

Far different, however, was the attitude of Muhammad Alī towards Mysore all through the period, an attitude which, as we shall see, was directly responsible for the death of Chandā Sāhib. On the retirement of Chandā to Śrīrangam (February 1752), Muhammad Alī paid a visit to Nanjarājaiya, in the course of which, says the contemporary chronicle *Haidar-Nāmāh*,⁵⁴ he affected to hand over the keys of Trichinopoly fort to the latter and to permit him to garrison the place, professing at the same time his desire to be allowed an assignment of lands in Karūr, to live in peace. Nanjarājaiya, however, continues the chronicle,⁵⁵ believing in Muhammad Alī, soothed him by stating that he would secure him

50. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

51. *Di. A. Pi.*, 111: Notes dated June 16, 1752.

52. *Ibid.*, 103, 107: Notes dated May 15, and June 13, 1752.

53. *Fr. Corres.* (1752), p. 80: *Letter* No. 17, dated August 3, 1752.

54. ff. 5.

55. ff. 5-6.

Haradanahalli in the Mysore territory as a *jahgīr* after putting to flight Chandā's troops, and handed back the keys to him. He not only allowed Muhammad Alī to return to the fort with a select retinue but also lent him a further sum of 10,000 *varahas* for the expenses of his troops. Then Muhammad Alī bribed and won over to his side Murāri Rao and the Tanjorean general Mānāji, and, while continuing his professions of friendship and attachment to Nanjarājaiya, began systematically to obstruct the passage of the latter's men to and from the fort of Trichinopoly. In the meanwhile, Chandā Sāhib (who was on the point of surrendering to the English at Śrīrangam, during May-June), having caught scent of the shifting policy of his rival, sent his Vakīl to Nanjarājaiya, imploring him not to confide in Muhammad Alī and assuring him of his support in obtaining possession of the fort if he only took up his (Chandā's) cause. At first, Nanjarājaiya was not inclined to listen to Chandā's words. About this time, however, Muhammad Alī had gone to the extent of cutting off supplies of provisions to the Mysore troops encamped at Trichinopoly. At this intelligence, Nanjarājaiya understood fully the bent of mind of his ally and entered into an agreement (*kaulu*) with Chandā Sāhib through Mānāji, undertaking to station Chandā's troops on the banks of the Chintāmaṇi river, in readiness for an attack on Muhammad Alī. Alarmed at this news, Muhammad Alī spread the rumour that he had lost his control over the fort of Trichinopoly in consequence of a mutiny of the English troops for their arrears of pay, and that, however, the Mysoreans might take possession of the fort, provided they captured Chandā Sāhib. Nor was this all. He blocked up the Mysoreans who had previously entered the fort, and, having again bribed Mānāji, plotted against Chandā's life. At length, one night (? June 1752), Mānāji, having induced Chandā Sāhib and his

Dewān Śēshagiri Rao (prisoners at Śrīrangam) to leave the camp on the pretext of an alleged informal meeting with Nanjarājaiya, beheaded them as pre-arranged. Muhammad Ali quietly retired to the fort; the heads were, however, sent to Nanjarājaiya who later despatched them to Seringapatam where they were suspended on the Mysore Gate.⁵⁶

56. Orme relates the following story: "The head was immediately sent into Trichinopoly to the Nabob, who now for the first time saw the face of his rival. After he had gratified his courtiers with a sight of it, they tied it to the neck of a camel, and in this manner it was carried five times round the walls of the city, attended by a hundred thousand spectators, insulting it with all the obscene and indecent invectives peculiar to the manners of Indostan. It was afterwards carefully packed up in a box and delivered to an escort who gave out that they were to carry it to be viewed by the Great Mogul at Delhi; a practice generally observed to heighten the reputation of the successful cause; but there is no reason to believe that it was ever carried out of the Carnatic." (*A History of the Military Transactions in Indostan*, I. 241). Charles Dalton, author of the *Memoir of Captain Dalton*, comments thus on this sacrilegious conduct of the Nawāb: "However repulsive this conduct may seem, it must be remembered that the actors in it were ignorant heathens and the conduct of Mahommed Ali was much more excusable than that of His Most Christian Majesty Charles the Second, who ordered the body of his enemy Cromwell to be disinterred and hung in chains, besides heaping every possible indignity on the corpses of others of his enemies." (P. 144). Local tradition at Trichinopoly says that the remains of Chandā Sāhib are interred at the shrine of Nutterowlia, whose tomb—evidently built out of the materials of Hindu temples—is ascribed to the time of Mālik Kāfir, who invaded Southern India in 1310. Chandā Sāhib is credited with the construction of the dome of this edifice (see *ante* p. 83, f.n. 66).

CHAPTER VII.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(contd.)

The Mysorean struggle for Trichinopoly, 1752-1755: The demand for cession, June 1752: Nanjarajaiya *vs.* Muhammad Ali—Muhammad Ali evades—Nanjarajaiya prepares for the siege—Renewed negotiations of Muhammad Ali, June-July 1752—His visit to Nanjarajaiya—His departure to Fort St. David, July 1752—A period of suspense and trial, July-December 1752—Nanjarajaiya tries indirect means, July-October 1752—Murari Rao's attitude towards him, July-December 1752—Nanjarajaiya at Srirangam, December 1752-January 1753—A surprise attack on the Mysoreans, January 1753—Nanjarajaiya prepares for the blockade of Trichinopoly, January-March 1753—His claim to the place—The Mysoreans push through the siege: March-April 1753—May 1753—Nanjarajaiya's negotiations for French alliance, *c.* June, July-December 1752—January-June 1753—The English attitude on the Trichinopoly question: June-July 1752—August-September 1752—November 1752-May 1753—Their attempted compromise between Mysore and Muhammad Ali, January-May 1753—Mysore and the French *vs.* Muhammad Ali and the English, 1753-1754—The siege continues: June 1753—July-December 1753—January-August 1754.

ON the fall of Chandā Sāhib, runs the chronicle,¹ Nanjarājaiya sent word to Muhammad Ali, demanding the cession to Mysore of the fort of Trichinopoly in compliance with his agreement. At first Muhammad Ali seemed willing to act up to his promise, desiring Nanjarājaiya personally to inspect the fort and arrange for garrisoning it. Accordingly, Nanjarājaiya, accompanied by a select retinue, proceeded thither. As he was about to enter the place after passing



The Mysorean struggle for Trichinopoly, 1752-1755:

The demand for cession, June 1752.

Nanjarājaiya *vs.* Muhammad Ali.

1. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 6-7.

Scale of 880 Yards or Half a Mile.



Trichinopoly Fort, 1752-1765—A view.

through the outer enclosure, Haidar Alī, who attended on him, foreseeing a plot at work, began to prevail on him to retrace his steps. At this juncture, Muhammad Alī, as anticipated, having securely closed the principal and wicket gates, started cannonading from above, and would have persisted in his course but for his mother who, reprimanding him for his treachery towards his ally, forthwith threw open the gates and allowed Nanjarājaiya and his followers to depart in safety.

The ulterior motives of Muhammad Alī in regard to Trichinopoly, soon stood revealed. As Muhammad Alī evades. the contemporary Diarist records,² "the Mysore Raja's people, including even the Vakil, are not allowed even to enter the fort. Muhammad Ali Khan told them that the English had occupied it and refused either to give it up or allow any to enter." In vain did his brother Abdul Wāhab Khān remonstrate with him to surrender the fort and continue the alliance with Mysore.³

Determined to take the fort, Nanjarājaiya promptly replied by encamping with his entire army before the walls of Trichinopoly, and, enlisting the services of Murāri Rao and his troops (at rupees 5,000 a day) as well as some matchlock people and horsemen (who had lately deserted the French), prepared to attack Muhammad Ali.⁴ The combined forces, further, refused to march on with the latter's army (under Major Lawrence) towards Gingee, "till he had complied with his promise of giving up Trichinopoly to the King of Mysore."⁵

2. *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII, 129, 133: *Notes* dated July 7 and 10, 1752. The dispute between Nanjarājaiya and Muhammad Alī over the cession of Trichinopoly is found first referred to in the *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1752), p. 22: *Consultation* dated June 29, 1752.

3. *Ibid.*, 166: *Notes* dated August 13, 1752.

4. *Haid. Nām.* ff. 7; also *Di. A. Pi.*, 133 *supra*.

5. *Mad. Desp.* (1744-1755), pp. 172-173: *Despatch* dated July 5, 1752; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, l.c.

By the end of June, Muhammad Alī sought to negotiate through his Vakīl, proposing to make over to the Mysoreans the fort and the country of Trichinopoly as soon as he was settled in Arcot, and offering them the English guarantee to that effect.⁶ Nanjarājaiya, however, in keeping with Muhammad Alī's original agreement, insisted on the prompt delivery of the fort and its dependencies as a condition precedent to his escorting the Nawāb to Arcot.⁷ In the meanwhile the Mysore troops had begun the blockade of Trichinopoly, intercepting the passage of provisions thither.⁸ Early in July, Muhammad Alī secretly managed to win over Murāri Rao to his side,⁹ paying him rupees two lakhs as the price for affording assistance to him against the French.¹⁰ He also, through Murāri's mediation, entered into a fresh agreement with Nanjarājaiya, by which he undertook to arrange, by means of a *sanād* from the Governor of Madras, to deliver up the fort to Mysore within two months (as and from June 9), while the Mysoreans, in the meantime, were to be allowed to station a Killedār with 200 men in the fort, and to maintain uninterrupted the flow of provisions thereto.¹¹

On the conclusion of this agreement, Muhammad Alī, accompanied by Murāri Rao, proceeded on a visit to Nanjarājaiya.¹² At this, the latter's officers, we are told,¹³ in

His visit to Nanjarājaiya.

6. *Di. A. Pi.*, l.c.; also *Mad. Desp.*, p. 173 *supra*.

7. *Ibid.*; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, l.c.

8. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; also *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, ff. 8.

10. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 88 (1753?).

11. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; *Count. Corres.* (1753), pp. 11, 29 and 70, *Letter* Nos. 11, 48 and 120, cited *infra*; cf. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (l.c.), referring to "700 peons" originally permitted to be sent into the fort; see also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.* (l.c.), *Letter* Nos. 84 (dated September 18, 1752) and 96 (dated March 3, 1753), speaking of Muhammad Alī as having held up one of Nanjarājaiya's captains (*i.e.*, Katti Gōpālarāja Urs) with 500 men in the fort of Trichinopoly. Orme and Wilks refer to the number as 700. The authority of the contemporary chronicle *Haid. Nām.* seems more acceptable as a correct indication of the position on the Mysore side.

12. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

13. *Ibid.*, ff. 8-9.

view of the impossibility of their taking possession of Trichinopoly once Muhammad Ali was away in Madras, represented in right earnest to Nanjarājaiya the feasibility of capturing him (Muhammad Ali) with a view to his eventual release. Nanjarājaiya, however, rejected with disdain the proposal, thoroughly relying on Murāri Rao as sufficient guarantee for the Nawāb's performance of his compact. Muhammad Ali's visit proved a success, and was followed by the entry into the fort of two Mysorean officers, Katti Gōpālarāja Urs and [Pradhān] Channappaiya, with 200 sepoys.¹⁴ At the same time, Śrīrangam was by agreement delivered to Nanjarājaiya who seemed, on the whole, to be "outwardly reconciled with the Nabob."¹⁵

About the middle of July, Muhammad Ali, having placed his brother-in-law Khair-ud-dīn in charge of the fort with an English detachment under Captain Dalton, marched off towards Fort St. David (Devanampatan) with his own and the English army, accompanied by Abdul Wāhab Khān.¹⁶

His departure to
Fort St. David, July
1752.

14. *Ibid.*, ff. 9.

15. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1752), p. 23: *Consultation* dated July 8, 1752. According to *Fr. Corres.* (1752), pp. 48, 80, *Letter* Nos. 4 and 17 (dated May 11 and August 3, 1752), a sum of rupees sixty lakhs had been promised by the king of Mysore to the English as soon as they had taken Śrīrangam ("Cheringham pagoda").

16. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letters* cited in f.n. 11 *supra*. *Captain Dalton*: In view of the prominent part taken by Dalton in the Trichinopoly affair, the following details of his career may be set down here: Son of Captain James Dalton; 2nd Lieutenant of Marines to H. M. S. *Preston* of 50 guns commanded by Captain, the Earl of Northesk, December 2, 1743; arrived at Fort St. David, July 22, 1745; First lieutenant, December 18, 1746, under Admiral Boscawen; discharged from the *Preston*, served at Fort St. David; offered and accepted a Captain's commission and the command of the Grenadier Company newly formed, 1751; gave evidence in the case of *Rev. F. Fordyce vs. Lieut. Olive*, which ended in the dismissal from service of Fordyce, 1749; in expedition against Dēvikōṭah, 1749; took part in the English fight for Trichinopoly, on behalf of Muhammad Ali, 1751-1752; appointed to the command of Trichinopoly for and on behalf of the English, June 15, 1752; defended it; relieved by Lawrence, first on May 6, 1753, and again on September 21; resigned his

In the wake of Muhammad Alī's departure, a period of suspense and trial followed. During July-August, Nanjarājaiya with Murāri Rao lay encamped outside Trichinopoly, anxiously waiting for the delivery of the fort on the expiry of the stipulated period, and demanding to be put in possession of Jambukēśvaram and other advanced outposts.¹⁷ He also sent Vakīl Śēshagiri-Pant and Barakki Venkaṭa Rao to Fort St. David and Madras respectively, to negotiate on the subjects, with positive instructions to press for the payment of actual expenses incurred by him on the Trichinopoly business as an alternative for the fort.¹⁸ His efforts, however, were attended with little success, Muhammad Alī having, as we shall see in the sequel, begun to evade the issue under pretence of mediation by his allies (the English). In vain did Nanjarājaiya move the matter with Khair-ud-dīn at Trichinopoly through Vakīl Vinnāji-Pant.¹⁹ At length, on August 10, he shifted his camp to a high ground near Uraiyūr, from where he continued to put forward his claim to Trichinopoly,²⁰ offering at the same time to assist Muhammad Alī with 3,000 horse if only he satisfied his demand for

commission, March 1, 1754; sailed for England, March 10, 1754, with a fortune of £10,000; married Isabella, daughter of Sir John Wray, Bart., of Glentworth, Lincolnshire, and Sleningford Park, Yorkshire, March 7, 1756; had three sons and three daughters; died, July 11, 1811. He is to-day remembered at Trichinopoly by the "Dalton's Battery," on which an unsuccessful attack was made by the French in 1754. Robert Orme, the historian, "transferred a great part of the contents of the Ms. journal kept by Captain Dalton, during the last few years of his service in India, to his *History of the War in India*, which appeared in 1763. Much of the credit that devolved upon Orme for his historical production was really due to Dalton" (see *Memoir of Captain Dalton*, by Charles Dalton, 1886).

17. *Ibid*; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 27, 32-33, 34, 37: *Consultations* dated July 27, August 17, 24 and 31, 1752.

18. *Count. Corres.* (1753), pp. 11, 29, *Letter Nos.* 11 and 48, cited *infra*; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 8.

19. *Ibid*; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 42: *Consultation* dated September 18, 1752.

20. *Press List* (1750-1754), p. 435: *Letter No.* 2987, dated August 10, 1752.

the "possession of all the outposts which command every avenue to the fort."²¹ He wrote also to the Nawāb, threatening to plunder his Arcot country through the Mahrattas under Murāri, if he failed to comply with his late agreement.²² In September, Nanjarājaiya raised permanent lodgings in his old camp in front of the Trichinopoly fort, with a view to his eventually securing it.²³ In October, the Maravas and other Pālegārs of Madura and Diṇḍigal, in alliance with Pratāp Singh of Tanjore, rose in revolt against the authority of Mysore in the south, keenly contesting her claims on Trichinopoly and engaging Nanjarājaiya and Murāri Rao at Karūr.²⁴ By October 28, Nanjarājaiya had moved on to Śrīrangam,²⁵ which became the principal centre of his activities and the base of his operations from about December 18 onwards.²⁶ In the meanwhile, he had, in November, received a letter from his elder brother Dēvarājaiya at Seringapatam, advising him to return to Mysore,²⁷ but he was reported to have declared his determination "to die rather than return with dishonour" so long as the Nawāb (Muhammad Alī) had neither delivered him the fort of Trichinopoly nor paid up his expenses.²⁸

All through the period the attitude of Khair-ud-dīn and Captain Dalton (at Trichinopoly) towards Nanjarājaiya was marked by suspicion and distrust, which was, in some measure, responsible for the indirect means adopted by him (Nanjarājaiya) to achieve

Nanjarājaiya tries indirect means, July-October 1752.

21. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 32-33 *supra*.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 35: Consultation dated August 30, 1752.

23. *Press List*, p. 454, Letter No. 3081, dated September 25, 1752.

24. *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII. 239, 242, 247: Notes dated October 9, 10 and 20; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 51-55: Consultation dated October 2 and 16, 1752.

25. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 66: Consultation dated October 28, 1752.

26. *Press List*, p. 485, Letter No. 3236, dated December 18, 1752.

27. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 68: Consultation dated November 13, 1752.

28. *Ibid.*

his object. Shortly after the departure of Muhammad Ali to Fort St. David, the Mysoreans in the fort of Trichinopoly met with resistance and opposition at the hands of the Nawāb's men during their movements to and from the fort.²⁹ This led to a plot by them "to get possession of Trichinopoly by arming the French prisoners and murdering him [Captain Dalton], then to seize one of the gates and let in a body of 4,000 horse."³⁰ The plot was, however, discovered [by July 20], the person entrusted with the execution "having been honest enough to confess it and produce the king's [Nanjarājaiya's] *choup* countersigned by his secretary"; the Mysoreans were deprived of their weapons and their officer, Katti Gōpālārāja Urs, was confined within.³¹ Another plot, by which Nanjarājaiya sought to secure Trichinopoly by bribing Captain Dalton, equally failed (July 27).³² From August 9 onwards, Nanjarājaiya had recourse to the stoppage of provisions to Trichinopoly;³³ and in October, to a threat to declare open war on the Nawāb, and "a heavy tax on everything" that passed into the town.³⁴ In fine, he left "no method untry'd to

29. *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 49, *Letter No. 89*, cited *infra*.

30. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 25-26: *Consultation* dated July 20, 1752.

31. *Ibid*; see also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter No. 96*, cited *supra*. *Choup* or *Chop* signifies the seal on which is engraved the name of the king and the year of his reign. The person entrusted with the execution of this plot in the main was, according to Orme, one Clement Poverio, a Neapolitan, who commanded a company of Topasses in the Nawāb's service. Dalton, on Poverio's confession, sought to turn the plot to his own advantage by entrapping the Mysoreans, but Khair-ud-din, "with his usual timidity and weakness of mind, stopped the enterprise" (see Charles Dalton, *infra*, quoting Orme; Wilks also refers to this affair, I. 321-322). Curiously enough, Poverio's name does not find mention in the *Consultation* we have cited. Orme seems evidently to be writing here from personal knowledge.

32. *Press List*, pp. 428-429; *Letter No. 2841*, dated July 27, 1752.

33. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter No. 84*, cited *supra*. The stoppage of provisions, according to this record, was begun from the time of the expiry of the promised period (*i.e.*, from August 9, 1752). See also and compare *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 27 *supra*, and *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 49, *Letter No. 89*, cited *infra*.

34. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 55: *Consultation* dated October 16, 1752.

gain his point by corruption.”³⁵ While he continued to press Khair-ud-dīn for the release of Katti Gōpālārāja Urs,³⁶ he did not forget “to lay up prodigious quantities of provisions,”³⁷ and “to make persistent demands for the money spent by him on the Nabob’s account.”³⁸

Of perhaps greater concern to Nanjarājaiya during the period was the attitude of his ally Murāri Rao, which was by no means consistent or safe. Murāri’s mediation in the dispute over the cession of Trichinopoly to Mysore (July 1752) resulted in a ruinous and most exorbitant charge to Nanjarājaiya, who was made to pay heavily both him and the Nawāb.³⁹ On the morrow of the latter’s departure from Trichinopoly, differences on the subject between Murāri and Nanjarājaiya naturally arose,⁴⁰ and were apparently made up in August by a solemn treaty known to have been ratified by them at the Śrīrangam temple.⁴¹ Murāri, while he continued openly to profess his alliance with Mysore, was amusing Khair-ud-dīn (at Trichinopoly) with the offer of a treaty,⁴² and towards the close of August despatched 2,000 Mahrattas under his paymaster Yoonas Khān and Chetṭappa (Setṭappa), to assist Muhammad Ali against the French in the Arcot province.⁴³ On this

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104 : *Consultation* dated December 30, 1752; see also *Press List*, p. 465, *Letter* No. 3105 (dated October 23, 1752), referring to the discovery of a conspiracy to murder Captain Dalton, etc.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 66, *supra*.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Press List*, p. 482 : *Letter* No. 3220, dated December 14, 1752. For an account of the transactions from the English point of view, see Charles Dalton, *Memoir of Captain Dalton*, Chap. IX. 146-170, based on Orme’s *History* and Dalton’s *Journal*. Nanjarājaiya is mentioned in this work as “Regent” of the king of Mysore, an appellation by which he is generally referred to by Orme even though he (Nanjarājaiya) was no longer *regent* after Krishnarāja Wodeyar II had attained his majority in 1746.

39. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 24 : *Consultation* dated July 13, 1752; also *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 70, *Letter* No. 120, cited *infra*.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26 : *Consultation* dated January 13 and 20, 1752.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 34 : *Consultation* dated August 24, 1752.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*, p. 37 : *Consultation* dated August 31, 1752.

occasion Murāri appeared to view with disfavour the Mysorean claims to Trichinopoly, a behaviour, perhaps, best reflected in a message he sent to Captain Dalton, "expressing his great satisfaction that Trichinopoly is not delivered up, saying that he would never be easy to see it in the King of Mysore's possession."⁴⁴ During September-October, Murāri was in the employ of both Mysore and Muhammad Alī, and was known to be receiving from the latter a salary of rupees 7,000 a day.⁴⁵ At the same time, as he continued his professions of attachment to them, he was suspected (in August) of negotiating a treaty for an alliance with Dupleix at Pondicherry.⁴⁶ In September, however, shortly after Lawrence had defeated the French at Bahūr (September 6), Dupleix sought Murāri's assistance against Muhammad Alī and wrote to him offering a larger sum of money than he received from Mysore, and to spare as many firelocks as he needed for his use.⁴⁷ Murāri at first affected to be unwilling to enlist himself in the cause of the French, replying that "his present engagement with the Mysore Dalaway puts it out of his power to enter into any other service."⁴⁸ Early in October, however, Dupleix sent Mirza Abdul Nabi Beig to treat with him, offering him rupees two lakhs if he marched with his army and attacked and slew Muhammad Alī, and another two lakhs after the latter had been disposed of.⁴⁹ Towards the close of October, Murāri was reported to have accepted the offer (striking the bargain at six lakhs, three to be paid directly into the hands of Yoonas Khān, the other three some time later), undertaking to engage his troops in the French service on a monthly subsistence of rupees one and a half lakhs.⁵⁰ It was not, however,

44. *Ibid.*45. *Ibid.*, p. 58: *Consultation* dated October 25, 1752.46. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33: *Consultation* dated August 17, 1752.47. *Ibid.*, p. 42: *Consultation* dated September 18, 1752.48. *Ibid.*49. *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII. 234-235: *Notes* dated October 7, 1752.50. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 66 *supra*; cf. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 88, cited *supra*.

till about the end of December 1752 that Murāri Rao marched on towards Pondicherry to join the French.⁵¹

By now Nanjarājaiya, in fond hopes of the delivery of Trichinopoly fort, had lain encamped with his forces (numbering about 5,500 men) at Śrīrangam, part of them remaining under its walls and the rest in the temple.⁵² "The Dalaway's [Nanjarājaiya's] people," says an advice referring to their activities,⁵³ "continue to collect all the grain about Trichinopoly to the very walls, and frequently appear in small parties with drawn swords to the great terror of the people, and even came to one of the advanced posts, but on the seapoys [sepoys] there preparing to receive them they thought proper to move off. Finding he could obtain no redress from the Dalaway, he [Captain Dalton] ordered the guards at the advanced posts to fire on them if they attempted to cut the paddy." This had led to a slight skirmish at Wayconda, in which several of the Mysoreans were wounded.⁵⁴ The movements of Murāri Rao, too, had become a source of alarm to Khair-ud-dīn and Captain Dalton, the latter having received instructions from Madras to attack the Mysoreans on receipt of news of his (Murāri's) having joined the French.⁵⁵ He was "to act immediately against the King of Mysore and distress him to the utmost of his power, if he does not instantly consent to recall Moraree [Murāri]." ⁵⁶

About the beginning of January 1753, shortly after Murāri's departure to Pondicherry, Captain Dalton took up his lodgings in a choultry near Śrīrangam to bombard it.⁵⁷ At 2 o'clock on the morning

51. *Vide* references cited *infra*.

52. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 10: *Consultation* dated January 3, 1753.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Press List*, p. 485: *Letter* No. 3296, cited *supra*.

56. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 12: *Consultation* dated January 5, 1753.

57. *Press List*, p. 496: *Letter* No. 3314, dated January 15, 1753.

of the 3rd, while the troops of Nanjarājaiya were lying fast asleep in the enclosure of the temple, the Captain, accompanied by Khair-ud-dīn and a select body of sepoy and soldiers, surprised them by brisk firing.⁵⁸ "The balls," as Nanjarājaiya wrote,⁵⁹ "missed, and 4 or 5 men only were wounded." Astounded at this, the horsemen and sepoy of Mysore prepared themselves to oppose the assailants. The latter beat a hasty retreat, but early on the same morning appeared again with "guns, wall-pieces and fire-locks, took possession of Ammamandapam and from there began to throw shells into the Srirangam pagoda."⁶⁰ The Mysore horse (under Hari Singh and Haidar Ali) promptly charged and chased the enemy, terminating the skirmish by the seizure of some firelocks.⁶¹

Hostilities, however, continued. Nanjarājaiya, immediately after the incident of January 3, recalled the main body of his horse (numbering in all 6,000) stationed in Madura, Diṇḍigal, Vijayamangalam, Karūr, Krishnarājapuram and other places in the south,⁶² and wrote to Murāri Rao (who appears to have still retained his professions of friendship to Mysore) that he would go to Karūr after establishing outposts in Śrīrangam and Jambūkēśvaram.⁶³ About the end of January, he made an entrenchment round the fort of Trichinopoly and attempted to take it by a stratagem by releasing and entertaining 100 Frenchmen formerly imprisoned there.⁶⁴ This led to an action between

58. *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 11, *Letter No. 11*, cited *infra*.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*; also p. 29, *Letter No. 48*, cited *infra*.

61. *Ibid.*; see also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 9; Charles Dalton, *Memoir of Captain Dalton*, Chap. X. 171-182. The Mysore peons in the Trichinopoly Fort were, according to Dalton's letter quoted in this work (o.c., p. 179), turned out bag and baggage shortly after this incident, and a guard kept over Katti Gōpālarāja Urs ("Gopaul Rauze").

62. *Ibid.*, p. 12. 63. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter No. 91*, dated January 26, 1753.

64. *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII. 275-276: *Notes* dated January 31, 1753; see also *Count. Corres.*, p. 20: *Letter No. 35*, dated February 25, 1753—Tanjore (i.e., king Pratāp Singh) to Saunders.

the troops of Mysore and those of Muhammad Ali and the English, in which the latter lost 70 men and 2 officers, the casualties on the Mysore side being few.⁶⁵ At the same time, Nanjarājaiya detached some of his forces to Coyilāḍi and Tercatpelly to curb Pratāp Singh of Tanjore who was assisting Muhammad Ali.⁶⁶ On February 12, says a *Despatch*,⁶⁷ "the Dallovoy fired 20 guns for joy at Srirangam," and moved on towards Karūr to join a portion of Murāri's forces there. By the end of February he had secured both Śrīrangam and Jambukēśvaram.⁶⁸ Early in March he began the blockade of Trichinopoly at the head of 6,000 horse and nearly 15,000 men.⁶⁹

In the meantime Nanjarājaiya had also been strongly urging his claim to Trichinopoly, thoroughly believing in the justice of his cause. The acquisition of Trichinopoly had been for long, and particularly since the extinction of the Nāyak kingdom of Madura in 1786, the objective of Mysore's expansion in the south as the first and foremost step in furtherance of the old Vijayanagar imperialistic ideal, namely, the domination of the whole of Southern India from the Tungabhadra to

65. *Mad. Desp.*, p. 184: *Despatch* dated February 21, 1753; also *Count. Corres.*, l.c.

66. *Count. Corres.*, p. 21 *supra*; also p. 24: *Letter* No. 42, dated March 5, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders. *Coyilāḍi*: Koilāḍi; 17 miles W.N.W. from Tanjore. The Grand Anicut is about 5 miles from this place. It takes its name from two old temples, one dedicated to Vishnu and the other to Śiva. Formerly the head-quarters of a Dy. Tahsildar. *Tercatpelly*: Tirukāṭṭupalli; 13 miles W.N.W. from Tanjore. The Kudamūrthi branches off from the Cauvery here. The old temple of Śiva here is dedicated to Agnīśvara. The fort is now in ruins.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 26: *Letter* No. 45, dated March 10, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* No. 93, dated February 13, 1753.

68. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* No. 96, dated March 3, 1753 (cited in f.n. 11 *supra*); also *Count. Corres.*, p. 29, *Letter* No. 48, cited *infra*.

69. *Ibid.*; also *Count. Corres.*, pp. 24, 26, *Letter* Nos. 42 and 45, cited *supra*; Charles Dalton, *Memoir of Captain Dalton*, Chap. X. 182-185; and Chap. XI. 186-208.

Rāmēśvaram.⁷⁰ It was to realise this objective that Mysore had so readily offered to join Muhammad Alī against Chandā Sāhib. And it stipulated no other consideration than the cession of Trichinopoly itself to her. Muhammad Alī had solemnly agreed to this condition without the slightest demur. But from the beginning he never meant to keep his word. Muhammad Alī, indeed, as we have shown, evaded compliance with both his first and second agreements in June and August 1752; and systematically put off fulfilling it, especially during September-January (1753).⁷¹ He even wrote "that he was at war with Morarey [Murāri Rao] and that as soon as he had punished him with defeat, he should deliver the fort" to Mysore.⁷² Despairing of a fulfilment of even this promise, Nanjarājaiya at last resolved upon taking possession of Trichinopoly by any means open to him. With this determination, he advanced on the southern frontier of Mysore up to Karūr,⁷³ and prepared to sacrifice himself on that stake, having spent "caroats of money."⁷⁴ During January-March (1753), disappointed by Muhammad Alī and shocked by the treacherous night-attack (of January 3), he exchanged letters⁷⁵ on the subject with Thomas Saunders, the Nawāb's ally, pressing for the delivery of Trichinopoly fort or, as an alternative, the payment of his expenses on the Trichinopoly affair (of course, Nanjarājaiya knew well that Muhammad Alī could not undertake the latter, as he was in distress), and desiring him to send back Barakki

70. This appears, perhaps, best reflected in Nanjarājaiya's letters to Saunders, dated March 12 and May 3, 1753 (see *Count. Corres.*, pp. 28, 50, *Letter Nos.* 48 and 89; see also and compare *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII, 133-134: *Notes* dated July 10, 1752). For earlier references to Trichinopoly as the objective of the southern expansion of Mysore, *vide* Vol. I, Chs. VIII, X and XI, and Chs. IV and VI of this Vol.

71. *Count. Corres.*, p. 70, *Letter No.* 120, cited *infra*.

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*, p. 50, *Letter No.* 89, cited *infra*.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 28, *Letter No.* 48, cited *infra*.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12, 28-30, and 37-38: *Letter Nos.* 11, 48 and 63, dated January 23, March 12 and 30, 1753—Dalavāi to Saunders.

Venkaṭa Rao whom, he complained,⁷⁶ he (Saunders) had detained in Madras since July-August 1752. He also reminded him "to get the Nabob's reasonable agreement performed," referring to a letter alleged to have been written by Saunders himself to that effect.⁷⁷ Nanja-rājaiya's attempt, however, met, as usual, with little success. Saunders, as will be seen from the sequel, assumed the attitude of a mediator bound to reconcile the conflicting interests of two obdurate parties like Nanja-rājaiya and the Nawāb, being under the painful necessity of supporting the latter in what was obviously a flagrant breach of promise.

The Mysoreans pushed on with vigour the siege of Trichinopoly. About March 26, however, the besiegers were repulsed by Captain Dalton while attacking an advanced battery before the fort.⁷⁸ "A good battle," states a *Letter*,⁷⁹ "has been again fought between the Mayasore people and those in the fort. Captain Dalton exerted himself

The Mysoreans
push through the
siege: March-April
1753.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 30, *Letter* No. 48; see also *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 71-72, and 96, *Letter* Nos. 89, 120 and 156, cited *infra* (referring to the confinement of both Venkaṭa Rao and Śēshagiri-Pant at Madras and Fort St. David respectively). Venkaṭa Rao, according to the *Haid. Nam.* (ff. 8), was sent by Nanja-rājaiya to Madras to obtain the Governor's *sanaḍ* confirming him in the possession of Trichinopoly. By way of frustrating this object, however, he (Venkaṭa Rao) was detained in Madras at the instance of Muhammad Ali, during 1752-1755. Venkaṭa Rao's detention is referred to also in *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* No. 96, cited *supra*. Cf. Saunders's letters to the Daḷavāi, pointing to the safety of Venkaṭa Rao's position in Madras (see *Count. Corres.*, pp. 14, 51 and 78, *Letter* Nos. 18, 90 and 125, cited *infra*). For further details about Venkaṭa Rao's detention, *vide* Ch. VIII, f.n. 65.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 29-30, 37, 69, 79 and 95, *Letter* Nos. 11, 48, 49, 63, 120, 128 and 156, cited *supra* and *infra*. Copies of this alleged Persian letter, which Nanja-rājaiya claimed to have in his custody, were not, however, produced, and its receipt denied, by Venkaṭa Rao before Saunders (see *Count. Corres.*, pp. 2-3, 14, 78 and 101, *Letter* Nos. 5, 18, 125 and 165, cited *infra*).

78. *Press List*, p. 532: *Letter* No. 3604, dated March 26, 1753.

79. *Count. Corres.*, p. 39: *Letter* No. 66, dated April 2, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders.

to the utmost and killed or wounded a great many of the enemy in so much that they were obliged to retreat to their camp." About this time, there even prevailed the news that Nanjarājaiya designed to return to Seringapatam on account of a Mahratta invasion of Mysore under Pēshwa Bālāji Rao.⁸⁰ Early in April, however, the Mysoreans resumed their activities, Nanjarājaiya having "spared no cost for enlisting sepoys with Europe arms" and "drawn together a body of at least 2,000 besides 4 companies of Topasses."⁸¹ They surrounded the fort of Trichinopoly, intercepting "25 bullock load[s] of rice" and "all manner of provisions" going into the fort, "cutting off the noses of coolies," and reducing the besieged to abject distress for want of stores and water.⁸² About the middle of April, Nanjarājaiya, it was reported,⁸³ even endeavoured to get possession of Trichinopoly by offering "large bribes." Towards the close of April the situation became serious. Khair-ud-dīn had imprudently sent into the Tonḍamān's country a detachment of his troops, and there was no likelihood of his recalling it early.⁸⁴ The country round about Trichinopoly was attacked and devastated by the Mysore troops.⁸⁵ Provisions became dear. "A rupee," says a news-letter,⁸⁶ "cannot fetch 4 seers of rice, and the poor people are forsaking the fort for want of food." Nanjarājaiya pressed hard the siege.⁸⁷ In this extremity, Sētupati, the Marava chief of Rāmnāḍ, the Tonḍamān and Pratāp Singh of Tanjore sent an express message to Muhammad Alī (now in the Tanjore territory), desiring him to march towards Trichinopoly and free it from

80. *Ibid.*

81. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 54 : *Consultation* dated April 2, 1753.

82. *Ibid.*, also pp. 57-58 : *Consultations* dated April 8, 10 and 14, 1753.


83. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59 : *Consultation* dated April 14, 1753 ; *Count. Corres.*, p. 44 : *Letter* No. 77, dated April 16, 1753.


84. *Ibid.*, p. 58 *supra*.

85. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* No. 100, dated April 22, 1753.

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 101, dated April 23, 1753 ?





Major Stringer Lawrence.

Nanjarājaiya, and promising even "to contribute towards the expenses of the campaign," as the latter's success, they were alarmed, would "threaten their own safety."⁸⁸ Captain Dalton also wrote to Madras,⁸⁹ representing the critical condition of the English garrison at Trichinopoly, and soliciting Major Lawrence's immediate personal march to his relief, "to put down the increasing strength of the Mysoreans" and "frighten the Dalavoy to flight." At Madras, it was observed that unless Trichinopoly was immediately relieved, "it must inevitably fall into the Mysorean hands, an event in its consequences more to be dreaded than the efforts of the enemy [the French] about Fort St. David."⁹⁰ At Pondicherry, on April 27-28, there prevailed the rumour, afterwards contradicted, that "the Mysoreans had taken Trichinopoly and that Muhammad Ali Khan had fled."⁹¹

About the beginning of May, Muhammad Ali (after a hard struggle with the French and
 May 1753. Murāri Rao at Tiruvaḍi, Fort St. David, Chidambaram and Pandanallūr, during January-April 1753) returned to Trichinopoly,⁹² and was followed early in the month by the arrival of relieving forces from Madras under Major Lawrence by way of Māyavaram and Kumbakōṇam.⁹³ By May 14, the Mysoreans were forced to retreat to Śrīrangam, on being thrice attacked by Captain Dalton in their camp.⁹⁴ By

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Press List*, p. 544: *Letter* Nos. 3686 and 3696; dated April 21 and 23, 1753.

90. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 65: *Consultation* dated April 23, 1753.

91. *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII. 315, 318, 320-321: *Notes* dated April 27-29, 1753.

92. *Ibid.*, 315, 320 and 327: *Notes* dated April 27-28, and May 3, 1753 (compared with *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* Nos. 100 and 101, cited *supra*).

93. *Ibid.*, 327 *supra*. The relieving forces, according to this source, consisted of "1,000 English soldiers, 5,000 foot soldiers and 18 guns." See also *Count. Corres.*, p. 96; *Letter* No. 156, cited *infra*. According to Wilks (I. 333), Lawrence arrived at Trichinopoly on May 6, 1753.

94. *Press List*, p. 553: *Letter* No. 3743, dated May 14, 1753; see also and compare *Di. A. Pi.*, 327 *supra*.

the 20th the Nawāb won a complete victory over them,⁹⁵ and on the 28th they were again defeated by Lawrence near Śrīrangam.⁹⁶ Nevertheless Nanjarājaiya held his own, expecting a reinforcement from Seringapatam, and sanguine about his alliance with the French at Pondicherry.⁹⁷

Since the outbreak of Muhammad Ali's dispute over the cession of Trichinopoly to Mysore (June-July 1752), there prevailed in Pondicherry expectations of an alliance of Mysore with the French, "to capture the fort and country of Trichinopoly."⁹⁸ Such an alliance seemed eminently to further Dupleix's overweening ambition, namely, the establishment of French sway over the whole of India including "Mysore, Tanjore and Trichinopoly, etc., countries" south of the Krishnā.⁹⁹ In August 1752, Nanjarājaiya was known to be in treaty with Dupleix "whose offers" were held "not satisfactory."¹⁰⁰ Early in October, however, Dupleix himself took the initiative, for, while negotiating for the services of Murāri Rao in his war against Muhammad Ali, he offered to secure Trichinopoly for Mysore, in return for which "the Raja of Mysore," it was stipulated, "is to pay 30 lakhs of rupees."¹⁰¹ At the end of October, an alliance of Dupleix with "the Mysore King, Morattas and the Vellore Fouzdar" (Ghulām Murtazā Khān) seemed to be "on

95. *Count. Corres.*, p. 59: *Letter No. 101*, dated May 20, 1753—Abdul Wāhab Khān to Saunders; see also *Di. A. Pi.*, 341: *Notes* dated May 23, 1753.

96. *Press List*, p. 561: *Letter No. 3796*, dated May 23, 1753; also *Count. Corres.*, pp. 64-65: *Letter No. 109*, dated May 29, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders.

97. *Count. Corres.*, p. 67: *Letter No. 114*, dated May 31, 1753—Tanjore Vakīl to Saunders; also *Di. A. Pi.*, l.c.

98. *Di. A. Pi.*, 129-130, 133-134: *Notes* dated July 7 and 10, 1752.

99. *Ibid.*, 136: *Notes* dated July 11, 1752.

100. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1752), pp. 32-33: *Consultation* dated August 17, 1752.

101. *Di. A. Pi.*, 234-235: *Notes* dated October 7, 1752.

the point of conclusion."¹⁰² It was not, however, till about the end of December (1752) that Nanjarājaiya became really earnest about the alliance, Muhammad Alī having by now systematically failed to comply with his agreements. Accordingly, when, about this time, Murāri Rao marched on to Pondicherry, Nanjarājaiya sent with him his Vakīl Venkaṭanāraṇappa, to strike with Dupleix advantageous terms for Mysore.¹⁰³ At Pondicherry, Murāri, we are told,¹⁰⁴ remained indifferent, caring for his own interests.

Since January 1753, Venkaṭanāraṇappa was therefore left to rely on his own resources in
 January-June 1753. conducting the negotiations.¹⁰⁵ In February, Dupleix, obviously to coerce Nanjarājaiya to accede to his own terms, wrote to him about his design to co-operate with Pēshwa Bālāji Rao in an invasion of Mysore for the realisation of the latter's alleged dues (*chauth*).¹⁰⁶ Dupleix's threat, however, remained unanswered.¹⁰⁷ Meantime Venkaṭanāraṇappa continued his diplomatic activities at Pondicherry. On April 21 he received a letter from Nanjarājaiya, "agreeing to all but one or two of the [French] proposals."¹⁰⁸ At the end of April, on the arrival of the English troops (under Major Lawrence) towards Māyavaram and Kumbakōṇam, Nanjarājaiya, as he tells us,¹⁰⁹ "entered into an agreement with the French who did the same with me on their part." In May, on the march of the English army to the relief of

102. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 85 : *Consultation* dated October 28, 1752.

103. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 9-10.

104. *Ibid.*, ff. 10.

105. *Ibid.*; see also *Di. A. Pi.*, 275 : *Notes* dated January 31, 1753 (referring to the Vakīl's presence at Pondicherry on that date).

106. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter No. 94*, dated February 22, 1753—Shāma Rao Yādava, Pondicherry, to Panta-Pradhān, Poona. See also and compare *Di. A. Pi.*, 282 (*Notes* dated February 16, 1753), with Dodwell's *Editorial note* and *Introduction*, p. xvii.

107. *Ibid.*

108. *Di. A. Pi.*, 309 : *Notes* dated April 21, 1753.

109. *Count. Corres.*, p. 96 : *Letter No. 156*, received July 24, 1753—Daḷavāi to Saunders.

Trichinopoly, he wrote repeatedly to Dupleix, asking for the services of one Hasan-ud-dīn Khān.¹¹⁰ Dupleix seemed reluctant to comply with the request, at the end of May.¹¹¹ Nanjarājaiya's alliance with the French Governor does not, in fact, appear to have become a reality till June 8, when he sent him a Bill of Exchange for rupees 3 lakhs (towards 4-5 lakhs promised in the first instance), drawn on Achārām Tarwāḍī (Gumāsta of Kāśī Dās Bukkānji), payable at a month and a half's sight.¹¹² And it was not till about the middle of the month (of June) that Dupleix, in satisfaction of the Bill, despatched a corps of "300 French soldiers, infantry, guns, etc., to help Nandi Raja, the Dalavoy of Mysore, who is commanding the Srirangam camp, in order to take Trichinopoly."¹¹³

Almost simultaneously the English Government at Fort St. George, Madras, had been obliged to decide upon hostilities with Mysore. As indicated already, the attitude of Thomas Saunders and the members of his Council in regard to the Trichinopoly question since June 1752 was, in general, that of *allies* of the Mughal Government (*sarkār*) of the time and, in particular, that of *mediators* between Mysore and Muhammad Ali, though they were gradually led to support the latter to counteract the ambitious designs of Dupleix and safeguard the commercial interests of the English in South India. At a *Consultation* held on June 29, when news of Muhammad Ali's difference with Mysore first reached Madras, the President observed :¹¹⁴ "The present dispute between the King of Mysore and

110. *Di. A. Pi.*, 345-346 : Notes dated May 28, 1753.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.*, 353 : Notes dated June 8, 1753.

113. *Ibid.*, 355-356 : Notes dated June 22, 1753. The French corps, according to the Diarist, was commanded by M. Astruc and M. Lavolonté Kōnapparangī.

114. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1752), p. 22.

the Nabob is an affair of the utmost consequence, in which we ought not to precipitate ourselves as the effects may be dangerous, for, should we who receive a jageer [*jahgīr*] for our alliance with the circar, be anyways instrumental to the separating so large a district [as Trichinopoly] from the subaship, we might draw upon ourselves the resentment of the Moors [Mughals] in general, at the same time as the Mysore King supplies the Nabob with men and money, should he withdraw his assistance, it would greatly embarrass our affairs." Accordingly Saunders wrote¹¹⁵ to Nanjarājaiya to send his Vakīl to Madras, "assuring him of his friendship and that no endeavours shall be wanting to settle everything to the satisfaction of both parties." According to a *Despatch* dated July 5,¹¹⁶ the dilemma is thus depicted: "The Nabob admits he has no right to give away such large countries and the English are allied with the circar to protect it and cannot appear in such a transaction. Moreover Mysore is the Nabob's sole support and should that state and the Marathas join the French, the Nabob would be in a dangerous situation. Dupleix is doing his best to foment these dissensions." At another *Consultation* (July 27), the President recorded.¹¹⁷ "It is now debated what measures are proper to be adopted at this critical juncture. On the one hand the Mysore King and Morattas [under Murāri Rao], disgusted at the Nabob's refusing to deliver up Trichinopoly according to agreement, are acting a part that leaves room to fear they may be induced to desert our cause and enter into an alliance with the enemy [the French], which, as they are a powerful people, may involve the province in a more terrible and destructive war than it has yet groaned under and create us fresh difficulties, and (? on the other) the only alternative is to comply with the Mysore King's

115. *Ibid*; also *Mad. Desp.* (1744-1755), p. 178: *Despatch* dated July 5, 1752.

116. *Mad. Desp.*, l.c.

117. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 27.

demand, which in its consequences may be equally dangerous, for, as allies to the circar, we cannot, without drawing on ourselves the resentment of the whole country, be instrumental in alienating so valuable a part of its territories. Upon the whole we are of opinion that as the future success of the Company's affairs on this coast undoubtedly depends on checking M. Dupleix in his ambitious views, the most advisable steps to be now taken are to support the Nabob Anaverdy Khan [Muhammad Alī] in his rights and pretensions to the government of the Carnateck [Karnāṭak] country and give him all the assistance we can agreeable to our treaty, and at the same time use all prudent means to keep fair with the Mysore King and Morattas."

Again, on August 2, having at a meeting discussed the issue with the Mysore Vakīl Barakki Venkaṭa Rao and examined it from both the Mysore and the Nawāb's points of view, Saunders told Venkaṭa Rao that "we should not concern ourselves in this affair but that as we have a great regard for the King of Mysore, if the Nabob is inclined to deliver up Trichinopoly to him, we shall rather persuade him to it than object."¹¹⁸ And on the 3rd, having "weighed and considered" the matter, he resolved:¹¹⁹ "As it will doubtless bring on the resentment of the circar, should we be concerned in alienating Trichinopoly, it is determined to be no further concerned in this affair than as it is a place of consequence to the Nabob in his present situation. We think it ought not to be delivered up as yet but that to prevent the Mysore King's being disgusted, it be hinted to him that when the Nabob is once settled in the province, if he can be prevailed on, and the circar's permission obtained, we shall have no objection." Further, on the 10th of the

118. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30: *Consultation* dated August 3, 1752.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

same month, while recording "letters from the Mysore King and Moraree [Murāri], the Moratta general, on the subject of the King's pretensions to Trichinopoly," Saunders resumed the consideration of the question, finding it "most advisable not to give them (the Mysoreans) any hopes of our assistance in obtaining their demand and in case they should join the enemy [the French] and declare against the Nabob, that we assist him to the utmost of our power, agreeable to our treaty with the circar."¹²⁰ On the 30th, it was "thought absolutely necessary to use our endeavours to convince the Mysoreans and Morattas that we are absolutely disinterested in this affair and shall not concern ourselves in it, either one way or the other."¹²¹ On September 16, it was further recorded:¹²² "In regard to the King of Mysore, as he has certainly advanced large sums of money on the Nabob's account which has been of great service to him, we think he [Nabob] ought in justice to assign some rents for the payment. If the King should not be satisfied with this but declare openly, he will be the aggressor and we must assist the Nabob against him as an enemy." On the 18th, the Government wrote¹²³ to Captain Dalton, "directing him to acquaint the King of Mysore that the Morattas [under Murāri] plunder all the country they pass through in their march this way and that as he has brought these people with him, we shall look upon him as answerable for all the damages they commit and shall write to Gazedey Khan [Ghāzi-ud-dīn, the legitimate claimant to the Subādāri of the Mughal Deccan] on that subject." Again, on the 22nd, the Captain was desired¹²⁴ to "endeavour to convince the King of Mysore that we have no other business with Trichinopoly than as it belongs to the circar and that our troops are there on that account and not our own."

120. *Ibid.*, p. 31.123. *Ibid.*, p. 42.121. *Ibid.*, p. 35.124. *Ibid.*, p. 48.122. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

The position of the English at Fort St. George on the subject is, perhaps, best summed up, and their views reflected, in a *Despatch* of theirs to the Court of Directors, London, dated November 3, 1752.¹²⁵ "The dispute between the Nabob and the King of Mysore continues. The latter has sent a Vakil to Madras with offers to support the Nabob if the English will guarantee the cession of Trichinopoly, but the Nabob declares that he has no power to execute his promise, which was made only out of dire necessity. Received a letter purporting to come from Salabat Jang, desiring the English to support Muhammad Ali and denying the latter's right to cede Trichinopoly. As the matter is intricate, have answered the King of Mysore that we are 'merchants, allies of the circar, and not principals,' that we cannot interfere in matters of this nature, but are willing to act as mediators. There is no doubt of the Nabob's having made the promise but both he and the King must have known that he could not fulfil it. The King is immensely rich and the acquisition of Trichinopoly would lead to his conquering Tanjore [where the English, and no less the French, had commercial settlements] and becoming overpowerful . . . In the south, Dupleix is negotiating with the Mysoreans and the Marathas." Again, as another source, dated May 6, 1753,¹²⁶ puts it: "The intentions of the English are not to take possession of the country for themselves. Their opinion is that if the country was under the Mogul's power, their trade might be carried on in safety, for which reason they have assisted Mahomed Ally Khan in several respects and supported him. They have never attempted to take possession of the whole country like the French."

125. *Mad. Desp.*, pp. 177, 179.

126. *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 86: *Letter* No. 183—Vakil Krishnāji-Pant to Peshwa Bālāji Rao.

In keeping with this position and with the course of affairs sketched in the foregoing pages, Saunders strove to make up matters between Muhammad Ali and Mysore. During January-May 1753 he successively wrote¹²⁷ to Nanjarājaiya, commenting on his hostile attitude towards the Nawāb and advising him to be reconciled to him. In February-March, he even tried to bring external pressure to bear upon both Nanjarājaiya and Murāri Rao, by writing to Pēshwa Bālāji Rao¹²⁸ and Saiyid Lāshkar Khān (Dewān of Salābat Jang)¹²⁹ to advise them "to desist from their scheme and retire to their countries" in the interests of "the welfare of the Mogul's dominions." These attempts having proved ineffective, he next, in May, empowered Major Lawrence and Robert Palk "to reconcile the difference between the Nabob and the Mysore King" through the mediation of Pratāp Singh of Tanjore,¹³⁰ offering as the basis of settlement the mortgage of the Trichinopoly country to Mysore in satisfaction of the Nawāb's dues.¹³¹ Nanjarājaiya having, however, declined the offer and insisted on his demand for "either the fort or the money lent in ready specie,"¹³² Saunders, at last, on June 15, treated him as the Nawāb's enemy¹³³ and wrote,¹³⁴ warning him against the consequences of his alliance with the French.

127. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3, 13-14, 36-37, and 51: *Letter* Nos. 5, 18, 62 and 90, dated January 6, 31, March 29, and May 3, 1753—Saunders to Dalavāi.

128. *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 24 and 34: *Letter* Nos. 26, 41 and 58, dated February 12, March 4 and 23, 1753.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 36: *Letter* No. 59, dated March 23, 1753.

130. *Vide* document quoted in Appendix II—(1).

131. *Count. Corres.*, p. 57: *Letter* No. 98, dated May 17, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders; p. 72: *Letter* No. 120, dated June 11, 1753—Dalavāi to Saunders; also cf. Appendix II—(1).

132. *Ibid.*

133. *Ibid.*, p. 78: *Letter* No. 124, dated June 15, 1753—Saunders to Tanjore.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 78: *Letter* No. 125, dated June 15, 1753—Saunders to Dalavāi.

With the appearance of the French and the English on the scene, the Mysorean struggle for Trichinopoly assumed a new aspect. It became an issue which was to be openly fought out by Mysore and Muhammad Alī as the principals, the French and the English—each enemy of the other—participating in it as their respective allies or auxiliaries. Among the country powers, Murāri Rao, while continuing in the service of the French, actively assisted Mysore, being paid for by both, while Muhammad Alī had the support of Pratāp Singh of Tanjore, the Tonḍamān and the Marava chief, who, as we have seen, apprehended trouble to themselves from the activities of Mysore in South India. “The preservation of Trichinopoly,” Muhammad Alī had urged upon his allies,¹³⁵ “will support his interest, as, on the contrary, the loss of it will reduce him to great distress”; to Mysore, the acquisition of Trichinopoly at any cost and risk meant, as indicated, the realization of her age-long ambition. Nanjarājaiya accordingly was resolved upon having the fort even if the enterprise lasted, as he said,¹³⁶ “five or seven years.” It was on this footing that either side carried on the further stages in this contest for Trichinopoly.

By June 22, M. Astruc, with the French contingent sent in aid of Mysore, arrived and lay encamped at the four-pillared maṇṭa-pam, near Rāyagōpuram, Śrīrangam.¹³⁷ Then Nanjarājaiya marched on with his forces and the allied troops of Murāri Rao and the French, towards the plains of Trichinopoly.¹³⁸ On the 27th, Muhammad Alī,

The siege continues: June 1753.

135. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 99: *Consultation* dated June 12, 1753.

136. *Count. Corres.*, p. 89: *Letter* No. 145, dated July 7, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders (quoting Nanjarājaiya's message). See also *Ibid.*, p. 86: *Letter* No. 138, dated May 6, 1753—Krishṇāji-Pant to Peshwa Bālāji Rao (referring to “the Maysorian's resolution to take Trichinopoly”).

137. *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII, 355-356: *Notes* dated June 22, 1753.

138. *Count. Corres.*, p. 94: *Letter* No. 155, dated July 11, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders; *Di. A. Pi.*, 368: *Notes* dated July 2, 1753.

with the English army under Major Lawrence, encountered him at Kaḷudai-malai,¹³⁹ a small fort north-east of Trichinopoly. In the engagement which followed, a number of Mysoreans, together with their horses as also several of the French, were killed; three of their guns, a mortar and four wagons loaded with stores, were made prize of; all the infantry except the slain flung away their arms and fled; one of Nanjarājaiya's principal officers fell along with Bālāji-Ghōrpaḍe, a sardār of Murāri Rao's army (whom Murāri, we are told, esteemed as his son), and 5-6 jamādārs and 20-30 troopers, while the French retreated with M. Astruc towards the Mysore camp, "abandoning their cannon, etc., and throwing away all they carried."¹⁴⁰

About the middle of July, Muhammad Alī, assisted by the English and the Tanjore, Tonḍa-mān and Marava chiefs, again attacked and defeated Nanjarājaiya, forcing him to retreat with his allies to Śrīrangam, Tiruvānaikkōyil and Mānapparai.¹⁴¹ Early in August, Nanjarājaiya (with M. Brenier as commander of the French troops), having recovered his ground, gave battle to Muhammad Alī at Trichinopoly, "in which two leaders of 500 men attacked Muhammad Ali Khan, killing a few and

July-December
1753.

139. *Ibid.* Kaḷudai-malai: Lit. "Ass's Rock" in Tamil. Wilks and Orme date the event as on June 26, 1753, and give a detailed account of the action from the English point of view, Orme referring to it as the "Battle of the Golden Rock" (see *Mysoor*, I. 337-339; *History of the Mily. Trans.*, I. 289-293). Writing of this success, Orme says: "Thus was Trichinopoly saved by a success which astonished even those who gained it; nor was the attempt, however desperate it might seem, justified by the success alone, for as the city would inevitably have fallen if the English had remained inactive, so the loss of it would have been hastened only a few days if they had been defeated, and Major Lawrence acted with as much sagacity as spirit, in risking everything to gain a victory on which alone depended the preservation of the great object of the war." (Orme, *Ibid.*). The sequel, however, shows that this success did not end the war. Nanjarājaiya was ill-served by his allies.

140. *Vide* references cited in f.n. 138 *supra*.

141. *Di. A. Pi.*, 374, 376-378: *Notes* dated July 19 and 22, 1753.

scattering the rest, and returned with some horses, cannon, etc., to Nandi Raja who richly rewarded his men."¹⁴² About the 20th, Muhammad Ali, in turn, attacked and defeated the troops of Nanjarājaiya at Allitturai (with M. Maissin as commander of the French), obliging them to flee to Krishnāpuram with considerable loss.¹⁴³ By September 11, however, Nanjarājaiya, with his allies, "closely surrounded Muhammad Ali Khan and the English troops in the fort of Trichinopoly, where provisions are scarce."¹⁴⁴ On the 21st, the Nawāb engaged Nanjarājaiya in an action, in which the latter's troops as well as those of Murāri Rao were defeated and put to flight amidst loss and confusion, their camp plundered, and "the French suffered a great many of their own men to be killed," some of their officers and soldiers being imprisoned.¹⁴⁵ At length Nanjarājaiya arranged with Murāri Rao and the French (now commanded by M. Mainville) to take Trichinopoly by a stratagem.¹⁴⁶ On November 29 (Thursday), at 4 o'clock in the morning, he attempted to storm the fort by the sides of a *darga*.¹⁴⁷ About five to six hundred Frenchmen, we learn,¹⁴⁸ scaled the walls of the outer fort ("*ped-cota*") with the help of ladders, some of them climbing up to the bastion. But the sentries discovered the plot and raised an alarm, whereupon Khair-ud-dīn, with his men and the English

142. *Ibid*, 395: *Notes* dated August 11, 1753; also 393-394, 397-398: *Notes* dated July 25 and 30, 1753 (referring to M. Astruc's quarrels with Nanjarājaiya and his supersession by M. Brenier in July, etc.).

143. *Ibid*, 398: *Notes* dated August 20, 1753; also 397: *Notes* dated August 12, 1753 (referring to the despatch of reinforcement from Pondicherry under M. Maissin, etc.). See also and compare *Count. Corres.*, p. 106: *Letter* No. 178, dated August 24, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders.

144. *Ibid*, 417: *Notes* dated September 11, 1753.


145. *Count. Corres.*, p. 128: *Letter* No. 239, dated October 7, 1753—Khair-ud-dīn to Saunders; also p. 126: *Letter* No. 231, dated September 24, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders.

146. *Ibid*, pp. 156-157: *Letter* No. 310, dated December 7, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders; see also and compare *Ibid*, pp. 153-154: *Letter* No. 305, dated December 14, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders.

147. *Ibid*, p. 156 *supra*.

148. *Ibid*, *Letter* Nos. 310 and 305, cited *supra*.

PLAN of the Attempt of the French Troops to take TRITCHINAPOLY by Escalade November 28 1753.



troops commanded by Captains Harrison and Kilpatrick, prepared to attack the enemy and opened fire. In the general engagement which followed, the Mysoreans and Murāri Rao retired to Śrīrangam; about 1,000 firelocks with two mortars were seized; 45 Frenchmen were wounded and made their escape, 64 were killed and buried, and 391 (including 8 officers from Pondicherry and 70 wounded) taken prisoners.

Despite these continual reverses, Nanjarājaiya at Śrīrangam persisted in his hopes of taking Trichinopoly, and continued hostilities. In particular, since January 1754, he attempted to recover his position by keeping Murāri Rao and the French engaged in his interest,¹⁴⁹ by indenting for a fresh detachment of 2,000 horse from Seringapatam,¹⁵⁰ by re-gathering his strength,¹⁵¹ and by enlisting recruits by means of advances.¹⁵² "The King of Mysore," news was even current,¹⁵³ "has commissioned his vakil to offer 40 lakhs and rupees 10,000 per day to Ballaze Row [Pēshwa Bālāji Rao] to put him in possession of Trichinopoly." Towards the close of August Nanjarājaiya moved on from Śrīrangam to Chercavarpalam, where with the French troops he fixed his camp.¹⁵⁴

149. *Ibid* (1754), pp. 3, 11, 31-32, 38, 44 and 47: *Letter* Nos. 3, 17-18, 51, 56, 66 and 76, dated January 4, 16, 20, February 10, 17 and 26, 1754.

150. *Ibid*, pp. 31-32: *Letter* No. 51, cited *supra*; also p. 45: *Letter* No. 72, dated February 3, 1754.

151. *Ibid*, p. 33: *Letter* No. 56, cited *supra*; also p. 79: *Letter* No. 140, dated April 16, 1754.

152. *Ibid*, p. 43: *Letter* No. 76, dated February 26, 1754.

153. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1754), p. 95: *Consultation* dated April 30, 1754. Already about April 1753, we learn, "a caroot of Rupees" had been offered by the King of Mysore to Bālāji Rao to obtain for him the fort of Trichinopoly, but Bālāji had rejected the offer [see *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 56: *Letter* No. 97, dated April 5, 1753; also *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 81: *Consultation* dated May 21, 1753]. The offer appears to have been renewed with greater zest in 1754, in view of the importance and seriousness of the issue.

154. *Count. Corres.* (1754), p. 154: *Letter* No. 311, dated August 24, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders.

CHAPTER VIII.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*).

The renewed struggle for Trichinopoly : Further attempts at a compromise between Mysore and Muhammad Ali, 1753-1754—July-September 1753—September-October 1753—October - December 1753—January - March 1754—March-April 1754—May-June 1754—June-July 1754—July-September 1754—The impasse, October 1754-January 1755—Its adverse effects on Nanjarajaiya—His persistent claims to Trichinopoly—His later movements, January-April 1755—His departure to Seringapatam, April 8, 1755.

MEANWHILE the English Government at Madras had been engaged in pursuing steadily a policy of

The renewed struggle for Trichinopoly.

Further attempts at a compromise between Mysore and Muhammad Ali, 1753-1754.

accommodation of affairs between Mysore and Muhammad Ali, in view of the callousness of Dupleix to all proposals of peace; his ultimate design on Trichinopoly and on the English trade and settlements on the Coromandel coast; the continual increase in the strength of the French and the expected reinforcements from France; the distress and financial straits of the Nawāb, despite his success over Nanjarājaiya and Murāri Rao; the stress and burden of his campaigns on the English; and the general unrest and turmoil prevailing in South India.¹ Such an accommodation, as was expected,² would not only "immediately terminate the war [between the English and the French in the 'Carnatic']" but also be "a great step towards it," while the Court of Directors in London were urging the adoption of "every pacific and prudent measure" to reconcile the Nawāb

1. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), pp. 144-145, 147, and (1754), pp. 95-96: Board's *Proceedings* dated September ? 1753, and April 30, 1754.

2. *Ibid* (1754), p. 146: Board's *Proceedings* dated June 20, 1754.

and the King of Mysore, as the quarrel between them was thoroughly prejudicial to the former's affairs.³

In accordance with this policy, Saunders, in July 1753, wrote to Murāri Rao,⁴ advising him to endeavour to reconcile Muhammad Ali and Nanjarājaiya; to the Nawāb,⁵ to be friends with the Dalavāi; and to Nanjarājaiya,⁶ to do what was expedient to extricate himself out of the difficulties he had plunged himself and his country in. He wrote⁷ also to Saiyid Lāshkar Khān to prevail upon Nanjarājaiya and Murāri to desist from hostilities, if not, contrive means to punish them. In August, Muhammad Ali communicated his willingness "to mortgage the districts belonging to Trichinopoly [*i.e.*, Madura and Tinnevely] excepting the fort" in satisfaction of the Dalavāi's demand, desiring his allies to negotiate the affair on that footing with the Mysore Vakil, Barakki Venkaṭa Rao, at Madras.⁸ On the other hand, Nanjarājaiya, though at first seemingly little inclined to peace for fear of offending the French, about September proposed to Saunders, through Venkaṭa Rao, "either being paid the money he had advanced or put in possession of Trichinopoly, and if the latter, he would draw off the Moratta [Murāri] from the French, who with himself were to join the Nabob, settle him in the Arcot province, enter into a strict alliance with him and further would pay him a considerable sum of money and that he would also enter into a friendly alliance with the King of Tanjour [Tanjore]." ⁹

3. *Mad. Desp.* (1744-1755), p. 222: *Despatch* dated December 19, 1753.

4. *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 92: *Letter* No. 151, dated July 16, 1753.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 100: *Letter* No. 162, dated July 30, 1753.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 101: *Letter* No. 165, dated July 31, 1753.

7. *Ibid.*: *Letter* No. 164, dated July 31, 1753.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-109: *Letter* No. 180, dated August 15, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders; also *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), pp. 137-138: *Consultation* dated August 27, 1753.

9. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), pp. 141, 144-145: *Consultations* dated August 25, and September ? 1753; see also Appendix II—(2).

On September 12, Saunders and his Council, having resolved "to make a further trial to promote a reconciliation between the Nabob and the Dalloway" (Lawrence and Palk having failed in May-June), appointed Thomas Cooke on a Commission, with full powers to treat at the camp of Trichinopoly through Pratāp Singh of Tanjore.¹⁰ They recommended to him the conclusion of an accommodation with Nanjarājaiya on the basis of "a mortgage of the districts belonging to Trichinopoly as a security for the payment of a certain sum to be settled and agreed on in full satisfaction of all his demands on the Nabob;"¹¹ but if the Dalavāi was to be satisfied "with anything less than Trichinopoly," he (Thomas Cooke) was desired to consent to its cession on certain specific terms advantageous to all the parties concerned.¹² In October, Muhammad Alī empowered Saunders to negotiate with Venkaṭa Rao, sending him alternative proposals;¹³ urging upon him to use his "utmost endeavours" to let the fort of Trichinopoly remain in his (Muhammad Alī's) possession and "settle peace on the assignment of the

10. *Vide* Appendix II—(2). *Thomas Cooke*: Thomas Cooke, Junior, was, on the fall of Madras in 1746, appointed a member of Council of the newly created head settlement of Fort St. David (*P. from England*, II. July 24, 1747). He was styled "junior" evidently to distinguish him from Thomas Cooke, Senior, who was also a member of the Civil Service on the Madras establishment at about the same time. Thomas Cooke, Junior, became, on Madras being declared the seat of the Presidency on April 6, 1752, a member of the Madras Council. He was 11th of Council on December 31, 1754, but under suspension (see H. D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II. 382, 401, 437). Thomas Cooke, Senior, entered service in 1702; at the Seagate, 1712; Receiver at the Sea Gate and Land Customer, 1715; Deputy Governor of Bencoolen, in 1720, superseding Richard Farmer, who had been made a close prisoner for maltreating his subordinates and the local inhabitants; returned to Fort St. George in 1721; dismissed for disobedience of the Company's orders, and later arrested for alleged misappropriation of the Company's cash (see Love, *Ibid.*, II. 123, 145, 170, 181, 183, 184). Whether the two Cookes were brothers or not is not known.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 180-181: *Letter* No. 242, dated October 20, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders; see also Appendix II—(3), for a summary.

country;"¹⁴ and laying down the conditions on which the fort was in the last resort to be ceded to Mysore.¹⁵

Great hopes were entertained of these developments.

As a *Despatch* from Madras records,¹⁶

October-December
1753.

"The King of Mysore demands Trichinopoly; the Nabob will agree to anything but that. The Nabob certainly has no right to cede Trichinopoly and it should not be done except of absolute necessity. The King would give very advantageous terms including the repayment of the Nabob's debt to the Company. Will do everything possible to find a middle course although the cession of Trichinopoly would probably not affect the Company's investment at Salem as that would make the King as firm a friend of the English as an Eastern prince can be." At Trichinopoly, Thomas Cooke at first conducted negotiations through the mediation of Pratāp Singh of Tanjore;¹⁷ and Nanjarājaiya proposed a settlement of affairs with the Nawāb for rupees 130 lakhs on the security of the Trichinopoly country.¹⁸ Pratāp Singh, however, attempted to square up for 60 lakhs on the mortgage of Madura and Tinnevely.¹⁹ However advantageous such a settlement seemed to the English, and possibly to Nanjarājaiya too, it was in reality, as the former anticipated it,²⁰ a design only to amuse, as the Rāja of Tanjore was averse to the surrender of Trichinopoly into the hands of Mysore. In particular, Pratāp Singh himself, while mediating as above, had sent in provisions and forces to Muhammad Alī's relief at Trichinopoly during

14. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Mad. Desp.*, p. 212: *Despatch* dated October 29, 1753.

17. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 213: *Consultation* dated November 17, 1753.

18. *Count. Corres.*, p. 146: *Letter* Nos. 284 and 285, dated November 28, 1753—Saunders to Rāma Naik, and Saunders to Nawāb; p. 167: *Letter* No. 333, dated December 29, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 194: *Consultation* dated November ? 1753.

19. *Ibid.*; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 196: *Council's Proceedings* dated November 15, 1753.

20. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 194, 196: l.c.

Nanjarājaiya's blockade of the place (September 21).²¹ In wrath, Nanjarājaiya sent back the Tanjore Vakil and the negotiations fell through.²² In November, Pratāp Singh wrote²³ to Cooke to treat direct with the Dalāvāi. Cooke's efforts, at the end of November, were of little avail, Nanjarājaiya merely continuing "to send answers" and refusing "to give up the fort."²⁴ Nor were Saunders's negotiations with Venkaṭa Rao at Madras attended with success, the latter having communicated the Dalāvāi's resolve to listen to no other proposal of the Nawāb but the last one (relating to the delivery of the Trichinopoly Fort to Mysore), objecting to its limitations (*i.e.*, rupees 15 lakhs demanded from Mysore and one year's time fixed for the actual delivery of the fort), and pointing to the need for treating direct with the king of Mysore on the subject.²⁵ So that at the end of the year an accommodation with Mysore seemed to be a remote possibility.

Nevertheless, since January 1754, the subject continued to engage the attention of the English at Fort St. George in an increasing measure. For, as the Court of Directors observed,²⁶ "the Nabob would have been much better off if he had surrendered Trichinopoly to Mysore when it was demanded of him. Hope then accommodation is still possible." Again, as they wrote,²⁷ "the quarrel between

January-March
1754.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 213: l.c.; *Count. Corres.*, p. 167: *Letter No. 833*, l.c.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Vide* f.n. 17 *supra*.

24. *Count. Corres.*, p. 153: *Letter No. 305*, dated December 14, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders; *Press List* (1750-1754), p. 666: *Letter No. 4538*, dated December 4, 1753—Cooke to Saunders.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 149: *Letter No. 236*, dated December 10, 1753—Saunders to Nawāb; also *D. Cons. Bk.*, p. 196: l.c.; pp. 217-218: Council's *Proceedings* dated December 9, 1753. A *Consultation*, dated November 26, 1753 (*Ibid.*, p. 207), speaks of how Venkaṭa Rao was desired by Saunders to proceed to Seringapatam to treat with the king, leaving his family in Madras "as a mark of his good intentions," and how Venkaṭa Rao "absolutely rejected it," "offering at the same time to take the most solemn oath to return whether he succeeded or not."

6. *Mad. Desp.*, pp. 226-227: *Despatch* dated January 23, 1754.

Ibid., p. 224: l.c.

the Nabob of Arcot and the King of Mysore is the more unfortunate as it has caused a great increase in the English advances to the Nabob. Urge the necessity of securing as speedy a reimbursement as possible." Saunders moved²⁸ with Muhammad Ali in the matter of sending a proper person to negotiate with the king of Mysore himself, as the Dalavāi, he believed, was "entirely in the power of certain people [the French];" he also advised²⁹ Nanjarājaiya not to be deceived by the French but make out his account with the Nawāb; and wrote³⁰ to Major Lawrence regarding the measures to be concerted "for satisfying the King of Mysore" (January-February). Muhammad Ali, however, less earnest about the cession of Trichinopoly to Mysore but more inclined to detach Murāri from Nanjarājaiya and make peace with Dupleix (as a means of obliging the Mysoreans and Murāri to desist from hostilities),³¹ replied about the uselessness of sending any deputy to Seringapatam.³² On the other hand, Nanjarājaiya, determined "to fight and die" if neither the fort was delivered nor the entire expenses paid to him,³³ sent in his proposals to Lawrence who replied to have the matter referred to the Governor of *Fort St. George*.³⁴ The Dalavāi, further, wrote³⁵ to Thomas Cooke, recapitulating all his transactions with the Nawāb since he first went to his assistance, and

28. *Count. Corres.* (1754), p. 11: *Letter No. 17*, dated January 16, 1754—Saunders to Nawāb.

29. *Press List*, p. 717: *Letter No. 4827*, dated February 2, 1754—Saunders to Dalavāi.

30. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1754), p. 32: *Consultation* dated January 31, 1754.

31. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 15 and 21: *Letter Nos. 26 and 34*, dated January 13 and 17, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders; see also and compare *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17, 38: *Letter Nos. 27 and 56*, dated January 9, and February 10, 1754.

32. *Press List*, p. 726: *Letter No. 4873*, dated February 11, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders.

33. *Count. Corres.*, p. 22: *Letter No. 35*, dated January 16, 1754—Rāma Naik to Saunders.

34. *Press List*, p. 722: *Letter No. 4849*, dated February 4, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 726: *Letter No. 4873*, dated February 11, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders.

justifying his demands on him (February). On March 13, Lawrence communicated³⁶ to Saunders about his having effected a reconciliation between Pratāp Singh of Tanjore and Nanjarājaiya, who renewed³⁷ their negotiations through Bābū Rao. This was followed by a letter³⁸ from Nanjarājaiya and his elder brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya (at Seringapatam), empowering Venkaṭa Rao at Madras to treat with Saunders on the subject of their demand for Trichinopoly, while Venkaṭa Rao himself submitted to the President a representation³⁹ containing the proposals for an accommodation with the Nawāb. These related in the main to the conditions under which the expenses were to be made good, or the fort of Trichinopoly delivered, by the Nawāb to Mysore, and the terms on which the latter was to enter on an alliance with the English.⁴⁰

However disagreeable an accommodation with Mysore "on the terms insisted on by the March-April 1754. Dalloway" seemed to them, the English at Madras, in considering Venkaṭa Rao's proposal, found it "preferable to the evident risk of losing the fort and exposing the army to imminent danger [at the hands of the French];"⁴¹ and came to the resolution "to close with the Dalloway on the terms offered by his Vackeel [agreeing to cede the fort to Mysore] with a few alterations which, he gives us reason to believe, his master will rather grant than break off the treaty."⁴² Accordingly, on March 25, they wrote⁴³ to Lawrence, detailing the articles of the proposed treaty

36. *Ibid.*, p. 752: *Letter* No. 5023, dated March 13, 1754—Lawrence to Saunders.

37. *Count. Corres.*, p. 58: *Letter* No. 93, dated March 17, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders.

38. *Press List*, p. 760: *Letter* No. 5066, dated March 25, 1754—Daḷavāi to Venkaṭa Rao.

39. *Vide* Appendix II—(4).

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 76-77: *Council's Proceedings* dated March 25, 1754.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Vide* Appendix II—(5).

with Mysore, pointing to the circumstances leading to the drafting of the proposals, explaining the possible objections that might be raised by the Dalavāi in regard to certain articles (Nos. 3, 4 and 7), and empowering him to conclude the treaty on his own judgment. Muhammad Alī, in the meantime, "averse to the delivering up of Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans" under the proposed treaty, showed,⁴⁴ on the authority of letters alleged to have been received from the court of the Mughal, his inclination "to preserve the fort," proposing⁴⁵ to the Council his own alternative which was, however, "defective in regard to no provision being made [in it] for the payment of [his] debt" to the English East India Company. On April 18, the Council were therefore of opinion⁴⁶ "that the Major [Lawrence] should be advised of what the Nabob has wrote and desired to discourse with him on the subject but by no means to be diverted from the plan of accommodation with the Dalloway, which, even if what the Nabob writes should be real, is more advantageous to the Company . . . , as the whole debt to the Company will be paid at once; but if the accommodation with the Dalloway should not take place and we should not be powerfully supported from Europe, the Board are of opinion, it will be advisable in that case to try the Nabob's plan." Again, on the 30th, reviewing the situation, they urged⁴⁷ upon Messrs. Lawrence and Palk to confer personally with the Nawāb and the king of Tanjore and press forward the negotiations for peace "whilst we can get any tolerable terms which, if any accidents should happen, we can have no reason to expect."

44. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 94 and 96: Council's *Proceedings* dated April 18 and 30, 1754.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 96: l.c. The alternative or plan is not specified in the *Proceedings*. But from the context, it seems to have related to the Nawāb's insistence on the mortgage of the Trichinopoly country to Mysore.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 94: l.c.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 96: l.c.

Early in May, Lawrence, as desired, wrote⁴⁸ to the Council, passing his remarks on the *Articles of Peace* proposed by them and those offered by Venkaṭa Rao.

May-June 1754.

On the 13th, certain alterations were permitted to be made in the proposals submitted by Venkaṭa Rao to the President (acting as mediator between Mysore and Muhammad Alī), with a Memorandum of explanations (particularly in respect of *Articles* 3, 7 and 11); and a copy of the draft thus drawn up was sent to the Major, he being requested to speedily communicate the same to the Daḷavāi to avoid further delay and suspense.⁴⁹ At the same time, the Council granted to Venkaṭa Rao a cash advance of 500 *pagoda*s, permitting him to depart (to Śrīrangam), "on his promise to use his endeavours to bring about the treaty."⁵⁰ On the 19th, the Council further advised⁵¹ Lawrence that the proposed treaty when concluded was to be as between the Nawāb and the king of Mysore as the Principals, with the English as mediators; that the fort of Trichinopoly was to be delivered by the Nawāb to Mysore under English guarantee "on condition [that] the usual tribute be constantly paid to the circar;" and that when the treaty was actually concluded, the Daḷavāi was to be assisted by an English detachment of 100 men in his settlement of Madura and Tinnevely. Lawrence's illness, however, prevented him from treating with the Daḷavāi,⁵² and there were difficulties in the way of appointing some one to relieve the Major in the command at Trichinopoly (May-June).⁵³ Palk's efforts at an accommodation with Mysore were equally attended with difficulties, and he wrote⁵⁴ to the

48. *Press List*, p. 794: *Letter* No. 5262, received? May 13, 1754.

49. *Vide* Appendix II—(6).

50. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 106: *Consultation* dated May 13, 1754.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 109: *Consultation* dated May 19, 1754.

52. *Press List*, p. 796: *Letter* No. 5262, received? May 13, 1754.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*, p. 811: *Letter* No. 5349, dated May 3, 1754 (received June 5, 1754).

Council regarding the advisability of excluding Trichinopoly from the *Articles* of the Treaty. Even Venkaṭa Rao's utmost endeavours to promote the settlement (in June) were of little avail. The Daḷavāi, as the Vakīl represented,⁵⁵ was not only disinclined to grant him an audience but also, when repeatedly written to at the President's desire, in the matter of peace, viewed him with suspicion and disfavour. The truth, however, was that, during the period of these activities, Nanjarājaiya, while he had "great expectations" from a much talked arrival of Pēshwa Bālāji Rao in the South,⁵⁶ was under the strong influence of Dupleix who, to counteract the English policy, had written to Madras of his intention "to give Trichinopoly to the Mysorean."⁵⁷

In June-July, Lawrence wrote⁵⁸ to Saunders, objecting to the plan of an accommodation with the Daḷavāi and pointing to the defects inherent in it, namely, the uncertainty of an alliance only consented to through necessity; the unfairness of giving up the Nawāb's cause after having long supported him "in the breach of a promise extorted from him by force;" the unsoundness of making peace for the realisation of the Nawāb's debt to the Company; the risk involved in the twelve months' time allowed for the delivery of the Trichinopoly Fort to Mysore, and the weakness and insufficiency of the securities proposed to bind the Daḷavāi with in satisfaction of the Nawāb's debt. Lawrence seemed, on the whole, to be much in favour of leaving things to take their own course and trying other resources for the recovery of the English advances to the

55. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 121-122: *Letter* No. 244, dated June 14, 1754 (received July 8, 1754)—Venkaṭa Rao to Saunders; also *Press List*, p. 818: *Letter* No. 5379 of the same date.

56. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 102: *Consultation* dated April 25, 1754.

57. *Vide* f.n. 51 *supra*.

58. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 146-147, 171-175: Board's *Proceedings* dated June 20 and July 29, 1754. Of the two letters of Lawrence, the first appears to have been written early in June 1754; the second was written on July 15 (see *Press List*, p. 858: *Letter* No. 5610).

Nawāb, for, he added,⁵⁹ "If pacific measures take place, the treaty will be partly concluded at home and if the giving up [of] Trichinopoly to Mysore is by them made an article, it is their own dowing, if not, the desire they have that agreement should take place is a sanction to us to do it, should we not like the other means proposed by the enemy for the security of our debt. That offer always remains to be made."

Far different, however, was the spirit in which Saunders and his Council viewed the proposed treaty and the points raised by the Major. At a *Consultation* on June 20,⁶⁰ they resolved "that the fort and country of Trichinopoly being in the Mysore hands does not seem in the least to promise any disadvantage to the Company's own particular concerns but on the contrary some advantages are offered in the treaty which, though not to be depended upon, are yet favourable; that notwithstanding the King of Tanjore's wavering behaviour, if the treaty should take place, it must still be his interest to keep him to the Nabob's cause whilst we engage to protect him, for there is not a single point for him to gain by siding with the enemy . . . but a more weighty argument than all is the heavy debt due by the Nabob to the Company which at this time cannot fall much short of 35 lakhs of rupees, a sum which, should the Company not recover, may greatly affect their credit at home, a debt which, if the war continue on the present footing, will be daily encreasing—an accommodation with the Dalloway on the terms proposed by Vencat Row will immediately discharge the whole or the greatest part, which, if there should be a necessity to continue the war, will certainly enable the Company to wage it with fresh vigour."

Again, at another *Consultation* on July 29,⁶¹ they recorded: "The main point which requires particular

59. *Ibid.*, p. 172 *supra*.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-175 *supra*.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147 *supra*.

observation in the Major's letter is the proposed treaty with the Dalloway which the Board are still of opinion should be concluded or at least attempted as soon as possible for the reasons often repeated in these occurrences. As to those offered against it in the Major's foregoing letter, the Board differ in opinion from them in some respects. In the first place it is urged that the same objections which were first made against the treaty still subsist. The case is very different now from what it was at the time the Mysoreans first declared their pretensions to Trichinopoly . . . We are surrendering [Trichinopoly] because we cannot well maintain it. The Nabob's debt to the Company is swelled to a prodigious sum. Experience has shown that any assistance from Ballazerow [Pēshwa Bālāji Rao] is vain. Salabat Jang is in full possession of the province and can deny the French nothing. The Mysoreans who have already expended perhaps two crores of rupees, continue obstinate, their treasures are not exhausted, and it is not reasonable to imagine that after so immense an expence they will give up the point without some equivalent when they are yet in a condition to contest it, and no other equivalent can be given them . . . Experience has shewn us that the French are always much more plentifully supplied; at all events they may recall de Bussy's army from Salabat Jang which will at any time give them the superiority, and the danger Trichinopoly has already been in through want of provisions and the difficulty of throwing in any quantity when the enemy are superior—ought to deter us from putting it again to that risk. The Nabob's debt to the Company is daily increasing; the conclusion of the treaty with the Dalloway will secure it, nor will any one advantage of trade be lost to the Company by it. The treaty on foot in Europe is not to be depended on. We are directed to be on our guard and the accommodation with the Dalloway is strongly

pressed by the Company, which though it may not end the war, will put it in our power to wage it with advantage."

"Another reason offered against an accommodation with the Dalloway," they continued,⁶² "is that after having so long opposed him it will be plainly seen that we came to terms only through necessity, if this were admitted as a just argument against a peace. It must also be confessed that after a war once declared between two powers, it could scarce ever cease till one of them were absolutely conquered, because if either party were to gain an advantage, it would (by a parallel reasoning) be imprudent to trust the antagonist because he might be supposed to submit through necessity to terms which at first he opposed or disliked, but the contrary is seen every day and it is the most common basis of peace. It is further said that if we were ever in the right to support the Nabob in the breach of a promise extorted from him by force that right still subsists. It has already been shewn that the circumstances of affairs are extremely different now from what they were then. How far in point of equity we ought to have interfered is a subject that has not till now been started and indeed too often gives way to the policy of the Government. In the present case there seems to be but little equity on either side of the question, for, on the one hand it is not very conformable to the laws of justice to support the Nabob in the absolute violation of a solemn promise and engagement; on the other hand, the deviation from equity would be as great were we to oblige the Nabob or be instrumental to his performing his promise when it is to give away what he has no right to but is the absolute property of another, as is the fort of Trichinopoly to the Mogul, but this at present seems to be out of the question. It is plain, not the equity of the disputes between the country powers but self-preservation and

self-interest (motives that influence the great councils of nations) were our inducements for taking part in the present troubles; and our plan may not be found quite void of equity when it is considered that the laws of self-preservation oblige us to ward off a blow aimed by the most desperate enemy to our nation at the very root of our commerce and possessions on this coast. Such have been the motives of our actions, and such must determine our future measures conforming still as nearly as possible to the general laws of equity and reason. These arguments may perhaps be too honest to be used to the world but they are arguments that must naturally flow from every discerning mind. The objection against the security for payment of the Nabob's debt must vanish at once when it is remembered that it does not depend in the least on the Dalloway's faith at the expiration of the 12 months but that it is to be secured by the *sovcars* at this settlement and the Fort is to remain in our possession till the debt is paid"

During July-September, prospects of an English accommodation with Mysore were not bright. Lawrence's illness being prolonged, the Council repeatedly wrote to Robert Palk,⁶³ desiring him to speed up the negotiations and passing resolutions in the matter. They, however, experienced considerable difficulty in getting anybody to go to the Dalavāi's camp as interpreter.⁶⁴ At Madras,

63. *Press List*, p. 835: *Letter No. 5483*, dated July 3, 1754; also pp. 846-847: *Letter Nos. 5549, 5550*, dated July 15, 1754. *Robert Palk*: Son of Walter Palk; born, December 1717; Chaplain, E. I. Co., Madras; gave up orders; entered Civil Service, Madras; Member of Council, 1753; Envoy of the Rāja of Tanjore, 1753-1754; conducted negotiations with the French; installed Muḥammad Ali as Nawāb of Arcot, 1755; Governor of Madras, November 1763 to January 1767; protected the Rāja of Tanjore against Muḥammad Ali; concluded treaty with the Nizām of Hyderabad, November 1766; resigned and returned to England, 1767; M. P. for Ashburton, 1767-1768 and 1774-1787; created Bart., 1772; died, May 1798. The *Palk Straits* is named after him.

64. *Ibid.*

the position of Venkaṭa Rao was by no means better. From time to time he wrote⁶⁵ to the President, requesting the grant of a pass for his people to proceed to Seringapatam, representing the necessities and hardship of his detention (since July 1752), desiring to be speedily permitted to return or his expenses defrayed until his departure, and intimating his having something important for communication to the President. About the middle of September, Nanjarājaiya having disagreed with M. Maissin, the French Commander, left the Mysore army at Rettamalai and Attur, etc., places and marched on to Śrīrangam, sending his cannons and other munitions of war by boat.⁶⁶ By the 26th, Murāri Rao had left Nanjarājaiya, having been bought off by the Nawāb and the king of Tanjore.⁶⁷ At last, on the 29th, the tables were turned by the three months' truce (as from October 11) under the provisional treaty concluded by M. Godeheu (who had succeeded M. Dupleix in Pondicherry early in August) with Saunders.⁶⁸

65. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 121-122: *Letter* No. 244, dated June 14, 1754, cited in f.n. 55 *supra*; p. 181: *Letter* No. 323, dated September 11, 1754; also *Press List*, pp. 867, 884 and 891; *Letter* Nos. 5659, 5759 and 5793, dated August 12, September 7 and 16, 1754; and *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 249: Board's *Proceedings* dated October 24, 1754. According to the last-mentioned document, Venkaṭa Rao, while he declared before the Board that "his master, the Mysore Dalloway" was "ready and willing to agree to the proposals" of peace, represented that his detention in Madras had put him to great expense and deprived him of very honourable and profitable employs in his master's service, and reduced him to very necessitous circumstances, "as his master refuses to make any allowances whilst he remains here." He accordingly submitted to the consideration of the Board, "whether his expences should not be borne out by them." The Board agreed "that his reasonable expences be defrayed." As we shall see in the sequel, it was not till January 1755 that Venkaṭa Rao was allowed to return to Seringapatam.

66. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 214: Board's *Proceedings* dated September 25, 1754; *Count. Corres.*, p. 167: *Letter* No. 339, dated September 26, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders; also *Di. A. Pi.*, IX. 10: *Notes* dated September 12, 1754.

67. *Count. Corres.*, l.c.; also *Ibid.*, p. 154: *Letter* No. 311, dated August 24, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders; and *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 279: Board's *Proceedings* dated December 20, 1754 (referring to Murāri Rao's engagement with Tanjore and the Nawāb, to quit his alliance with Mysore).

68. See *Editorial Note* in Wilks's *Mysoor* (I. 372), quoting from Sir George Forrest's *The Life of Lord Olive* (I. 249-252); also *Ante*, Ch. VI.

Godeheu's pacific policy ran counter to the bellicose intentions of Dupleix. In vain did Dupleix, on the eve of his departure from India, entreat him (Godeheu) to send reinforcements to Trichinopoly.⁶⁹ On the contrary, Godeheu, immediately after the conclusion of his treaty with Saunders, wrote⁷⁰ to M. Maissin (who was again in command since M. Mainville's relinquishment in August 1754), recalling him with the French troops from Śrīrangam, for, under the truce, both the French and the English were to suspend arms for three months in the south and to see that the respective powers, of whom they were allies, likewise observed the engagement strictly. Saunders too, in pursuance of the treaty, ordered⁷¹ the suspension of hostilities by Lawrence's troops at Trichinopoly, advising⁷² Abdul Wāhab Khān (brother of Muhammad Alī at Trichinopoly) and Murāri Rao about the cessation of hostilities (October). Indeed, to the English the truce seemed to promise certain special advantages. By furnishing Trichinopoly with a good store of provisions, they expected a possible alteration in the measures of Naujarājaiya,⁷³ who, it was believed,⁷⁴ would perhaps be inclined to drop his attempt on Trichinopoly since he would not "much relish the paying inactive troops for three months, at the same time that his grand object is at least removed to a greater distance." Again, even if the French were found, at the end of the period of truce, to be resolved to support the Mysorean claims to Trichinopoly, an alliance with Mysore, the Council at Madras unanimously held,⁷⁵

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Di. A. Pi.*, IX. 45: *Notes* dated October 10, 1754; also references *infra*.

71. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 230: Board's *Proceedings* dated October 1, 1754.

72. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 177, 179: *Letter* Nos. 361 and 367, dated October 9 and 10, 1754.

73. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 214, cited in f.n. 66 *supra*.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 214, 230: Board's *Proceedings* dated September 26 and October 1, 1754.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 248: Board's *Proceedings* dated October 21, 1754.

would, in the last resort, be helpful in reducing them to reasonable terms. The anticipated general results of the truce, on the other hand, seemed even more beneficial to the English, tending to counterbalance their proposed plan of accommodation with Mysore. The Nawāb, it was believed,⁷⁶ would be secure in Trichinopoly and all other possessions of his, "which are by far the largest share of the Arcot province"; the revenues of these countries would be paid "towards the discharge of his debt to the Company"; Nanjarājaiya would be obliged to decamp from Śrīrangam, "both parties [the English and the French] being bound to oppose him if he commits any hostilities," and the province would be secured "from the incursions of the Morattas and all common enemies, which cannot but have a good effect on trade." To Muhammad Ali, too, the truce seemed to open brighter prospects. Supported by Salābat Jang, as he claimed,⁷⁷ he became more firm than ever in his resolution to preserve the fort of Trichinopoly, declaring⁷⁸ "that the Mysorean has no demand of the country or town except his debt," and desiring⁷⁹ his allies (*i.e.*, the English) to allow the same "in the accounts of the *Peishkash*" alleged to be due by him (the king of Mysore) to the Mughal.

None was, perhaps, more adversely affected by the truce than Nanjarājaiya who continued to maintain friendly relations with M. Godeheu despite his first disagreement with M. Maissin (September).⁸⁰ Early in October, M. Maissin, in compliance with Godeheu's orders, sent a small detachment of French troops across the Coleroon, *en route to Pondicherry*.⁸¹ Nanjarājaiya, helpless against

Its adverse effects
on Nanjarājaiya.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 283: Board's *Proceedings* dated December 22, 1754.

77. *Coun. Corres.*, p. 197: *Letter* No. 416, dated November 7, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders.

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Di. A. P.*, IX. 22, 26, 29, 31, 43-44: *Notes* dated September 14., 15, 20 and October 7, 1754.

81. *Ibid.*, 45, cited in f.n. 70 *supra*.

an attack by the enemy—Murāri having left him—implored him (M. Maissin) “to stay a month or fifteen days,” at least “until he could fetch dhoolies, palankeens, carts, etc., from the city [? Trichinopoly]” to remove his family.⁸² “But,” we are told,⁸³ “he refused and persisted in departing,” whereupon Nanjarājaiya resolved to assemble his wife and children in a house and blow it up with gunpowder. The calamity, however, was averted, M. Maissin having in the meanwhile received Godeheu’s permission to remain with the Dalavāi. Nanjarājaiya was overjoyed at this; his hopes of Trichinopoly seemed to revive; he provided M. Maissin with money for his expenses, promising “a lakh more in eight days,” and wrote⁸⁴ to Godeheu assuring him of the payment of his arrears to the French Government. It was not, however, till about October 20 that Nanjarājaiya received intimation of Godeheu’s truce, with the latter’s instructions that he “must not attack Muhammad Ali Khan or their countries.”⁸⁵ Nanjarājaiya was deeply shocked that the truce had been concluded by Godeheu without his knowledge.⁸⁶ Indeed he wrote⁸⁷ to him, pleading how he had hoped to settle his affairs with Muhammad Ali and the English for rupees 60 lakhs, by which he expected to find means to pay his debt to the French and return to his country, and how the truce upset his calculations by enabling them (Muhammad Ali and the English) to strengthen themselves with forces and provisions, and to devise other plans to beat him with on the expiry of the truce. About the end of October, the position of Nanjarājaiya at Śrīrangam seemed insecure. He had only a small force at his disposal; ⁸⁸ Godeheu had recalled all the French troops except 300 military and

82. *Ibid.*83. *Ibid.*, 45-46, 59-60: Notes dated October 10, 17, 1754.84. *Ibid.*, 46 *supra*.85. *Ibid.*, 59 *supra*.86. *Ibid.*, 72: Notes dated October 22, 1754.87. *Ibid.*88. *Ibid.*, 83-84: Notes dated October 29, 1754.

1,000 foot with M. Maissin,⁸⁹ while Muhammad Ali and the English, as Nanjarājaiya complained,⁹⁰ were gathering troops at the fort of Trichinopoly daily, 100 military or 200 sepoys at a time. Nanjarājaiya wrote to Godeheu hinting at reinforcements being sent, but was told that no harm could be done to him under the truce and that Muhammad Ali was going to Cuddalore.⁹¹

Nevertheless, Nanjarājaiya hardly ever thought of giving up his claims to Trichinopoly, having, as he said,⁹² so far "spent over two crores of rupees" on the enterprise. His persistence became a source of alarm to the English, contrary to their expectations. As a Madras *Despatch* records:⁹³ "Should the King of Mysore get Trichinopoly, he would become a dangerous neighbour, as both the French and the English have settlements in the kingdom of Tanjore . . . The King of Mysore is regarded as the richest and most powerful prince that pays tribute to the Moghal; but inspite of his extensive territory, 'ambition and avarice prompted him to his scheme on Trichinopoly.' The king is young and all the power lies in the hands of the Dalaway, whose brother commands the Mysore troops at Śrīrangam. The expedition has cost great sums, but though the Mysoreans are reputed tenacious, they have been beaten so often and trust the French so little, that they would have withdrawn long ago but that the Dalaway's brother fears for his life should he acknowledge his defeat by withdrawal." In a letter⁹⁴ of his to Godeheu, Nanjarājaiya not only desired him to have the Dutch and Danes as

89. *Ibid.*90. *Ibid.*91. *Ibid.*92. *Ibid.*, 12, 26: *Notes* dated September 12, 14, 1754.93. *Mad. Desp.*, p. 249: *Despatch* dated November 10, 1754; see also Ch. IX, f.n. 39. [The king was 26 years of age at the time. The reference to the kingdom of Mysore being a tributary State of the Mughal is more in keeping with the current political conceptions of the time than the realities of the position as explained in Ch. IV, f.n. 19 (*q.v.*).]94. *Di. A. Pi.*, 97: *Notes* dated November 15, 1754.

mediators during his discussions on peace with the English, but also pointed to his belief in the ultimate success of his own cause as against Muhammad Ali's, for he reiterated,⁹⁵ "If they [the English] speak on behalf of Muhammad Ali Khan and you [Godeheu] on ours, Muhammad Ali Khan cannot win the day, by reason of the grant he made me of Trichinopoly fort and country." With a view to his eventually taking Trichinopoly, Nanjarājaiya continued also his professions of friendship with the French, expecting from Godeheu supplies of troops and ammunitions, and promising to pay up his dues to the French Government.⁹⁶

Although Nanjarājaiya (at Śrīrangam) appears to have desisted from hostilities during the period covered by the three months' truce (October 1754-January 1755), disturbances of a general character continued to prevail in South India.⁹⁷ On January 11, Godeheu's provisional treaty with Saunders was terminated by an eighteen months' peace between the French and the English.⁹⁸ Three days later Saunders resigned his office at Madras and sailed home, being succeeded by George Pigot (1755-1763). At the same time Barakki Venkaṭa Rao (the Mysore Vakīl at Madras) was also allowed to return to Seringapatam,⁹⁹ the English plan of accommodation with Mysore having been kept in abeyance for the time being. Disappointed, Nanjarājaiya, who continued to remain at Śrīrangam (with M. Dusaussaye, French Commander in succession to M. Maissin),¹⁰⁰ and whose

95. *Ibid.*

96. *Ibid.*, 180-181: *Notes* dated December 29, 1754; also 96: *Notes* dated November 13, 1754 (referring to the receipt of two elephants from Nanjarājaiya as presents to Godeheu).

97. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 199-200: *Letter* No. 419, dated December 8, 1754—Abdul Wāhab Khān to Saunders; *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 284: *Consultation* dated December 22, 1754.

98. *Ante*, Ch. VI. This well-known Peace is also referred to in Nanjarājaiya's letter to Godeheu (see *Di. A. Pi.*, 176-178: *Notes* dated February 23, 1755).

99. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 8. 100. *Di. A. Pi.*, 147: *Notes* dated January 26, 1755.

movements were closely watched by the English at Trichinopoly (under Major Alexander Heron),¹⁰¹ began to levy exactions in Toreyūr, Ariyalūr and Valikonḍapuram,¹⁰² and carry on incursions into the Nawāb's possessions.¹⁰³ In February, Muhammad Alī and the English promptly answered by the seizure of the southern and middle countries (comprising Madura, Tinnevely and Naḍumaṇḍalam), which Nanjarājaiya claimed to belong to Mysore.¹⁰⁴ Nanjarājaiya repeatedly complained to the French about these aggressions (of Muhammad Alī and his allies), remarking that the eighteen months' time was enforced only against himself.¹⁰⁵ He wrote¹⁰⁶ also to Godeheu, recapitulating the details of his alliance with the French since 1753, and seeking his assistance either to take Trichinopoly or recover from Muhammad Alī all his expenses (to enable him to meet the pressing demands of Salābat Jang and de Bussy on Mysore). Nanjarājaiya, however, was only desired¹⁰⁷ to observe the "peace" and to desist from hostilities in Toreyūr (claimed to belong to the French), as otherwise he would be treated as an enemy. Early in March, Nanjarājaiya declared that Toreyūr was a dependency of Mysore, and that he was regularly receiving tribute from it.¹⁰⁸ He also, in satisfaction of his dues to the French, executed in favour of the Toreyūr

101. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1755), pp. 4, 6: Board's *Proceedings* dated January 6, 8, 1755.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 16: *Consultation* dated January 25, 1755; also *Di. A. Pi.*, 179, 184-185: *Notes* dated February 28, and March 5, 1755. Toreyūr, Ariyalūr and Valikonḍapuram are places in the Trichinopoly district, being situated in the present Musiri, Uḍaiyārpālayam and Perumbalūr taluks respectively.

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22: *Consultation* dated January 31, 1755. See also *Ibid.*, p. 26: *Consultation* dated February 11, 1755 (referring to the Board's "approval of the measures taken by Major Heron to get satisfaction from the Mysoreans," etc.)

104. *Di. A. Pi.*, 176-178, 206, 254: *Notes* dated February 23, March 21, and April 10, 1755.

105. *Ibid.*, 177-178, 206 *supra*.

106. *Ibid.*, 176-178 *supra*.

107. *Ibid.*, 179: *Notes* dated February 28, 1755.

108. *Ibid.*, 188: *Notes* dated March 6, 1755.

Pāḷegār (Paramānanda Pillai) a bond for a lakh of rupees (sent by M. Barthelemy) on the security of Kandāchār Channappaia.¹⁰⁹ Yet Nanjarājaiya found himself in great straits. To the French he still owed a heavy balance of 20 to 22 lakhs, to Murāri 10 to 12 lakhs;¹¹⁰ he had flung away, as was estimated,¹¹¹ 3 to 4 crores of rupees on the Trichinopoly business, and was on ill terms with his master ("Rāja of Mysore").¹¹² He tried other means to gain his object. Towards the close of March, we learn,¹¹³ he "got together a great number of troops and prepared four hundred scaling ladders, with a design to make an attempt on Trichinopoly," despite "the representations and threats of the French officer [M. Dusaussaye]" with him. The attempt, however, failed (Major James Kilpatrick having been instructed to dislodge the Mysoreans in co-operation with the French, and Captain John Caillaud being sent to the relief of Trichinopoly—now stored with one year's provisions).¹¹⁴ And it resulted only in breeding dissensions between Nanjarājaiya and the French. His next plan to take the fort by winning over the English soldiers was likewise a failure.¹¹⁵ In the meanwhile, his troops continued to ravage and disturb the countryside;¹¹⁶ but as their pay had fallen into arrears, they, early in April, incited by Muhammad Alī, sat in *dharna* before his house.¹¹⁷ Their rising, however, was promptly quelled by Haidar Alī, on his promising to satisfy them with half their dues within three

109. *Ibid.*, 190-191: Notes dated March 7, 1755.

110. *Ibid.*, 238-239, 247-248: Notes dated April 7-8, 1755.

111. *Ibid.*, l.c.; also 255: Notes dated April 11, 1755.

112. *Ibid.*

113. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 53, 57: Board's Proceedings dated April 2, 3, 1755.

114. *Ibid.*; also pp. 4, 56 and 65: Board's Proceedings dated January 6, April 3 and 5, 1755.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 64: Consultation dated April 12, 1755.

116. *Count. Corres.* (1755), p. 28: Letter No. 63, dated April 1, 1755—Pigot to Salābat Jang.

117. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 10.

days.¹¹⁸ The French Government too (under the new Governor, M. de Leyrit, 1755-1758) continued to press Nanjarājaiya for their dues,¹¹⁹ though he had, in part satisfaction, mortgaged to them Śrīrangam, Jambukēśvaram, etc., places between the Cauvery and the Coleroon, yielding about 4 lakhs annually.¹²⁰ At Śrīrangam, on the other hand, M. Dusaussaye, the French Commander, mounted a cannon on the Rāyagōpuram and posted infantry along the roads.¹²¹ Nanjarājaiya proposed terms to him, which, however, did not prove acceptable.¹²²

At last, on the night of April 8, alarmed by a report of the death of his brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, and by an urgent call from Seringapatam (which was, as we shall see in the sequel,¹²³ invaded by Pēshwa Bālāji Rao and Salābat Jang), Nanjarājaiya marched on from Śrīrangam by way of Ariyalūr and Toreyūr, having given up all hopes of Trichinopoly, after more than three years' untiring activities in the South.¹²⁴

118. *Ibid.* For details of Haidar's services on the occasion, see under *Early Career and Rise of Haidar Ali* in Ch. X.

119. *Di. A. Pi.*, 207, 238-239, 247-248: *Notes* dated March 21, April 7-8, 1755.

120. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, 76, 98: *Consultation* dated April 26 and June 19, 1755; also *Di. A. Pi.*, 292-293: *Notes* dated April 25, 1755.

121. *Di. A. Pi.*, 261: *Notes* dated April 12, 1755.

122. *Ibid.*

123. *Vide* Ch. IX below.

124. *Di. A. Pi.*, 255, 257-259, 260-261, 265-266: *Notes* dated April 11, 12 and 13, 1755; see also and compare *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 66, 70, 72, 75-76, 78 and 85: *Consultations* dated April 21-29, 1755; *Count. Corres.*, p. 30: *Letter* No. 72, dated April 12, 1755—Nawāb to Pigot; and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 10. The death of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya in April 1755, as reported in the *Di. A. Pi.* (260, 283: *Notes* dated April 12 and 21, 1755) and in the *Di. Cons. Bk.* (p. 76 *supra*), afterwards proved to be false (see *Di. A. Pi.*, 290-291: *Notes* dated April 25, 1755). The Daḷavāi's demise actually took place in June 1758 (see Ch. IX). For an estimate of Nanjarājaiya's foreign policy with reference to the Trichinopoly issue, *vide* Ch. XIII.

CHAPTER IX.

KRISHNARĀJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*)

Sixth Phase : 1755-1759—Deccan affairs, down to 1755—French influence in Hyderabad—The Karnatak policy of the Nizam and the Peshwa (down to 1755)—Invasion of Seringapatam by the Nizam and the Mahrattas, c. March-June, 1755—Internal affairs, 1755-1759: Strained relations between the Dalavais and Krishnaraja—A silent Revolution: Beginnings, 1755—Securing the Palace and person of the king—Further developments, 1756—Nanjarajaiya supreme, 1756-1757—Renewed Mahratta invasion of Seringapatam, 1757: Nanjarajaiya buys off the Peshwa—The crisis of 1757-1758: Reconciliation between the Dalavais and Krishnaraja; Execution of a *Bhasha-patra*—Nanjarajaiya in Mysore, 1759: Krishnaraja seeks Haidar's help to put him down.

WE must now take a retrospect of the general course of affairs in the Deccan,¹ which led to the invasion of Seringapatam by the Mahrattas and the Nizām in 1755, and necessitated the recall of Nanjarājaiya from Trichinopoly.

As related in an earlier chapter, the Mahrattas and the Nizām, in the period down to 1748, had been contesting keenly the sovereignty of the South of India up to Trichinopoly and their attempts had been attended with varying degrees of success. The foreign and domestic troubles which followed on the deaths of Nizām-ul-mulk (1748) and Shāhu (1749), however, stood in the way of the effective realization of this objective by these Deccan

1. *Vide*, on this section, Kincaid and Parasnis, *History of the Maratha People*, III. 1-19, 29-34; C. H. I., V. 134-138.

powers—particularly the Mahrattas. In the monsoon season of 1750, Pēshwa Bālāji Rao, as an ostensible ally of Nāsir Jang against Muzaffar Jang, entered the Nizām's territories to bring them under Mahratta sway. Disturbed in his plan by the death (by treachery) of Nāsir (December 1750) and the rise of the French in the south as allies of Muzaffar and Chandā Sāhib, Bālāji Rao, about the end of December, negotiated with Saiyid Lāshkar Khān, Governor of Aurangabad, to support the claims of Ghāzi-ud-dīn, eldest son of Nizām-ul-mulk—then in high office at the court of Delhi—to the Nizāmate of the Deccan, in return for the cession by him of Aurangabad and Burhanpur as the price of Mahratta assistance. By the middle of February 1751, the Pēshwa occupied these places. About the same time, Muzaffar Jang had been slain by his enemies (at Rāchōṭi) and Salābat Jang succeeded to the Subādāri of the Deccan with M. de Bussy's help, while at Satāra, Tārābāi, in league with Dāmāji Gaekwād, was threatening the entire fabric of Mahratta power. So that at the end of February, Bālāji Rao was obliged to make peace with Salābat Jang (on the latter agreeing to pay him rupees 17 lakhs, 2 in cash and the rest in bills on bankers) and retire to Poona to deal with Tārābāi's opposition (March-April). In June, Salābat Jang, with his French allies, occupied Aurangabad. In November, however, Bālāji Rao, taking up Ghāzi-ud-dīn's cause, renewed the war with Salābat, the latter having put off paying his dues and attacked a Mahratta convoy. In the actions which followed (at Kukadi and Ghodnadi, November-December), the Mahrattas at first sustained reverses at the hands of Salābat and de Bussy during a night-attack, but later overwhelmed their opponents by a vigorous charge, taking the fort of Triambak. In January 1752, Salābat entered into a truce with the Pēshwa at Shingwa and retreated. In March-September, Dāmāji and Tārābāi, too, made

peace with Bālāji Rao. In the meanwhile, Ghāzi-ud-dīn, supported by Hōlkar, Sindhia and the main Mahratta army, proceeded to Aurangabad to contest his legitimate claims for the Subādāri of the Deccan with Salābat Jang, but, unfortunately, was poisoned to death by one of his step-mothers in the Aurangabad Palace (October 16). Salābat thus became the undisputed master of the Deccan but the Mahrattas insisted on his carrying out Ghāzi-ud-dīn's engagements with them. On November 25, 1752, Salābat concluded with them the treaty of Bhalki, ceding to the Pēshwa the town and fort of Triambak and the entire country west of Berār from the Tapti to the Gōdāvarī (comprising Aurangabad and Burhanpur).

With the establishment of Salābat Jang in Hyderabad, French influence became predominant in his court, which was as much abhorred by the local nobility as it tended to checkmate Bālāji Rao in his ambitious designs. The Pēshwa, therefore, in concert with Saiyid Lāshkar Khān (Dewān of Salābat Jang in succession to Rājā Raghu-nāth Dās who was assassinated early in 1752), set himself to work out a scheme whereby to get rid of M. de Bussy and his army from the Deccan. At the end of 1752, Bussy prepared to enter Mysore to assist in Dupleix's plans against Trichinopoly but was checked by the refusal of Salābat's troops to move. Early in 1753, Bussy fell seriously ill and in February proceeded to Masulipatam to recover his health. During his absence from Hyderabad, Saiyid Lāshkar Khān began to work actively in the Pēshwa's interest. While he persuaded Salābat Jang to return to Aurangabad, he reduced the strength of Goupil, Bussy's lieutenant, by prevailing upon him to relax the strictness of his discipline, divide and scatter the major portion of his troops and go about the country to collect their pay by plundering the

French influence
in Hyderabad.

neighbouring districts. The French cause in the Deccan seemed thus to be on the point of collapse. In May, however, de Bussy returned to Hyderabad and in October, recalling his detachments, he led them against Aurangabad. In December, he recovered his ground by obtaining from Salābat Jang a grant of the *Northern Sarkārs* (yielding annually a revenue of rupees thirty-one lakhs) for the maintenance of his troops. Early in 1754, he reformed the ministry of Salābat, replacing Saiyid Lāshkar Khān by Shāh Nawāz Khān. In March-April, he settled the Nizām's trouble with Raghuji-Bhōnsle in Berār and prepared to set out for the *Sarkārs*, arriving at Bezwada in July. At the same time, Bālāji Rao continued to be active, urging Shāh Nawāz Khān to fresh plots against M. Bussy; and his southern objective was further aided by the recall of M. Dupleix to France (in August), by M. Godeheu's recognition of Muhammad Alī as the Nawāb of Arcot (in December), by Salābat's resentment at it and his inclination to rely on English military help to support his interests, and lastly by the growth of a real national sentiment among the nobles of the *Subāh*, who sought the expulsion of the French. In January 1755, de Bussy returned to Hyderabad. Despite his attempts to smooth matters over, he found his position at the Nizām's court considerably shaken. Worse still, to complete his (Bussy's) downfall, Shāh Nawāz Khān advised Salābat Jang to demand the Mughal's contributions (*Pēshkāsh*) from Mysore. M. Bussy was expected to oppose this proposal, Mysore, about this time, being still in alliance with the French. He, however, proved himself equal to the occasion and took the direction of the invading army of Salābat. So that, by February 1755, Mysore became the common objective of both the Pēshwa and the Nizām, each marching on her, taking different routes.

These developments apart, the Nizām and the Mahrattas were, during the period 1751-1755, closely watching the trend of Karnāṭak affairs, the Mahrattas, in particular, steadily keeping an eye on the reduction of Mysore as an important step in the evolution of their southern policy. In 1751, the Pēshwa and the Nizām seemed desirous of enforcing their pretended claims on the Karnāṭak, finding in Murāri Rao of Gooty a no mean competitor. And there were possibilities of success to the Pēshwa.² Already during 1751-1752, Bālāji Rao established diplomatic relations with the court of Seringapatam, putting forth claims for *chauth* from Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya,³ who, however, adopted dilatory tactics.⁴ A letter, dated September 18, 1752,⁵ points to the disturbed state of South Indian politics; desires the Pēshwa's immediate presence in the south, and urges him to make a definite move to win over the whole of the Karnāṭak by the application of "the divide and rule" policy. In the same year, Salābat Jang, it is significant, was known to have positively ordered both Muhammad Ali and the English "not to give away Trichinopoly" [to Mysore], and Mysore "not to demand it."⁶ In February-March 1753, the Pēshwa, while ostensibly maintaining friendly relations with Muhammad Ali and the English, attempted an alliance with Dupleix who, however, viewed with suspicion his movements, and pressed him not to support the Nawāb but to help the French in settling the province of Arcot and realising the *chauth*, etc., of the Mahrattas.⁷ About the end of

2. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, Letter No. 77, ? dated October 1751.

3. *Ibid.*; also Letter No. 81, dated February 7, 1752—Rāṇoji Naik, Seringapatam, to Pēshwa.

4. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 81 *supra*.

5. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 84, dated September 18, 1752—Shāma Rao Yādava, Nārāyanpet, to Pēshwa.

6. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1752), pp. 103-104: Consultation dated December 30, 1752.

7. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, (l.c.), Letter Nos. 93, 94, 96 and 97, dated February 18, 22, March 3 and 8—Shāma Rao Yādava, Pondicherry, to Pēshwa.

March, Bālāji Rao succeeded in exacting rupees 25-30 lakhs from Mysore while rejecting her offer of a "caroat of rupees" for securing Trichinopoly to her.⁸ The Pēshwa was even expected to mount the ghāṭs and march on Trichinopoly, but he returned to Poona by way of Basavāpaṭṇa, in view apparently of the approaching monsoon.⁹ The truth was that he deferred his southern project and sought to bide his time. For the moment, he prevailed on the Mysoreans and the French (whose respective designs he knew well) to put an end to the troubles, and agree and conclude peace with the Nawāb.¹⁰ At the same time, he advised the English to continue their assistance to Muhammad Alī, "to preserve the Trichinopoly fort" for four months and "get a fresh *sanad*" from Salābat Jang in the name of the Nawāb for the forts of Arcot and Trichinopoly.¹¹ And he had had an eye on Trichinopoly itself as the base of his power in South India. "I shall," he said,¹² "build my power and settle all affairs there." In March-April 1754, Bālāji Rao was again in Mysore and great expectations had been held out of a much intended arrival of his at Trichinopoly.¹³ He, however, returned to Poona after effecting a compromise with the Mysoreans but refusing to agree to their measures about Trichinopoly.¹⁴ In January 1755,

8. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 74: *Consultation* dated May 9, 1753; *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 56, *Letter No. 97*, dated April 5, 1753—Kriṣṇāji-Pant to Saunders.

9. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter No. 100*, dated April 22, 1753—Shāma Rao Yādava, Vellore, to Pēshwa; *Count. Corres.*, l.c.; *Di. A. Pi.*, VIII. 282: *Notes* dated February 16, 1753.

10. *Count. Corres.*, p. 52: *Letter No. 93*, dated May 5, 1753—Bālāji Rao to Saunders; pp. 86-87: *Letter No. 138*, dated May 6, 1753—Kriṣṇāji-Pant to Saunders (enclosing Bālāji Rao's reply to his letter); and pp. 90-91: *Letter No. 146*, dated June 23, 1753—Bālāji Rao to Nawāb.

11. *Ibid.*, *Letter Nos. 138 and 146 supra*.

12. *Ibid.*, *Letter No. 138 supra*, *Vide also*, on this point, text of f.n. 24 and 25 in Ch. X below.

13. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1754), p. 102: *Consultation* dated April 25, 1754; p. 95: *Consultation* dated April 30, 1754.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 112 and 115: *Consultation* dated May 12 and 22, 1754.

the Pēshwa sent dresses of honour to the statesmen of Seringapatam through Banāji Mādhava Rao (Banāji-Pant) and Rāma Rao, renewing his claims for his alleged dues.¹⁵

Early in March, Salābat Jang with M. de Bussy, having crossed the Krishnā and levied exactions from the Nawābs of Cuddapah and Kurnool, marched on Mysore by way of Kunigal and Hāgalvādi, and encamped about five miles from Seringapatam, laying claim to the so called arrears of *Pēshkāsh* due to him (3 to 5 crores, as was variously estimated), and threatening the State with an invasion.¹⁶ At the same time, the Pēshwa's agents too, at the court of Seringapatam, continued to press his claims for *chauth* from Mysore.¹⁷ Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya was in serious straits. The Government was involved in debt and he had, besides, to provide for the expenses of the Mysore army below the ghāṭs (at Śrīrangam).¹⁸ While, therefore, an attempt was made to satisfy the Pēshwa by a

Invasion of
Seringapatam by the
Nizām and the
Maharattas, c. March-
June 1755.

15. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXII, *Letter* No. 159, dated January 15, 1755—Extract from the expenditure sheets of the Pēshwa when on tour. Among the personages mentioned in the record (to whom dresses of honour were sent), are: His Highness Jagadrāj (*i.e.*, Jagadēvarāj, the familiar Vijayanagar name by which the king of Mysore is referred to in the *Pēshwa Daftar*); Nandarāj (Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya), Prime Minister; Dēvarāj (Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya), Commander of the army; Vyankaṭapati (Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya), a minister; Virshet (Vīra Setṭi) [a merchant]; Chenavir Dēvaroo (Channavīra Dēvaru); Chenapaya (Channappaiya of *Bagila-Kandāchāra*), a minister; the Queen Mother of the king (the dowager queen); and the wife of the Commander.
16. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 10; *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 112, dated March 8, 1755—Banāji Mādhava Rao to Bābā Sāheb *alias* Mahadōba Purandhare; XXIX, *Letter* No. 1, ? March 1755—Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya to Dādaji-Paṇḍit Gōsāvi; *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1755), pp. 66, 70, 76, 78, 83: *Consultations* for April-May 1755; *Count. Corres.* (1755), p. 41, *Letter* No. 100, dated May 5, 1755—Nawāb to Saunders; see also and compare *Di. A. P.*, IX. 177-178, 238-239, 255, 259, 260, 265-266, 281, 292, 293-294, 297, 304: *Notes* for February, April-June 1755; also references *infra*.
17. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* Nos. 1 and 112 *supra*.
18. *Ibid.*

recourse to dilly-dallying,¹⁹ it was represented to the Nizām that the great losses the Mysoreans had sustained on the Trichinopoly enterprise prevented their meeting his exorbitant demands.²⁰ On March 8, Banāji Mādhava Rao, the Pēshwa's representative at Seringapatam, wrote²¹ to Bābā Sāheb, urging the immediate march of the Mahratta forces as the only means by which they could hope to realise their claims. In or about April, the Pēshwa, crossing the Tungabhadra, arrived with his horse beneath the walls of Seringapatam.²² Whereupon the authorities, as related in the preceding chapter, sent in an express message to Nanjarājaiya at Śrīrangam, desiring him to return to the capital; and Dēvarājaiya prepared to meet the combined forces of the Nizām and the Pēshwa.²³ Early in April, a fierce fight ensued, in which many perished on either side; Salābat Jang and Bussy, however, got the upper hand and seized Sōmavārpēt (a suburb of Seringapatam), finally investing Seringapatam itself.²⁴ Meanwhile Nanjarājaiya, having left Śrīrangam on the night of 8th April as already narrated, reached the fort of Nāmakal by the 19th.²⁵ During his stay there,

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Di. A. Pi.*, 281: *Notes* dated April 19, 1755.

21. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* No. 112 *supra*.

22. Kincaid and Parasnīs (o.c., III. 33-34) speak of the Mahratta expedition of 1754-1755, but in the light of the document from the *Pēshwa Daftar*, above referred to, the Pēshwa appears to have been before Seringapatam not earlier than April 1755. A military advice, dated April 26, 1755, refers to the arrival in Trichinopoly of the Tanjore Vakil from the army of the Nāna (Pēshwa Bālāji Rao) and Salābat Jang, encamped "near Syringapatam" (Seringapatam) (*Di. Cons. Bk.*, 1755, p. 76: Captain Caillaud to the Board). The *Di. A. Pi.* (p. 260) records, on April 12, 1755, an invasion of Mysore by "the Nana's horse and Salabat Jang." Obviously the Mahrattas had arrived in Seringapatam in or about April 1755. For details about the investing forces, see f.n. 23 *infra*.

23. According to Capt. Caillaud's advice, above referred to, M. Bussy commanded "500 French, and 4,000 sepoys." "The army consists, besides, of country troops, 60,000 horse and 300 Europeans in the Nana's service."

24. *Di. A. Pi.*, 260 *supra*; also 292, 293-294, and 297: *Notes* dated April 25-26, and May 8, 1755.

25. *Ibid.*, 281: *Notes* dated April 19, 1755.

he not only levied contributions (to the extent of 5-6 lakhs of *varahas*) from the local officials to meet the arrears of pay of his troops,²⁶ but also kept up communication with the court of Pondicherry. He is represented to have requested M. de Leyrit, the new French Governor, to write to de Bussy at Seringapatam about his alliance with the French and, through the latter's influence, to prevail upon Salābat Jang to collect only the usual *Pēshkāsh* from Mysore.²⁷ And it is added that though seemingly reluctant to interfere, M. de Leyrit, in view apparently of the prospects of Nanjarājaiya's dues to the French Government being speedily discharged, replied to him about his having advised M. Bussy to help him as far as possible.²⁸ This, in effect, suggests that the French were to moderate, if not wholly abate, their illegal demands on Mysore, whether it be their own alleged claims or those of the Nizām. In May, M. Bussy and Salābat Jang received letters from Pondicherry to the effect that "as the Mysore Raja is under the French flag, he must not be attacked or put to trouble and that only the usual *Peshkash* should be collected."²⁹ That was a literal fulfilment of the representation made, indeed, too literal to be taken too seriously. About this time the invading forces of the Nizām were, it is said, on the point of capturing the fort of Seringapatam.³⁰ Forthwith they ceased to attack and, it is added, demanded payment.³¹ After protracted negotiations the matter was, we are told, settled for fifty-six lakhs of

26. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 10; see also and compare *Di. A. Pi.*, 283: *Notes* dated April 21, 1755.

27. *Di. A. Pi.*, 287, 291-293: *Notes* dated April 24-25, 1755 (recording letters of Nanjarājaiya to Ananda Ranga Pillai); 294-295: *Notes* of the same date (containing a summary of the letters as furnished to the Governor).

28. *Ibid.*, 295-296: *Notes* dated April 26, 1755.

29. *Ibid.*, 319: *Notes* dated June 29, 1755.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*

rupees.³² Only one-third of this could, however, be paid in ready money, the amount being made up with considerable difficulty from the treasury balances and the jewels and valuable effects of the Seringapatam Palace and temple.³³ For the remaining two-thirds, bills on the security of local merchants (*sowcārs*) were issued, and their personal clerks (*gumāstas*) pledged as hostages

32. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 11. According to the *Di. Cons. Bk.* (p. 92: *Consultation* dated June 12, 1755), the total sum reported to have been collected by Salābat was 52 lakhs. Further, according to this source, M. Law, who was with Bussy in Seringapatam, "made a demand on Mysore, in the name of the French Company, for 7 lakhs, for the loss they [the French] sustained when he was taken along with Chundah [Chandā Sāhib]. The money was refused and at M. Bussy's request Law desisted from his demand . . . " A still later document, a *Madras Despatch* dated October 27, 1755, refers to the amount collected by Salābat Jang from Mysore, according to report, as 83 lakhs (*Mad. Desp.*, 1754-1765, p. 40). According to the *Di. A. Pi.* (p. 320: *Notes* dated June 29, 1755), the authorities at Seringapatam replied that even the usual *Peshkash* could not be paid, and the French decided to put a boy of the royal family on the throne, who was brought and installed with the usual ceremonies, in the name of the French. "But then," says the Diarist, "a letter was written to M. Bussy who explained everything to Salabat Jang and settled the matter for 52 lakhs, for the payment of which a long period was allowed," etc. A recent writer seems to attach too much importance to the statement in the *Diary* that a boy from the royal family was put on the throne by the French to gain their own objective. From this he goes to suggest that the French invaders "set up a rival Rāja to spite Dēva Rāja" (see C. S. Srinivasachari in *J. I. H.*, Vol. XIV, p. 253, f.n. 7). There is no reason why the French should have had recourse to this curious proceeding when Krishnarāja Wodeyar II, the reigning king of Mysore at the time, was himself only a young man of 27 years of age, whom they could have easily won over. Under the troubled political conditions of the times and the defective system of transmission of news prevailing in the country, the Diarist Ananda Ranga Pillai did not, as we have elsewhere shown, always write from first-hand knowledge. From a reading between the lines of his version of Mysore affairs of 1755, one is inclined to doubt if he is not recording this portion of it from hearsay. More so, as there is not even a whisper of the particulars mentioned by the Diarist, either in the *Fort St. George Records*, or in the contemporary local chronicle *Haidar-Nāmāh*, touching on the event. The latter source, on the other hand, would maintain how the Seringapatam authorities themselves settled the money claim for 56 lakhs, and strained every nerve to raise the amount, etc., as narrated above. The authority of this work seems preferable here.
33. *Ibid.* According to the *Di. Cons. Bk.* (l.c.), Salābat Jang collected "27 lakhs" in "ready money" and "bills on the merchants for the rest." Cf. *Di. A. Pi.* (l.c.), which merely speaks of a long period being allowed for the payment of the amount, etc.

(some of whom later died and some made good their escape before the realisation of the dues).³⁴ Having exacted thus much, Salābat Jang with M. Bussy retired to Hyderabad about the beginning of June.³⁵ The Mahrattas, however, retraced their steps, M. Bussy having, during an audience with the Pēshwa, brought home to him the utter uselessness of making further demands on Mysore.³⁶

Early in June, Nanjarājaiya moved on from Nāmakal, arriving at Haradanahalli on his way to Mysore.³⁷ By now Krishnarāja Wodeyar had attained his twenty-seventh year and had begun to take an active interest in, and view with concern, the affairs of the kingdom. Since 1752 Nanjarājaiya, his father-in-law, had spent over three crores of state treasure in futile attempts to capture Trichinopoly,³⁸ whereby he brought in steady opposition to his measures,³⁹ and had “earned nothing but dishonour for the kingdom,” while

Internal affairs,
1755-1759.

Strained relations
between the Dalavāis
and Krishnarāja.

34. *Ibid.*

35. From the *Di. Cons. Bk.* (pp. 83, 92) it would appear, Salābat Jang had collected his dues from, and left, Seringapatam between May 20 and June 12, 1755. See also and compare Wilks's account of the event (I. 384-386).

36. Kincaid and Parasnis, *o.c.*, III. 34. “Balaji,” on this occasion, “was deeply impressed by de Bussy's bearing, his studied courtesy, his unruffled temper, and above all, by his vast capacity for military and civil affairs” (*Ibid.*). For a note on M. Bussy, *vide* Appendix II—(7).

37. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 10-11.

38. *Di. A. Pi.*, IX. 370-371: *Notes* dated October 7, 1755.

39. Since July 1752, there was, it would appear, steady opposition in the court of Seringapatam to Nanjarājaiya's activities in the South. According to *Di. A. Pi.* (VIII. 134: *Notes* dated July 10, 1752), “The Dalavoy wishes to take Trichinopoly and rule it for himself. So the Raja wishes to check him, lest he should seize him as his predecessors seized the former Raja and took possession of the country. The Raja is therefore trying to strengthen himself and will then attack the Dalavoy.” Again, in August 1753, it was reported, Nanjarājaiya's conduct of the Trichinopoly affair was “censured at Seringapatam” and “they will send him no more money” (*Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 134: *Consultation* dated August 10, 1753). A *Madras Despatch*, dated November 10, 1754, already referred to (*vide* Ch. VIII, f.n. 93), speaks of Nanjarājaiya as fearing “for his

"all the countries dependent upon Mysore had been ruined" ⁴⁰ and the State reduced to great want after the exactions of Salābat Jang and M. Bussy. The management of the internal administration of the State too, since 1734, was by no means satisfactory, dominated as it had been by Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya and his favourites. Naturally the Daḷavāi brothers incurred the odium of their erstwhile nominal master and the dowager queen Dēvājamma (Doḍḍamma), who resolved first to seize and imprison Nanjarājaiya and appoint Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya as *Sarvādhikāri* in the former's place. ⁴¹ On receipt of this intelligence, Nanjarājaiya halted at Nanjangūḍ, where he collected a rabble (of 300 Europeans, mestices, Topasses and some infantry), ⁴² and proceeded to Seringapatam in August (*Yuva, Śrāvaṇa*). ⁴³ The brothers, now on their guard, determined to seize Venkaṭapataiya and the members of his party, and keep Krishnarāja under close custody in the Palace. ⁴⁴ Not satisfied with this, Nanjarājaiya, in October, plotted against the life of Krishnarāja, to secure his own position. ⁴⁵

In the words of the contemporary Diarist: ⁴⁶ "Nandi Raja [Nanjarājaiya] desired to seize the present Raja of Mysore, put him in prison and kill him, so that his

A silent Revolution:
Beginnings,
1755.

life, should he acknowledge his defeat by withdrawal (from Trichinopoly)." According to *Di. A. Pi.*, again, as we have seen (Ch. VIII, f.n. 112), Nanjarājaiya was on "ill terms" with his master (Krishnarāja Wodeyar II), already about March-April 1755. The opposition, although it hardly deterred Nanjarājaiya from the pursuit of his ambitious designs, became, however, more pronounced in June 1755, on his arrival at Haradanahalli.

40. *Di. A. Pi.*, cited in f.n. 38 *supra*.

41. *Ibid*; see also and compare *Annals*, I. 182-183.

42. *Ibid*, 369-370: *Notes* dated October 7, 1755.

43. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 11.

44. *Di. A. Pi.*, 370-371 *supra*.

45. *Ibid*, 376-377: *Notes* dated October 24, 1755 (recording news from Mysore); see also and compare *Ibid*, 394, 396: *Notes* dated November 20, and December 1, 1755; and *Ibid*, X. 181-182: *Notes* dated August 28, 1756.

46. *Ibid*; see also and compare *Ibid*; cf. *Wilks*, I. 395. The reference to the son of the king of Mysore by Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya's daughter, in the

son who was born last year [?] may be placed on the throne. Then Nandi Raja learnt that attempts were being made to seize and imprison him and appoint the chief Pandit Venkatapati Ayyan [Venkatapataiya] Pradhani [? Sarvādhikāri]. As the army was under his control, he expected to prevent this. As the Raja's wife is the daughter of Nandi Raja, the latter sent word to her that her husband should be put to death and her son placed on the throne. She replied that such a thing could never be done, for God would not suffer it, so that, if he formed such plans, he would be striving against God and suffer the consequences. At the same time she told her husband about her father's intentions and warned him to be on his guard. The Raja thereupon collected 4,000 faithful men, arming both them and himself. Nandi Raja also made ready, collecting 200 European deserters and marched to battle. But when Devaraja Udaiyar [Dēvarājaiya] (Nandi Raja's elder brother and the chief Dalavoy), who had been ailing, learnt this, thinking that the country was on the verge of destruction and all things would be ruined, if, in tenderness for his health, he did nothing till it was too late, he went to his younger brother, his son-in-law [?] and the Raja, pacifying them and putting a stop to the war. But Nandi Raja then seized Venkatapati Ayyan, the Pradhan, and his people who followed him, imprisoning them, plundering their houses and seizing about 6 lakhs of pagodas"

above passage, is to Nanjarāja Wodeyar, eldest son, and afterwards successor, of Krishnarāja II. The Diarist appears to have had no correct information as to the date of Nanjarāja's birth. Here he records as if the king's son was born in 1754, and in another place (*Ibid.*, X. 132 *supra*) in 1751. Since Nanjarāja Wodeyar is known from local accounts to have been a young man of eighteen years of age at the time of his accession in 1766, his date of birth naturally falls in 1748 and he must have been a boy of seven when the events narrated above took place. Again, for "his son-in-law and the Raja" in the same passage read "and his son-in-law the Raja". The son-in-law of Nanjarājaiya was, in effect, the son-in-law of his elder brother Dēvarājaiya also.

On the 1st of November (12th day in the dark half of *Āśvīja*), the Diarist continues : ⁴⁷

Securing the Palace and person of the king. "Guards were set on the Raja in his palace ; and the Dalavoy [*Dēvarājaiya*] summoned the old *Pradhani* Venkatapati Ayyan, his son and others, to his house and told them that though he and the Raja were as uncle and son-in-law, they and the Raja had resolved to kill each other but that he need not trouble himself about what would come to pass or take any part in it ; he reminded him that he had served as *Pradhani* under his younger brother, to whom [the former *Rāja*] at the time of his death had entrusted his welfare, so that he became one of his household, when he had not even *conjee* to drink and under such protection had become *Pradhani* of Mysore and the master of lakhs. Besides this, sometime after the former Raja's death, when he had been desired to retain the office of *Pradhani*, he had refused, but had still been suffered to enjoy his grants of land and other property, so that he should not have proved a sinner against God. Venkatapati Ayyan replied that that was all true, but that his master had sent for him and told him half a dozen times that as Nandi Raja wanted to put an end to him, he must be seized and kept in prison, that he was bound to do as he was desired, inasmuch as he had eaten the Raja's food, and that that was why he had acted thus. On hearing this Devaraja Udaiyar replied, ' You served not the Raja but my younger brother Nandi Raja who was *Sarvadhikari*. At the time of the [former *Rāja*'s] death, he entrusted you to me and I protected you. So you, as my man, should have told me what your master said when he consulted you, instead of acting as you did.' Thus Venkatapati Ayyan, the former *Pradhani*, and his wife were chained and imprisoned in Manvallidrug

47. *Ibid.*, 896-898 : Notes dated December 1, 1755 (recording the report of Venkatanārāṇappa, Mysore Vakil, on the occurrences at Seringapatam, the capital of Mysore).

[? Maḷavalli] and his son and son-in-law in another drug . . . His brother-in-law and his wife were imprisoned in Kapaldrug [Kabbā]-durg]. Thus all his people were imprisoned and their houses and property, gardens, inam villages, etc., were given to Nandi Raja. Three or four days later, people were allowed to go in and out of the Palace; but his master the Raja feared what might happen to him, and certain jemadars, officials, merchants and others concerned in this affair also feared, and the whole town was alarmed. Day and night men burnt with terror at the thought of being falsely accused, not knowing what might happen . . .”

In place of Venkaṭapataiya, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya appointed Channappaiya, head of the *Bāgila-Kandāchār* department, as *Pradhān*.⁴⁸ Early in January 1756,

Further develop-
ments, 1756.

disagreement arose between the Daḷavāi and Krishnarāja Wodeyar,⁴⁹ and the latter—now a virtual prisoner in the Palace—secretly communicated with Pēshwa Bālāji Rao, seeking the assistance of his troops.⁵⁰ Soon differences also arose between the Daḷavāi brothers themselves, particularly over the shortage of cash in the treasury and the removal of the king's advisers.⁵¹ In vain did Dēvarājaiya remonstrate with Nanjarājaiya over the course of action the latter intended to pursue.⁵² At length, on the 3rd of August, matters came to a head, when Krishnarāja Wodeyar, having decided to shake off the yoke of the Daḷavāis, induced Śābās Sāhib (Haidar's elder brother) to quit their service and entrusted Khaṇḍē Rao with 50,000 gold pieces to be given to Śābās and Haidar to enable them to collect troops and men “with whom to

48. *Annals*, I. 178.

49. *Di. A. Pi.*, X. 14: *Notes* dated January 29, 1756; also *Annals*, I. 182-183. The disagreement, according to the latter source, was due to the king's inquiry into the Daḷavāi's conduct of affairs of state since 1734.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 11; also *Annals*, I. 188.

52. *Annals*, l.c.; also *Wilks*, I. 395-397.

attack the fort, the next day."⁵³ "Knowing this," records the Diarist,⁵⁴ "Nandi Raja and the Dalavoy Devaraja Udaiyar ordered the fort gates to be closed and troops to be on the watch all night. Guns were mounted on the walls facing the Palace, and the infantry, Europeans and Topasses, who were hired at Trichinopoly, were posted on the walls. The other troops were posted all round the Palace. Thus they prepared to kill the Raja the next morning. But at once the Raja, the 300 members of the royal family, his priest, some Sudra nobles, his Dalavoy [?], wealthy kinsmen of his father's, a thousand in all, rallied forth with drawn swords and a battle ensued, in which 500 fell on either side. The Dalavoy Nandi Raja's troops retreated and the Raja withdrew to his Palace; Nandi Raja then fired all the guns mounted on the walls, slaying men, women, female servants and others, a hundred persons in all, and then Nandi Raja and Devaraja Udaiyar entered the Palace and ordered all the Raja's people who survived, to be seized and imprisoned. They also resolved to kill the Raja but Krishnaraja Udaiyar's [Krishnarāja I's] wife who had brought him up, clung to him and vowed that they should kill her first. After much talk, they decided to imprison the Raja, his son and his wife and the woman in the Palace [the dowager queen Dēvājamma] under a guard of Nandi Raja's people. When the Nana's [Pēshwa Bālāji Rao's] Vakil learnt of this, he went to Nandi Raja and said, 'Are you justified in taking up arms against the Raja? It is not well for you to do so. When Nana Sahib learns this, he will visit you heavily.' Nandi Raja then sent men to bring the Raja out of the fort, which they did accordingly. Immediately afterwards the Raja sent a letter to the Nana by four camel messengers, reporting

53. *Di. A. Pi.*, 181-184: *Notes* dated August 28, 1756 (recording the report of Krishnappa, Mysore Vakil, on the occurrences of 3rd August 1756).

54. *Ibid.*, 182-184 *supra*; cf. *Wilks*, I. 396; *Annals*, I. 183-184.

what had happened. The place has since been so closely guarded that men cannot pass to and fro."

Shortly after this occurrence, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, alarmed for his own safety, left Nanjarājaiya
 Nanjarājaiya
 supreme, 1756-1757. Seringapatam to Satyamangalam, accompanied by 1,000 horse and 3,000 foot and by Pradhān Channappaiya.⁵⁵ For the time being, Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya became the master of the situation, "devising means to kill the Raja of Mysore and set another on the throne."⁵⁶ Krishnarāja Wodeyar, at the same time, continued his appeals to the Pēshwa for the assistance of his troops,⁵⁷ "offering to pay as much as 60 lakhs of rupees."⁵⁸ He was, we learn,⁵⁹ even inclined to seek the help of the French at Pondicherry, "to overthrow Nandi Raja"; and it seemed well nigh possible for the French to obtain a diplomatic success by agreeing to bring Nanjarājaiya to subjection on condition of securing from Krishnarāja the former's dues to them or "some sum, such as he [Krishnarāja] has offered the Nana."⁶⁰ By March 1757 the misunderstanding between the Daḷavāi brothers and Krishnarāja Wodeyar had become so acute that there even prevailed a rumour that the former had killed the latter (*Mysore dorai*).⁶¹ In truth, Krishnarāja, all through the period, managed to maintain his position in the Palace with considerable difficulty, renewing his request to the Pēshwa to come in person,⁶² and offering, "if he seized and imprisoned

55. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; see also and compare *Annals*, I. 184, and *Wilks*, I. 397. Cf. the gossip version reported in *Sel. Pesh. Daft.* (Vol. XXVIII, Letter No. 170, dated February 12, 1757?—Tamāji Chando to Pēshwa), referring to the Daḷavāi's expulsion from the kingdom and his perfidious murder at the hands of his enemies!

56. *Di. A. Pi.*, 241-242: Notes dated October 31, 1756.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, 242 *supra*.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, 317: Notes dated March 5, 1757. Dodwell identifies the *Mysore dorai* with the French adventurer Monis in the Mysore service (see *Editorial note in Ibid.*). In the light of the context, however, the *dorai* actually refers to the king of Mysore. See also *Di. A. Pi.*, 359, for a similar reference.

62. *Ibid.*, 345: Notes dated April 9, 1757.

Devaraja Udaiyar, the *Dalavoy*, and Nandi Raja, the *Sarvadhikari*, or slew them, and restored him to the possession of the country or got the Trichinopoly country for him, to give him half the country and daily pay amounting to 15,000 rupees for the services of his army."⁶³ Throughout Nanjarājaiya too held his own, declaring that if the Pēshwa approached he would kill the Rāja (*dorai*) and even the Paṇḍit minister (Venkaṭapataiya, who had been removed to the fort of Seringapatam about April) and others, and then kill himself.⁶⁴

At last, in March-April 1757, Pēshwa Bālāji Rao (whose presence was badly needed for the protection of the Mahratta outposts in the Karnāṭak and who set out with about 40,000 horse), after having taken possession of the country as far as Sira and Kōlāla, appeared with Murāri Rao-Ghōrpaḍe (with whom the Pēshwa had concluded an agreement in 1756 for the collection of the *chauth* of the Karnāṭak) before the walls of Seringapatam.⁶⁵ In

Nanjarājaiya buys off the Pēshwa.

this extremity, Nanjarājaiya found it expedient to buy off the Pēshwa who, through the mediation of Visāji Krishṇa (Beeni Visāji-Pant) and Balavant Rao, settled

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*, 359: Notes dated April 19, 1757.

65. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, Letter Nos. 161 and 182; *Di. A. Pi.*, 345, 359 *supra*; *Count. Corres.* (1757), pp. 88, 93-94 and 145; Letter Nos. 195, 203 and 303, dated May 19, 24 and July 19, 1757; see also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 12. According to the last-mentioned source, the Pēshwa (Nāna) laid siege to the fort of Seringapatam at the head of 10,000 horse and an equal number of foot, accompanied by Raghunāth Rao, Viśvās Rao and Sadāśiva Rao Bhao. The event is dated in *Dhātu* (1756-1757). In the light of other sources, above referred to, we would not be far wrong in fixing it about the end of March or the beginning of April 1757. The *Di. A. Pi.* (X. 52, 85) and the *Sel. Pesh. Daft.* (Letter No. 207) mention also the movements of Bālāji Rao and Salābat Jang against Mysore during 1756 (March-May) and 1757 respectively. These appear to have been at best not more than incursions, variously reported. The Mahratta expedition to Seringapatam in March-April 1757 was, however, a well-planned one. *Kōlāla*, referred to in the text, is now the head-quarters of a *hobli* of that name in Tumkūr taluk (see *List of Villages*, 59). It is not to be confused with Kōlār as is the tendency among certain writers.

his demand for rupees thirty-two lakhs, six lakhs being paid in ready money, jewels and effects, the balance being agreed to be paid within a year and a half on the substantial security of *sowcārs* and the pledge of thirteen taluks (*viz.*, Nāgamangala, Kaḍaba, Bānāvar, Kikkēri, Channarāyapaṭṇa, Honnavalli, Kaḍūr, Turuvēkere, Bēlūr, Chiknāyakanahalli, Hāranahalli, Huliūr-durga and Kandikere).⁶⁶ About May, Bālāji Rao retired from Seringapatam, marching on to Sīra.⁶⁷ For ten days after his departure, the fort gate of Seringapatam had been closed and nobody allowed to go out by Nanjarājaiya's orders, and it was not known what was going on in the fort.⁶⁸

During 1757-1758, the strained relations between the Daḷavāis and Krishnarāja Wodeyar continued. Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya remained callous to the invitations of his brother to return to the capital;⁶⁹ the State was exposed to a severe financial crisis, remittances to the treasury from local parts having ceased on account of Mahratta incursions;⁷⁰ and, as we shall see in the sequel,⁷¹ Seringapatam was constantly threatened with a fresh invasion by the Mahrattas under Balavant Rao, Viśāji Kṛṣṇa and other sardārs in charge of outposts in different parts of the Karnāṭak for the collection of their alleged dues. The situation became critical about March 1758, when the Mysore military demanded disbursement of arrears of their pay and sat in *dharmā* before the residences of the king and Nanjarājaiya in the Seringapatam fort.⁷² The disturbance was, as we shall relate,⁷³ promptly quelled, and followed by a compromise

66. *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.; see also and compare *Count. Corres.*, *Letter* No. 208 *supra*; *Wilks*, I. 398; *Annals*, I. 189.

67. *Count. Corres.*, *Letter* Nos. 195, 203 and 303 *supra*.

68. *Di. A. P.*, 389; *Notes* dated May 21, 1757.

69. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* Nos. 193, 197 and 201, dated in September-October 1757.

70. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 13.

72. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 13-14.

71. *Vide* Ch. X below.

73. *Vide* Ch. X below.

between Nanjarājaiya and Dēvarājaiya at Mysore in Māy, and by a reconciliation between the brothers and Krishnarāja Wodeyar in a public

Reconciliation between the Dalavāis and Krishnarāja. *Durbār* at Seringapatam in June.⁷⁴ On June 23, 1758 (*Bahudhānya*,

Jyēṣṭha ba. 2), Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya,

who had been ailing from a swelling of his body up to the waist, died on his journey back to Satyamangalam.⁷⁵

About two months later, Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya was reinstated in office.⁷⁶ On October 24, Krishnarāja Wodeyar, in furtherance of the reconciliation, concluded

Execution of a with his father-in-law (Nanjarājaiya) *Bhāshā-patra*. a deed of promise (*Bhāshā-patra*),⁷⁷

by which it was agreed, among others,

that the civil government of Mysore was to remain in the hands of Krishnarāja and the members of the Mysore Royal Family; that Nanjarājaiya and the members of the Kaḷale House were to retain the command of the Mysore army and enlist horses and men in proportion to the receipts and expenditure of the State; that tracts (*sīme*) approved of by Nanjarājaiya and yielding 2,66,000 *Kaṇṭhīrāya varahas* (out of which 2,24,000 were to be utilised for the pay, etc., of 700 horse, 2,000 *bār*, 500 *Karnātakas*, 500 *janjālu*, 106 gunners, 10 Europeans, Coffres, *Kārēgārs* and others serving under him, and 42,000 for Nanjarājaiya's household expenses), were to be assigned to him and managed by him; that the increase of horses and men in his service was to be in proportion to the territorial acquisitions made by Mysore from time to

74. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 13; also *Annals*, I. 185.

75. *Ibid*; *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 220. According to Wilks (I. 407), Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya had developed "fatal symptoms of dropsy" even before his departure from Satyamangalam.

76. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 12; *Annals*, I. 184; see also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter Nos. 219, 220 and 227.

77. *E.C.*, IV (2) Nj. 267: *Bahudhānya*, *Āśvīja* ba. 8. See also the connected document *Nambuge-nirūpa* (order of assurance) [*E.C.*, IV (2) Nj. 268], referred to under *Grants*, etc., in Ch. XII below.

time ; that Nanjarājaiya was to erect a fort in Kaḷale and enjoy the government of it as before ; and that during times of disaffection in the country requiring public action, he was, on his own responsibility, to do the needful, either in person or through other fit persons. In pursuance of this agreement, ten taluks (*viz.*, Nāmakal, Paramatti, Śādamangalam, Beṭṭadapur, Arkalgūd, Koṇanūr, Anantagiri, Mysore, Kaṭṭe-maḷaḷavādi and Piriyaṭṭa) yielding 3,00,000 *varahas* were assigned as a *jaḥgīr* to Nanjarājaiya (in December) ;⁷⁸ and it was decided that he should be allowed to stay at Koṇanūr.⁷⁹ Nanjarājaiya, however, remained in Seringapatam⁸⁰ and dominated the administration till June 1759.

About this time, however, fresh differences arose between him and Krishnarāja Wodeyar (obviously caused by the latter's undue advancement of Haidar, as we shall see in the sequel) and in consequence, Nanjarājaiya retired to Mysore.⁸¹ His stay there soon became a source of suspicion and alarm to the officers at Seringapatam (namely, Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya, Lālā Dās, Khaṇḍē Rao and others), who alleged before Krishnarāja about his (Nanjarājaiya's) intentions of strengthening himself and eventually subverting the Government.⁸² About the end of June, Krishnarāja Wodeyar requisitioned the services of *Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr* to lay siege to Mysore.⁸³

78. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 15. According to this source (l.c.), Nanjarājaiya was finally allowed to retain in his service 1,000 horse and 3,000 foot (*bār*). See also and compare *Wilks*, I. 416 ; *Annals*, I. 188.

79. *Ibid* ; see also and compare *Sol. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XL, Letter No. 116, dated January 19, 1759 (referring incidentally to the "internal feud" in the State, attempted compromise, etc.) ; cf. *Wilks* and *Annals*, l.c.

80. *Ibid*, ff. 18 ; see also and compare *Wilks*, l.c. ; and *Annals*, I. 192.

81. *Ibid*.

82. *Ibid*, ff. 19 ; see also and compare *Wilks*, I. 416-417 ; *Annals*, I. 191-192.

83. *Ibid*.

CHAPTER X.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(contd.)

Ancestry, early career and rise of Haidar Ali—Down to 1746—Distinguishes himself during the siege of Devanahalli, 1746-1747—Takes part in the *Karnatak War of Succession*, 1750-1751—Accompanies Karachuri Nanjarajaiya to Trichinopoly, 1751-1752—His services during the Mysorean struggle for Trichinopoly, 1752-1755—As *Faujdar* of Dindigal, 1755-1757—His activities during the crisis of 1758—Mahratta affairs in the Karnatak, 1757-1758: A retrospect—Their pressure on Seringapatam, c. May 1757-July 1758—Their advance on Bangalore, February-August 1758—Their renewed pressure on Seringapatam, August-September 1758—Their siege of Bangalore, September 1758—Haidar's opportunity, August-September 1758—His march on Bangalore, September 1758—Progress of the siege, September-October 1758—Haidar raises the siege and engages the Mahrattas, October-December 1758—Rises in the estimation of his masters, December 1758—Is granted an assignment, April 1759; Returns to Seringapatam, August 1759.

WE have now to pause for a while and proceed to sketch the ancestry, early career and rise to power of that remarkable man, Haidar Ali, and the course of events which tended to make him a prominent figure in the politics of the kingdom of Mysore—and even of India—about this time (1759).¹

Ancestry, early career and rise of Haidar Ali.

1. Cf. *Wilks*, I. 261-270, 292, 297-330, 358-359, 370, 387-486. His account of the ancestry and early career of Haidar Ali is a disjointed one, while his treatment of Haidar's rise and usurpation is so thoroughly divorced from the main currents of the history of Mysore that this part of his narrative reads as if it formed the main thesis of his work rather than an episode—which it really is—in the historical evolution of Southern India (1750-1761). Wilks lived too close to the events he described to tear himself off successfully from the very deep impression they had left on him. The sources now available to us and referred to here and in Ch. XI below, however, enable us to treat this topic as an incident in the history of the kingdom of Mysore, a study in reaction of affairs—external and internal



Hajdar Ali (in his younger years).



Among the immediate ancestors of Haidar was one Asharāf Sāhib who came from Arabia and distinguished himself in the service of the Adil Shah of Bijāpur (16-17th cent.). In course of time, a descendant of his migrated to Kōlār, where he eventually died leaving three sons. Fāthullā, the eldest, engaged himself under the Nawāb of Sīra (c. 1720) as an officer of 500 horse and 650 men, became famous as Futte Nāyak and settled at Gummanahalli, near Sīra, which became his *jahgīr*; Gulām Haidar, the second, served under Mallarājaiya, officer of the Mysore Government at Maddagiri; and Gulām Alī, the third, under Abbās Kuḷi Khān, Killēdār of Doḍballāpur. Fāthullā was slain during an action against the chief of Chitaldrug (Hiriya-Medekere Nāyaka) near Gummanahalli (c. 1730), and he left behind him two sons, Muhammad Šābās Sāhib and Haidar Alī (b. 1717? 1722), and a debt of 9,000 *varahas* (three due to the Subādār of Sīra and six to the local merchants). In dire distress, Šābās and Haidar, having pledged the ladies and children of the family in satisfaction of the dues, proceeded to their uncle Gulām Alī at Doḍballāpur. The latter himself owed 1,000 *varahas* to the Killēdār and was unable to help his nephews. Whereupon Gulām Haidar, the other uncle, made a representation to Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya at Seringapatam, and with his permission succeeded in redeeming the entire debt through Mallarājaiya (c. 1735). Šābās and Haidar then went over to Maddagiri. After the death of Gulām Haidar, Šābās succeeded to his place and in due course both he and Haidar joined service in the Mysore army as peons under Katti Gōpālarāja Urs at Bangalore (c. 1738).²

2. *Haid. Nām.* (1784), ff. 1-2. See also and compare *Annals*. The account of Haidar's ancestry, early career, rise, etc., as given in this work (the *Annals*) (I. 176-182, 184-196), partakes of the character of a compilation from earlier authorities, including even the *Haid. Nām.* For a treatment of this topic from the Muslim point of view, see *Neshaumi Hydur* (*The History of*

Haidar first attracted the attention of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya in 1746, when the latter, on his way to Dēvanahalli, instituted a tournament in marksmanship at Bangalore, in which Haidar, alone among all the competitors, scored a brilliant success, to the wonder and approbation of Nanjarājaiya. During the siege of Dēvanahalli (1746-1747), Haidar distinguished himself as a commander of 50 horse and 200 peons, and with conspicuous ability and skill fought against heavy odds, extricating his elder brother Śābās from the clutches of his opponents in the fort.³

Haidar next took part in Nāsir Jang's campaign against Muzaffar Jang (April-December 1750) in the Arcot province, serving under Barakki Venkaṭa Rao, officer commanding the contingent from Mysore. During the confusion which followed the death by treachery of Nāsir (in December), Haidar, we learn, succeeded in capturing fifteen camel loads of *Akbar Mohars* from the latter's camp, and returned to Seringapatam early in 1751. Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya attempted to confiscate the fortune Haidar had thus amassed. Nanjarājaiya, however, managed to satisfy him and the property became the nucleus of Haidar's power.⁴

Haidar now settled himself with his family at Dēvanahalli (1751). During the contest between Muhammad Ali and Chandā Sāhib for the Nawābship of Arcot and

Accompanies Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya to Trichinopoly, 1751-1752.

Hydūr Naik) by Husain Ali Khān Kirmānī, translated by Col. W. Miles (Obs. I-VII, pp. 1-95). This work is later than the *Haid. Nam.*, being written during c. 1798-1802. It suffers, however, from a loose sequence of events and is a curious medley of fact and fiction, and fulsome eulogy. The colourless, and chronologically accurate, account of the earliest chronicle *Haid. Nam.*, supplemented by other contemporary sources of information, is preferred here. Haidar's place of birth is not known for certain. It was either Būdikōṭe where his father lived or Kōlār, the residence of his grandfather.

3. *Ibid.*, ff. 2-3.

4. *Ibid.*, ff. 4-5, 7.

Trichinopoly (1751-1752), he accompanied Nanjarājaiya to Trichinopoly and was of considerable assistance to him in furnishing him with supplies in men and money, in recognition of which Nanjarājaiya conferred upon him the title of *Bahadūr* and permitted him to raise fresh troops for future use. Haidar soon made himself master of 2,000 horse, 4,000 armed peons and 4,000 *bār*, which he levied out of his recent acquisition. On the fall of Chandā Sāhib (June 1752), he purchased from the latter's army a number of matchlocks (at Rs. 3 to 4 each) for his men, and rendered signal service in interrupting provisions to the Trichinopoly Fort.⁵

During the Mysorean struggle for Trichinopoly (1752-1755), Haidar made a name for himself as a loyal servant of Nanjarājaiya. In June 1752, as we have seen, he gave a timely warning to Nanjarājaiya against Muhammad Alī's treachery, and in July, he even suggested to him the capture of the Nawāb. In January 1753, he, with Hari Singh, his military rival, led the Mysore horse and charged the enemy at Śrīrangam, terminating the skirmish by the seizure of some firelocks. Again, in April 1755, he tactfully put down a rising of the Mysore troops at Śrīrangam, promising to satisfy them with half their dues within three days. So powerful indeed was the influence of his personality over the military, that they soon recognised him as their leader, went over to him and prepared to march back to Seringapatam as if nothing had happened.⁶

In June 1755, Nanjarājaiya, on his way to Mysore, dismissed some of his forces and placed the rest under Haidar (now *Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr*),⁷ appointing him *Faujdar* of Dinḍigal and assigning to him places below the ghāṭs (*viz.*, Satyamangalam, Ērōḍe and Śankhagiri)

His services during the Mysorean struggle for Trichinopoly, 1752-1755.

As *Faujdar* of Dinḍigal, 1755-1757.

5. *Ibid.*, ff. 7.

6. *Ibid.*, ff. 6-10.

7. *Ibid.*, ff. 11.

yielding 3,00,000 *Gōpāli varahas*.⁸ During 1755-1757, Haidar was active in Diṇḍigal, subduing Ammi Nāyaka, Appi Nāyaka and other Pālegārs of Palani (Palni), Virūpākshi and Miḷlemirangi, winning the goodwill of the local populace by presents and benevolences (*nazarāṇe*), accumulating funds to the extent of rupees two lakhs, securing orders for his measures from Vakil Khanḍē Rao at Seringapatam, and equipping himself with resources in men and materials (such as, new matchlocks prepared by *Kārēgārs*, specially requisitioned from Trichinopoly).⁹ About the middle of 1757, he despatched a detachment of 2,000 horse and 4,000 *bār* under Saiyid Mokhdum (his brother-in-law) and Barakki Venkaṭa Rao to Malabar, where differences had arisen between the local chiefs. Haidar's troops raided the Calicut-Cochin province, levying contributions from the rulers of Pālghaṭ and Tellicherry and settling the tribute (*pagadī*) due from the Nairs of Calicut at rupees twelve lakhs. The Nairs, however, secretly communicated with Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya—now at Satyamangalam—promising to pay the amount to him, provided he would recall Haidar's contingent from Malabar. Haidar too, in turn, wrote to Dēvarājaiya about the heavy expenses incurred by him on his army. Whereupon Dēvarājaiya executed a draft for rupees three lakhs on one Vādēbāgila Ranganna, payable to Haidar. Haidar then recalled his troops and Dēvarājaiya despatched Jamādār Hari Singh at the head of 500 horse to Calicut to demand the stipulated amount of tribute.¹⁰ So strong was the position of Haidar in Diṇḍigal that by the end

8. *Ibid.* In this connection, a military advice, it is interesting to note, refers to "Haider Naique" as "marching down this way [*i.e.*, south of Mysore] with 6,000 men and 8 lakhs of rupees . . ." [*Di. Cons. Bk.*, (1755), p. 117, July 17, 1755: Captain Caillaud to the Board]. The *Di. A. P.* (XI. 9: *Notes* dated July 6, 1757) speaks of Haidar as having been "sent as Sardar [to the south, *i.e.*, Diṇḍigal] with 5,000 horse, 6,000 or 7,000 sepoys and 25,000 or 30,000 men," etc.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, ff. 11-12,

of 1757 he was known to have been engaged in a design to take possession of Madura and Tinnevely countries in co-operation with the French.¹¹

Meanwhile Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya was utilising for his personal use the revenues from Satyamangalam, due to Haidar. About the beginning of January 1758, Haidar paid a visit to Seringapatam, to set matters right. He inspected the spot from where the Mahrattas had delivered their attack on the fort in April 1757, expressing apparent regret at his not being sent for on that occasion.¹² During January, Haidar led an attack against Sīra (which was in the possession of the Mahrattas since May 1757) jointly with Basālat Jang, plundering the country round and impressing the Mahrattas, for the first time, as a power to reckon with.¹³ By February Haidar retraced his steps to Diṇḍigal, visiting Dēvarājaiya at Satyamangalam and arranging with him through Khaṇḍē Rao for the prompt remittance of the dues from that place to himself.¹⁴ About March, the Mysore army at Seringapatam, as related in the preceding chapter, became mutinous on account of arrears of their pay, and Haidar was desired by Nanjarājaiya to proceed forthwith to the capital.¹⁵ Haidar, on his way thither, insisted upon Dēvarājaiya to return to Seringapatam but the latter refused to comply. Whereupon Haidar fired shots at the fort of Satyamangalam, much to the consternation of the local officials. Dēvarājaiya then left for the capital, halting at Mysore (in April).¹⁶ By April

His activities during the crisis of 1758.

11. *Di. A. Pi.*, 66 : *Notes* dated October 13, 1757 ; *Count. Corres.* (1757), p. 175 : *Letter No.* 369, dated September 8, 1757 ; also *Press List* (1755-1759), pp. 663, 671, 676, 678 : *Letter Nos.* 4425, 4500, 4540 and 4558 (December-January 1757-1758).

12. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 12-13.

13. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter No.* 275, dated January 13, 1758—Visāji Bābū Rao, Gooty, to Bābū Sāheb.

14. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 13.

15. *Ibid.*, ff. 13-14.

16. *Ibid.*, ff. 13 ; see also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter No.* 219, dated April 29, 1758—Banāji Mādhava Rao to Peshwa.

1758, Haidar was in Seringapatam where the situation had become critical. The disaffected military were sitting in *dharna* before the residences of the king and Nanjarājaiya, obstructing the passage of water thereto. At the same time Haidar made it a point of paying a visit to the *Kartar* (Krishnarāja Wodeyar) and Nanjarājaiya once in three or four days. The situation was, however, by no means improved. At length, during one such visit, both the *Kartar* and Nanjarājaiya were driven to the necessity of prevailing upon Haidar to endeavour to terminate the trouble to the utmost of his ability. At first Haidar affected to be reluctant to act, representing in all humility that during the crisis it was but expedient for his masters to exert themselves, and that if he, a servant of theirs, acted up to their orders, he would, far from winning their esteem and approbation, eventually incur their displeasure besides public obloquy. Haidar was told in reply that he might not worry himself about the consequences, since he would only be proceeding as a delegate of his masters who looked upon him as their virtual son. Haidar, however, made up his mind to handle the situation only after a deed (*Karar-nāme*) was drawn up by them (*i.e.*, his masters) investing him with absolute powers to punish and control anybody in the kingdom except the *Kartar*, Nanjarājaiya and the members of their family.¹⁷ Then Haidar got Vakīl

17. *Ibid.*, 13-14. *Kartar* : from *Karta*, lit. doer, maker, creator, master, king, agent, etc. Cf. *Karta* of a joint Hindu family, where *Karta* signifies manager, one who is legally the head of a family. The word is literally used in the Ms. of *Haid. Nām.* to denote the ruling sovereign Krishnarāja Wodeyar II. In reality, however, it is reminiscent of the earlier position of the rulers of Mysore from Rāja Wodeyar onwards as the agent to or representative of the Vijayanagar Empire in the southern Vice-royalty of Seringapatam (*Dakshina-simhāsana-Śrīrangapaṭṭanake Kartarāda*) [see Vol. I, pp. 64 (n. 114), 232-233]. Evidently, about the time we are writing of, this derivative meaning seems to have fallen into desuetude in favour of the general conception of master or king implied by the word. Haidar himself, as we shall see in the next chapter, was,

Khaṇḍē Rao appointed as his chief executive officer (*sarvādhikāra*) and began to hold daily office in the *Kartar's* pavilion (*Kartara dēvaḍi*) in the Palace, exercising his authority with a judicious combination of rigour and moderation, exacting presents and benevolences from the populace, amassing large sums of money and systematically quelling the rising of the military by paying off their arrears, by dismissing 4,000 cavalry and plundering, and enlisting in his own service, some of them, who remained unwieldy. At the same time he strengthened his position by posting guards at the gate of Seringapatam, and by removing his troops from the fort and stationing them on the elevated ground of Kaḍatanāḷu and Kennāḷu near by.¹⁸ In May-June, Haider with Khaṇḍē Rao composed the differences between Nanjarājaiya and Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya at Mysore; effected a reconciliation between the two brothers and the *Kartar* in a public Durbār at Seringapatam; and finally encamped with his troops near the *Mahānavami maṇṭapam* at the junction of both the banks of the Cauvery.¹⁹ About July, Haider despatched Sayid Mokhdum with 500 horse and 2,000 *bār* against his rival Hari Singh, who had failed to collect the tribute from the Nāirs of Calicut and encamped near Avanāsi. The detachment succeeded in plundering Hari Singh's forces, putting him to death and capturing 300 of his horse, 1,000 matchlocks, 3 elephants and treasure, out of which Haider made over to the Seringapatam

after 1761, considered to derive his authority from king Krishṇarāja, as is evident from the title *Kārya-Karta* ascribed to him. Though he appears to have assumed virtual independence in the territories directly administered by him, he was, in his own view, but an agent's agent. It may be added that the word *Kārya-Karta* was the designation of the day of an agent who carried out the duties vested in him by his master. See, for instance, f.n. 75 below. Even much earlier, during 1734-1758, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya also occupied a similar position. See, for instance, *M. A. R.*, 1935, p. 100, No. 28 (1751), l. 9, where he is referred to as an agent for the affairs of king Krishṇarāja (*Kārya Kartuvāda*).

18. *Ibid.*, ff. 14-15.

19. *Ibid.*, ff. 13.

Government 15 horses, 3 matchlocks and one elephant.²⁰ In July, Haidar marched on from Mysore, passing through Karūr, Nerūr and Tottiyam, with 2,000 horse, on his way to join the French (now under M. Count de Lally, 1758-1761) in the design on Madura and Tinnevely.²¹ About the middle of August, however, Haidar was again back in Mysore, in time to watch the situation caused by the movements of the Mahrattas in the Karnāṭak and particularly by their pressure on Seringapatam.²²

Ever since the invasion of Seringapatam by Pēshwa Bālāji Rao in March-April 1757, it had become his definite ambition to dominate the whole of the Karnāṭak-Bālaghāt and Pāyanghāt as far as Rāmēśvaram, in furtherance of the Mahratta ideal of a Hindu Empire (*Hindu-Pād-Pādshāhi*). In working out this objective, Bālāji Rao, on May 11, concluded with Murāri Rao-Ghōrpaḍe a second agreement, specifying the conditions under which the *chauth* of the Karnāṭak (from places like Bednūr, Harihar, Basavāpaṭṇa, Kōlār, Doḍballāpur and Chikballāpur) was to be collected.²³ On the 19th, the Pēshwa expressed his strong disapproval of the policy of the English Government at Madras (under George Pigot),²⁴ who, since 1755, were attempting to negotiate for the surrender of Trichinopoly to Mysore by way of recovering their advances to Muhammad Alī (whose financial position was by no means improved since the truce of 1754-1755).²⁵ Evidently the Pēshwa, as

20. *Ibid.*, ff. 15.

21. *Di. A. P.*, 234: Notes dated July 18, 1758.

22. See *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 227 (dated August 24, 1758), cited below.

23. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 185, dated May 11, 1757.

24. *Count. Corres.*, p. 88: Letter No. 195, dated May 19, 1757—Bālāji Rao to his Vakīl. The Pēshwa wrote, "I hear that the English are willing to give the fort of Trichinopoly to the Mayasorians on receiving a sum of money. As the English are merchants, it is not in their power to sell it nor is it proper for them to do this business . . ."

25. *Ibid.*; see also Appendix II—(8).

indicated in the last chapter, had an eye on Trichinopoly as the base of his power in South India. About the 24th, Bālāji Rao, on his way from Seringapatam, took possession of Sīra from its Killēdār "partly by contrivance and partly by threats," and placed it under Balavant Rao at the head of 15,000 horse.²⁶ On the approach of the rainy season, the Pēshwa, alarmed by the news of hostilities committed by the Pāṭhāns at Delhi, returned to Poona, instructing Balavant Rao to settle Sīra and take notice of Arcot and other places, and leaving under him Visāji Kṛishṇa, Mukund Rao Śrīpat, Amrit Rao, Ragho Bābaji and other Sardārs in charge of the Mahratta outposts in different parts of the Karnāṭak for the levying of contributions and collection of arrears of *chauth* therefrom.²⁷ The Pēshwa's acquisition of Sīra was, however, soon resented by the Nawābs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanūr, the Mysoreans and the local Pāḷegārs of Chitaldrug and other places, who, in July, incited by Muhammad Ali and the English, not only appealed to Murāri Rao but also proposed their readiness to join him in an attempt to curb the "strong power" of the Pēshwa.²⁸ During 1757-1758 there was no peace in the Karnāṭak which was constantly devastated by Mahratta and Mughal incursions and torn asunder by internal dissensions.²⁹

Since Bālāji Rao's departure from Seringapatam (c. May 1757), Banāji Mādhava Rao, his representative, was actively pressing the authorities for the payment of arrears of *chauth* due to the Pēshwa.³⁰

Their pressure on
Seringapatam, c.
May 1757-July 1758.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94, 145 : *Letter* Nos. 203 and 303, dated May 24 and July 19, 1757.

27. *Ibid.*, *Letter* Nos. 195 and 203 *supra*; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, cited *infra*.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 145-146, 148-149, 163 : *Letter* Nos. 290, 303, 307, 337 (July-August 1757).

29. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* Nos. 198, 197, 200, 201, 207, 210, 214, 275; also Vol. XL, *Letter* No. 107, etc.

30. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 197, dated October 10, 1757?—Banāji Mādhava Rao, Seringapatam, to Balavant Rao. The reference to the Mahratta claims

In September-October (1757), the promised period of the chief of Seringapatam expired and Nanjarājaiya began to put off the issue, his disagreement with Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya contributing no less to that end.³¹ Balavant Rao, from Sira, promptly answered by taking stations and trying to overawe Nanjarājaiya.³² About the end of December, the latter attempted to save himself by entering into an agreement with Mukund Rao Śrīpat (Balavant's lieutenant), and by making fresh promises and assurances, jointly with the *Kartar*.³³ Nevertheless, the dues remained uncleared and in January 1758, the Mahrattas advanced on all sides, gradually establishing new pickets and subduing the land.³⁴ Bangalore soon became their objective, from where, in February, they decided to give a strong warning to the authorities in Seringapatam to raise as much money as possible in payment of the arrears of 1757 and *chauth* for 1758, and if there was no settlement, "to capture 3-4 stations like Bangalore and preclude him [Nanjarājaiya] from any control this side of the Cauvery except perhaps only 2-4 hill-forts."³⁵ By April, Balavant Rao had taken 13-14 places round about Bangalore and was on the

to *chauth* or tribute from Mysore, frequently reflected in the letters of the *Pēshwa Daftar*, is in full accord with the current political conceptions of the time explained in Chapter IV, f.n. 19, and cannot be taken to be a literal claim enforced by a conqueror on the conquered. For there is no evidence of Mysore having been subdued by any of the country powers, or of her having entered into any political obligation with them, during the period, while the Mysoreans themselves were trying to assert their supremacy over the South as against those powers, and claiming such "tribute" from certain of their neighbours.

31. *Ibid*, Letter No. 193, dated September 6, 1757—Visāji Krishṇa to Nānā Sāheb (Pēshwa Bālāji Rao) and Bhao Sāheb; also Nos. 197 and 201, cited *supra* and *infra*.

32. *Ibid*, Letter No. 201, dated October 28, 1757—Pēshwa to Balavant Rao.

33. *Ibid*, Vol. XL, Letter No. 104, dated January 4, 1758—Mukund Śrīpat to Bābā Sāheb.

34. *Ibid*, Vol. XXVIII, Letter No. 210, dated January 21, 1758—Visāji Krishṇa to Nānā Sāheb and Bhao Sāheb.

35. *Ibid*, Letter No. 214, dated February 8, 1758—Visāji Krishṇa to Pēshwa.

point of entering the territory of Seringapatam,³⁶ when the authorities there just attempted to move about and raise the required amount by appealing to Muraḷi Dās and other bankers to make up 4-5 lakhs each.³⁷ The ways of Seringapatam, however, became extremely dilatory.³⁸ In April, Banāji Mādhava Rao, in obedience to the orders of the Pēshwa, left the place to join Balavant Rao,³⁹ passing by way of Mēlkōṭe and Nāga-mangala and taking Dēvanahallī.⁴⁰ At the end of April, Balavant Rao was in haste to go back to the home country.⁴¹ Early in May, Ragho Bābaji, from Huli-yūrdurg, sent clerks to Seringapatam to sound the situation,⁴² though neither the news of the arrival of the Pēshwa in the Karnāṭak nor even of the capture of Dēvanahallī would open the eyes of its inhabitants.⁴³ At length, in July, Gōpāl Rao Gōvind (Gopāl Hari of Mirāj) and Malhār Rao Bhikāji (Malhār Rao Rāste), who set out from the Deccan at the head of 40,000 horse and foot to collect *chauth* in the Seringapatam and Arcot countries,⁴⁴ despatched their agents, Banāji-Pant (Banāji Mādhava Rao, sent for the third time since 1755) and Bhawānji Naik, to Seringapatam,⁴⁵ with instructions to demand the arrears and the biennial tribute for 1757-1758 and 1758-1759 and warn the people of the State to pay off the dues of the Pēshwa as otherwise ruin and grief would await them.⁴⁶

36. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 218, dated April 4, 1758—Mukund Śrīpat, Bēgūr, to Bābā Sāheb.

37. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 237, dated April 8, 1758—Dāji Nārāyaṇ Sāsawād to Pēshwa.

38. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 219, dated April 29, 1758—Banāji Mādhava Rao, Dēvanahallī, to Pēshwa.

39. *Ibid.*; see also Letter No. 249, dated April 1758.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.* By August 1758, Balavant Rao had left the Karnāṭak (see Letter No. 248, cited below).

42. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 220, dated May 3, 1758—Ragho Bābaji, Huli-yūrdurg to Balavant Rao.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 16.

45. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter Nos. 222 and 223, dated July 19 and August 2, 1758—Gōpāl Rao Gōvind and Malhār Rao Bhikāji to Banāji-Pant.

46. *Ibid.*

Meanwhile, elsewhere affairs wore a different appearance. Since February 1758, Mukund Rao Śrīpat was with his 500 horse engaged in raiding the Bangalore Pettah, occupying and devastating the country round and intercepting the passage of provisions to the fort (of Bangalore).⁴⁷ In April-May, Barakki Venkaṭa Rao at Seringapatam prepared to proceed to Bangalore, accompanied by Khupsa [? Yākoob Sāhib] and Amar Singh.⁴⁸ Venkaṭa Rao having probably fallen ill, his son Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao (the "Śrīnivāsa Venkaṭeś Bangalorekar" of the letters of the *Pēshwa Daftar*) was desired by the *Kartar* and Nanjarājaiya to take the command.⁴⁹ In June, Śrīnivāsa Rao proceeded towards Bangalore. He lay in wait with 40 select followers on the route between Bangalore and Hoskōṭe, and at dawn made a surprise attack on Mukund Rao—then on his return journey from Bangalore—pursuing him as far as Hoskōṭe, wounding his men and capturing a hundred of his horse.⁵⁰ During June-July, Śrīnivāsa Rao, having gathered 200 horse, began systematically to raid and harass Hoskōṭe and other Mahratta outposts, reducing Mukund Rao to severe straits and compelling him to report frequently the state of affairs to Gōpāl Rao and Malhār Rao, now on their way to Bangalore.⁵¹ About the end of July, Mukund Rao managed to raise fresh recruits and attempted with considerable difficulty to hold his own against Śrīnivāsa Rao,⁵² who, with reinforcements from Seringapatam, planned to take Dēvanahallī from the Mahrattas.⁵³ About five miles from Bangalore (?), a

47. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 15-16.

48. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter Nos. 218 and 220 (dated April 4 and May 3, 1758) *supra*. According to No. 218, Venkaṭa Rao had collected "2,000 horsemen, 1,000 *gardies*, 200 Europeans and 5-7 guns."

49. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 16.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*; see also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 248, dated August 1758—Mukund Rao Śrīpat to Mahīpat Rao Dāda.

52. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 248 *supra*.

53. *Ibid.*

skirmish took place, in which there were casualties on both sides and Mukund Rao won the day.⁵⁴ Early in August, the latter made a sally on the Pettah of Bangalore, pursuing Śrīnivāsa Rao to the very walls of the fort "under the range of its guns."⁵⁵ In the action which followed, Mukund Rao was again victorious, though there were losses on either side, among those killed being a Commander of Mysore horse.⁵⁶ Śrīnivāsa Rao was forced to remain in Bangalore, blockaded by the Mahratta troops.⁵⁷

About the middle of August, Gōpāl Rao and Malhār Rao, having settled the contribution with the chief of Chitaldrug and taken possession of Kandikere, Chiknāyakanahalli, Honnavalli and Turuvēkere, arrived in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, from where they continued, through their agents at Seringapatam, to bring pressure to bear upon the authorities there for the speedy settlement of the Pēshwa's dues.⁵⁸ Already at the end of July, Banāji-Pant had written to Gōpāl Rao about "nine lakhs only of the arrears and the tribute in cash [for 1758] being guaranteed" by the Rāja of Seringapatam.⁵⁹ On August 18, the Mahratta leaders communicated to Banāji the Pēshwa's peremptory orders "never to leave the territory [of Seringapatam] in a lakh degrees, unless and until the whole of the past arrears and a considerable amount as the tribute for these years is paid in cash; if satisfactory decision is not made, to establish stations over Bangalore and the rest of the territory on this side of the Cauvery; and if this does not bring them [the authorities at Seringapatam]

54. *Ibid.* The text refers to *Bagetala*, which is unidentifiable. Probably it is a scribal slip for *Bangalore* (?), according to the context.

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, Letter Nos. 224 and 225 (dated August 18 and 19, 1758) *infra*; see also Nos. 222, 228 and 248 (dated July-August 1758) *supra*.

59. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 223 *supra*.

round to an amicable settlement, to go beyond the Cauvery after the water subsides, render the province barren and force them to pay the demanded tribute or transfer the possession of the kingdom itself in a treaty."⁶⁰ At the same time, by way of moderating the Pēshwa's demand, they repeatedly instructed Banāji to agree to the Rāja's proposals for the payment of the arrears, and, as for the biennial contributions, to urge upon him, in all possible ways, to sue for peace by issuing three *hundis* payable at three different periods (that might be fixed) or one consolidated *hundi* for the entire dues, whichever convenient.⁶¹ There seemed, however, no possibility of definite action in the court of Seringapatam and the negotiations lingered on.⁶² On the 24th, Banāji was desired by his superiors to speed up the negotiations.⁶³ And on the 31st, they sent him positive instructions to leave the capital.⁶⁴ Meantime, the authorities at Seringapatam sought to bide their time by fresh promises and talks of guarantee.⁶⁵ Early in September, Banāji was again instructed to hasten to settle with the Rāja "all payments in cash and in *hundis*."⁶⁶ Banāji exerted his utmost to push through the negotiations,⁶⁷ and could only prevail upon the Rāja "to try to hand over thirty lakhs worth of valuables to the bankers who were to be requested to stand guarantee for forty lakhs [to the Mahrattas]."⁶⁸ The actual collections amounted to not more than "twenty or barely twenty-five lakhs" and the valuables consisted mostly of diamonds.⁶⁹ At first the authorities proposed to give the diamonds to the bankers who were to guarantee the

60. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 224, dated August 18, 1758?—Gōpāl Rao Gōvind and Malhār Rao Bhikāji to Banāji-Pant.

61. *Ibid.*; also Letter Nos. 225 and 226, dated August 19 and 20, 1758—*Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 227, dated August 24, 1758—*Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 228, dated August 31, 1758—*Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 229, dated September 4, 1758—*Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 233, dated September 10, 1758—*Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*

money, but later they found it expedient to hand them directly to the Mahrattas.⁷⁰ On the 13th, therefore, Banāji was directed to insist upon payment on the valuation of diamonds on the spot by four people on the Mahratta side or upon their being sent to Poona for the purpose and making the bankers of Seringapatam either pay according to the local calculation or guarantee full payment in rupees at Poona.⁷¹ The negotiations, however, fell through, as the Rāja could not get sureties of the bankers (who would not guarantee payment in the absence of *manōti* or customary advances) for the amount proposed.⁷² In the meanwhile, on the 20th, Gōpāl Rao and his colleague had received fresh instructions from Poona to the following effect:⁷³ "Pattan must pay in the course of one year fifty lakhs in all, including 30-32 lakhs as arrears and twenty more as the tribute for the current year. When this much is guaranteed, the captured stations should be given up. And if he [chief of Seringapatam] consents to pay 30 lakhs for every year to come, his territory should be guaranteed against any further molestations. Or, if he is not agreeable to this wholesale payment, he should not demand back the 15 lakhs worth of territory now in the Government possession and should supplement it by paying 15 lakhs as an additional payment by way of tribute. If he does not agree even to the last proposal, as much territory as possible should be conquered." About the same time Banāji-Pant and Bhawānji Naik, in obedience to their masters' orders, left the court of Seringapatam, arriving at Bangalore on the 22nd.⁷⁴ They came with fresh proposals from the Rāja, which amounted to "15 lakhs in cash, 15 lakhs worth of diamonds, 2 lakhs with Ranga

70. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 231, dated September 13, 1758—*Ibid.*

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*, Letter Nos. 232 and 235, dated September 28, 1758—Gōpāl Rao Gōvind and Malhār Rao Bhikāji to Pēshwa.

73. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 232 *supra*.

74. *Ibid.*, Letter Nos. 232 and 235 *supra*.

Sheti [Ranga Setṭi] and a guarantee of 2 lakhs of a moneyed man named Neel Chikaya and 2 lakhs in the form of orders of payment to be drawn on the revenues of the province."⁷⁵ But it was too late.

Alongside of these negotiations, the Mysoreans and the Mahrattas were gradually drifting into war. About the 20th of August, the Mysore troops captured nearly 250 Mahratta horse "engaged in looking out for provisions."⁷⁶ By the 24th, Gōpāl Rao and Malhār Rao in turn took Channapaṭṇa by cannonade, seizing 4,000 cattle and driving all the farmers to Seringapatam ("to expedite payment of tribute").⁷⁷ On the 26th, they went up to Maddūr (which, however, could not be taken owing to the river there being now unfordable) and from thence marched on in the direction of Bangalore.⁷⁸ On the 18th of September, they invested and took possession of Kānkānhalli⁷⁹ and this was followed by the acquisition of Apramēya-durga.⁸⁰ At last, on the 19th, they directed their batteries against Bangalore, from where they intended eventually to advance on Seringapatam.⁸¹

By now the position of Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao at Bangalore had become critical in the extreme. Encircled as he was by the Mahrattas who had encamped as far as Channapaṭṇa and Maddūr, he experienced considerable difficulty in getting supplies of provisions to the fort, and his men were famishing.⁸² About the end of August, he wrote letters to the *Kartar*, Nanjarājaiya and Venkaṭa

75. *Ibid*, Letter No. 235 *supra*. "Neel Chikaya," mentioned in this record, is perhaps identical with *Nirli Chikkaiya* referred to as an agent for the affairs (*kāryakke kartarāda*) of Chikke Urs of Kaḷale, in *E.C.*, III (1) Nj. 94 (1766).

76. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 227 *supra*.

77. *Ibid*.

79. *Ibid*, Letter No. 233 *supra*.

78. *Ibid*, Letter No. 228 *supra*.

80. *Ibid*, Letter No. 235 *supra*.

81. *Ibid*, Letter No. 242, dated October 14, 1758, addressed to the Pēshwa.

82. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 16.

Rao (his father), appealing for immediate despatch of relief.⁸³ At Seringapatam, it became a serious problem to find a Sardār who could lead convoys to Bangalore in the teeth of the enemy's opposition.⁸⁴ At length, early in September, Venkaṭa Rao, says the chronicle,⁸⁵ pitched upon Haidar as the proper person to undertake this difficult service. Approaching the latter in his camp, he entreated him to save his son from the crisis. Haidar, profuse in his expressions of regard and sympathy, willingly accepted the offer, and sent back Venkaṭa Rao, duly honouring him with presents. Indeed, to Haidar this was a supreme chance. Since August, he had been, as indicated, cautiously watching the trend of Mahratta affairs in Mysore. Already, about the 20th of that month, we learn,⁸⁶ he had, with Venkaṭapataiya, made his own proposal to Banāji-Pant, offering "to pay up the [Pēshwa's] tribute for two years and escape any charge of dishonesty that would attach to non-payment." Banāji, however, seemed to view the proposal with suspicion, since "the guarantee," as he observed,⁸⁷ "cannot be assured without consulting twelve money-lenders." At the end of August, "when money was not forthcoming," Haidar, we further learn,⁸⁸ sought to arrange for payments "by speaking more or less on the strength of his military power." In truth, however, he had been, during all this time, silently preparing to overawe the Mahrattas, moving his flags and talking "threateningly of battle and warfare."⁸⁹

About the middle of September, Haidar, in consultation with Mokhdum Sāhib and Kabīr Beig (Haidar's trusted follower), was busy planning the acquisition of Maddūr and Channapaṭṇa as the first step in conducting any

His march on
Bangalore, Septem-
ber 1763.

83. *Ibid.*84. *Ibid.*86. *Sel. Pesh. Daft., Letter No. 227 supra.*88. *Ibid., Letter No. 229 supra.*85. *Ibid., ff. 16-17.*87. *Ibid.*89. *Ibid., Letter No. 228 supra.*

effective march to Bangalore.⁹⁰ Luckily, at this juncture, we are told,⁹¹ Sārangi Venkaṭagiraiya, the Brāhman *Gurikār* of Huli-yūr-durga, who had fled from his place on account of the incursions of the Mahratta horse under Ragho Bābaji, approached Haidar and offered to take possession of Channapaṭṇa for him through the mediation of Hari-Pant, the local Śānabhōg. At this, Haidar, who had by now mustered "about 2,500 cavalry, 2,000 gunmen, about 70 Europeans with 15 guns and 2,000 Kanarese foot soldiers," hastened to Maddūr,⁹² from where he despatched with Venkaṭagiraiya a detachment of 700 horse and 1,000 musketeers (under Mokhdum and Kabīr Beig) to Channapaṭṇa.⁹³ "They lost no time," says the news-letter,⁹⁴ "in getting into the fort by means of ladders. The people from the Government side were not aware of the gathering storm [it being a nocturnal enterprise⁹⁵] till they felt the counter-attack considerably strengthened owing to this accession to the enemy power, and suffered a great loss as some of their men were seized, wounded or killed in the fray." About the 20th of September, Channapaṭṇa was taken and revenue deposits in that fort to the extent of two lakhs of *varahas* made prize of.⁹⁶ Whereupon the Mahratta forces, encamped near Maddūr, engaged Haidar's troops in a skirmish, in which the latter got the upper hand.⁹⁷ Haidar now set out with substantial supplies to the relief of Bangalore.⁹⁸ On receipt of this news, Banāji-Pant was sent to confer with him (September 23).⁹⁹ At Channapaṭṇa, Banāji met Haidar who, however, had but one answer to give,¹⁰⁰ namely, "I am but a servant and am proceeding to Bangalore at the masters' behests to

90. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 17.91. *Ibid.*92. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 242 *supra*; see also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 17-18.93. *Ibid.*; also *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 17.94. *Ibid.*95. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.96. *Ibid.*97. *Ibid.*, ff. 17-18.98. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l.c.; also *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 18.99. *Ibid.*100. *Ibid.*

give a fight there. If at all you have to say something, you have now to go to Pattan and get the orders changed. I will act up to the orders issued from there." By the 25th, Haidar arrived with his forces near Bangalore.

Meanwhile the Mahrattas had pushed on the siege of Bangalore and almost overcome it, greatly weakening the fort under the cannonade of their guns, causing casualties of 250 men and about 60 horses of Śrīnivāsa Rao and advancing up to the moat.¹⁰¹ Haidar so manœuvred as to place the small investing force of Śrīnivāsa Rao between the two divisions of the enemy, while he himself occupied a vantage ground with his main army, so that he could not only relieve Bangalore but also turn upon the Mahrattas jointly with Śrīnivāsa Rao.¹⁰² Gōpāl Rao found it considerably difficult to cope with this position of Haidar. Accordingly, on the 2nd of October, he abandoned the batteries and advanced to about 3 miles from Bangalore between Yelahanka and Bāpāvar, the next day.¹⁰³ On the 13th, he marched with his forces to Māgaḍi by way of Nelamangala.¹⁰⁴ It was his avowed object to chastise Haidar, capture Channapaṭṇa and then march on to Seringapatam, "where the prospect of peace or war was to be left to be decided by circumstances."¹⁰⁵

101. *Ibid.*102. *Ibid.*103. *Ibid.*; also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.104. *Ibid.*

105. *Ibid.*; also *Letter No. 245*, dated October 14, 1758, addressed to the Pēshwa (?). According to this letter, Banāji-Pant, shortly after Gōpāl Rao's unsuccessful attempt on Bangalore, went a second time to Seringapatam to effect a settlement with the Rāja, "who had earlier made certain proposals to Banaji Pant, which proved ineffective then." Banāji, however, met with little success even on this occasion. For, says the letter, "When the news that Raoji [Gōpāl Rao], in fear of Haidar's army, abandoned the siege of Bangalore and marched away from there, reached Pattan, the Raja there assumed superior airs . . . The earlier tone was all changed. It became progressively difficult for Banaji Pant even to obtain an interview and they began openly to talk of war. Banaji Pant reported that the settlement could have been possible but for the news of your [? Pēshwa's] giving up the siege. 'This last development has changed their mind and there is no prospect of peace,' said he. Nothing further was done."

By the 20th of October, Haidar, having raised the siege of Bangalore and provided for its safety,¹⁰⁶ was on his way back to Seringapatam, when the forces of Gōpāl Rao began to pursue his troops.¹⁰⁷ Haidar, with his usual self-possession, made a counter-movement, leading his pursuers to the jungle tracts of Channapaṭṇa, where, for nearly a month and a half, he engaged them in a guerilla war, harassing their ranks and reducing them to extremities.¹⁰⁸ At last, early in December, Gōpāl Rao was obliged to agree to a peaceful settlement. Haidar, on his own surety, compounded the entire claim of the Pēshwa at rupees 30 lakhs and returned to Seringapatam with the bankers of Gōpāl Rao's army, after securing the release of all the places pledged to the Mahrattas in 1757.¹⁰⁹

106. According to *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 242 *supra*, Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao was left with "800 cavalry, 1,000 musketeers and 5,500 foot soldiers at Bangalore."

107. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 18.

108. *Ibid.*

109. *Ibid.* This work makes it appear that Gōpāl Rao was so harassed that he was obliged to sue for peace and retire. But in view of what followed, this position cannot be taken to be literally true. Evidently both parties were tired of the war as much as of the negotiations they had indulged in and agreed to a friendly compromise. The "claim" as such was one that could have been sustained only by a show of successful "might" and the "levy" was treated by Mysore as no more than an "imposition" which could only be exacted from her by nothing short of war actually carried out. Cf., on this topic, *Mad. Desp.* (1754-1755), p. 169, dated October 5/10, 1758, referring to rupees 20 lakhs as the amount reported to have been stipulated by the Mahrattas about October 1758. This seems inaccurate in the light of the *Haid. Nām.* and other sources. According to the *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, Letter No. 254 [dated January 13, 1759 (?)—Child Rāmachandra to Dāda], the Mahrattas appear to have signed peace with Seringapatam not earlier than December 1758. According to another letter from the same source (Vol. XL, No. 116 cited *infra*), Seringapatam was "still under investment" during January 1759 and the Mahrattas were pressing their claims for the arrears of the Pēshwa's dues. "The Raja," we are told, "tried his best to raise money in Pattan but the bankers would not contribute a farthing." At an interview on January 11, he is also reported to have said to the Mahratta representative, Viṭhal Samrāj, "We have already guaranteed payments to Bhukanji as agreed with Raj. Gopal Rao last year. The balance remaining will also be paid in a short time. We are anxious to keep the friendship of the Peshwa and we will see that the dues this year

Haidar rose in the estimation of both the *Kartar* and Nanjarājaiya, who, in recognition of his services, about the middle of December, designated him as *Navāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr*, honouring him with presents.¹¹⁰ At the end of the year (1758) Haidar got Khanḍē Rao appointed to the Dewānship of the State, mediated in the *Kartar's* grant of three lakhs' *jahgīr* to Nanjarājaiya, issued a pay order to Vāḍēbāgila Ranganna in satisfaction of his demand for rupees three lakhs (advanced to Haidar in 1757) and despatched a portion of his troops to Cuddapah.¹¹¹

Four months later (*i.e.*, in April 1759), Haidar represented to the *Kartar* the financial burden devolving upon him by what he alleged as the recruitment of additional troops for the army and the demands of the bankers' clerks for the arrears of the Pēshwa's dues.¹¹² In settlement of these claims, Haidar was granted an assignment of revenues from one half of the kingdom.¹¹³ Indeed his influence on the administration was distinctly perceptible already about the end of April, as inscriptions seem to testify.¹¹⁴ Early in May, Haidar advanced with

are also guaranteed. But you see the State is being rendered feeble and we are solely dependent on the support of the Mahrattas. There is internal feud in the State itself, which has to be made up. We will compromise somehow in some 2-4 days. We have to arrange for redeeming the diamonds that are pawned. The Nizam has some arrears with us. It is 4-5 years since they were due and his armies are coming soon. His representative is ordered to wait at Sira and is not yet admitted to audience. We think it important to seek the friendship of the Shrimanta and hence it is that we have received you in preference to others." The arrears, however, remained unpaid till July 1760, when Visāji Krishṇa, as we shall see in the next chapter, enforced the Pēshwa's claim therefor by a renewed invasion of Mysore.

110. *Ibid.*

111. *Ibid.*, ff. 15; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XL, Letter No. 116, dated January 19, 1759—Viṭhal Samrāj, Seringapatam, to Pēshwa (?)

112. *Ibid.*, ff. 18.

113. *Ibid.*

114. *Vide* references noticed under *Grants and other records* in Ch. XII, f.n. 20.

his troops from Mysore, capturing the countries between the Cauvery and the Coleroon and attacking the Trichinopoly fort.¹¹⁵ He stayed in the South streng-

thening his position at Dinḍigal and Returns to Seringapatam, Sālem-Bārāmahal, and returned to August 1759.

Seringapatam by the end of August, being required to lay siege to Mysore under circumstances narrated in the last chapter.

115. *Di. A. Pi.*, XI. 322: *Notes* dated May 11, 1759. The reference to the southern movements of Haidar Ali in 1759 is significant from the point of view of his treading in the footsteps of his master, Karāchūri Nanjarāja-ya. Haidar's appointment to the Faujdāri of Dinḍigal in 1755 was in itself, as we have seen above, a landmark of considerable importance in his career, and he first turned his attention towards the South already by the end of 1757. His southern objective began, however, to shape itself in a more effective manner from 1759 onwards.

CHAPTER XI.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(contd.).

Haidar lays siege to Mysore, c. August-December 1759 : Fall of Nanjarajaiya —The end of the *Dalavai Regime*—*Seventh Phase*: 1759-1761 : Haidar's aggrandisement, 1759-1760 —His southern movements, May-June 1760—Returns to Mysore and makes truce with the Mahrattas, July 1760—First attempt of Khande Rao to put down his rising power, July-August 1760—Haidar's flight to Bangalore, August 1760—Krishnaraja signs peace with the Mahrattas, August 1760—Khande Rao plans Haidar's capture, and seeks Mahratta aid, August-September 1760—Haidar blockaded by the Mahrattas in Bangalore, September-November 1760 ; His peace with them, November 1760—Renews his southern movements, December 1760—Khande Rao opposes him, December 1760—Haidar and Nanjarajaiya vs. Khande Rao : December 1760—January-March 1761—Haidar strengthens himself, March-May 1761—And invests Seringapatam, June 1761 ; His ultimatum—The Royalist movement, 1760-1761 : Their alliance with the Mahrattas (down to November 1760) ; And their negotiations with the English Government at Madras, September-October 1760—The negotiations continued, October-December 1760—December 1760-June 1761—The English attitude on the Mysore question, 1760-1761—The position of the Mahrattas in the Karnatak (down to June 1761)—The climax, June 20, 1761 ; Haidar's usurpation complete, July 1761—*Eighth Phase* : 1761-1766 ; The usurpation and after.

IN DECEMBER 1759 Haidar succeeded in reducing the fort of Mysore after an investment ranging over a period of three or four months.¹ At the desire of the *Kartar*, he next curtailed the three lakhs' *jahgīr* granted

Haidar lays siege to Mysore, c. August-December 1759.

1. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 19. See also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, Letter No. 269, received January 23, 1760—supplement of letter to Bābā Sāheb. According to this source, "there are disturbances rife even in

to Nanjarājaiya (Haidar's erstwhile master) to one of five places (namely, Katte-Malalavādi, Piri-yāpatna, Konanūr, Bettadapura and Arkalgūd) yielding only a lakh of *varahas*; sent Nanjarājaiya to Konanūr; and returned to Seringapatam after placing guards over the Mysore fort.²

Thus came to an end the Dalavāi régime in Mysore (1734-1759). Nanjarājaiya, accompanied by Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao (who had remained with him in Mysore since June 1759), quietly proceeded to Konanūr, where he settled himself with his family and spent the rest of his life.³

With the retirement of Nanjarājaiya from the public life of Mysore, the predominance of Haidar over the counsels of State was fully ensured, for he rose as much in the favour and approbation of Krishnarāja Wodeyar (the *Kartar*) as Nanjarājaiya went down. Haidar's military position too, at the end of 1759, was secure. He had become so powerful that, as a contemporary letter puts it,⁴ "no body can hope to score any point against him." His strength was concentrated in Diṇḍigal; he had

Seventh Phase:
1759-1761.

Haidar's aggrandisement, 1759-1760.

Shrirangapattan, as there are differences growing between Haidar Khan and Nandiraja. Haidar Khan has collected his army at Shrirangapattan and has besieged that fort." The reference to the siege of Seringapatam in this passage is incorrect. In the light of the context and the *Haid. Nām.*, the allusion is obviously to the siege of Mysore, which is inaccurately reported. The letter appears to have been written in or about December 1760 when the siege was in progress.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, ff. 20. According to the Ms., Barakki Venkaṭa Rao and his two sons Śrīnivāsa Rao and Chandra Rao had stayed with Nanjarājaiya in Mysore. Nanjarājaiya, however, while leaving for Konanūr, sent back Venkaṭa Rao and Chandra Rao to Seringapatam, taking with him Śrīnivāsa Rao only.

4. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XL, Letter No. 116, cited in Ch. X, f.n. 111. Though this letter is dated January 19, 1759, it is a sufficient index of Haidar's military position throughout the year. See also text of *Mily. Cons.*, quoted in f.n. 8 *infra*.

taken possession of Pāḷilore, Vāṇiyambāḍi and Krishṇagiri; and was undisputed master of a territory below the ghāṭs, "worth 5 lakhs of undisturbed revenue."⁵ Early in 1760 Haidar again, we learn,⁶ represented to the *Kartar* about more countries being assigned to him in view of his having, as he alleged, lately incurred enormous expenses, particularly during the siege of Mysore. In vain did Khaṇḍē Rao protest against the demand being acceded to. The *Kartar*, however, made over to Haidar the four, out of ten, taluks (namely, Śādamangala, Paramatti, Anantagiri and Nāmakaḷ) formerly granted to Nanjarājaiya. And this brought in its train a misunderstanding between Khaṇḍē Rao and Haidar.

In May-June 1760 Haidar was in the south, actively assisting the French against the English. These two nations were now at war in India (The *Seven Years' War*, 1756-1763), on the renewed pretext of espousing the cause of Razā Sāhib (Nawāb Zia-ud-daula Alī Razā Khān Chuckmak-Jang Bahadur, second son of Chandā Sāhib) and Muhammad Alī Wālājāh, respectively, to the succession to the Nawābship of the "Carnatic."⁷ In June, M. Lally, by way of retrieving his position after the

5. *Ibid.* *Pāḷilore*: may be identified with Polilore, in the present Chingleput District, Madras Presidency. More correctly, *Puḷḷalār*, palmyra village; about 9 miles north of Conjeeveram. Remarkable later as the scene of the most grievous disaster which befell the British army in India in the 18th century. As will be narrated below, on 10th September 1780, Col. Baillie, who was marching from Madras to effect a junction with Sir Hector Munro at Conjeeveram, was here totally routed and his whole force either cut to pieces or captured by the united forces of Haidar and Tipū. The palmyra trees here still bear evidence of the fierceness of the cannonade. Another battle took place here, on the same ground, between Sir Eyre Coote and Haidar in the following year, in which the former was so far victorious that he occupied the post taken up by Haidar. Haidar, however, always claimed it as a drawn battle. The importance attached to the place by Haidar will be perceived from the fact that he had his eye on it in 1759-1760.

6. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

7. For the general course of the history of South India during 1755-1761, see *Wilks*, I. 419-464; *C.H.I.*, V. 138-140, 157-165; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 18-19, etc.

battle of Wandiwash (January 22, 1760), sought Haidar's help and concluded with him through Noronha, Bishop of Halicarnassus, a treaty, by which Haidar was, among other things, promised Tyāga-durg (the "Tagada" of the *Fort St. George Records*) and other places (namely, Tiruvannāmalai, Elavāsanūr, Śankarapuram and Valikoṇḍapuram) as *jahgīr*, French assistance to capture Madura and Tinnevely countries as soon as the English had been defeated, and rupees two lakhs a month for the pay of his troops.⁸ Haidar, in pursuance of this treaty,

8. *Di. A. Pi.*, XII. 162, 187-188: *Notes* dated June 17, 29, 1760 (see also Dodwell's *Editorial Introduction*, pp. XIII-XIV). According to this source, Haidar had encamped at Tyāga-durg already by June 17, 1760, when the treaty was concluded. See also and compare *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 624-626: *Consultation* dated July 3, 1760. This treaty is further significant from the point of view of the continuation by Haidar of Nanjarājaiya's scheme of southern expansion of Mysore. It seems, however, to have been Haidar's ulterior motive to make the treaty serve his own personal ends also, for an advice speaks of him as having "assumed the reins of government in the Mysore kingdom, where the Rajah has many powerful relations," whence "it was no small inducement to Hyder Naik to assist the French, when they promised to support him, with their whole force, against all his opponents, as soon as their fleet arrived" (*Mily. Cons.*, 642-645: *Letter* dated June 26, 1760—Captain Richard Smith, Trichinopoly, to George Pigot and Council, Fort St. George).

Tyāga-durg: 8 miles east of Kallakurchi, South Arcot District, about 750 ft. in height; once strongly fortified; like Tiruvannāmalai, it formed one of the bulwarks against invasion from above the *ghāṭs*. After capturing Tiruvannāmalai, the French, in October 1757, attacked it but were repulsed. They took it, however, in 1759, at the direction of the French General M. Lally. The place was defended by Serjeant-Major Hunterman and Lieutenant Raillard, a Swiss in the employ of the English. A thrilling account of the fight that ensued between the English and the French is given by Orme (*Indostan*, II. 500-501). Raillard, after a gallant fight, killed himself to avoid the disgrace of defeat, while Hunterman and Krishna Rao, a Brahman officer who greatly distinguished himself in the defence of the place, obtained honourable terms and surrendered the place. As mentioned in the text above, it was made over to Haidar Ali in 1760, in return for help to be given to the French, who were then being besieged in Pondicherry. When Haidar withdrew his forces from it owing to trouble at home, the French reoccupied it in September 1760. The British recaptured it in 1761, Major Preston bombarding and blockading the Pettah for 65 days. Haidar took it in 1781 but on his retirement it was retaken by the English. In 1790, Tipū made an unsuccessful attempt on it but was beat off by Captain Flint, the defender of Wandiwash. It is now an

despatched a detachment of 3,000 horse and foot with artillery to Pondicherry, under Saiyid Mokhdum and Barakki Venkaṭa Rao.⁹

In July, Haidar returned to Mysore which was being invaded by the Mahrattas under Visāji Krishṇa (the "Wazazey Punt"—Visāji-Pant—of the *Fort St. George Records*) on account of the alleged arrears of contributions for 1758 and 1759, due to the Pēshwa.¹⁰ Haidar was "desirous of accommodating matters by paying the chout [chauth]." ¹¹ The Mahrattas, however, demanded 40 lakhs; Haidar offered only 15. Whereupon a truce was agreed upon for eight days and it was expected, before the expiry of the period,

important trade centre, being at the intersection of the old road from Arcot to Trichinopoly with the road from Salem to Cuddalore. Why Haidar wanted to secure it will be evident from its position, commanding as it does the Attūr Pass from Salem. This accounts for the severe fighting that took place in connection with it during the 18th century.

A recent visit to this place shows that the space on the top of the hill is rather small and cramped. It actually consists of two knolls, joined by a somewhat lower saddle, the more western of which is slightly the higher. The plan in Orme's *Indostan* shows that the village at the foot of the hill was also fortified in his time. Tradition says the upper fort was built by one Lālsingh, who, with his wife, is said to be buried in the two tombs which are to be still seen beside a tank, north of the road to Kallakurchi. A well to the south of the road to Cuddalore is also attributed to Lālsingh. On the western knoll of the hill are the ruins of a battery attributed to the French. Below these is an old cannon marked with Royal Crown and the monogram "G.R.," which probably stands for "George Rex," having been cast during the reign of King George III (1760-1820). A similar cannon is found on the eastern part of the fort. These two cannons must form part of the three sent by the English with the detachment from Trichinopoly to reinforce the garrison under command of Lieutenant Raillard, above mentioned. The third cannon must be buried somewhere near about. (See, for further information, W. Francis, *South Arcot District Gazetteer*, 340-343.)

9. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 19; cf. *Mily. Cons.*, 624-626 *supra*.

10. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII. pp. 229-230, 230-231, *Letter* Nos. 262 and 263, dated July 15, 16, 1760—Pigot to Visāji-Pant, and Pigot to Pēshwa Bālāji Rao. See also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 266 cited *infra*.

11. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 719-720: *Letter* dated August 3, 1760—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council.

“such terms will be made as to prevent further hostilities.”¹²

In the meantime, there was growing opposition to Haider in the court of Seringapatam, where Khanḍē Rao, in collaboration with Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya, Nara-simha Dās, Lālā Dās, Viranna Seṭṭi of Kolḷēgāl and Annaiya Śāstri, had been actively bringing home to Krishnarāja and the dowager queen (Doddamma) the supreme position attained by Haider and the probable consequences it might lead to.¹³ This apart, Haider had also incurred the displeasure of the Rāja by acting against the latter's wishes in assisting the French.¹⁴ Taking advantage, therefore, of the truce between Haider and the Mahrattas, Khanḍē Rao and his colleagues managed to win over Visāji Krishna through Bhukānji Hari Dut, the Mahratta banker now in Seringapatam,¹⁵ agreeing “to pay the [Pēshwa's] tribute in conformity with the contract with Gopalraoji last year [1758-1759],” on condition of Mahratta assistance being

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Haïd. Nam.*, ff. 20; see also text of *Mily. Cons.*, quoted in f.n. 8 *supra*.

14. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 321: *Letter* No. 380, received October 3, 1760—King of Mysore to Capt. Smith; also pp. 328-330: *Letter* No. 387, received October 7, 1760—Khanḍē Rao to Pigot.

15. *Haïd. Nam.*, l.c.; also *Mily. Cons.*, 777-778: *Letter* dated September 3 1760—John Andrews to Pigot and Council. According to the latter source, Visāji-Pant is stated to have explained in a letter of his to the Nawāb (Muhammad Ali), “That the King [of Mysore] wrote him if he would return thither and expel Hyder Naigue his dominions, he would give him 40 lack [lakhs] of Rupees, 5 forts and the possession of half his country, upon which he marched near Syringapatam, the capital . . .” See also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 291: *Letter* No. 350, received September 9, 1760—Visāji-Pant to Pigot, wherein Visāji speaks of “the Mayasore Vakeels having come to me jointly with Bukensay Harydet, soucar, negotiated and finished the affairs of Kandamy alias chout and for straw and grain agreeable to the directions of the king there but Hyder Naick, who was formerly a common peon and has raised himself lately to the highest posts, through his wicked pride and want of consideration, began to delay or interrupt the affairs of Balazeraw's [Bālāji Rao's] circar,” etc.

guaranteed for putting down Haidar.¹⁶ At this juncture, "Haidar," as Visāji tells us,¹⁷ "intervened and decreed non-payment of the fixed tribute, and proposed to support his proposal by means of what he considered to be a well-equipped army, lodged in the Shukravarpeth of Pattan [Seringapatam]." Almost simultaneously the negotiations with the Mahrattas were supplemented by a selected force of four thousand under the command of Khaṇḍē Rao, "with instructions to bide their own time for sure victory."¹⁸ At length, early on the morning of August 24, Khaṇḍē Rao, having secured the eastern gate of Seringapatam, opened fire on the camp of Haidar from above the fort walls, while some of his forces, passing through the Bridge Gate (*sētuve bāgīlu*), surprised Haidar's contingent near Karīghaṭṭa, killing M. Mainville (French Commander now in Haidar's service).¹⁹

At the same time, the Mahrattas too appeared on the scene.²⁰ Haidar saw the reality of the situation he was in, and, scenting danger to his very life, prepared to take to flight.²¹ It was rainy season; the Cauvery was in full floods; Khaṇḍē Rao had removed all the basket boats (*haragōlu*) into the fort and there was no conveyance by which to cross the river, save an old hollow

16. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 266, dated September 11, 1760—Visāji Krishna to Balkōba Tātya.

17. *Ibid*; see also and compare *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* No. 350 *supra*.

18. *Ibid*; cf. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* Nos. 380 and 387 *supra*.

19. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 20. [Here, for the scribal slip *Pramāthi*, *Śrāvāṇa* *śu.* 13, read *Vikrama*, *Śrāvāṇa* *śu.* 13 (August 24, 1760, Sunday), the correct date of the event. There was an intercalary *Śrāvāṇa* in *Vikrama* (see *Ind. Eph.*, VI. 323), and the event is assigned to *Nija-Śrāvāṇa* with reference to the context, as above.] See also and compare *Mily. Count. Corres.* and *Mily. Cons.*, cited in f.n. 14 and 15 *supra*.

20. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l.c.

21. *Ibid*; also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. Cf. *Mily. Cons.*, 816-823: *Letter* dated September 6, 1760, cited *infra*. Cf. also advice in *Mily. Cons.* (880-891: *Letter* dated September 15, 1760—Pigot and Council to the President and Council, Fort William), which speaks of Haidar's flight thus: "Hyder Naig, late Duan to the King of Mysoor, has proved a rebel and been driven from the heart of his dominions by the assistance of the Morattas."

bamboo structure (*bidaru tokare*).²² Haidar, says the chronicle,²³ soon got it shaped into a boat by securely tying it with water-skins (*pakāli*) from his army. At dusk he forded the river, with as much treasure as could be conveyed, twenty horses and a select retinue, leaving behind his wife and his eight-year old son Tipū. At Hārohalli, on his way, Venkaṭapataiya, the local Amildār, furnished him with the revenue collections (*irasālu*) of the place and, about the end of August, Haidar reached Bangalore.²⁴ Having, with the help of Kabīr Beig, consolidated his position as far as Ānekal and raised substantial loans from the merchants of Bangalore,²⁵ Haidar recalled Saiyid Mokhdum with his troops from Pondicherry as well as his force from Krishnagiri in the Pāyan-ghāṭ.²⁶ Haidar's position about this time was sought to be further secured by the appointment in his service of a talented soldier in the person of Mīr Fuzzul-Ullāh Khān (from Kōlār), son-in-law of Dilāvar Khān, Nawāb of Sīra, on a monthly salary and a proffered assignment of one lakh country as his *jahgīr*.²⁷

Meanwhile at Seringapatam Khanḍē Rao, on the morrow of Haidar's flight, kept the latter's family in honourable confinement;²⁸ and Krishṇarāja Wodeyar signed a treaty of peace with the Mahrattas, granting them biennial *chauth* for 1758 and 1759 as agreed with Gōpāl Rao, in addition to three

Krishṇarāja signs peace with the Mahrattas, August 1760.

22. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

23. *Ibid.*, ff. 20-21. [Haidar's retinue during his flight, according to the Ms., consisted of Ibrāhim Sāhib and Husaln Sāhib (his maternal uncle and nephew), Diṇḍigal Venkaṭappa, Venkaṭa Rao of Uttamapālyam (26 miles S.W. of Periyakulam, Diṇḍigal Sub-Division, Madura District), Śrīnivāsa Jivāji of the *Tashikhāne*, and Mīr Ali Razā Khān.] See also and compare *Mily. Count. Corres.* and *Mily. Cons.*, cited in f.n. 14 and 15 *supra*.

24. *Ibid.*, ff. 21.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*; also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, Letter No. 350 *supra*.

27. *Ibid.*, ff. 21-22.

28. *Ibid.*, ff. 21; also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, l.c.

lakhs by way of *Ghāsdāna*, and returning the stations newly taken from them (during 1760).²⁹ Visāji Krishna retired to Hoskōṭe, leaving his main army near Seringapatam to collect the dues and secure the release of the military strongholds under the treaty.³⁰ For it was his programme "to attend to the many questions pending below the ghats," by way of realising the Pēshwa's ambition.³¹

Almost simultaneously Khanḍē Rao had letters—in his own name and that of the king—circulated all over the country, proclaiming that Haidar Naik, having turned out a traitor, had fled, and offering adequate rewards to those who would capture his person and send him to Seringapatam.³² His plan, however, proved ineffective. On receipt of news of Haidar having reached Bangalore, Khanḍē Rao, on behalf of Krishnarāja, not only wrote to Visāji to obstruct the passage of Mokhdum's detachment from Pondicherry,³³ but also despatched 4,000 horse, 6,000 sepoy, 500 soldiers and 40 guns with necessary ammunition, to lead an attack on Bangalore jointly with the Mahrattas.³⁴ During September, the Mahrattas were planning Haidar's pursuit to Bangalore,³⁵ and Visāji Krishna, in expectation of assistance from Mysore, "resolved to send a proper

Khanḍē Rao plans Haidar's capture, and seeks Mahratta aid, August-September 1760.

29. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 266 *supra*; also Letter No. 276, dated September 1760 (?)—Visāji Krishna to Lakshmanpanta Anna; *Mily. Count. Corres.*, l.c., and p. 328: Letter No. 386, received October 7, 1760—Visāji-Pant to Pigot; see also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 22. *Ghāsdāna*: customary halting allowance for straw and grain. See also quotation from *Mily. Count. Corres.*, Letter No. 350, in f.n. 15 *supra*. S. G. Vaze, B.A., in his *Marathi-English Dictionary* (1928), gives under *Ghāsdāna* the following:—"A levy of grass and grain. A military contribution" (p. 164).

30. *Ibid.*, Letter Nos. 266 and 276 *supra*.

31. *Ibid.*, Letter No. 266 *supra*.

32. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 21.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX. pp. 11-12: Letter No. 14, received January 26, 1761—King of Mysore to Pigot.

35. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Letter No. 266 *supra*; also *Mily. Cons.*, 823-824: Letter dated September 10, 1760—John Andrews to Pigot and Council.

force to give him a finishing stroke.”³⁶ Indeed to the Mahrattas the crushing of Haidar seemed absolutely necessary in their projected expansion southwards (up to Rāmēśvaram), and they had been viewing with concern his rising military talents and power, particularly since 1758.³⁷ Haidar's position, however, about the middle of September 1760, is perhaps best reflected in a letter of Visāji Krishṇa, wherein he says,³⁸ “Haidar maintains an unconvincing pomp. Though he has a well-equipped contingent, [his boasts are perfectly valueless]. He had sent his forces to aid the French at Pondicherry. Half of them were destroyed by the English. The Raja of Pattan [Seringapatam] has joined hands with us and consequently he can achieve nothing on this side. Otherwise it is not in the nature of Haidar to be quiet. . . .”

Towards the close of September, Saiyid Mokhdum (from Pondicherry), passing through Gingee and Tyāga-durg, arrived with his detachment at Anchutty-durg in the Bārāmahal, and found himself encircled and opposed by Ānanda Gōpāl, the Mahratta sardār, sent thither by Visāji Krishṇa.³⁹ Haidar despatched a portion of his forces under Fuzzul-Ullāh Khān and Kabīr Beig to Mokhdum's relief, and it was not till about the middle of October that the latter, with Barakki Venkaṭa Rao, succeeded in making his way to join Haidar.⁴⁰ Meantime the forces from Mysore sent by

36. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII, Letter No. 350 *supra*.

37. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XL, Letter Nos. 104 and 116; and Vol. XXVIII, Letter Nos. 228, 229, 242, 245, 275, etc., cited in Ch. X and *supra*.

38. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVIII, Letter No. 276 *supra*.

39. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 22; see also *Mily. Cons.*, 811-812, 826, 830-831, 848, 868 and 880: Letters dated September 14 to 29, 1760; *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII, pp. 316-317: Letter No. 374, dated September 28, 1760—Pigot to Nawāb. According to *Mily. Cons.*, 812 (dated September 14, 1760), Haidar's detachment was “of very little assistance to the French.” The disturbances caused by his troops below the ghāṭs are frequently noticed in the *Cons.* for June-September 1760.

40. *Ibid.*

Khaṇḍē Rao, in co-operation with the ten thousand horse of Pēshwa Bālāji Rao commanded by Visāji Krishṇa, had invested Bangalore.⁴¹ Mokhdum stationed his troops near Nelamangala,⁴² where he was again surrounded by 1,000 Mysore horse, 2,000 sepoys and Mahrattas with 4 guns.⁴³ For nearly two months, Bangalore was under a blockade and Haidar reduced to great extremities. At last, about the end of November,

he was obliged to make peace with the Mahrattas on the strength of what was understood to be a *cowle* from

Bālāji Rao who had sent orders to the Mahratta general (Visāji Krishṇa) "to be friends with Hyder Naick, and act in conjunction with him."⁴⁴ Visāji Krishṇa, however, did not depart from Bangalore until he had obtained from Haidar formal cession of Krishṇagiri in Salem-Bārāmahal;⁴⁵ and the Mysoreans, disappointed, retraced their steps not long after.

41. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX, Letter No. 14 and VIII, Letter No. 380 *supra*; also VIII. pp. 303, 349; Letter Nos. 359 and 413, received September 18 and October 24, 1760; *Mily. Cons.*, 861: Letter dated September 23, 1760—Pigot and Council to Colonel Eyre Coote; 912-913, 933-934 (Letters dated October 8 and 12, 1760), etc.

42. *Ibid.*, VIII. pp. 357-359, Letter dated November 13, 1760—Khaṇḍē Rao to Rāma Rao and Bakshi Krishṇaiya, Officers Commanding Mysore forces at Diṇḍigal. The letter refers to the place of Mokhdum's encampment as "Telamangolom," which is clearly Nelamangala according to the context.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 1127-1128 (Letter dated December 6, 1760—*Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council*); also XIV. 15-19 (Letter dated December 30, 1760—*Ibid.*), and XIII. 1126, 1145 and 1162 (Letters dated December 11, 20 and 24, 1760). According to these *Cons.*, Visāji-Pant, after finishing the affairs at Bangalore, had arrived with the Mahratta army at the Cudapanāttam Pass by December 11, 1760. See also and compare *Haid. Nām.*; l.c. There was evidently a secret understanding of some kind underlying the above-mentioned peace, with a view to satisfy Haidar on the one hand and keep up the alleged Mahratta claims on the other. The opportunist that Haidar was, he was ever equal to all emergencies.

45. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. For a detailed account of this transaction, see *Neshau. ni-Hyḍur* (Col. Miles's translation), pp. 88-89. According to this work, Visāji Krishṇa was eventually disappointed by the deceptive orders issued by Haidar to the Faujdār of Krishṇagiri, and marched off without attaining his object.

On the retirement of the Mahrattas and the Mysore-ans, Saiyid Mokhdum with his forces entered Bangalore.⁴⁶ Early in December, Haidar, relieved from the fear of Mahratta attack, placed the fort under Ibrāhim Sāhib.⁴⁷ Then, out of an available strength of 3,000 horse and 6,000 *bār* and 4,000 Karnātak foot, he posted a portion under Mīr Alī Razā Khān for the conquest of the upper country and despatched another for the reduction of Satyamangalam and other taluks below the ghāts,⁴⁸ while he himself proceeded at the head of a small detachment towards the Gejjalahatti Pass, where he encamped about the middle of December.⁴⁹ For, with part of his forces united with the Mahrattas, it was his avowed object to march immediately to the assistance of his Pondicherry friends (*i.e.*, the French, now hard pressed by the English who had laid siege to Pondicherry), and eventually lead a joint attack against all his opponents in Mysore.⁵⁰

Haidar's plans, however, were soon upset. For, already about this time, Khanḍē Rao, deceived in his expectations of the Mahratta alliance and alarmed by intelligence of Haidar's southern movements, had marched on with his forces towards Nanjangūd-Haradanahalli. About the 18th of December, he succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on Haidar at the Gejjalahatti Pass and putting his troops to flight.⁵¹

For the time being, the Royalist cause, led by Khanḍē Rao, seemed to gain ground. Alone and helpless, Haidar's attention now became increasingly concentrated on the reduction of his domestic enemy (*i.e.*, Khanḍē Rao). His only hope of success in this

46. *Ibid.*47. *Ibid.*48. *Ibid.*49. *Ibid.*50. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 1127-1133, 642-645 *supra*.51. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; also *Mily. Cons.*, XIV. 15-19 *supra*. The *Haid. Nām.* somewhat loosely places this event early in January 1761 (*Vikrama*,

direction, however, appeared to lie in a timely composing of his differences with Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, his erst-while master, whose downfall he had lately assisted in bringing about. Accordingly he made haste to Kopanūr where he stood as a supplicant before Nanjarājaiya, profuse as ever in his expressions of apology and penitence for his past conduct, and entreating, on solemn oath, to be restored to his (Nanjarājaiya's) favour.⁵² Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao and other intimate councillors of Nanjarājaiya, we are told,⁵³ in close confidence, tried their utmost to dissuade the latter from the proposed accommodation and prevailed upon him to keep Haidar in close custody, but in vain. For, indeed, to Nanjarājaiya the presence of Haidar at this moment seemed most opportune, having by no means been satisfied with his own position since his loss of office in 1759 and having, already about October 1760, sought the aid of the English at Madras to re-establish himself in Seringapatam.⁵⁴ Believing, therefore, in the sincerity of Haidar's intentions, Nanjarājaiya readily condescended to overlook his faults,⁵⁵ and not only honoured him with presents but, placing his own troops at his (Haidar's) disposal, prepared to march with him, sending written instructions to the local parts to provide necessary supplies and assistance to Haidar.⁵⁶ At this change in the aspect of affairs, continues the chronicle,⁵⁷ Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao retired to Seringapatam in an attitude of positive disgust. About the end of December, Haidar, in alliance with Nanjarājaiya, had almost recovered his lost ground and was pressing Krishnarāja Wodeyar for the surrender of Khanḍē Rao to him. "Both Nunda

Pushya). Both with reference to the context and the *Mily. Cons.*, it seems to have taken place even much earlier, i.e., about December 18 1760 (*Vikrama, Margaśira*).

52. *Ibid.*, ff. 22-23.53. *Ibid.*, ff. 23.54. *Press List* (1760), p. 212: *Letter* No. 1061, dated October 14, 1760—Muhammad Yusuf Khān to Pigot.55. *Haid. Nam.*, l.c.56. *Ibid.*57. *Ibid.*

Rauze [Nanjarājaiya] and Hyder Naick," says a letter,⁵⁸ "have united their Interests in order to oblige the King [*i.e.*, Krishnarāja] to sacrifice Cundy Row [Khaṇḍē Rao] to their Resentment; Letters have past with offers from them of laying down their arms, if the King would deliver up the Prime Minister [*i.e.*, Khaṇḍē Rao], which he has resolutely refused and invested [him] with full power."

In January (1761) Haidar advanced as far as Kaṭṭe-Maḷalavāḍi,⁵⁹ threatening Seringapatam with a blockade, "if the King will not deliver up Candy Row [Khaṇḍē Rao]." ⁶⁰ Thereupon Khaṇḍē Rao, accompanied by his colleagues, marched with his forces from the capital.⁶¹ In the meantime, Haidar had contrived to get false letters—in his own name and that of Nanjarājaiya—written to the effect that all the principal officers in Seringapatam had been won over by him, that they were engaged in capturing Khaṇḍē Rao and been solemnly promised substantial rewards after they had actually delivered Khaṇḍē Rao to him. Haidar had also taken care to see that these letters fell into the hands of the sentinels of Khaṇḍē Rao's army.⁶² The letters, as was expected, were promptly handed over by them to Khaṇḍē Rao, and he, on perusing them, so thoroughly believed in the reality of their contents that, apprehending treachery, he forthwith rode back in post haste to Seringapatam.⁶³ On receipt of this news, Haidar surprised and put to rout Khaṇḍē Rao's troops, capturing ammunitions and stores from his camp.⁶⁴ In February,

58. *Mily. Cons.*, XIV. 15-19 *supra*.

59. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

60. *Mily. Cons.*, 102-106: Letter dated January 17, 1761—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council.

61. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.* According to a *Despatch*, dated February 4, 1761, "Hyder Naig, former Duan to the King of Mysore but who lately rebelled, having made peace with the Morattas, has, we hear, collected a powerful army to oppose the King's forces. He will probably be joined by the party of French, that during the siege of Pondicherry was employed under the command of Major Allen, to endeavour to preserve its communication with

Haidar, having stationed Nanjarājaiya near Katte-Maḷala-vādi, proceeded up to Seringapatam.⁶⁵ On March 4 (*Vikrama, Māgha* ba. 13), he plundered Khanḍē Rao's detachment near the Bridge Gate and marched back towards the Gejjalahatti Pass.⁶⁶

During March-May, Haidar was active below the
 Haidar strengthens himself, March-May 1761. ghāṭs, taking possession of Satya-mangalam, Kāvēripuram, Nānakal, Anantagiri, Śankhagiri and other forts⁶⁷

and strengthening his position by winning the goodwill of the local populace, by amassing large sums of money, by increasing the numerical strength of his forces and by systematically corrupting the leading officials in Seringapatam through his agents.⁶⁸ Towards the close of May, Haidar retraced his steps to Mysore, after reducing all the military outposts of Seringapatam "with the help of his 5,000 horse, 8,000 muskets and 40 guns, well-equipped in all particulars."⁶⁹

Early in June, Haidar arrived in the neighbourhood
 And invests Seringapatam, June 1761. of Seringapatam and invested the fort about the middle of the month.⁷⁰

During the progress of the blockade

the country, but the party we had out under Major Preston has always kept him in check" [*Mily. Desp. to Court*, III. 1-12; also *Mad. Desp.* (1754-1765), p. 231]. This document, while it but touches on the fringe of the internal politics of Mysore, merely points to how Haidar's strategic position in South India was being viewed by his foreign observers about January-February 1761. The course of affairs at home during the period was actually drifting in the manner described above.

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid*; also *Mily. Cons.*, 299-300: *Letter* dated May 11, 1761—Major Preston, Trichinopoly, to Pigot and Council.

68. *Ibid.*, ff. 23-24.

69. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 281, dated June 10, 1761—Mukund Rao Śrīpat, Hoskōṭe, to Pēshwa.

70. According to the above document, by June 10, 1761, "Pattan [Seringapatam] is still free, being commanded by the Kartar and Khande Rao Banaji. But Haidar is after it and wants to corrupt the inmates during his stay in the vicinity." Allowing an interval of a few days for these indirect efforts of Haidar, we would not be far wrong in fixing his investment of Seringapatam between the 13th and 20th of June 1761. For, as we shall see below, his ultimatum was acceded to on the 20th.

(c. June 13-20), he dictated the following terms to the Court of Seringapatam:⁷¹ firstly, that His ultimatum. Khandē Rao was to be surrendered to him (he having been, as Haidar alleged, a servant of his and not of the king); and secondly, that he (Haidar) was to be reimbursed the vast sums of money the Government owed him on account of the pay of the military and other items. If these terms were satisfied, Haidar added, he would leave Mysore forthwith and seek service elsewhere; otherwise he was prepared to continue the fight. The crisis had been reached. Krishnarāja Wodeyar found himself helpless in the extreme, he and his party having been foiled in their attempts to put down Haidar by the latter's superior cunning and power of dissimulation.

Since July-August 1760, it may be recalled, there was a movement afoot in Seringapatam, which systematically aimed at the destruction of Haidar and the preservation of the ancient Hindu sovereignty in Mysore. This movement, actively encouraged by Krishnarāja Wodeyar, was led by Khandē Rao, who, though alleged to be a "servant" of his own by Haidar, was really a loyal subject and officer of the Rāja.⁷² During September-November, Krishnarāja Wodeyar, as related already, was allied with the Mahrattas in blockading Haidar at Bangalore and in preventing him from being joined by

71. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 24.

72. Khandē Rao was a Mahratta (Dēśastha) Brāhman and belonged to the Banāji family. His full name was Khandē Rao Banāji, by which name he is mentioned and referred to in the Pēshwa's correspondence of the period. (See, for instance, f.n. 70 *supra*). The Banāji family is still represented in the Mysore State. Some of its members have since the Restoration held subordinate offices in the State Government or in the office of the Hon'ble the British Resident in Mysore. There were other members of the Banāji family serving in Mysore contemporaneously with Khandē Rao and even before his time. (See, for instance, *ante* Chs. IX. 190, and X. 209, f.n. 16; 213, f.n. 30; 217, f.n. 59, etc., referring

Saiyid Mokhdum's detachment from Pondicherry. In furtherance of this objective, Krishnarāja, early in September, seemed desirous of accommodating affairs

with the English also at Madras.⁷³

And their negotiations with the English Government at Madras, September-October 1760.

The latter at first appeared to view this proposal with disfavour, as they held:⁷⁴ "Although Hyder Naig be in rebellion to the King as well as an enemy to us, we are by no means satisfied that the King is not also opposed to our interest . . ." Evidently, in the absence of correct information, they took him, and no less Haidar, to be in alliance with the French, since, about this time, the Mysore troops under Saiyid Mokhdum were ravaging the Company's territories. About the end of September, however, Krishnarāja Wodeyar, by way of renewing his friendship with the English, wrote to Captain Richard Smith (commanding at Karūr),⁷⁵ assuring him that Haidar had joined the French without his orders, advising him of his having sent a Vakīl to the Governor of Madras, expressing his intention—as soon as certain affairs were settled—of sending "5,000 horse, 6,000 or 7,000 seapoys [sepoys] and a good many cannon with plenty of ammunition, together with 4,000 or 5,000 Morattas" under Khanḍē Rao to the assistance of the English against Pondicherry,

to Banāji Mādhava Rao or Banāji-Pant, the Pēshwa's representative at the Court of Seringapatam during 1755-1758). The sole justification—if such a word can at all be used in such a connection—for Haidar's claiming him as his "servant" was that he had worked with Haidar and Haidar had risen in the service of the king sooner than Khanḍē Rao and had sought sometimes to assert his new superiority over his old friend and colleague in service.

73. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 816-823: *Letter* dated September 6, 1760—Captain Richard Smith, Karūr, to George Pigot and Council, Fort St. George; see also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII. p. 352: *Letter* No. 420, received October 26, 1760—Nawāb (Muhammad Ali Wālājāh) to Pigot.

74. *Ibid.*, 832-834: *Letter* dated September 15, 1760—Pigot and Council to Capt. Smith.

75. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 321: *Letter* No. 880, received October 3, 1760—King of Mysore to Capt. Smith.

and seeking their aid to beat Haidar's troops under Mokhdum, then on their way to Bangalore. About the same time Khandē Rao also wrote a similar letter to George Pigot, Governor of Madras,⁷⁶ requesting him to order the cessation of disturbances by the Company's troops within the limits of Karūr belonging to Mysore.

During October-November, the English Government at Madras seemed to entertain great hopes of the conclusion of an alliance with the king of Mysore as an advisable measure, in view of their renewed struggle with the French at Pondicherry.⁷⁷ They not only despatched a detachment under Major Preston to prevent the French at Tyāga-durg from joining Haidar,⁷⁸ but also ordered the Company's officers to desist from any further hostilities in the Mysore country,⁷⁹ and were in expectation of the arrival of the Mysore Vakil at Madras,⁸⁰ even pressing the king and Khandē Rao on the subject.⁸¹ So anxious indeed were they about the proposed alliance that, on December 18, they recorded a

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 328-330, *Letter* No. 337, received October 7, 1760—Khandē Rao to Pigot; see also p. 321: *Letter* No. 379, received October 3, 1760—Khandē Rao to Capt. Smith. In keeping with these documents, a *Despatch* reports thus on the affairs of Mysore: "The King of Mysore, with the assistance of the Marathas, expelled his prime-minister and general Haidar Nayak. His new minister Khande Rao wrote to the President and the Nawab, stating that Haidar Nayak was a rebel who had joined the French on his own authority. This revolution caused Matta Nayak [Mokhdum Nāyak], the commander of Haidar's party, to return to Mysore and engage the Marathas, thus freeing us from the fear of a Maratha incursion. . . . A Vakil is expected from the King of Mysore" (*Mad. Desp.*, p. 227: *Despatch* dated November 3, 1760—Pigot and Council to the Company).

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 326-327: *Letter* No. 384, dated October 6, 1760—Pigot to Nawāb; also *Mily. Cons.*, 908-910: *Consultation* dated October 6, 1760.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 324-325: *Letter* No. 383, dated October 6, 1760—Pigot to King of Mysore.

79. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 384 *supra*; also p. 327: *Letter* dated October 6, 1760—Pigot to Muhammad Yusuf Khān; and pp. 347-348: *Letter* No. 409, dated October 22, 1760—Pigot to Khandē Rao.

80. *Mad. Desp.*: *Despatch* cited in f.n. 76 *supra*.

81. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* Nos. 383 and 409 *supra*.

Minute to the following effect:⁸³ "The delay of the King of Mysore in sending his Vackeel to Madras and [in] replying to the several letters we have since wrote him, show[s] that his former proposal[s] to accommodate with us were only to amuse. But although we are convinced that neither the King nor Hyder Naigue wish our prosperity, it is yet possible they may from political motives be kept from joining the enemy [*i.e.*, the French], at least the King, who without great probability of success would hardly venture to assist our enemies openly and by that means draw upon him our resentment in case we succeed against Pondicherry. In our present circumstances, it is most certainly our interest to gain time and we much approve of Captain Smith's thought of opening a negotiation for that purpose, as the correspondence he has already had with Mysore may naturally lead to it and time may be protracted by waiting for our conclusion. It is thought necessary and agreed that Capt. Smith be invested with power to make such proposals either to the King of Mysore or Hyder Naigue, as from circumstances shall appear to him best calculated to serve our present purpose, without including any definitive treaty which is always to be referred to our approval and determination." At the same consultation, they also resolved to continue the management of Karūr and other districts (belonging to Mysore) under an Amildār, with a view to their eventual restoration to Mysore,⁸³ for they held :⁸⁴ "If the King of Mysore is to be wrought upon by negotiation to refrain from giving assistance to our enemies, the hopes

82. *Mily. Cons.*, 1182-1193: *Consultation* dated December 18, 1760; also 1140-1141: *Letter* dated December 20, 1760—Pigot and Council to Capt. Smith. According to *Mily. Cons.*, 1116-1117 (*Letter* dated December 6, 1760), a Vakil from the king of Mysore had arrived in the English army about December 6, and was expected at Madras. The Vakil, however, as we shall see in the sequel, appeared before George Pigot at Pondicherry only about the middle of January 1761.

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Ibid.*

of having the Caroor districts restored may be a consideration of weight . . .” In the meanwhile, the Governor (Pigot) had also written to Krishnarāja Wodeyar,⁸⁵ expressing his surprise at the non-arrival of his (Rāja's) Vakīl to settle affairs, acquainting him with the low state to which the French had been reduced, desiring him to be on his guard against any promises for assistance the latter would doubtless make to be relieved from their distress, and expecting to be informed of his final intentions without delay.

Krishnarāja Wodeyar, during a greater part of the period (October-November 1760), found it expedient to temporise,⁸⁶ sanguine as he was about his alliance with the Mahrattas against Haidar. It was not, however, till about the end of December 1760 that the Royalists, deceived by the Mahrattas and alarmed by the combination of Haidar and Nanjarājaiya,⁸⁷ began to look upon the English as their “most natural ally,”⁸⁸ and were inclined more earnestly to seek their friendship.⁸⁹ In January 1761, Krishnarāja Wodeyar and Khandē Rao communicated with the Governor of Madras, advising him of their having despatched to him their Vakīl Śrinivāsāchāri,⁹⁰ Khandē Rao, in particular, assuring the

85. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, pp. 369-370: *Letter* No. 445, dated December 9, 1760—Pigot to King of Mysore.

86. *Mily. Cons.*, 1106: *Letter* dated November 26, 1760—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council; 1112-1114: *Letter* dated December 4, 1760—Pigot and Council to Col. Eyre Coote. According to *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* No. 379 *supra*, a headman of the Dindigal province had been ordered to wait upon Capt. Smith (in September 1760) and a Vakīl from the king of Mysore was intended to be sent to him sometime later.

87. *Ibid.*, XIV. 15-19 *supra*.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid.*

90. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX. pp. 11-12: *Letter* No. 14, received January 26, 1761; also pp. 12-13, *Letter* No. ?—Khandē Rao to Pigot. The date of writing or of receipt of the second letter is not recorded. But from the similarity of the contents, it appears to have been written and received about the same time as the first one, i.e., January 1761. In the *Press List* for 1761, both these documents are entered as on January 15 (see p. 268, *Letter* Nos. 1339 and 1340).

Governor of his desire to join him "to do things of great consequence."⁹¹ In February, Krishnarāja again wrote to the Governor on the subject of his friendship with the English, reminding him of his having sent Śrīnivāsachāri (the Vakīl) to inform him "of some certain matters."⁹² During March-April, Krishnaiya, Chief Bakshi of the Rāja, negotiated with Nawāb Muhammad Alī for securing through him English support against Haidar.⁹³ On April 30, the Bakshi addressed a letter to the Governor,⁹⁴ entreating him to assist and support his master's Government by all means by ordering the despatch of the English army "to punish Hyder Naick and take possession of the Gadys [gaḍi] and countries." In May, Krishnaiya waited upon the English at Trichinopoly in hopes of their "sending him assistance

91. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13 *supra*.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 23: Letter No. 37, received February 15, 1761—King of Mysore to Pigot.

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56: Letter No. 105, dated April 30, 1761—Bakshi Krishnaiya to Pigot. The Bakshi is referred to in this and the other documents as "Banda Krishnaya," "Bein Kisthna," "Beni Kistnah," "Benny Kistnah," "Bany Krishnaya"—"the King's General," "the King of Mysore's chief Bexy," "a creditable person," etc. (see *Mily. Cons.*, XIV. 15-19, 102-106, 299-300; *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII. 857-859; IX. Letter No. 142, etc.). He appears to have been popularly known as Beppe Krishnaiya (?), the prefix being pronounced by his English contemporaries in the forms mentioned above. As early as December-January 1760-1761, Krishnaiya—then commanding at Tottiyam, near Dinḍigal—had moved with Capt. Richard Smith at Trichinopoly in the matter of a treaty of alliance with the English against Haidar, "which he expected every hour to be invested with full power to conclude" (*Mily. Cons.*, 102-106 *supra*). On the approach of Haidar towards Nāmakal in March 1761, the Bakshi, according to the letter under reference (*Mily. Count. Corres.*, No. 105 *supra*), was entrusted by his master (*i.e.*, the king of Mysore) with "the management of the districts and gadys [gaḍi] on this side of the Canama of the Mysore country," and some of the troops of Mysore placed under his command, in anticipation of English assistance to put down the growing power of Haidar. It was during his sojourn below the ghāṭs that he came into contact with Nawāb Muhammad Alī Wālājāh and the English Government at Fort St. George, Madras. Bakshi Krishnaiya was a staunch Royalist. The *gadys* (gaḍis) referred to are the fortified hills and rocks with which the country was then full.

94. *Ibid.*

enough to recover his master's affairs and overset Hyder Naig."⁹⁵ In or about June, the Bakshi concluded an agreement⁹⁶ with the Nawāb to the effect that if an army of 1,000 soldiers, 3,000 sepoy, 200 troopers and 1,000 horse with 20 guns and mortars were sent to the assistance of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, he would pay the charges thereof (rupees ten lakhs, at one lakh a month) monthly, provided Katti Gōpālārāja Urs (who was in confinement in the Trichinopoly fort *since July 1752) was released. About the same time, Krishnarāja Wodeyar and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya (the latter having by now transferred his allegiance to the Rāja, having been lately deceived by Haidar) sent to acquaint Muhammad Yusuf Khān (officer in charge of Madura and Tinnevely on behalf of Nawāb Muhammad Alī),⁹⁷ "that Hyder Naick extended his animosity to the highest pitch and laid siege to Seringapatam alias Mysore, so that if the Company will be pleased to send an assistance of force and extirpate the enemy, in that case they (the King and Nanzeraz) will make them a present of two

95. *Mily. Cons.*, 299-300: Maj. Preston's letter dated May 11, 1761, cited in f.n. 67 *supra*.

96. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, pp. 83-84: Letter No. 142, dated June 30, 1761—Nawāb to Pigot. For the text of the agreement contained in this letter, *vide* Appendix II—(9). Though the letter is dated June 30, the agreement referred to in it seems to have been, according to the context, concluded much earlier, as stated above. Katti Gōpālārāja Urs, mentioned in the document, was not released from Trichinopoly till 1762. And in March of that year, he was appointed by Haidar to the charge of Chikballāpur (see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25 A).

97. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192: Letter No. 159, dated July 29, 1761—Muhammad Yusuf Khān to Pigot. The proposals related in this letter appear to have been made, according to the context, much earlier than the date of the letter itself, *i.e.*, in or about June 1761. As to Muhammad Yusuf Khān, see W. Francis, I.C.S., in *Madura District Gazetteer*, 62-67, and the authorities cited therein; also the monograph entitled *Yusuf Khan, the Rebel Commandant*, by S. C. Hill, I.E.S. (Retd.), 1914. Sir John Malcolm spoke of Yusuf Khān as "the bravest and ablest of all the native soldiers that ever served the English in India." Col. Fullarton writing of him says that his example shows that "wisdom, vigour and integrity are of no climate or complexion." See *A View of English Interests in India* (Madras Edn., 1867). Yusuf Khān proved a rebel and was hanged in 1764.

lacks of Pagodas and bear the expense of the troops besides, . . . that as long as the Company remain [in] the Carnateck [Karnāṭak] country they should assist them and they would give up to the Company the districts of Dindigal, etc., in the Pain Gaut [Pāyanghāt] but that if the Company are not desirous of these districts, in such case they will deliver up countries to the amount of 4 or 5 lakhs towards Tellichery as their limits lie near the said place and further that they will not sell the merchandizes of their country such as cloth, sandallwood, etc., to any except the Company whom they will always supply and are desirous that the friendship with the Company should be continued from generation to generation."

The attitude of the English Government at Madras on the Mysore question during the period 1760-1761. The English attitude on the Mysore question, 1760-1761. was, however, in close keeping with their policy towards the French, being, as usual, governed rather by considerations of expediency than political insight. During December-January (1760-1761), Pondicherry was closely besieged by the English and they directed all their resources to the crushing of the French power in India. Early in December, the English seemed to view with concern the possibility of the French being joined by Haidar and the Mahrattas.⁹⁸ Their apprehension was, however, soon removed by the rise of the combination of Haidar and Nanjarājaiya against the Royalists in Seringapatam. So that, at the end of December, the English seemed inclined to support the king against Haidar and to amuse the latter,⁹⁹ and in January, it was very much in their own interest to settle matters with the king of Mysore, cultivate more assiduously an alliance with him

98. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 1127-1133, cited in f.n. 44 *supra*.

9. *Ibid.*, XIV. 15-19 (cited in f.n. 44 *supra*) and 25-26 (*Letter dated January 9, 1761*)—Council to Capt. Smith.

and "prevent an union betwixt the king and Hyder Naig."¹⁰⁰ About the middle of January, the Mysore Vakil arrived in Pondicherry but was ordered by the Governor of Madras to wait upon Muhammad Ali.¹⁰¹ The latter took him to Trichinopoly, promising that he would dispatch the king's affairs.¹⁰² On the 16th, Pondicherry was reduced by the English and in February, Krishnarāja Wodeyar and Bakshi Krishnaiya were desired to send their Vakils to Madras if they had any proposals to make.¹⁰³ However much the English wished to conduct "further negotiations with the Court of Mysore,"¹⁰⁴ they seemed to be less earnest about it, despite the Nawāb's advices to settle the Mysore affairs,¹⁰⁵ and Major Preston's letter from Trichinopoly, urging for the Governor's particular instructions in the matter of sending assistance to Mysore.¹⁰⁶ In reply to the Major's letter, however, the Government only recorded a *Minute*, acquainting him¹⁰⁷ "that as we hold it necessary at present to preserve tranquillity in the country, he is on no account to furnish the Nabob or

100. *Ibid.*, 28-35 : *Consultation* dated January 12, 1761; 102-106 : *Letter* dated January 17, 1761, cited in f.n. 60 *supra*. According to the latter document, about January 17, 1761, there seemed every possibility of success for the Royalists against Haidar, if they could only be effectively supported by the English. For the forces of the king of Mysore had by now assembled near the English frontiers at Dindigal, Salem and Nāmakal, "all which could join in two days, if necessary, [*i.e.*,] about 2,500 horse and 3,000 seapoys [*sepoys*], besides matchlocks, etc., innumerable." The English, however, about this time, were actively engaged in the reduction of Pondicherry.

101. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* Nos. 37 and 105 *supra*.

102. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 105 *supra*.

103. *Mily. Cons.*, 189 (*Letter* dated February 19, 1761—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council); see also 146 (*Letter* dated February 10, 1761—Pigot and Council to Capt. Smith) and 102-106 (*Minutes of Cons.*, dated January 27, 1761?).

104. *Ibid.*, 102-106 : *Minutes of Cons.*, cited *supra*.

105. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 38, *Letter* No. 70, dated March 25, 1761—Nawāb to Pigot; and pp. 83-84, *Letter* No. 142 (dated June 30, 1761), cited in f.n. 96 *supra*.

106. *Mily. Cons.*, 299-300 (*Letter* dated May 11, 1761—Maj. Preston to Pigot and Council), cited in f.n. 67 *supra*.

107. *Ibid.* : *Minutes of Cons.*

any country powers with troops from his garrison without our express orders, but to apprise the Nabob that his application must be immediately [sent] to us for any assistance he may stand in need of." The proposals for an accommodation with Mysore lingered on and were finally rejected by the Government (in July).¹⁰⁸

Elsewhere, too, the state of affairs was thoroughly unfavourable to the Royalist cause in Mysore. On the 14th of January 1761, the Mahrattas had sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of Ahmad Shah Ābdālī on the field of Pānipat (the last battle of Pānipat). Stunned by the news of that disaster, Visāji Krishṇa, who had encamped in the Pāyānghāṭ since December 1760, hastened back to his country about April.¹⁰⁹ His departure meant, indeed, a serious blow to the progress of Mahratta arms in the Karnāṭak and

108. *Ibid.*, XV. 451-452: Council's *Proceedings*, dated July 15, 1761, on *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX, Letter Nos. 140 and 142 (*supra*), from Nizām Ali and the Nawāb, received at *Fort St. George* on July 14 and 15 respectively. According to No. 140, Nizām Ali had sought the aid of the English E. I. Company to establish himself in Hyderabad by overthrowing Salābat Jang. The Council, however, observed: "Though Nizam Ally's offers have the appearance of great advantage to the Company, yet the recent proofs of the loss which the French Company sustained by their troops in the Deccan notwithstanding the immense revenues assigned for their support is a warning to us not to plunge the Company into the same difficulties by sending their troops into parts so distant from their capital at this time, especially when the country is scarcely sound and indeed it would not at any time be advisable to undertake an expedition into the Deccan without a sum of money amply sufficient to defray all the charges until the revenues of the country assigned should put into our hands such a capital as might enable us to ensure to the Company a profit at least equal to the expense." On the Nawāb's letter (No. 142), they recorded: "The same reasons induce us to reject the proposals of the King of Mysore without first having money in hand." At the same time, the Council unanimously held "that as the war with the French, though they have been subdued on the coast, still subsists, our affairs are not yet in a sufficient state of security to admit of our sending an army to Nizam Ally's assistance," while "apparently no reply was resolved to be sent to either [the] Nabob, or [the] Mysore King, or his representative, Beny Krishnaya [Bakshi Krishṇaiya]."

109. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 41: Letter No. 76, received April 1, 1761.

South India. They were in danger of losing one by one most of their outposts in the Bālagḥāt.¹¹⁰ Already about June, Mirza Kabīr Beig, Haidar's lieutenant from Bangalore—commanding 600 horse, 500 gunners, 3 guns and 2,000 Karnāṭak foot-soldiers—had succeeded in taking Nelamangala, Dēvanahalli and other stations.¹¹¹ The Mahratta position in the Karnāṭak in June is, perhaps, best reflected in a letter of Mukund Rao Śrīpat, from Hoskōṭe, wherein he reports to the Pēshwa thus:¹¹² “Ever since Visaji Krishna left this part and approached the Tungabhadra, the Palegars on this side have begun circulating all kinds of false alarms and acting in all sorts of unrestricted and uncontrolled manner in even places belonging to our Government. . . . It is known to all that Haidar bears an ill-will against me, from long ago. Therefore he is on the lookout for an opportunity to play false against me just when I came in his grip after leaving Hoskota . . . Cuddapah, Jagadev [Mysore], Vajrakarur, all these stations are very insistent in their demands for help. Their needs are certainly urgent. However much I may long for helping them, the position here is quite disappointing and if I cannot help them, the stations can scarcely be held . . . The arrangements made by Visaji Krishna as regards the appointment of the garrison and other matters are so scanty and scandalous that the less said about them the better. The only way, therefore, to save the situation and protect the Mamlatdars here is to despatch some forces speedily from the capital. I will not fail to make every effort in my power, as I value government service better than my very life. And I have determined to give my very life while on duty. . .

110. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 281 (dated June 10, 1761), cited in f.n. 69 *supra*.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.* For a connected account of the Mahrattas in Mysore, *vide* Appendix II—(10).

It is daily growing difficult to recruit new men as all capable persons have already been taken up by Haidar Naik. Kanarese soldiers, which are the only kind available, are not to be depended upon in this crisis. And I see no other remedy to quiet all the elements of disloyalty but by the arrival of the Government forces. It can be imagined how the revenues cannot be collected under these circumstances . . . Kabir Beig from Bangalore, the man of Haidar, is waiting just two *kosh* from here to entangle me and is using all his ingenuity in devising a new cause for struggle everyday. We have no other course but to take things lying down and restrain us from hastily involving ourselves in a ruinous quarrel. If I once leave the fort [of Hoskōṭe] and go away 5/7 *kosh*, I cannot be sure of returning to it very easily. The whole situation seems like carrying fire in the sleeves, and yet I cannot but think that only a thousand horsemen could have brought the situation under control. With that much power behind me I would have risked going anywhere to Gurrunkonda, Sarkar Jagadevgad [Mysore] and Vajrakarur, the rightful possessions of Government. What could have Ajij Khan [Azīz Khān]¹¹³ been able to do if I had ventured to relieve any one or even all of these stations which are pitiaibly helpless? It is better to close one's eyes in death rather than be compelled to tamely brook the insulting attitude of these paltry enemies. We are ashamed to see the plight of our master. The Sardars come to this part very often, invested with the full responsibility of administering the conquests here. It is incumbent upon them to appoint competent men and to provide them with sufficiently powerful garrisons, with foresight and real understanding as to the imminent problems of the situation. Their negligence inevitably

113. Azīz Khān, according to the context, was formerly in Haidar's service, which he had lately left.

makes the Government interests to suffer and their prestige to lower down, besides making the situation particularly dangerous for those who are to stay here for long. The Palegars here have their own uncanny ways of circulating all sorts of rumours regarding the difficulties the Mahrattas had to encounter in the north and they have begun to regularly flout our authority. We are but servants and will not fail in our duty so long as we are alive. We shall be faithful and remain loyal for ever. If only 5,000 men are sent in this nick of time, the Mahratta power will be maintained in this province . . .” In these circumstances, any hope of succour from the Mahrattas against Haidar was well nigh an impossibility.

In this extremity, Krishnarāja Wodeyar and the dowager queen were prevailed upon by the councillors—by now won over by Haidar—to accede to Haidar’s terms as the only way out of the difficulty.¹¹⁴ Accordingly, on June 20 (*Vishu, Jyēṣṭha* ba. 3), Khanḍē Rao was surrendered to Haidar¹¹⁵ (who kept him a close prisoner)¹¹⁶ and the latter, with the help of Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya, concluded an arrangement, assigning a three lakh territory to Krishnarāja and one lakh country to Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, and reserved for himself the management of the rest of the kingdom ostensibly to meet the expenses of the army and the annual contribu-

114. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 2A.

115. *Ibid.*

116. *Mily. Cons.*, XV. 531: Letter dated August 31, 1761—Maj. Preston to Pigot and Council. For what was his alleged ingratitude to Haidar, Khanḍē Rao was, according to the generally accepted local accounts, condemned (by Haidar) to life-long punishment by being put in an iron cage and fed on rice and milk like a parrot, and exposed in the market-place at Bangalore—a most pathetic end. Whatever may be the nature or extent of Haidar’s allegations against him, Khanḍē Rao, from the materials now available, will ever be remembered as a loyal subject of Krishnarāja Wodeyar II, who, as the leader of the Royalist movement, worked wholeheartedly to save the country from the usurper’s hands.

tions to the Nizām and the Mahrattas.¹¹⁷ At the same time, Venkaṭapataiya was granted Kuṇigal as a rent-free estate (*inām*) and the other councillors promised suitable awards.¹¹⁸ Then Haider took formal possession of the fort of Seringapatam, and on July 3 (*Vishu, Āshāḍha śu.* 1) appointed Saiyid Mokhdum as its killēdār.¹¹⁹ He next attended to the preliminary arrangements for the defence of the fort and placed Bokkasada Venkaṭapataiya in charge of the administration of the *Kartar's* portion of the kingdom (*Kartara-sīme kārūbāru*).¹²⁰ Haider's

Haider's usurpation complete, July 1761.

usurpation was practically complete by about the middle of July, when he left with his family for Bangalore.¹²¹

Thus, by a combination of circumstances at once favourable to himself and detrimental to the Royalists, Haider stepped into the position of the Daḷavāis, eclipsing them as the supreme arbiter of the destiny of the kingdom of Mysore.

Inscriptions of Krishnarāja Wodeyar extend up to

Eighth Phase: 1761-1766.

The usurpation and after.

1766.¹²² Evidently, he continued to rule though with his authority considerably reduced. He kept up making grants, etc., during the remainder of his reign, 1761-1766. His political position in this period, perhaps, finds adequate expression in a letter which speaks of him thus :¹²³ "The King still bears the outward show of what he was, but no more. Hyder Naig has

117. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. The *Annals* (I. 194-196) tacitly assumes the usurpation and speaks of it in terms of delegation of powers by the king to Haider, treating the latter as a *Sarvādhikari*. The truth was, however, as related above, that Haider himself, by his usurpation, virtually stepped into the position of the *Sarvādhikari*, maintaining intact the *de jure* sovereignty of Krishnarāja, very much like the Daḷavāis. The question of sovereignty during the usurpation period is dealt with separately below.

118. *Ibid.*

120. *Ibid.*

122. Noticed below in another chapter.

119. *Ibid.*

121. *Ibid.*

123. *Mily. Cons.*, l.c.

entirely divested him of the management of his country." In keeping with this description are certain records in which Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān is formally treated or referred to as agent to the reigning king (*Kārya-karta*).¹²⁴

With this we enter upon a new phase in the reign of Krishnarāja, to which we shall advert presently.

124. *Vide* references noticed under *Grants and other Records* in a subsequent Chapter below.

CHAPTER XII.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(contd.)

Causes of Haidar's usurpation—Army: the key to the situation—The traditional *vs.* the historical Haidar—Haidar's early vicissitudes—His marriage, etc.—His personal appearance—His daily life and personal habits and characteristics—His soldierly qualities—His love for the horse—Haidar's exercise of authority: (a) *In re* the Mysore Royal House—Haidar, a Royal servant—(b) *In re* Hindus and their religion—(c) *In re* the Army—Garrisoning of forts and fortifications—Adoption of European military discipline—Recruitment of Europeans of all nations—Haidar's aim, a well-trained and well equipped army—His displacement of the territorial system by the paid personal service system—The displacement, a corollary to his policy of unification—His policy of unification—Policy of unification only a means to an end—The implications of the policy—The policy both a political and an economic move—The means he employed to carry it through—The evolution of a new Mysore army under Haidar—The example of the French at Pondicherry—The example of the English at Madras—The army of the English at Madras as it stood in 1761—Haidar's adaptation of European discipline—Infantry—Cavalry—Artillery—Military recruitment open to all—Medical aid; compensation for wounds received—The Army department—Camp routine—The military Bakshi and Secretary—Salaries to the army: (a) To Infantry—(b) To Cavalry—(c) To Europeans—Fair treatment to European Officers—Policy underlying the adoption of new discipline—Haidar's belief in the value of military discipline—Encouragement given to Topasses as a military counterpoise—Financing the army—Other financial sources tapped—Formation of a Fleet—Arsenals—Limitations on French and other European aid—Character of Haidar's Revolution—An appreciation of Haidar's work as the creator of a new army; comparison

between the armies of Haidar, the Nizam and the Mahrattas—The Nizam and his army organization—The Mahratta army system as evolved by Sivaji—(a) Infantry—(b) Cavalry—The Mahratta army as it came to be under the Peshwas—Mysore and Mahratta army systems: a comparison and a contrast—Haidar's Standing Army—Levies from tributary chiefs—Haidar, the military organiser.

THE mediate cause of the usurpation of authority by Haidar was the disproportion in the troops under his command and the troops under his colleagues, which gave him a superiority in strength which he was not slow to utilize; its immediate causes were a series of circumstances which promoted active discontent against Nanjaraja, his master. During the half a century which elapsed between the death of Chikkadēvarāja and the reign of Krishnarāja II, the Mysore army had been converted into a miscellaneous motley crowd of people belonging to different nationalities—Hindu, Muhammadan, Portuguese, French, Abyssinian, Zanzibari, etc., besides those of mixed breeds¹—and divided into groups, each attached to its particular master. The national character of the army had been lost. He who paid won the army's loyalty and service. The system of assignment of revenue to army leaders had degenerated into rank personal aggrandisement of large territorial areas.² Territorial control led to higher ambition, and from ambition to treasonous designs was but an easy step. Cultivation and commerce suffered as the result of wars and even larger territorial assignments failed to yield adequate returns. Irregular payments led to indiscipline

Causes of Haidar's
usurpation.

1. The last two are thus described by Mirza Ikbal, an annalist of the period: "Africans from Habsh and Zung Bar, 1400." See statement of troops in Haidar's service given by him [in *Ahwālī Hydur Naik* appended to Kirmānī's *Neshawni-Hyduri* (*History of Hydur Naik*)—Col. Miles's translation, 518].

2. For a description of the Army system, see below.

in the ranks, while they proved an open invitation to ambitious soldiers of fortune who had laid by treasure. The man with money could recruit more easily and more rapidly and thus add immeasurably to his material strength and man power. There are cases on record of whole regiments going over from one dead leader to another or from one side to another, for they saw in the change an advantage to themselves. New methods of warfare had, at the same time, come into vogue, and before them the old order was rapidly giving way. Plunder assumed a new position in the army code of the day. The recognition of the *Looty-Wāllah*, as he was called, shows the premium put on this profitable task.³ The troops were in a chronic state of debt. The infantry depended for its pay on the leader to whom they were attached and if he could not pay it, sat *dharna* at his doors.⁴ The cavalry was on the old *Sillāhdāri* model, and provided its own horse and provender in return for a monthly pay. When on the move, one of the conditions of the service was that the money collected by way of contribution from the enemy country, went to the army as *Ghāsdāna* (*Hullu-kāḷu*), maintenance allowance for grass and gram. If the payment of the contribution was delayed, the leader had to meet this charge himself in whatever way he could. Often he borrowed from *Sāhukārs* and merchants by offering personal or other security.⁵ If he failed to meet it, the discontent may well be imagined. Already in debt, the troops were nearer rebellion than any one else. They would naturally have favoured any attempt to upset the existing order of things. With such forces as these in full play, the

3. See Innes Munro, *A Narrative of the Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast* (1789), to which a picture of "A Looty-Wallah Chase" is prefixed as frontispiece. Innes Munro describes a *Looty-Wallah* as a *hussar* (*Ibid.*, 131).

4. See, for instance, *Ante* pp. 181, 210 of this Vol.

5. See, for instance, *Ante* p. 224 of this Vol.

possibility of rebel dictators rising in the land was great. There were deeper causes as well at work. The discontent among the dispossessed *Pālegārs* was always smouldering. What was in store for those still in possession of their *Pālayams* was another source of discontent. The sword of Damocles was always hanging over their heads. What they feared from was even worse than what they or their kind had already suffered. It was from among their retainers that the main body of the army had been in olden days recruited. The hereditary principle had been set at naught. The new recruits came from different countries and different castes and creeds and they broke through the old traditions of the army under which it had been for long recruited from father to son from the families of those who had made warfare their primary occupation. Then, again, the increasing introduction of Muhammadans, Topasses and Europeans, the last two mainly to make up the new artillery wing, had produced a further breach in the old composition of the army. Its corporate unity had been destroyed. Discipline became sectional and the co-ordinating influence was weak, because of the other heavy work that fell on those who controlled the army or administered its affairs.

It was in these circumstances that Haidar rose to power. He early saw that the key to the situation was the army. He realized that a regularly paid and well cared for army meant power. He amassed treasure by every way open to him and got together men who would stand by him. Soon he had under his command armed forces which could cope with simultaneous attacks from the Mahrattas on the one side and the Nizām and the English on the other, or any combination of these three. He saw to it that he could open a campaign suddenly and soon carry the war into the enemy's territory and

Army, the key to
the situation.

before the latter thought of a defence, Haidar so swooped down on him that he was paralysed in his activities. It was the strength of his army and the command he had over it that made possible the revolution he actually wrought in the twenty-first year of his service under his sovereign. After pursuing above the fleeting reigns of seventeen sovereigns of Mysore for three hundred and fifty years, we now arrive in the reign of the eighteenth, Krishnarāja II, at a period in the history of Mysore, which saw its name famous in the far West. While the State was exhausted by the incessant wars waged by its generals, and the adjoining kingdoms were distracted by the collapse of the central power, and there were ready representatives of European nations near by to take sides in furtherance of their own interests but whose material organization was not equal to their political ambitions, Haidar, with sword in hand, tried to supplant his sovereign master and found a dynasty of his own on the ruins of those he pulled down. The military genius of this unknown Muslim who had found his way into Nanjarāja's army from an obscure corner of Mysore and the spirit of political adventure that had seized him firmly on the plains of Trichinopoly, involve the causes of the rise of a great European nation in India and the redemption of the State itself from the savage grip of a supplanter who neither cared for king nor for humanity at large. And our eyes are curiously intent on perhaps the most memorable revolution which India has so far known—a revolution which has impressed it with a character which has all but transformed it from a mere geographical expression into a political nation.

The traditional picture drawn of Haidar as a clever but cruel man who cared more for the end than for the means he employed in attaining it, is one that deserves to be examined closely. We have to-day evidence enough,

The traditional vs.
the historical Haidar.

first, to see the man clearly, not as his enemies or partisans painted him to us, but as he actually was; secondly, to see him against his own background, not ours, and to understand what limitations it imposed upon him, and to what extent he overcame them. His life covers nearly three-quarters of the eighteenth century, the critical period in which modern India was being born. Haidar devoted most of his life to the defence of Mysore against those who invaded her territories or tried to impose their will on her; to her advance towards the north-west from where came the Mahrattas to disturb her peace; to her extension toward the south, where the pretensions of Muhammad Ali, aided by the English, had despoiled Mysore of her just rights to Trichinopoly and barred her further advance southwards; and to reform the army in such a manner as to make it practically invulnerable against not only the country powers but also against the European nations whose military organisation and methods of training had impressed him deeply. In this titanic struggle, he literally wore himself out. It was largely his achievement that Mysore attracted to her standard almost every one of any nationality who could make her army strong or invincible; that she became early famous in the far-famed capitals of Europe; and that she expanded on all sides and became a compact kingdom, as it was intended she should be, from sea to sea. He fought with astonishing patience and tenacity; and as he alone withstood the powers that tried to absorb Mysore, he won their sincere ill-will and opposition. His methods may not have been always right but there can be no question that he held to the right itself with singular devotion. And in defence of it, he fought his wars in a manner that made his name to be feared and in his own age respected. It was not for nothing that he came to be described later as "the most formidable Asiatic rival the British ever encountered in India."

He was accused by his enemies of many crimes, but except one, most of these may be refuted by the evidence available to-day. But curiously enough, or perhaps naturally enough, the general outlines of his portrait have been fixed for all time by the historians of the past century. He is still the cruel, severe, terror-striking, merciless, extortionate, exacting, unjust, deliberate, calculating, autocratic, arbitrary, unfeeling man who stood beside the Mysore throne, hiding who knows what behind that sly smile of his—really an inhuman person, a perfect master in the art of dissimulation. How much of this picture is true? Was Haidar a mere treacherous usurper and no more? Did he not possess any redeeming features? Did he attempt anything useful or good for Mysore? To this question our answer is definitive to a degree. In developing it, we are resolved upon not accepting anything of importance unless upon trustworthy contemporary evidence. We do not think that anything more would be required of us or of any writer of authentic history.

Haidar, as we have seen,⁶ was of humble origin, though, after his successful career, attempts were made by annalists to represent him as having sprung from the very tribe of Koreish, the most illustrious of the Arabs, to which the Prophet Muhammad belonged.⁷ Whatever the truth in their stories, there is scarcely any doubt that he was born in a family that had some pretensions to religious piety and to military talents. The former developed into the religious bigotry which came to be associated later with the name of Tipū and the latter into the genius for military leadership which distinguished Haidar throughout his career. Among the many

Haidar's early
vicissitudes.

6. See *Ante* Ch. X. 205, f. n. 2, where his ancestry and early career are very briefly dealt with. This section fills in certain lacunae left over for inclusion here. The authorities are quoted below.

7. See Appendix III, for a note on the *Ancestry of Haidar*.

different accounts that have come down to us, one says that he started life in a small way in the family of a Brāhman landlord, whose lady was particularly kind to him. One day, it is said, at about noon, she called for him once or twice, and receiving no response from him, stepped into the garden to look for him. Strange to relate, she found him fast asleep under a little tree, with a cobra playing over his head. She retreated hastily and the cobra shortly thereafter quit the place, leaving Haidar still asleep. The mistress of the house came back to where Haidar lay and bid him get up and go with her into the house. Here she fed him on "rice and curds"⁸ and told him he was destined to become a great ruler and when he did become one, she entreated, their poor family may not be forgotten. Whether true or not, the story shows that there were not wanting signs early in his life of his future greatness. He had his meed of trial and suffering. In his infancy, he was bereft of his father. He had, however, a cousin—uncle, according to other sources—his namesake, who took interest in him and his elder brother, Śābās. Both owed much to this cousin and Haidar owed a great deal to his brother as well. Kirmāpi records a tale on the authority of "an historian," as he says, who had "sought for historical documents" relating to the life of Haidar,⁹ which shows how Haidar was saved from death shortly after his birth. Immediately after the birth of Haidar, goes the story, "certain astrologers cast his nativity, and disclosed that though this boy would certainly arrive at the dignity of the crown and throne, and rise to be the sovereign of the Karnātics, yet, that he would, in a short time, suffer the pain and grief of becoming an orphan; that is, his father would be taken from him. On hearing this prediction, his relations, with one accord, determined that the child

8. Food usually given to a fondled child in the household.

9. Kirmāpi, *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 10.

should be fed with the milk of death, and laid to sleep in the cradle of eternity. His father, however, on being informed of this intention, said, 'If the evil omen attendant on his birth rests on me, well and good, be it so; but I will not allow him to be put to death; for good and bad proceed alike from God's decrees.' In consequence of this, the mother and relatives of this light of the eyes of prosperity and good fortune spared no pains in his nurture and preservation." And Haidar lost his father in his third year! Not only that. Immediately on the death of his father, he and his brother suffered imprisonment at the hands of Abbās Kuḷi Khān, son of Darga Kuḷi Khān, the cruel Killēdār of Doḍ-ballāpur. Abbās Kuḷi proved himself not only unfriendly but also wholly ungrateful. For all the service rendered by Futte Muhammad, the father of Haidar, his only return was to cruelly ill-treat the family of his loyal colleague who had yielded his life in his service. Abbās Kuḷi plundered Haidar's mother of all she possessed, including her personal trinkets, utensils and jewels, and what is worse, seized her two young sons, Śābās and Haidar, then eight and three years old, and confined them in a kettle-drum, the head (or parchment) of which being stretched on the drum, it was beaten, in order that, by the pain and distress of these poor orphans, he might extort more money from their family! From this horrible imprisonment, the boys were rescued by the intervention of the King of Mysore who, through the efforts of Haidar Sāhib—the Gulām Haidar of other sources—the cousin of Haidar Alī, called on Tāhir Khān, the Nawāb of Sira, to require Abbās Kuḷi to liberate at once Futte's widow and children from the indignities to which they were being subjected. Haidar Sāhib, in due course, got Futte's widow and his two cousins to Seringapatam and brought them up with care and affection. He taught them the use of arms and horsemanship.

Śābās was married immediately he reached the age of discretion and he tried to shift for himself by seeking service under one Abdul Wāhab Khān, an younger brother of Muhammad Alī, Nawāb of Arcot. Abdul Wāhab held the *Jahgīr* of Chittoor, and he appointed Śābās to the command of 1,000 foot and 200 horse and Haidar Alī to "the command of the horse," the number being probably too insignificant for mention. But either the brothers did not fare well at Chittoor¹⁰ or Haidar Sāhib, the cousin, desired their presence at Seringapatam, and they both joined him soon at Seringapatam with their families and belongings. Here they were presented to Nanjarājaiya, the Dewān, and they were each appointed to the command of 350 horse. Shortly after, Haidar Sāhib, who then commanded Chikballāpur, fell in an attack on Dēvanahallī. On this, Nanjarājaiya transferred to Śābās the command of Chikballāpur and its dependencies, together with the command over the troops of his cousin Haidar Sāhib. Śābās settled down with his family at Chikballāpur, despatching his brother Haidar Alī with his own and Nanjarājaiya's troops to Seringapatam. Here, Haidar Alī conducted himself with such prudence and discretion that he rose in the estimation of the king (Krishnarāja II) and his minister Nanjarājaiya. He was granted a *Jahgīr* for maintaining his horse and regular foot and was even dignified with the title Haidar Alī Khān. He had so far ingratiated himself with Nanjarājaiya at this time that, in the words of the chief annalist of the period, "neither in business nor pleasure" did Nanjarājaiya "ever separate himself from him."

10. Kirmāṇi says that "Shabaz received an affront from Abdul Wāhab Khān, and being offended, with difficulty obtained his discharge from his service, and having no employ, he, at the invitation of his relative (Hydur the elder), joined him with his brother, their family, followers, and property." (*Ibid*, 22).

In his nineteenth year or so, while serving at Seringapatam, Śābās made arrangements for His marriage, etc. the marriage of Haidar Alī. He found a bride for him in the respectable and pious family of one Saiyid Śābās—who was commonly known as Shāh Mean Sāhib—who resided at Sīra. This Saiyid Śābās was a *Pīrẓādā*, one learned in the Law. His spiritual glory had been crowned with domestic happiness; he became the father of six children, three sons and three daughters. He was sent for to Seringapatam and his eldest daughter was married, in the Deccani manner,¹¹ to Haidar Alī. She bore him, not long after, a daughter, but, owing to some unfortunate neglect or other cause, while yet in child-bed, she was attacked with dropsy and became a cripple for life. He could not marry again at once, as he desired and arranged to do, as he had to proceed on military duty down the ghāṭs with Nanjarājaiya.¹² On his return home, his wife gave him, of her own free will, permission to take another wife. His brother Śābās Sāhib selected for him the sister¹³ of one Mīr Alī Razā Khān, who, after having

11. This touch is supplied by Kirmāṇi (*Ibid*, 24). Kirmāṇi, though inaccurate in some of his dates and also confused in his accounts, supplies details which need not be disbelieved, especially as he is confirmed by the other annalist Mirza Ikbāl.

12. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*, 24-25. Kirmāṇi says that Haidar had to postpone his second marriage and accompany Nanjarājaiya on his expedition "to reduce the country of the Payanghat, which is south of Mysore, and consists of Calicut, Coimbatore, Dindigal, Palghat, etc., some of the Naimars of which had rebelled." He took "a year and a half" to "reduce the country to order and punishing the discontented Naimars." This would fix his second marriage in about his twenty-second year. This would also fix Śābās's death after Haidar's second marriage.

13. Described by Kirmāṇi as "sister-in-law" (*Ibid*, 25-26). This is a mistake for "sister," as is evident from Mirza Ikbāl's *Ahwālī Hydur Naik*, who so describes her. But Mirza Ikbāl is wrong in calling her his first wife, because Haidar Alī's first wife was the eldest daughter of Saiyid Śābās of Sīra, as mentioned in the text above. It is possible, however, that this lady was dead at the time Mirza Ikbāl wrote his account. See Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*, 500. A translation of Mirza Ikbāl's work will be found in this publication (*Ibid*, 493-512). The *Haid. Nām*, (ff. 7, 108) also corroborates the above information relating to Haidar's marriage. According to this work (ff. 108), Haidar's second wife was known as Fātimā Bégum.

been Killēdār of Gurramkoṇḍa, had been living in the Bārāmahal. Haidar, though he took a second wife, was considerate to his first one. We are specially told that he "still considered his first wife as holding the principal sway in the home," Haidar continuing to her "all her privileges and honours," and he "moreover regarded her as the ornament of his family, and placed all his family under her authority."¹⁴ Haidar, however, had no children by his second wife for three or four years. He sought the intervention of a saint named Tipū Mustān Aulia, whose tomb is to be seen in the market-place at Arcot. Through his blessings, he had a son, the celebrated Tipū Sultān, named after that Saint. He was born on November 19, 1749,¹⁵ when Haidar had attained his twenty-seventh year. Haidar strengthened his relationship with his second wife's family by marrying his first wife's youngest sister to his new brother-in-law Mīr Alī Razā Khān, while he married her second sister to one Saiyid Burhan, a learned man. His three brothers-in-law by the first wife—Saiyid Kamāl, Saiyid Mokhdum and Saiyid Ismail—and all his other relations were found some kind of service or employment, with the result that he had men to depend on in times of need. Indeed, a part of the policy of Haidar after settlement of his differences with the Mahrattas over the conquest of Bednūr was to place the more important

14. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*, 26.

15. *Ibid*, 26-29. Also see Major Charles Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan and Tippoo Sultan* (Cambridge Uni. Press, 1809), where it is stated that Tipū was born in or about 1749 (pp. 5,43). According to the *Haid. Nām.*, however, Tipū was born in 1752 for he was eight years of age in 1760 (see *Ante* p. 234 of this Vol.) The Saint Tipū Mustān, referred to above, was well-known during his time for his miracles in both Hindustān proper and the Deccan. He had two brothers, one being Numid Sāhib who sleeps at Trichinopoly, and the other lies buried at Hunūr, Rāyadurg taluk, present Bellary district (Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*, 26-27). Tipū Mustān Aulia's tomb at Arcot bears the date 1142 *Hijra* or 1728 A.D. It was erected by Nawāb Sādat-ullāh Khān, who died in 1732.

places under the charge of men closely related to him or in men in whom he possessed confidence. Invariably these were Mussalmans in religion. After the return of the Mahrattas from Bednūr, Haidar left his son Tipū in the command of that place, appointing at the same time Lālā Mean, his sister's husband, to the command of a stronghold a few miles off. He put Sīra under Mīr Sāhib, whose sister he had recently married. Similarly, he appointed Fyzullā Khān to the command of Mysore fort and district, while Mokhdum Sāhib was nominated to be in charge of Seringapatam itself. Ibrāhim Sāhib, uncle of Haidar, continued at Bangalore, and Amīn Sāhib, his nephew, commanded the Bārāmahal valley.¹⁶

According to contemporary accounts, Haidar was neither distinguished by the beauty of his person nor the eloquence of his tongue. He was a plain man, his features coarse, his nose small and turned up and his lower lip rather thick. Of average stature, he was robust in build, bulky in size but characterized by spirit and vigour, and hot-blooded. He was of active habits and capable of bearing fatigue as well on foot as on horse-back. Brown in complexion, he wore neither beard nor whiskers, contrary to the custom of Muhammadans.¹⁷ Though not handsome, Haidar's countenance

16. Robson, *Life of Hyder Ally*, 84; De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 97-98. Robson refers to Fyzullā or Fuzzul-ullāh as "Phasula." De La Tour calls Mīr Sāhib as Mirza; he also mentions Mokhdum Sāhib as having been nominated to Mysore and Amīn Sāhib to the "government of the kingdom of Bisnagar," meaning thereby Bednūr itself (see *Ibid.*, I. 98). He further states that in the patents given to his relations on this occasion, he prolonged their names, evidently by ennobling them. (*Ibid.*, I. 97, f.n.).

17. See M. La Maitre De La Tour, *History of Ayder Ali Khan* (History of Hyder Ali Khan), first edition in two Vols. (London, 1784), Vol. I. p. 22. De La Tour was commandant of Haidar's artillery and knew him well personally. His description has been widely copied. Bowring, in adopting it in his *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*, adds that Haidar's eyes were small. So far as one can see, there is no warrant for this elaboration of De La Tour's description. Kirmāni does not give us any lengthy description of Haidar's personality as De La Tour does. But what he

was open and calculated to inspire confidence. Though a perfect master in the art of dissimulation when the occasion required it, he did not of set purpose cultivate the habit of disguising his aspect which was either gay or overspread with chagrin as the circumstances demanded it. He dressed in white muslin and wore a big turban of ancient style, made of the same cloth, or of red or yellow cloth of Burhanpur manufacture, nearly 100

sets down, though brief, is expressive. Haidar was, he says, "very dark and strong bodied, but of middle size" (see Kirmāṇi in *Neshawni-Hyduri*, 491). Kirmāṇi adds that Haidar was "accustomed to shave his beard, moustaches, eyebrows and eyelashes." (*Ibid*). These descriptions, though furnished by those who had known Haidar personally, do not help us to visualize the man. Contemporary portraits enable us to do this better. One of these shows him as a thin built, tall man, with whiskers and a short clipped beard, in light-fitting military vest and a peaked up turban with a feather in it. The nose is aquiline and small, and the eyes not small but medium in size. It is a picture of a slim, active, though somewhat awe-striking personality. In a portrait representing Haidar as sitting in his Durbār, which originally appeared in the *European Magazine*, he is shown as a tall, handsome, beardless, small-nosed, striking personality, of gigantic proportions, dressed in flowing robes and slightly resting on a pillow at his back, with a rounded flat turban. This evidently depicts him as he was nearly at his end. In a third one, prefixed to Prince Gholām Mohanmed's edition of De La Tour's *History* (Thacker & Co., London, 1855), he is represented as he should have looked in his comparatively younger days. This is a reprint of a portrait, engraved in steel by Morrish. It depicts Haidar as of average stature, with the small hooked-in nose, in military dress, and with turban on. In the portrait which depicts Admiral De Suffrein's interview with Haidar, we have Haidar presented to us, as in the *European Magazine*, as a distinctly tall man, with an aquiline nose, flowing robes and a flat turban. The main ideas conveyed by these portraits are that Haidar impressed his contemporaries as a tall man with aquiline nose, clean shaven face, with fairly regular features, though somewhat bulky in body. As De La Tour says that he was "5 feet 6 inches high," Haidar may be correctly described as of average human stature. According to anthropologists, the average human stature appears to be about 1·675 m. (5 ft. 6 in.). Those who are 1·725 m. (5 ft. 8 in.) or more in height are said to be tall; those below 1·625 m. (5 ft. 4 in.) are short; while those who fall below 1·500 m. (4 ft. 11 in.) are now usually termed pygmies (see A. C. Haddon, *Races of Man*, 3). Haidar's black complexion, average height, long face, fairly regular features and convex narrow nose would suggest his affiliation with the Indo-Afghans, an intermediate race. His marital and other connections with the Afghan families of Cuddapah and Kurnool—his second wife, who became the mother of Tipū, was the daughter of Nūr Moin-ud-dīn, who had been Governor of Cuddapah, and his brother-in-law Mir Ali Razā Khān had been Governor of Gurramkonda—seem to afford some

hands long and flat at the top.¹⁸ His robe was made up in accordance with the fashion of the time—the body and sleeves fitting neatly, and drawn close by strings, the rest of the robe being ample and in folds, so that when he walked, a page supported his train, from his first stepping off the carpet to his entering into his carriage. In the army, however, he appeared in a different manner. He wore a military habit, said to have been invented by himself for his generals.¹⁹ It was an uniform composed of a vest of white satin, with gold flowers, faced with yellow, and attached by cords or strings of the same colour. The drawers were of the same materials,²⁰ while

ground for this affiliation. On the conquest of Cuddapah, Haidar married the sister of the Nawāb of Cuddapah and made her the head of his harem, with the title of Bakshi Bégum. He also gave his daughter in marriage to the eldest son of Abdul Hakīm, the Nawāb of Savanūr, who was of Afghan descent, and received the latter's daughter in marriage to Karīm, his second son. One version of his ancestry states that his great-grandfather Muhammad Bahlol was a Muhammadan devotee who left the Punjab to seek his fortune in Southern India, accompanied by his sons (see Appendix III, on *Haidar's Ancestry*). It must be added here that Bahlol is an Afghan name and was that of the founder of the Lōdī dynasty, which was uprooted by Babar, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, in 1526. The aquiline nose and long face would indicate, perhaps, original Arab ancestry. The fine regular features, white complexion and short stature (5 ft. 4 in.) associated with the Arabs of South Arabia (Semites), seem to have been modified by later admixture.

18. This turban of red or yellow colour was, according to Mirza Ikbāl, of Burhanpur manufacture—see *Ahwālī Hydr̄ Naik*, 506-507, in Kīrnāpī's *Neshawāt-Hydr̄i*. Burhanpur is a town in the Central Provinces, about 260 miles N.E. of Bombay. It was a flourishing manufacturing centre in Mughal times. In those days, it extended over an area of 5 square miles. Akbar built a palace in it, still in existence, while Aurangzib added a mosque, which is yet in use. Taken by Wellesley in 1803, it came under British control in 1860.
19. De La Tour says that it was "invented" by Haidar. But there is no reason to doubt that Haidar was only continuing the existing fashion in this respect.
20. Mirza Ikbāl gives some additional details: "He did not wear his *Jamah* (coat or tunic) often; but a vest, open in front, made of a broad kind of white cloth, which is called in India, *Doria*, that the width of the cloth might allow of its being broad at the breast." He also tells us that "his trousers were made of Masulipatam *Chintz*; and he was fond of *Chintz*, the ground of which was white, strewed with flowers" (i.e.). What De La Tour calls "boots" must be taken to be the "*Chafav*" worn by Muhammadans. He also wore large slippers with a long point turned back, resembling those usually worn in France and called *Souliers à la pou laine*.

the "boots" were of yellow velvet. He wore also a scarf of white silk about his waist; and with the military dress, his turban was either of a red or aurora colour.²¹ When he was on foot, he commonly used a gold-headed cane; and sometimes on horseback he wore a sabre hanging by a belt of velvet embroidered with gold, and fastened over his shoulder by a clasp of gold, enriched with precious stones.²² He did not ordinarily wear much jewellery either on his turban or his clothes—neither necklaces nor bracelets.²³

Haidar was, from all accounts, a simple and plain man, free from vanity and self-sufficiency. His daily life and personal habits and characteristics. He was not fond of delicacies nor particular in what he ate. He gave no orders about his table, eating only whatever was placed before him. He ate of all the dishes available, showing a preference, however, for salt and sour ones. In his journeys and marches, he subsisted mostly on parched gram, almonds and dry bread, made of rice, *jawār* or *rāgi*, with which, soldier-like, he appeared well-contented.²⁴ His mode of living was much unlike that of a man of rank, being more like that of a private soldier. At his table, twice a day, some of his most intimate friends used to join, but the food and the quantities served to all were alike.²⁵ Though in later life he was accused by some²⁶ of being arbitrary and as indulging in abuse and the whip

21. What De La Tour calls "aurora" is the "yellow" of Mirza Ikbal, "aurora" meaning here nothing more than "golden." According to Kirmānī, Haidar was very fond of the red and purple colours (*Neshauni-Hydrī*, 475).

22. Morrish's engraving of Haidar Ali generally fulfils this description.

23. We use advisedly the word "ordinarily," qualifying the version of De La Tour. But in the portrait reprinted in the *European Magazine*, he is shown as wearing a bracelet on his left wrist. This picture shows him as sitting in his Durbār and confirms Mirza Ikbal's description. According to him, Haidar "wore diamond clasps on his wrists and two or three diamond rings on his fingers" (l.c.).

24. Kirmānī, *Neshauni-Hydrī*, 474-475.

25. Mirza Ikbal, *Ahwalī Hydr Naik*, 506, in *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, 507.

even towards those belonging to the army,²⁷ there is no doubt that he was essentially a man who attracted people to himself.²⁸ He was easily accessible and possessed facility for conversing on any subject.²⁹ He had, indeed, none of that stateliness or taciturnity that is generally associated with those in power.³⁰ When he first received a stranger, he was reserved and appeared to speak with gravity, but soon recovered his usual ease, and conversed with all the world, repeating himself the news and common topics of the day with the utmost affability.³¹ An astonishing characteristic of his was that he asked questions, gave answers, heard a letter read, and dictated an answer to another, beheld a theatrical exhibition, and even seemed to attend to the performance that was on—at the same instant that he delivered decisions concerning things of the utmost importance.³² Every one who had any business with him, whoever he might be, could go to him. Only to strangers, he was more formally introduced, a *chōbādār* or mace-bearer preceding and announcing him. It may seem strange, but yet it is true, *fakīrs* (or religious mendicants) were excluded from this indulgence of free audience, they being dealt with by a special official, who had instructions to provide their wants.³³ Haidar was unsparing with himself in doing the day's work, and expected all to do the same. From morning till night, he never remained a moment idle. He was a slave, we are told, to the regulations of his working establishments, or manufactories.³⁴ His memory was excellent to such an extent that he could recollect a word, or an incident, for years. It was said of him that any one whom he had seen twenty years before, in the

27. *Ibid.*, 495.28. *Ibid.*, 494.29-31. De La Tour, *Ayder Alā*, I. 24-25. The Rev. C. F. Schwartz, writing, in 1779, of Haidar's mode of transacting business—just after he assumed full power—bears testimony to the same effect.32. *Ibid.*, I. 25.33. *Ibid.*34. Kirmānī, *Ibid.*, 474.

common dress of the people of the world, he could recognize, after that period, in the patched garment of a mendicant. The story goes that one day he asked the official in charge of his stable to bring an old saddle, which had been laid by and neglected for a long time. When it was brought and examined, he said, "There is another saddle missing; it is a Mahratta saddle, with a housing of yellow broad-cloth, moth-eaten, and I desired it might be wrapped up in a cloth and taken care of." This also, on search, was found! And he had given the orders he mentioned eleven years before! He began his day as the morning dawned. As he sat down to wash his face, his messengers and spies stood about him on all sides, repeating the news and intelligence of the day before.³⁵ His capacity for hearing was even more excellent than his capacity for remembering.³⁶ It is said that he could readily distinguish and comprehend the different voices and the different details. This was really astonishing. People, indeed, would not give credit to what was said of him. But on trying repeatedly, it was found that they were wrong and that his capacity for following simultaneously many and giving orders only to those and to them only when on the points they really needed, was indeed great. When the news-reporters began repeating their news, whatever did not require inquiry, he passed over in silence. But, when he heard any news which required examination, or might be deemed important, he, after listening to it, at once stopped all further talking, and entered into the investigation of its truth, bearings or relevancy to the topics on hand.³⁷ The human side of the man appealed to many who, hearing of his daring deeds, wished to join his ranks. One of the annalists of the period, indeed, says of him

35. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 26; Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid.*, 505-506.

36. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

that "his humble and agreeable manners attracted from all parts many adventurers to his service," and it is added of him that even in public he assumed no distinction between himself and one of his private troopers, nor were any deductions made from the pay of the soldiery in his employ.³⁸ Whatever changes may have come over him in his later years,³⁹ in the earlier part of his career—when he was still on the first steps of the ladder of fortune—he was simple, unostentatious and inviting to a degree.

Brought up as a soldier from his infancy, Haider had some eminently soldier-like qualities. Plain as he was in his bearing, simple in his dress and accessible to all, he did not like persons who indulged in long-winded speeches. One of the annalists of the period curtly says "he did not like great talkers."⁴⁰ He was essentially a man of action, and severely practical in his outlook. "In penetration and in store of practical wisdom," Kirmāni says, Haider "took the lead from all the State ministers, princes and kings of former days."⁴¹ The subject of conversation at his public audience generally related to matters affecting the State or the order and regulation of kingdoms and empires, or to swords, muskets, horses, elephants or invigorating medicines,⁴² so that the body may be well maintained to aid the mind in its desire for achievements. His understanding was quick and, according to contemporary opinion, may be described as "wonderful,"⁴³ while the noble desire to attempt great things was a marked feature of his mental make-up.⁴⁴ Of foolish pride or vain glory, he had none; indeed,

38. *Ibid.*, 494.

39. *Ibid.*, 494-495. It should be remembered that Mirza Ikbāl, though he writes with apparent candour, cannot be described as in any sense partial to Haider in his delineation of his character or even his achievements. Where such a man agrees with the opinions of Kirmāni or De La Tour, we may not be far from the truth.

40. Kirmāni, *Ibid.*, 478.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*, 474.

44. *Ibid.*

if Kīrmāṇi is to be believed, he had expelled them from his mind.⁴⁵ As became a soldier, he loved his kind. "He was the friend and protector of the soldier," writes one who knew him well, and adds that he was "altogether full of kindness and generosity" to him.⁴⁶ His estimate of the value of the brave and experienced soldier was, we are told, very high; and any man, who distinguished himself by his bravery, he heartily cherished and protected, and used his endeavours to promote and exalt him.⁴⁷ But he demanded hard work from him and nothing but the best he was capable of would satisfy him. He treated his colleagues as his equals and even shared his food with them. In his dealings with them, in the social as in the military sphere, he treated them with the utmost cordiality and goodwill, making no distinction between himself and his private troopers. Unlike Muḥammad of Ghazni, who seldom, if ever, shared the hard life of his soldiers, Haidar attached no dignity to his position. He was ever ready to put himself to the severest tests that he presented for his men.⁴⁸ While on the field, *rāgi* or dry rice bread and gram satisfied him as much as it did the common soldier serving in his ranks.⁴⁹ Nor would he allow any deductions from salaries due to them.⁵⁰ No wonder his friendliness and kindness inspired deeds of valour on the field of battle and added to his renown. There is some reason to believe that towards the close of his career he was a changed man, but it is clear that he was in his earlier life both a steadfast friend and well-wisher of the common soldier who helped him to attain higher distinction and office. Everything relating to the army interested him. His understanding in regard to it was

45. *Ibid.*46. *Ibid.*, 473.47. *Ibid.*, 474.48. Muḥammad Ḥabīb, *Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazni*, 77, f.n. 42.49. Kīrmāṇi, *Ibid.*, 474-475.50. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid.*, 494.

as keen as in regard to territorial or revenue affairs.⁵¹ One keen glance of his, we are told, decided without difficulty the enlistment of recruits, the merits of horses about to be purchased, and their price, and the appreciation of valuable articles, and their selection.⁵² He had a singularly profound knowledge of the quality and value of arms and instruments of war. Such knowledge, indeed, seemed to come to him almost instinctively, so quick and so spontaneous were his decisions on them.⁵³

Next only to the soldier was the personal attention Haidar paid to the horse—the noble animal on which depended so much success in the warfare he continuously engaged. Every one who has written of him has remarked eloquently on the great regard he showed to dealers in horses. Himself an excellent judge of horse-flesh, his interest in horses, their purchase, their upkeep and their safety was unbounded. If he could write, Haidar's choice to declare his knowledge of the letters would have fallen on the horse, and then we would have had a treatise on the horse and horsemanship which would have delighted not only the horse-lover but also have given us a literary parallel to the work of that celebrated warrior-literate Xenophon, whose famous treatise stands unique in the world's literature.⁵⁴ If Haidar had been duly blessed and could have written—he knew not more than putting topsy-turvy his initial 'Hai' in Urdu—he would have given us hints not only on the points of a good horse; on how to approach it and in what mood or temper; on how to break it in; on how to keep a stable fit or where it should be located; on how to acquire a good steed and to

51. Kirmāni, *Ibid.*, 482.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*

54. Dakyns on Xenophon in *Hellenica*, iii-2 p. 93. 52. Xenophon on *Horsemanship (Hippi Ke)* is a classic on the subject of horses. No one interested in the horse should miss reading it. Xenophon not only wrote pure Greek in a plain, perspicuous and unaffected style, but had also an eye to the practical in his estimate of things.

train it for cavalry work, including the arts of "leaping ditches, scrambling over walls, scaling up and springing off high banks," and on how to make it a valuable ally in war; but also on how to treat the merchant who brings and sells the noble animal to you. This is the one thing that Xenophon, perhaps the greatest western writer on the horse, has failed to touch on, though he even furnishes elaborate suggestions for guidance in buying a horse. The horse has played a great part in Indian history, and there be some who say that it is the horse that brought the Muhammadan into India.⁵⁵ Whether this is so or not, there is no doubt that successive dynasties of kings in India have befriended the merchant who specialised his trade in horses. The Vijayanagar kings were particularly interested in this business and treated Portuguese dealers in it with marked goodwill.⁵⁶ Indeed, it has been said that the Portuguese languished with the disappearance of the Vijayanagar rulers, whose valued patronage they lost with the extinction of their dynasty.⁵⁷ But there seems some exaggeration here, for the trade in horses soon readjusted itself and the Mysore dynasty of rulers began to encourage it. Haidar continued the patronage and that in a manner which shows that he had improved on what he had learnt from his teacher Nanjarāja. If a soldier is known from the horse he keeps, Haidar would be reckoned to stand easily first. If the majesty of men themselves is best discovered in the graceful handling of the prancing horse, Haidar would have shown himself to the best advantage. And he would have agreed with Xenophon that "a horse so prancing is indeed a thing of beauty, a wonder and a marvel, riveting the gaze of all who see him, young and gray beards." He valued the horse, as it should be, for its own qualities; not only as a useful servant and a

55-57. On the patronage extended by the Vijayanagar Kings to the Portuguese in this matter, see *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 1788-1784, 2089, etc.

splendid ally in warfare, but also as a beautiful natural object and a noble creature meriting the best attention. Else we cannot understand the uniform praise that local annalists and foreign observers of Haidar's period bestow on his fondness for horses and the special manner in which he treated those that brought them in numbers to him. Thus Mirza Ikbāl, who is not always partial to Haidar, says that while his relations with and management of merchants generally was so excellent as to be beyond praise, his kindness to horse-dealers was more particularly so.⁵⁸ The exacting businessman that he was, while he extended his favour to them, he, in return, expected them to conform to his pleasure. He especially stipulated that the horses they brought should not be sold until he had seen them. If any horse died after it entered his boundaries, and the tail and good evidence of the fact of death were produced, he paid half the price of the horse.⁵⁹ He always saw the horses himself, and, having seen them, fixed their prices. After four days had elapsed, he sent for the merchants, and having paid them separately for as many horses as he had approved, he presented them with an order for the discharge of the customs duty due, and told them they must consider themselves his guests the next day and after that depart. When the morning arrived, he sent them a large quantity of rice, some sheep, butter and other things, enough to make a good feast.⁶⁰ Kirmāni, the other historian of the period, amply confirms these statements.⁶¹ To horse-dealers, he says, Haidar gave presents of gold and raiment, besides the value of the horses he purchased; and so liberal was he that, if on the road through his territories, any horse by chance died, he paid half the price, after

58. Mirza Ikbāl, *Ibid.*, 502-503.

59. This custom obtained in Vijayanagar also [*vide* Nuniz's account (c. 1536) in Sewall's *A Forgotten Empire*, 307]. Haidar was, it is significant, following an old custom which had descended to him from Vijayanagar times through the Mysore Kings.

60. Mirza Ikbāl, *Ibid.*

61. Kirmāni, *Ibid.*, 475.

the arrival of the tail and mane, with a certificate from the civil officers of the district.⁶² The result of his liberality was that horses were brought to him from all quarters; but if any horse-dealer sold a horse before Haidar saw it and his messengers became acquainted with the circumstances and reported the same to him, he would neither buy any of the horses himself nor allow any one else to buy them. On this account, no one else could get a good horse; and if they bought any of the horses rejected by Haidar, they had to pay higher prices and such higher prices too for horses which manifestly were "good for nothing."⁶³

When he came to power, Haidar set to himself certain rules of conduct. Realising the circumstances under which he had come to power and the nature of persons he had to deal with in and outside the State, he set certain limits to the exercise of the authority that came to be vested in him as the result of the downfall of both Nanjarāja and Khaṇḍē Rao. First, he desired, as far as may be possible, not to come into conflict with the Royal Family. There can be no doubt that when he got the substance of power into his hands, he did not desire more. There is reason to believe that later other circumstances supervened, and he changed his mind and tried to build up a kingdom, if possible, for himself, apart from that of the sovereign of Mysore. This change of attitude—if not mind—reacted adversely on him, with the result that popular goodwill began to evaporate slowly but steadily. But he did not reach this position

Haidar's exercise of authority:—(a) *In re the Mysore Royal House.*

62. *Ibid*; see also f.n. 57 *supra*.

63. Mirza Ikbāl, *Ibid*, 503. The price for high class horses paid for by Haidar varied from six to fourteen thousand rupees each, and special arrangements were made for their upkeep on a regal scale. There were horses in his stable which came from Bāghdād, Irāk, Arabia, Gujerāt, etc. The daily food supplied to each horse amounted to forty seers of choice stuff including horse-grass, Bengal-grass, green-grass flour, wheat flour, almonds, parched gram, sugar, ghee, milk, butter and spices (see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 104).

all at once. Indeed it may be said of him that the idea of assuming the royal position seemed always unwelcome, if not repellent, to him. Though foreign observers of his time spoke familiarly of him as "sovereign" and a "prince"; of his assumption of supreme power as "usurpation" of "sovereignty" itself and not merely of the power signified by it; and his audience to those who visited him as his "court," there is reason to believe that he himself did not pretend either to supersede the sovereign or to assume the Royal dignity or insignia.⁶⁴

64. The first writer who unwittingly—it is to be presumed—did this was De La Tour in his *History of Ayder Ali Khan*, written while Haidar was still alive but first published in 1784, about two years after his death. He spoke of Haidar, indeed, as "this sovereign," "sovereign" and "prince," quite commonly, and of his "court"—language that might have been in keeping with his assumed power in the State but not certainly in keeping with the position Haidar assigned to himself at the Royal Court. As mentioned in the text above, he spoke of himself as the "agent" of his king and master and actually never went beyond that description to the end of his life. He always pretended to act for and in the place and under the orders of the king, and, as stated above, he rendered a formal account annually at the Dasara Court to the king of what he had done under his orders. Foreign observers could not naturally have grasped all this, and seeing the power wielded by him both at home and in the outside world, should have thought he was "sovereign" himself. But the position was really something different. Throughout the whole period covered by Haidar and Tipu, the English at Madras refused to recognise anything more than the *de facto* character of their (Haidar and Tipu's) authority. The English, both by their conduct and by their attitude—implicitly and explicitly—may be said to have wholly repudiated to recognise any *de jure* authority on their part. The limit Haidar set to his usurpation is thus found reflected in one of the drafts of Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras (1781-1786): "Hyder Ali Khan, when he usurped (as a traitor or rebel) the throne of the Prince of Mysore, his master, was from policy obliged, or thought himself so, to continue the name and seal of his dethroned Prince to whom he had been a hireling servant" (see the *Macartney Papers* in the Satara Historical Museum, Sec. I. No. 288C). [Italics ours]. This seems confirmed by De La Tour himself, who says in one place: "The letters signed by Ayder are closed by the seal of the sovereign, of which the principal secretary is guardian" (*Ayder Ali*, I. 31). The reference to the "sovereign" here is possibly to the King of Mysore while the reference to the "secretary" is to Haidar's representative at the Court. De La Tour refers also in the same place to the "particular or private seal" of Haidar himself, "which he always wears on his finger." The differentiation between the public and private seals is very significant from the point of view of sovereignty during the usurpation period.

Indeed, De La Tour, the French writer, who was his first annalist, though he popularised the wrong idea of Haidar being "sovereign" and "prince," was careful enough to point out, whenever he spoke of him with reference to Mysore itself, that he (Haidar) was only "Regent" or "Dayva" (*i.e.*, Dēva) of Mysore.⁶⁵ In one place, he explicitly states that Haidar occupies the position of Dewān once held by Nanjarāja.⁶⁶ This is enough to show that he knew that Haidar was only minister and not King of Mysore, though by the loose manner in which he used the words "sovereign," "prince," etc., he

65. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 46-47, 52, 58. De La Tour translates "Dayva" into "Regent," evidently following the custom of the time. Nanjarāja was termed "Regent" and his supplanter was styled the same. But Nanjarāja was really "Regent," as the king was young at the time he began his reign. But the name stuck to him in his later years as well. The word "Dayvas," plural, appears in another part of the narrative of De La Tour (I. 178). It means "lords". "The Dayvas, notwithstanding their great power, are only the first subjects of the king," says De La Tour, thereby suggesting that though they wielded power in the land, they were still subjects of the king and that the most powerful of them, who was Regent, was also no more than a subject. (*Ibid*). De La Tour, in describing the Nizām's Minister "Rocum Dawla" (Ruku-ud-daula), speaks of him as "Divan Rocum Dawla", and adds that the title "Divan" signifies the Minister and Keeper of the great seal of the Suba, (*Ibid*, I. 177, f. n.). De La Tour thus knew the significance of the word "Dayva" as distinguished from "Divan." Other writers of the period describe Haidar not as "Dayva" but only as "Divan," which word appears in many disguised forms in them. Thus it appears as "Duan" (spelt as pronounced) in Captain Robson's *Life of Hyder Ally* (1786) (see pp. 15, 16, 17 *et passim*); as "Dewanni" in Kirmāni (see p. 62); and as "Dewan" in Mirza Ikbal (see p. 512). Kirmāni translates the term into "Prime Ministership" (see p. 62) and "Prime Minister" or "Purdhan," which is *vulgo* for *Pradhāni* or Chief Minister (*Ibid*). In a section devoted to the titles of Haidar Ali, De La Tour describes him as "Suba of Scirra," *i.e.*, Subādār of Sira; "King of the Canarin and Corgues," *i.e.*, ruler of the Kanarese and Coorg countries; "Dayva of Mysore," *i.e.*, Regent of Mysore; "Sovereign of the Empires of Cherqule and Calicut," *i.e.*, ruler of Chirakkal and Calicut by virtue of his conquest of these countries; "Nabob of Bangalore," *i.e.*, Nawāb of Bangalore, etc. (see pp. 46-48). It will be seen that so far as Mysore is concerned he is only termed "Dayva," *i.e.*, "Regent."

66. De La Tour's exact words are "Nand Raja (*i.e.*, Nanjarāja) was Dayva, which signifies regent, as Ayder is at present. It will hereafter be seen how this prince lost the regency" (pp. 52-53, f. n.). The indiscriminate use of the word "prince" is here seen in its application to Nanjarāja also.

spread abroad the impression that Haidar was actually "sovereign" of Mysore. This, added to the fact of the actual exercise of power by Haidar, confirmed the wrong notion of foreigners that Haidar was really the "sovereign" of Mysore. As a matter of fact, this was far from being the case. Haidar himself did not pretend, in the beginning, at any rate, to be more than Dewān or Prime Minister. That was the position held by Khandē Rao to which he succeeded, Khandē Rao having succeeded Nanjarāja in it. Haidar, the cautious man that he was, described himself from the beginning to King Krishnarāja as "his servant."⁶⁷ After the downfall of Khandē Rao, he sought an audience of the king only in the capacity of "his servant," a statement as diplomatic as true from the point of view of mere description of relationship. Kirmāni, who describes this first interview, speaks of Haidar's visit as one sought by himself. "On the following day—the day following Khandē Rao's fall—he (Haidar) sent word to the Raja," writes Kirmāni,⁶⁸ "that if he were permitted, he, his servant, would visit his family in the fort." Permission having been granted "to admit" him, he visited King Krishnarāja the next day, and made his obeisance to him. A more detailed account gives the outline of what took place a little more plainly. Haidar, on his first visit, was, it would seem, "profuse in his protestations of fidelity and attachment," and on the second, when he repaired to court, "demanded a patent or commission conferring on him and his posterity the perpetual office of Delaway (Daḷavāi)." King Krishnarāja, we are told, "acquiesced in this demand," but required from Haidar "a written engagement stipulating that he and his posterity should prove

67. Kirmāni, *Ibid.*, 96.

68. *Ibid.*, 96-97. Capt. Robson, writing in 1786, states that Haidar had "artfully given the king (Krishnarāja II) such full assurance of his perfect obedience, that he prevailed on him to open the gates."—*Life of Hyder Ally*, 23.

themselves loyal and obedient subjects." Haidar thus did not aim, either for himself or his son, anything more than the perpetual office of Dalavāi, *i.e.*, the hereditary chiefship of the army which had been held by Nanjarāja, his master. Though he thus acquired the authority he coveted, "he continued his respectful behaviour to the Raja. All the public acts of Government were made in the name of the Prince; and on occasion of any new conquests, congratulatory letters and presents were sent to him," evidently in recognition of the fact that they had been made in his name and for the benefit of his kingdom.⁶⁹ And the name of "Sirkāri Khoḍādād" (the government given by God) with which Mysore came to be associated from then, shows that it was a trust in his hands to be discharged loyally and dutifully in the interests of its Ruler, his sovereign.⁷⁰ And Kirmāni, likewise, writing as he did after the fall of Seringapatam, speaks of Mysore in the usual manner as the "Khoḍādād State," *i.e.*, the God-given State,⁷¹ and does not go beyond suggesting that Haidar was virtual master of the situation but not "sovereign" of Mysore, after the fall of Khanḍē Rao.

Haidar is, as a matter of fact, described by De La Tour himself as succeeding to Khanḍē Rao's place; indeed he goes so far as to state that the widow of Krishnarāja I, whom he describes as privy to Khanḍē Rao's downfall, prevailed

Haidar, a Royal
servant.

69. See Major Charles Stewart, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of the late Tippoo Sultan with Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan and Tippoo Sultan* (1809), 13. This work, especially the *Memoirs*, is based on Persian Mss. from Hyderabad, supplied to Col. Kirkpatrick, see *Ibid*, 94. Indeed, according to one of these Mss. (c. 1800), Haidar, at the time of his usurpation, is said to have "demanded a *sanad* conferring the office of Dalavoy on him and his posterity" and "the Rājah acquiesced in the demand and entered into a contract (*ahed nama*)," etc. [see *Asiatic Annual Register* (1800), 2-7].

70. For *Sirkāri Khoḍādād*, see Stewart, P. 8, where it is stated that that name was stamped on at the top of every volume in the library of Tipū.

71. Kirmāni, *Ibid*, 97, 116, 160. See also f. n. 80 *infra*.

on King Krishnarāja II "to declare Ayder regent instead of Nand Raja (Nanjarāja), who expected the appointment, and supposed Ayder would be contented with the post of generalissimo."⁷² And, De La Tour significantly adds, "upon his accepting the regency, Ayder made every submission to appease Nand Raja (Nanjarāja)."⁷³ De La Tour next mentions that it was "by virtue of his power as regent" that Haidar spared the life of Khandē Rao and "commuted his punishment," and that he began work only in discharge "of the duty of a regent."⁷⁴ It will thus be seen that in total disregard of what he himself states in one part of his work, De La Tour describes Haidar in the rest of it in another light, a description which naturally confuses his readers and creates an impression which was the reverse of the correct one. Haidar, indeed, to be fair to him, did not represent himself as more than Dewān. At the annual Dasara, which he continued as of old, he submitted a formal account of the transactions he had conducted and obtained Royal recognition for them. After the conquest of Bednūr (1763), the first idea of founding a kingdom for himself seems to have crossed his mind. It was then, according to De La Tour, that he first assumed the title of "King of Canara (Kanara) and of the Corgues (the people of Coorg)."⁷⁵ In keeping with this assumption of a Royal title,⁷⁶ he formed the design of having absolute personal control over it, evidently as its ruler in his own interest, as distinguished from his administrative control as Dewān, his professed office, over the Mysore kingdom, which had Seringapatam for its capital. His plan was to entrust the civil administration of Bednūr to the officials of the deposed Rāni's government, to which he made up his mind to appoint a

72-74. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 72-73.

75. *Ibid.*, I. 91.

76. This subject is dealt with at some length below—see under *Conquest of Bednūr*.

separate Minister to act under himself. He thus affected, as Wilks plainly puts it,⁷⁷ "to treat it (Bednūr) as a separate kingdom," while "Seringapatam and its dependencies he on all occasions professed to consider as belonging to the *Kartar* (Sovereign)" of Mysore. He went one further step. He gave Bednūr the name of *Haidar-nagar* and "he avowed" it, as Wilks adds,⁷⁸ "to be his own." It is certain that he formed the deliberate determination of transferring to Bednūr the seat of his government. He gave orders for the removal of his family, the erection of a splendid palace—which was never finished—and the establishment of a mint, and struck coins for the first time in it in his own name, and even prepared for the erection of a dockyard and naval arsenal on the West Coast for the construction of ships of war. The conquest of Bednūr, in fact, formed the turning-point in Haidar's career.⁷⁹ But it was not long after that he discovered that he would be making a mistake in pinning himself to a place which was neither central from an administrative point of view nor of any strength whatever from a military point of view. While he dropped promptly the idea of centralizing his administration at Bednūr and removed his family and himself from there without delay, he probably did not give up the idea of a kingdom for himself in that region until

77. Wilks, *Mysore*, I. 279. This position seems to find remarkable corroboration in the contemporary local chronicle *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 106), from which we learn that the circulation of the *Bahadūri* or *Haidari Varaha* issued by Haidar on the conquest of Bednūr (1763) was ordained by him to be restricted only to the *Nagar-sime*, while in the *Seringapatam-sime*, directly under the sway of Krishnarāja, the institutions of the early rulers of Mysore in respect of coinage, weights and measures, etc., were to be continued intact. Haidar was also, according to this work (ff. 24-25), in the habit of reporting his activities to the *Kartar*, i.e., King Krishnarāja (*Kartara baḷige arji baradu*).

78. *Ibid.*

79. Wilks, *Ibid.*, 279-280. Wilks goes so far indeed as to write: "The conquest of Bednōre, in short, seemed to form a new era in the history of this extraordinary man" (*Ibid.*, 281). Kirmāṇi is silent on this aspect of the matter (see *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 125-139). See further on this subject below, under *Conquest of Bednūr*.

later. Indeed, contemporary writers state that he did not usurp the supreme power until Krishnarāja's death. It was, according to them, only after the death of Krishnarāja that he usurped the authority under the title of Regent.⁸⁰ Thus, Adrian Moens, the Dutch Governor on the Malabar Coast, writing in 1781, records that Haidar treated the king as a "mere child" and on the plea that he "had not sufficient understanding to govern the country," he undertook to "administer it for him and on his behalf."⁸¹ Having commenced this exercise of authority in the reign of Krishnarāja II, he continued it in his successor's reign as well, as we see Moens states in the very next sentence: "This he does to this day in

80. Innes Munro, who wrote in 1789, records thus: "Upon the demise of his sovereign, the old king of Misore, he immediately usurped the throne under the title of regent and guardian of the young prince (who was then an infant), and has ever since assumed the supreme authority," etc. See *Narrative of Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast*, 120. He compares the "usurpation" of authority by Haidar to the usurpation by the English E. I. Company at Madras of the authority of Muhammad Ali, Nawāb of the Karnātic (*Ibid.*). Whether the comparison can be justified or not, there is no doubt that the "divesting" of authority in either case was understood to be more constructive than actual. While the regal authority rested (or was supposed to rest) in one, the actual exercise of it was passing to another. Among other writers, Capt. Peixoto refers to Haidar as "regent of the kingdom" [*Memoirs of Hyder Ally* (1770), 148]. Col. Fullarton mentions him as "the Prime General and Chief Minister" of Mysore [*View of English Interests in India* (1787), 59]. Another English writer speaks of him as "regent of the kingdom of Mysore" [see *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* (1788), I, 121]. Even the local Muslim historian Kirmāni admits, though tacitly, Haidar's position as the agent of the Hindu kingdom of Mysore when he, writing of him, asserts, "service or agency of the infidels is not infidelity" (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 489). Haidar appointed himself as *Rector Regis et Regni*. He of course made it known he was assisted by the Cabinet of Ministers which we know was always functioning in Mysore in association with the king. He was thus *governor of the king and ruler of the kingdom*, i. e., one who exercised regal authority or had a predominant share in the exercise of regal authority. In one word, he made himself Regent and in that capacity was to some extent guided, if he chose, by his Cabinet of Ministers. For a Note on the subject of Haidar's position as Regent, see Appendix IV.

81. See *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government: Dutch Records* No. 13, p. 151.

the name of the heir of the king who has since died." ⁸² But the continued exercise of authority made him steadily autocratic with the result that he lost both the goodwill of the people and of the Ruling House itself. His treatment of king Nanjarāja and old Dalavāi Nanjarājaiya, to be referred to below, will show how he had estranged himself as much from public goodwill as from the confidence that the Royal Family had placed in him since his rise to power in the place of Khaṇḍē Rao. ⁸³ The behaviour of King Nanjarāja towards Haidar shows how far the latter had been transgressing the limits of his authority in regard to his sovereign and master, while the manner in which he (Nanjarāja) met his end indicates the recklessness Haidar had slowly but steadily developed in his attitude towards the Royal House that had given him and his forbears opportunities to rise in its service. ⁸⁴ It is from about 1770 that he began definitely his downward career in this behalf and from that date we may observe a hardening of the Royal attitude towards him. ⁸⁵ Chāmarāja Woḍeyar VII, King Nanjarāja's brother and successor, was but a youth. He bided his time and died in 1776. Haidar, true to his better instinct, paid homage to him as king, though he wielded his authority unabated as his Minister. ⁸⁶ The untimely death of Chāmarāja VII in 1776 and the succession to the throne of Khāsā Chāmarāja Woḍeyar (Chāmarāja VIII) only made it the more easy for Haidar

82. *Ibid.* The "king" referred to here is Krishnarāja II while the "heir" adverted to is Nanjarāja Woḍeyar who, as will be seen below, succeeded Krishnarāja Woḍeyar in 1766. Nanjarāja was only eighteen years of age at the time of his accession. He was the eldest son and heir of Krishnarāja II. (See below).

83. See text below.

84. *Ibid.*

85. Peshwa Mādhava Rao's invasion of Mysore was the direct result of King Nanjarāja's attempt at assertion of his own power—see text below.

86. An inscription dated in 1774 (*E.O.*, V Bl. 65) truthfully represents Chāmarāja VII as the king and the Nawāb, the most excellent Bahadūr Haidar Ali, as "the administrator." The relevant text reads thus: *Chāmarājē nṛpālē śāsatyurvīm Nawāba pravara Bahadārē Haidaralyākhyā bhūpē.*

to use his power the more absolutely. Indeed, these frequent successions to the throne of young kings after the death of Krishnarāja II—Nanjaraja, Chāmarāja VII and Chāmarāja VIII—only increased the opportunities for Haidar aggrandizing all power to himself, while all the while he kept up the formal *de jure* position of the King of Mysore unimpaired to the world outside. The fact that between the twenty-one years (1761-1782) covered by the first usurpation of power by Haidar and his death there were four kings is enough to show the conditions in which Haidar developed his *de facto* authority and exercised it. But it is clear that he limited the exercise of this authority to that of Dewān and Regent and never really went beyond it even during his last years. Though he went far, he did not attack the throne or prevent the succession to it. Kirmāṇi, indeed, gives us a circumstantial account of the story relating to the manner in which Haidar tried to get “the patents of the appointment of Prime Minister (Pradhāni or Sāhib Dewanni) from Nanjaraj, the Dalwai,” from which it is clear that his main objective was to obtain the supreme executive power vested long in the Dewān and nothing more.⁸⁷ That this was the actual position was widely known at the time even beyond the State and it was this knowledge that induced the English at Madras to enter into Treaty relations with the Mysore Royal House in later years.⁸⁸ The main governing idea of Haidar being self-assertion and not the subversion of sovereignty as such, he may be acquitted of ever having aimed at Royal power. Mirza Ikbal plainly states that he was neither “fond of the throne” nor of “state display.”⁸⁹

87. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid.*, 61-66.

88. See below. The *Sullivan Treaty* is dated in 1782. Khanḍē Rao's correspondence with the English at Madras is based on the essential idea that Haidar was trying to assert his authority beyond his legitimate limits. See p. 244, f.n. 76 above.

89. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid.*, 507.

He sat by himself, we are told, spreading a special seat for himself. He never pretended—at any time—to occupy the traditional throne any more than he tried to abolish the ancient Royal House itself. He might have even gone beyond the prudential limits of exercise of the authority vested in him, but he never involved himself in assuming or pretending to assume the Royal position or status. That is where he differed from his son and successor Tipū. As it was, Haidar alienated from himself the goodwill of many among his own following and if Tipū eventually fell from power, it was due as much to his inflaming public opinion against himself by his attitude towards the Royal House as by his other acts which brought him into conflict with his neighbours.⁹⁰ It will be seen from what follows that so far as Haidar acted within the limits of his authority as executive head of the State, he had little or no trouble internally to surmount. When, however, he went beyond it, he got into the meshes of his own action, with the result he had to resort to autocratic, if not tyrannical, methods to maintain his authority. That he still strove to compromise his authority with the superior one of his master and sovereign, at least formally, should stand to his credit.

The second limit that Haidar laid to the exercise of his authority was one dictated by prudential considerations, if not by the environment in which he found himself and the chief objective he aimed at. He avoided conflict with the Hindus, who formed, as now, the main population of the State. There is enough evidence to believe that though by birth and faith he was a Muhammadan, Haidar treated the Hindus with goodwill and toleration: it might, indeed, be said that he was every inch a Hindu

(b) *In re* Hindus
and their religion.

90. This subject will be found discussed at some length below.

alike in temperament and training.⁹¹ Mirza Ikbal, for instance, notes the fact that "he never allowed any reduction of the allowances of the Hindu

91. This aspect of Haidar's position finds itself adequately reflected in the contemporary local chronicle *Haid. Nām.*, utilised in this work. In this connection, we may also note the following interesting anecdote recorded by Viscount Valentia in 1804: "A celebrated Mussulman saint, called Peer Zaddah, resided at Seringapatam, and was greatly revered. On the festival of *Shri Runga*, the Goddess (? God) of Abundance, when her (? his) statue was, as usual, carried in procession from the temple through the streets, it unfortunately passed the door of the Peer, whose pupils, being irritated at the idolatry, sallied forth, beat the people, and drove them and the Goddess (? God) back to her (? his) sanctuary. The Brahmins complained to Haidar, who told them that they ought to defend themselves when attacked. The next day the procession again went forth, and was attacked by the pupils of Peer Zaddah. The event was, however, very different; for the Hindus, being by far the most numerous, beat their assailants, and continued their procession in triumph. The next day the Peer presented himself, with all his pupils, at the Durbar of Hyder, and complained of the injuries they had received. Hyder heard them patiently, and then asked them what they wanted of him: they had attacked the party, and had been deservedly beaten; what else could they expect? and what had induced them to act so? The Peer replied 'that the procession was an insult to the Mussalman religion, and ought not to be suffered under a Mussalman government, whilst he, a Mussalman Prince, was at the head of it.' Hyder instantly interrupted him by asking, 'who told you that this was a Mussalman government, or that I was at the head of it? I am sure I never did.' On this the Peer desired a private audience, which was granted; when, finding he could not change Hyder's determination, he declared his intention of quitting the place. Hyder told him he might go wherever he pleased. Extremely indignant, he retired to Arcot, where many fakirs at that time resided; but not finding his new residence as pleasant as his old one, he shortly returned to Seringapatam, and wished again to live within the fort. Hyder, however, positively refused his permission, telling him 'that he had proved himself unworthy of doing so, but that he would give him a house anywhere else.' The Peer retired in wrath to the Black Town (Madras), where he died, and was buried at Chinapatam (Madras)" (Valentia, *Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, etc.*, I. 417-418). The reference to "*Shri Runga*" in the above passage is to God Śrī Ranganātha, the presiding deity of Seringapatam. Possibly by a slip it is referred to as a "goddess." Wilks refers rather sarcastically to Haidar's more than "half-Hindoo propensities" which "had induced him to grant unqualified indemnity to the sacred temple of Tripety (Tirupati), only 9 miles distant from Chandergherry (Chandragiri), to the extent of not even interfering with the payment of a tribute to Mohammad Ali for similar indemnity." (*Mysoor*, II. 97). Elsewhere Wilks once again sneeringly describes Haidar as "half a Hindoo" and as sanctioning the performance of Hindu ceremonies, and adds the remark that that was for him "in the ordinary course of human action." (*Ibid.*, I. 818).

temples."⁹² The national festival of the Dasara was not only kept up but carried out on the scale on which it had been traditionally celebrated. Though he was never proverbially liberal in the matter of largesses, Haidar is said to have been "comparatively liberal" during this period of the year and to have donated freely to his friends and to those who took part in the celebrations.⁹³ It is clear from the accounts given by contemporary writers that he kept up the festival not because it was diplomatic to do so but because he could not well dispense with it. Indeed, Kirmāṇi goes to the extent of stating that to Haidar "every heart was dear" and adds the special plea that "service or agency of infidels is not infidelity."⁹⁴ Haidar was, in fact, in matters of this nature, more Hindu than the Hindus and did not desire interference in anything that helped him to keep close to the reigning king and his subjects. And this is exactly the confession plainly made by Kirmāṇi, when he says that in this connection Haidar desired "to please" King (Kriṣṇarāja II) and his successors, and their ministers.⁹⁵ Haidar also endeavoured to enforce Hindu customs and even pay homage to the common prejudices of the people. Adrian Moens, the Dutch Governor, in his account of Haidar, thus suggests that Haidar at first not only enjoyed the confidence of the people on account of his former services but also "employed a little policy to secure their (the people's) goodwill more and more."⁹⁶ This seems a just appraisal, for, as he says, "although he was a Moor

92. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid.*, 505.

93. This is admitted even by the generally critical Mirza Ikbal (*Ibid.*, 504). Kirmāṇi, indeed, as may be expected, remarks that though the celebration of the Dasara was "a custom of the infidels" and "to follow which he (Haidar) in his heart was averse, still, with a view to please and gain the affections of the Mysoreans," he adhered to the ancient custom (*Ibid.*, 489-490).

94. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid.*, 489.

95. *Ibid.*

96-97. See Adrian Moens, *Memo on the Administration of the Coast of Malabar, dated 18th April 1781*, included in the *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government: Dutch Records No. 13*, P. 151.

or Muhamedan and the Kingdom of Mysore is a heathen country, in which, as is well-known, cows are not eaten, much less killed, he gave out at once strict orders against the killing of cows and announced at the same time that every one was free in the exercise of his religion and if he was obstructed in it, he might complain direct to himself and would obtain satisfaction."⁹⁷ Haidar, in the restraint he laid on himself in this regard, had evidently even higher motives governing his conduct. He had designs on the English at Madras, who had come in the way of the Mysorean conquest of Trichinopoly and the country beyond it. Haidar, it is evident, had schemes in that direction and he desired to keep well with the Hindus, if he was to succeed in his attempt. He even aimed—as will be seen later—at a compromise with the Mahrattas for winning his objective. And, as the sequel will show, he endeavoured to get them to join him in his attempt to drive the English simultaneously out of all their settlements "from the Ganges to the Cape Comorin."⁹⁸ One who had such ambitious projects could not but be friendly to the Hindus and, exceptions apart, could not but have felt the utmost need for the strictest limitations on his powers, however easy their exercise might have seemed to him in his position.

The third limit that Haidar set on himself was his recognition of the duty he owed to his
 (c) *In re* the Army. army. Whether in recruiting, organising or managing it, he showed both talents and energy. A born soldier himself, brought up

Major Charles Stewart, writing in 1809, says that Muhammadans accused Haidar "of reverencing Hindu deities." See his work "*A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of the late Tippoo Sultan of Mysore, Memoir of Hyder Aly Khan*, 42. This *Memoir*, as stated above, is based on two (Persian) memoirs of Haidar written by two persons formerly in the service of Tipū Sultān. Col. Miles, writing in 1842, says that Haidar was, "from policy, and perhaps from superstition, more indulgent to the Hindoos than his son Tippoo." See *History of Hydr Naik*, Preface XX.

98. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 124. Also see below.

in war and accustomed to the vicissitudes of warlike conditions, he possessed the insight to see that his army was so made up that it could not rise against him, come what may. He recruited his men in many ways. He is known to have given loans or made advances of money for securing men. Indeed, one annalist says that these loans and advances "were scattered like sand over the face of the Earth."⁹⁹ The same writer, though never lacking in hyperbolic language, is perhaps not exaggerating when he describes Haidar's instinct for good men. Haidar's estimate of the value of the brave and experienced soldier of whatever tribe or caste he might be, was, he says, very high.¹⁰⁰ And he adds that any man who had distinguished himself by his bravery he heartily cherished and protected, and used his endeavours to promote and exalt him.¹⁰¹ His humility and agreeable manners attracted from all parts many adventurers to his service.¹⁰² He was so far mindful of their services that, at his public audience, he assumed no airs and made no distinction between himself and a private.¹⁰³ Nor was he unmindful of what was owing as his due to the soldier.¹⁰⁴ He would not tolerate—at any rate in his earlier years—any deductions from the salaries of the soldiers.¹⁰⁵

99. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid.*, 476.

100. *Ibid.*

101. *Ibid.* The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 80) records the following interesting particulars relating to Haidar's appreciation of the services of one Balavant Rao, a tried and trusted Mahratta cavalier in his army: Balavant Rao, says the chronicle, was once despatched by Haidar from Chitaldrug with a detachment against the Māpīḷas of Calicut, his wife accompanying him. The Nairs, however, treacherously surprised Balavant Rao, whereupon his wife, galloping the horse, successfully charged the assailants and extricated her husband. Haidar, on receipt of this news, duly honoured her with *Khillats*. The gallant lady died in Seringapatam in November 1781, at just the time when Balavant Rao was himself seriously wounded in an action with the English contingent from Trichinopoly. So grieved was Haidar with the news of these happenings, and so solicitous was he about Balavant Rao's welfare, that he allowed him to retire forthwith from the field, and granted him an allowance of rupees one thousand for the curing of his wounds and a gratuity of rupees three thousand for the expenses of his second marriage, together with suitable *Khillats*.

102. Mirza Ikbal, *Ibid.*, 494

103-105. *Ibid.*

The first thing he did when taking over troops disbanded from the service of another was to pay them their accumulated arrears, an act which at once bound them to himself.¹⁰⁶ His plan of recruitment was so all embracing in character that even the blind were not left out of account.¹⁰⁷ The story is told of him that as he was riding out one day, a blind man asked him for alms. Haidar desired his servant to ask the beggar if he would take service with him. The beggar consented, and Haidar sent him off to the arsenal with the direction that he might be employed in blowing the bellows of the blacksmith's forge, and be allowed a *fanam* a day and two cotton cloths every year. When the artillery marched, the blind man was placed on one of the artillery tumbrils and brought along with them! Haidar's passion for enlistment of all and sundry was so great that he directed the chief of his artillery to enlist as many blind men as he could find.¹⁰⁸ This excessive zeal for enlistment led him sometimes into acts which smacked of oppression. If any one, for instance, arrived in the country, and did not ask for service, Haidar became exasperated. The man was siezed and examined, and was then forced to accept service, or was turned out of the State. Apart from these extreme examples of his desire to recruit good men in all possible ways, he was the friend and protector of the soldier, and towards him he was altogether full of kindness and generosity.¹⁰⁹ He ate, while on the march, what the common soldier ate—parched grain and dry bread made of rice or *rāgi*.¹¹⁰ His love for horses and the care he bestowed on their selection and upbreeding has been mentioned above. Strict in exacting duty, he was even stricter in issuing his commands and commissions. He was precise and exact in

106. He is known to have done this repeatedly.

107. Mirza Ikbāl, *Ibid*, 498-499.

108. *Ibid*, 499.

109. Kirmāni, *Ibid*, 473.

110. *Ibid*, 474-475.

his directions and in their execution did not spare even his son. Whenever Tipū was ordered to repel enemies, or to attack forts, to whatever quarter he might be sent, he was first summoned to the presence and admonished in the manner characteristic of Haidar. Haidar would turn to him, look him full in the face, and with his own lips, tell him that he had selected him for the particular service, because he thought him worthy of it; that he committed a force of so many horse and foot, so many guns, and a treasury of so much money to his orders; that he was to take great care to see that no neglect occurred; and that he was to use great prudence and caution, and return successful. He was then dismissed.¹¹¹ If anything went wrong, Haidar was not the man to excuse. He is known to have personally chastised his own son for remissness of duty on the day he escaped from Chinkurji.¹¹² But, true to his soldierly instinct, Haidar was ever thoughtful of his kind, while on duty in the field. Whenever he despatched a body of troops to perform any particular service, he was never free from anxiety in regard to their safety. Constant supplies were going to them—money, military stores and grain for men and cattle. He paid personal attention to the smallest detail relating to the equipment of the army, so much so, that even leather, the lining of bullock-bags or tent-walls, and strands of rope, all passed under his inspection, and were then deposited in the stores. The suppliers of various things required—merchants and traders—and those who provided the sinews of war—bankers and money-changers—he kept always in good humour. So great was his desire to please them that he made “kingly presents” to them and bought their goods with the greatest avidity and at the highest prices.¹¹³ In the repairs of forts and the construction of new defences, he was unremitting, expending as he did lakhs or crores

111. *Ibid.*, 478.

112. See below.

113. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid.*, 475.

of rupees.¹¹⁴ The state of preparedness he always exhibited in this regard was one that could not be contradicted.¹¹⁵

It is not, however, to be supposed that Haidar invented a new system of administration for forts or that he did anything more than enforce the discipline by which they were bound. The forts were mostly intended for defence purposes and were mainly of three kinds: situated in a plain surrounded by low ground, on a hill, rock, or a rocky tract; or in the midst of a river, *i.e.*, on an island. Seringapatam is a good example of the last of these varieties. From time immemorial, hill and rock fortifications were much valued, as they were deemed best suited to defend populous cities. Kautilya refers to them in his *Artha-Śāstra* (c. 4th cent. B. C.) Haidar appears to have maintained a corps of pioneers at a large expense for military purposes in war. They were employed on useful labours in peace time, more particularly to look after the keeping in repair of fortifications. Each fort had an establishment, at the head of which was the *Killēdār*. The *Killēdār* was both commandant and administrative head. Under him were various officers who had charge of grain, water, stores, ammunition, etc. There was also a clerical staff attached to his office. Discipline was strict. Egress and ingress was strict, while watches and patrols were provided for with scrupulous care. Haidar did not introduce any system of his own in this connection, but enforced the system to which he succeeded—and it had descended to him from a time anterior even to the days of the Vijayanagar kings and going back to the Chōla and Hoysala times—with the utmost rigour, especially in his later days when

114-115. *Ibid.*, 487. Kirmāṇi's words are: "Indeed, the state of the strong hill forts in the Payanghaut and Balaghaut will afford sufficient testimony."

war became almost a passion with him. The garrison was usually made up of both infantry and cavalry units, each fort having a complete establishment of its own. This establishment was usually made up of different classes of people and included Brāhmans, Lingāyats and others, who were known by the common designation of *Gurikārs*. A *Gurikār* was usually a headman of armed peons, whom he controlled. He himself was one well-trained—at least originally—in archery, and was invariably an excellent marksman. The *Gurikārs* generally had assignments of rent-free lands in the vicinity of the forts they served in and they were faithful to a degree, being in many cases those who had already rendered faithful service. Some of their descendants—in Mysore at least—still draw hereditary pensions of varying amounts, being included in the Palace establishment. Some of these belonged really to the intelligence department of the army and as such brought in useful information as to the movements of the enemy. The *Haidar-Nāmāh* not infrequently mentions these *Gurikārs* by name and refers to the particular services rendered by them.

As the main objective of Haidar was the acquisition of territory—in the directions in which Mysore could expand on natural lines, where it had been prevented for some time through machinations—he perceived early that that objective was capable of realization only through force of arms. He was under no delusion whatever as to that. He had seen the fate that had overtaken Mysore in the matter of Trichinopoly after it had fulfilled its part of the contract. He had seen how the English, in the alleged interests of Muhammad Ali, had stood in the way of its surrender to Mysore. Accordingly his first aim was to establish a good army, good by reason of its careful recruitment, and good also because of its improved organization. Haidar had, within the fifteen years he

Adoption of Euro-
pean military disci-
pline.

had served in the army,¹¹⁶ learnt a few lessons from which he tried to profit, now that he had an opportunity to put them to practical use. Chief among these was that discipline was at the very root of a sound military policy. He had realised why Nanjarāja had failed at Trichinopoly. Though he had a large army, though he had expended large sums of money, though he had tried all possible expedients, though he had spent much time on the adventure and though he had risked all his name and fame on it, he had failed in his attempt. He had seen that ill-disciplined masses of men could not make head-way against the picked and disciplined few of the English and the French. He had been impressed as much with English strategy and cunning as with French genius for warfare and diplomacy. Beyond all, he had been deeply impressed, during the course of his frequent conflicts, that European discipline was a *sine qua non* for the efficiency of an army. He had learnt this important lesson from personal experience and the first thing that he did, immediately he got power into his hands, was to introduce it into his own army. In fact, he tried to make it the sheet-anchor of his military organization.¹¹⁷ The story is told of him that when Nanjarāja got the

116. Haidar distinguished himself at the siege of Dēvanahalli in 1746-1747 and received an independent command in that year. In 1761, he successfully displaced both Nanjarāja and Khaṇḍē Rao and came to occupy their posts. In the interval between 1746 and 1761, he had seen much of the Anglo-French warfare in the Karnāṭic and had even taken part in it. See *Ante* pp. 206-209, 229-231, etc.

117. There is hardly a European writer left—contemporary or post-contemporary—that has not remarked on this important fact. For instance, Innes Munro, writing in 1789, says that Haidar was early impressed with the need of "European discipline" if he was "to establish a good army."—*Narrative*, 121. De La Tour (1784) says that he learnt to appreciate French discipline and exercised his troops in French evolutions even.—*Ayder Ali*, I. 56. Adrian Moens (1781) remarks that while with the French "he applied himself diligently to the science of war and observed everything carefully."—*Dutch Records* No. 13, p. 150. Col. Miles (1842) attributes his success to his "ready adoption of the advantages of European discipline."—*History of Hyḍur Naik*, Preface XXI.

French to join him against the English and Muhammad Ali at Trichinopoly in 1752, Haidar, who had been despatched, at the head of eighteen hundred horse, in aid of the French Commandant, showed how observant he could be of things that were taking place round about him. Immediately the Mysore and French armies came together, Haidar, whose camp then formed the left wing of the Mysore forces, came and encamped himself to the right of the French, in spite of the protestations of the French Commandant and even Nanjarāja himself. However disagreeable it might have been to the French to see themselves, as it were, cooped up, he would not remove himself from the station he had occupied. He told the Commandant that he wished to be near the French that he might learn from them the art of war! In fact, he was very observant and exact in noting everything that passed in the French camp and caused several of their evolutions to be repeated, as well as he could, in his own camp! This repetition, it is said, caused some diversion to the French officers and soldiers, whom he was attentive enough to please by his politeness and good manners.¹¹⁸ Whether literally true or not, this story shows that Haidar had come to value discipline for its own sake. It was, however, the first step in the reform of the army. The second was to secure the services of European officers to train his men. As to this, his personal knowledge of the French and his experience of

118. De La Tour, l. c. M. de Maissin, who commanded the French at that time, is mentioned to have been the author of this anecdote. It was held by the French to confute the several stories that had been, prior to its publication, circulated respecting Haidar's intentions in being in a place where he was not wanted. It may be added that though Haidar was an officer of cavalry in Nanjarāja's army at Trichinopoly, he had troops of his own, with whom evidently he had gone over to the right of the French Commandant's troops to learn at close quarters French evolutions. M. Maissin, it may be noted, commanded the French troops in the attempt to surprise Trichinopoly, November 27, 1753. See Orme, *Indostan*, I. 321, 357, 360, 368, 370, 396-397.

their ways and manners had impressed him so deeply that he appears to have first turned to them for help. It is recorded by De La Tour that when Haidar accompanied Nāsir Jang during his descent upon the coast of Coromandel in 1750, he was present at the battle at which Nāsir Jang was killed, and the bravery of the French, who, to the number of but 800, seconded by 4000 sepoys, had the courage to attack the army of the Nizām, numbering more than 3,00,000 strong, made such an impression on Haidar's mind that he was persuaded that the French were capable of undertaking the most difficult enterprises. Following Muzaffar Jang, successor of Nāsir Jang, to Pondicherry, Haidar was even more deeply impressed with the prowess of the French. He there saw with his own eyes that newly sprung city, a bit of real France, both in its setting and make-up, while the observations he made while in it on the manners, discipline, fortifications, buildings, arts and industry of the French gave him the highest idea of that great nation, more especially of Dupleix, their then Governor.¹¹⁹ De La Tour would have us believe that this personal experience of French life and French greatness and its possible causes made Haidar ever after lean towards the French and follow their example. Without going so far, it might be conceded that Haidar had had personal knowledge of the English and the French, and probably also of the Dutch and the Portuguese,¹²⁰ and had learnt to appreciate the European mode of warfare and the iron discipline that dominated it. He clearly perceived how invaluable that discipline would prove when applied to large masses of his own soldiers who lacked the training that would have made them all but invincible in the field. Many fruitful results followed this study of

119. *Ibid.*, I. 51-52.

120. See below for Haidar's relations with these nations. Also Adrian Moens, *Ibid.*, 151, 166.

European tactics and methods of warfare. Foremost among these were his ready adoption of the advantages of European discipline; his application of them to his own troops, even the English words of command being taken over by him, many of his subordinate officers having been decoyed from the English army at Madras; and the increased employment of Europeans in his service, as also of those who had had training in their mode of warfare. Abundant proof of all this is to be found in the history of his career. His contact with Europeans had also a more important effect on him. It strengthened him in his idea of territorial ambition not only in the South of India but also in the West and the East coasts. He saw the Dutch and the Portuguese ill-equipped for warfare and knew that with the troops he could put on the field at any moment, they could not stand him. What could not ample funds, disciplined troops and well directed effort achieve? His mind widened as his perception of the situation he saw before him grew clearer. He saw at his feet unfolding, as it were, an Empire in the South of India coterminous not only with the old Vijayanagar Kingdom but also including the whole of the Malabar coast from Goa to Cape Comorin. That became, as the result of European intercourse, Haidar's imperishable dream.

When we remember this, we can understand easily the passion with which he cultivated in
Recruitment of Europeans of all nations. turn the friendship or enmity of the European settlers in the South; tried to seek offensive and defensive alliances with them; and used their men, in so far as he could absorb them into his own army, for building his arsenals, for manning his artillery, for training his troops, for constructing his ports and, when occasion demanded, for fighting in his ranks against his adversaries. A well-authenticated story is recorded of his first attempt to pick up Europeans for

service in Mysore. As it is one which belongs to the earlier part of his career, it is well worth relating here, especially as it is illustrative of the acuteness of Haidar's character.¹²¹ On his return to Mysore from Muzaffar Jang's camp in 1751, one of the first things he appears to have done was to inform his brother Śābās, then still alive, of the advantages to be derived from the adoption of European modes of warfare, of the superiority of the European arms and of the effective manner in which the Europeans managed their great guns. He succeeded in inducing his brother to despatch a Parsi to Bombay to purchase there, from the English Governor, cannon and muskets with bayonets.¹²² The Parsi purchased, we are told, ten thousand muskets and six pieces of cannon, and, on his way back, enrolled on the Malabar coast thirty European sailors—evidently of different nationalities—to serve as gunners, and returned to Mysore. Śābās thus became "the first Indian who formed a corps of sepoys armed with firelocks and bayonets, and who had a train of artillery served by Europeans." De La Tour, who tells this story, sets the credit of adopting Haidar's advice to his brother Śābās. It is, however, clear that Śābās himself was in the employ of Nanjarāja, the Daḷavāi of Krishnarāja II, and without his aid and co-operation, this purchase of European artillery and small arms,

121. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 52.

122. De La Tour calls Haidar's brother "Meer Ismael Saheb." He may be identified with Śābās. He styles the person despatched as "a Guebre," which is a contemptuous term used by Iranians when they refer to a non-Muslim Iranian, particularly a Zoroastrian. Though the word "guebre" is not restricted to Indian Zoroastrians, and Haidar's agent might have been a Persian Zoroastrian, it is more probable that he was an Indian Zoroastrian who had arrived at Mysore and been employed by Nanjarāja at the request of Śābās and Haidar Ali. De La Tour notes the fact that this Parsi died in 1767. (*Ibid.*). Parsis in India have not been too passionately attached to their religion; they also have followed trade and commerce with the utmost zeal. Dastur Meher-ji Rāna, a Gujerāṭi Parsi theologian, who first met Akbar at the siege of Sūrāt in 1573, became his initiator in Zoroastrianism about 1580. Parsis appear to have reached Calicut pretty early. From Calicut to Mysore, the route cannot have been a matter of any difficulty.

and the importation of European arms and gunners, would have been impossible. Nor is it improbable that Nanjarāja would not have perceived equally clearly the advantage of Haidar's suggestion, if indeed he had not already in his army gunners and others conversant with the use of firelocks and bayonets. There is evidence to believe that he had these in his service, as we see mention made both of *pirangis* (cannon) and *parangis* (Europeans) in the *Bhāshā-patra* (deed of promise) he entered into with King Krishnarāja in 1758.¹²³ Probably the practice of maintaining guns and gunners is much older than this date, though Haidar's ardent desire for a more effective mode of warfare gave it a prominence never known before. This is the more probable as we see not only a growing desire on the part of Haidar, as

123. The *Bhāshā-patra* between king Krishnarāja II and Nanjarāja, his Minister, is dated in *Śaka* 1680 or 1758 A.D. Under this agreement which was come to at the mediation of Haidar and Khandē Rao, Krishnarāja II allowed to Nanjarāja the sum of 224,000 *varahas* "for the pay of 700 horse, 2000 *bārr* (sepoys), 500 Karnātakas (Karnātak sepoys), 500 *janjālu*. 106 guns (*pirangi*), 10 *parangi* (Europeans), *kāfer* (Kāfirs), *Kāregārs* and others" for service under him, the same to be raised from districts assigned to him. Evidently the use of a fixed number of guns and the employment of a fixed number of European gunners had been in vogue for some years past in Mysore. Presumably their numbers were in proportion to the general strength of the army under its different heads. The *Bhāshā-patra* was concluded shortly after Krishnarāja's attempt to throw off the authority of Nanjarāja in 1756, and the retirement of the latter's brother Dēvarāja from his official position. It will be found referred to at p. 202 above and further down below at some length. The use of guns in Indian warfare goes back to Vijayanagar days. During the reign of Krishṇadēvarāya of that dynasty (1509-1530), guns and muskets were employed in the reduction of Raichūr in 1520. The Portuguese were prominent in this battle. A large force of Portuguese fought on the Vijayanagar side and the spoil that fell to Krishṇadēva Rāya included 400 heavy cannons, besides small ones and 900 gun-carriages. At the siege of Raichūr itself, Krishṇadēva Rāya was assisted by one Christovao de Figueiredo, a Portuguese horse-dealer, who was evidently an adept in the use of guns and led a contingent of musketeers, whom he had brought with him (see *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 1843, 1845). Gunpowder was introduced into Indian warfare by the Portuguese in or about 1500 A.D. In 1526, the Mughals adopted it as a means of warfare. Krishṇadēva Rāya of the Vijayanagar dynasty was the first to use it in Southern India at the siege of Raichūr. See Appendix III, for a note on gunnery in India.

time passed, to increase the number of European troops but also to remake his army on new lines with their aid. Among the Europeans thus recruited by him, the greater number were French, though there were representatives of other European nations as well.¹²⁴ There were

124. Among the French were M. La Maitre De La Tour; Sieur Stenet (De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 56); Lally (Wilks, I. 415); Hughel (*Ibid.*, 49, 167) who probably was Swiss in origin; and M. Allen, who took service under Haidar at Seringapatam in 1761, after the capitulation of Pondicherry, with his party of 300 Europeans, who subsequently were "of the greatest utility to him, in disciplining his infantry and in the management of his artillery and arsenals" (Major C. Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan*, 15). The last-mentioned must be the Mons. Alain referred to by Wilks (I. 264). M. Alain and M. Hughel were operating in 1761 between Thiaghur and the hills for the purpose of collecting and covering supplies to Pondicherry, then being besieged by the English. When they heard of its fall on 16th January 1761, they joined Haidar at Bangalore. Their troops consisted of 200 cavalry and 100 infantry, all Europeans and some scattered detachments of Indians. They were on Haidar's side in his first vain efforts against Khanḍē Rao at Nanjangūd. Orme styles Alain Major Allen and speaks of him as an officer of Lally's regiment. (*Indostan*, II. 703, 714, 715). According to Orme, Allen led the French cavalry on the night of 3rd December 1760, rushed out of the pettah of Thiaghur and went to the west of Tiruvannāmalai. According to Orme, Allen offered Thiaghur and Gingee to Visāji Punt with Rs. 500,000 for helping the French for relieving Pondicherry in January 1761. When he went over to Haidar on the fall of Pondicherry, he was accompanied by the person called the Bishop of Halicarnassus. (*Ibid.*) Lally was joined a little later by a number of French deserters or prisoners, who escaped from Pondicherry during or after the siege of 1778 (*Ibid.*, 28). Another Frenchman in Haidar's service was M. Jani, who commanded a regiment of Anglo-Indians [Kirmāpi, *Ibid.*, 390. He describes the regiment as one made up of "Chittikars," evidently a corruption of the "Shattalkars," a Tamil word still in current use in the Tamil districts of Madras for "Anglo-Indians," i.e., those who wear the "Shattai" or coat, the reference being to the principal dress (red coat) worn by these people to cover the main part of their body. The word is often written to-day as "Chattakārs" or "Chettakārs." Col. Miles was right when he explained the term thus: "Chittikars" are so called, I believe, from their clothes, perhaps the tiger-striped cotton—*Ibid.*, 46 and 211, f.n.]. Belonging to the Portuguese nation was one Mequinez (De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 157), and after him his wife, whom Haidar appointed as woman-Colonel of his corps until her adopted son came of age. To the same nation belonged Eloy Joze Correa Peixoto, Captain of the Portuguese troops at Goa, who entered the service of Haidar in April 1768 and served in the Mysore Army till August 1770, with a short break between November 1767—May 1769. He was "chief of the Vanguard and of all the European Fusiliers and the Regiment of Grenadiers." (See his Ms. entitled "*Anecdotes relative to the rise*

at least "one hundred European cannoneers of different nations" in the service of Haidar, if we are to believe De La Tour,¹²⁵ apart from the rank and file forming the European forces serving in the Mysore army at the time.¹²⁶ That these European employees were highly prized as gunners is also evident from the fact that the annalists of the period speak of them in terms of high praise. Thus, Kirmāṇi describes the artillery men in Haidar's service as "the sureties of conquest."¹²⁷ Not a campaign was undertaken by Haidar without an adequate artillery train forming part of its equipment nor a battle fought without its aid. Thus, at the taking of Arcot, Haidar, it is said, employed seventy guns.¹²⁸

of Hyder Ally"—British Museum Addl. Mss. 19287. The references in this work, however, are to a copy of this Ms. in the Mysore Archaeological Office, entitled *Memoirs of Hyder Ally*—see p. 99). Of the same nationality were Joze Austin de Menezes, who was Captain Commandant of Artillery in Haidar's army in 1770 (*Ibid.*, p. 145), and Manuel, who joined him in 1761 (Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 50, 91, 93). Among the Irish were Turner (De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 150), and his first Captain Minerva (*Ibid.*, I. 153). Of the Swedish nationality, there was at least one, who was an accomplice of Turner in an infamous spying affair (*Ibid.*, I. 169, f.n.). Among the Germans, there was Constantin, a native of Andarnac on the Rhine in the Electorate of Cologne, who was serjeant, when M. Hughel commanded the Europeans in Haidar's army (*Ibid.*, II. 25, f.n.); and there was Lene, a Westphalian, who was Captain of the Grenadier Topasses (*Ibid.*, II. 183-184, f. n.); under him served one Mammon, a Maltese, who with this officer distinguished himself at the battle of Raṭṭihalli (*Ibid.*). And among the English, there was one who had been appointed by Haidar as Admiral of his fleet (*Ibid.*, II. 15). Elsewhere De La Tour calls him Stanet. Stanet displaced Aḥi Rāṇa, whom Haidar dismissed for his ill-treatment of the King of the Maldives. (*Ibid.*, I. 98). He was evidently Admiral on the Malabar Coast.

125. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 206.

126. M. Lally joined Haidar with the following forces, which represented about one-fifth of the number which he had stipulated to bring: 100 European infantry, 50 European cavalry, 1000 Indian infantry and 2 guns. See Wilks, I. 415. While in the Nizām's service, he bore the title of Rustum-Jang (Kirmāṇi, *Ibid.*, 813). Cf. Kirmāṇi (*Ibid.*, 390), who says that Haidar entertained Lally "with a body of 2000 regular infantry, 500 Europeans or Portuguese, and 100 Allemaund horse." Haidar's arsenal at Diṇḍigal was under the superintendence of French artificers, whose services he obtained from Pondicherry. This was in 1755.

127. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid.*, 297.

128. *Ibid.*, 380.

Haidar, indeed, appears to have been most indebted in all his battles to his artillery and his European and regular infantry under these European officers. These officers seem to have done duty with the artillery in times of need, as was actually the case when Baillie's detachment was defeated, the blowing up of the tumbril being entirely ascribed to Lally.¹²⁹

There can be no doubt that Haidar was early impressed with the importance of a well-manned, a well-trained and a well-equipped army. When exactly he added the artillery to his equipment is perhaps inferable from the Śābās story narrated above. But, apart from the statement of De La Tour, we have other evidence to support the view that Haidar got his first lessons in European military tactics while serving with the French, when the French were at the height of their reputation in India under Dupleix. Moens, indeed, specifically states that it was during the period of his service with the French, in or about 1751, that "he applied himself diligently to the science of war and observed everything carefully."¹³⁰ A short time later, when he increased his corps from 500 to 3,000 men, "he provided his men with artillery, further informed himself of everything that belonged to warfare and in this way soon got an idea of European tactics, so that he was able to manœuvre fairly regularly and did much execution with his corps of 3000 men, well provided with artillery wherever he was employed or stationed."¹³¹ When he took Bednūr,¹³² he not only secured and fortified it but also took hold of Honāvar, Basrūr, Bār-kūr and Mangalore, the four well-known ports of Canara, and the country

129. See Kirmāpi, *Ibid.*, 93, f.n. Also below.

130. Adrian Moens in *Dutch Records* No. 13, 150

131. *Ibid.*

132. See below.

beyond them forming part of the uplands.¹³³ He also made himself strong at sea at the same time by building ships, *palens* (country boats), *gallivats* (large row-boats) and other vessels.¹³⁴ The Portuguese, it would appear, "assisted him on the sly by allowing many private soldiers and even officers to enter his service in order to keep this dangerous conqueror their friend."¹³⁵ It would thus seem that between 1751 and 1763, *i.e.*, between his 29th and 41st years of age, covering a period of service in the Mysore army of about 13 years,¹³⁶ he had not only convinced himself of the need for modernising the army, if he was to succeed in his ambitious designs, but had also adopted the military tactics, equipment and discipline of the European nations and had even successfully absorbed into his ranks as many of the European adventurers as he could get at or induce to join. He also attracted unto himself European artificers and sepoys who had undergone training and won experience in the service of the English Company. To these he held out high hopes of rapid advancement and the most tempting rewards. To win such over, he never lacked suitable emissaries in the English Company's service. He was so signally successful in this endeavour of his that before long his forces had so far imbibed the new training and the new discipline that English words of command came to displace the local ones throughout his army.¹³⁷ These and other changes directly helped Haidar to remake his army on modern lines, so that his troops soon became capable of meeting on equal terms those in the employ of the European settlers in India.

133. Adrian Moens, *Ibid.*, 151.

134. *Ibid.*

135. *Ibid.*

136. Assuming that he was born in 1722 and counting his personal service from 1740, when he received an independent command.

137. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 121.

The reason why Haidar remodelled the army is to be seen in the conditions of the time. His displacement of the territorial system by the paid personal service system. The *mansabdāri* system, in which he had been brought up, was found to be practically unwise to continue and, from the military point of view, useless. It had had a long and ancient history to back it but it was compatible only with the existence of a strong centralized government, a government that could keep the *mansabdārs* in check, make them do their duties by their sovereign and keep the forces under their control in proper condition. The competition for men was beginning to be felt about the time that Haidar rose to power. Numerous local potentates and chiefs were competing for power. They depended on their armies for realising their ambitious designs. The French, the English, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Danes were in the field and each of these to some extent were recruiting for their old-established or new-fledged armies, particularly the English and the French. Their hold on their men was personal; their contact with them continuous; and their training was on lines that made for efficiency. Their equipment too was modern and their corporate character had an effect on their discipline and their conduct in the field. Haidar had observed all this and had been deeply impressed by what he had seen. The *mansabdāri* system was essentially territorial in character. The officers were spread over the land. The State taxes granted to them in the districts assigned to them for military service could not often help to maintain the horses, elephants and the men they had to keep. The system had, besides, bred laziness, license, extravagance and greed in the *mansabdārs* who ate up all the grant, no money being left to pay the men who formed the ranks. The result was the *amīrs* dressed up their grooms and servants as soldiers and passed them off at the muster, and then sent them back to their own

work. As Badauni had observed as early as the reign of Akbar, the Mughal Emperor, " the treasure, tax-gathering and expenditure of the *mansabdārs* remained unchanged but in every way dirt fell into the plate of the poor soldier, and he could not gird up his loins. Weavers, cotton-dressers, carpenters and Hindu and Muslim chandlers would hire a charger, bring it to the muster, obtain a *mansab* and become a *crōri*, trooper, or substitute for some one; a few days later, not a trace would be found of the hired horse, and they became footmen again.¹³⁸ The dangers, evils and uncertainties of the system were probably too well realized by Haidar to be perpetuated by him any longer, especially in the conditions in which he found himself. Those competing for power—principally the French and the English—made the individual soldier the unit of recruitment; they had made direct control the principle of their military policy; and they had made the maintenance, upkeep and well-being of the soldier a matter between themselves and the soldier, allowing no intermediary to step in and claim either his service or his loyalty. Haidar was not slow to grasp the advantages of the new system he saw in actual operation before him. He not only adopted it but also tried to improve on it by making it the lever for centralizing all authority in himself, thus paving the way for the unification of the country as quickly as he might, so that the expansionist policy he so ardently aimed at—adopting in this respect wholesale Nanjarāja's policy—may be pursued without let or hindrance from within. His policy was essentially one of peace at home and force abroad, a policy without which he could not have made any impression either on his own contemporaries or on posterity, however talented personally he might have been as a soldier.

138. Badauni, II. 189 *et seq.*

The policy of unification inside appealed to him not only as mere good policy but also as a corollary to his policy of unification. eminently practical politics.¹³⁹ His ideal of peace within and force abroad required as its first corollary the early subjugation of the *Pālegārs* on the one side and the few independent States left in the north-west and the west on the other.¹⁴⁰ They were sources of trouble and weakness to him. His great advantage over his opponents was the possession of all power in his hands. The new army policy put all his forces also at his personal disposal. All his resources could thus be used against each of them in turn to overcome them. He could, in fact, fight them one by one at his own convenience and subdue them. They had neither the willingness nor the opportunity for combining against him. Each of these in turn became thus an easy prey, though some of them appear to have fought him bravely and even with obstinacy. They did not lack fighting spirit nor a cause to defend. The love of independence had bred in them, for ages, the love of their hearths and homes, and the love of their religion and their country was so great that they would not yield except after a struggle. But Haidar's devotion to the principle of unification, his determination to overcome all obstacles in this regard, and his great anxiety to finish this work as quickly as may be possible, had made him steal his heart. He refused to yield to any compromise in this matter. He wanted nothing less than complete surrender. He was a firm believer in the principle underlying the maxim *parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos*. Whoever stood in the way was not spared. His organized army did its work, and his enemies told the

139. Haidar seems to have foreseen the need for unification about 1761-1762. In a letter dated January 18, 1762, he says: "By the blessing of God, if we may be united, many affairs will be dispatched" (*Fort St. George Records: Milly. Count. Corres.*, X. No. 21).

140. See Chs. XIII, XVII-XIX below.

rest in sorrow. Before his trained men, his disciplined cavalry and his fire-spitting artillery, the Pālegār retainers or even the better bred soldiers of ancient kings could make no headway. The result was, as might be expected, total annihilation and the annexation of their country and the absorption of their military forces into that of Haidar's own.

Haidar thus early realized the inter-relation that existed between the unification of the country and the unification of the army and its control by a centralized authority. There is hardly any doubt that he definitely understood the advantages of the new system and he worked to make it not only the basis of his army organization but also the corner-stone of his political ambitions. He went on the principle that the more he kept his eye on the individual soldier and made him look to him for his living, preferment and promotion, the more he would be able to achieve the ambitions he had set his heart on. He took a comprehensive, common-sense view of the situation he was in at the time he came to power. Haidar, though an admirer of the French, was not, in the beginning, at any rate, for an intensification of the relations of Mysore with the French at Pondicherry. He realized that both the French and the English aimed at power and that they used the country powers as pawns in their own game. His attitude towards all the European nations in India was the same: to use them, to keep them away or to subdue them, as his needs may dictate. It was the attitude of the English that dispelled him from them. As the years sped, his cry against them became louder and louder. At the time we are writing of, Haidar, with a view to eventualities, evidently reviewed the immediate past with a view to provide for the immediate future, so that chaos may be avoided at home and a step taken to assert its advance all round to avoid chaos.

beyond it. The impression that his European neighbours had made on him determined him to wipe them out successively out of the country, if they did not voluntarily agree to come to terms with him on the basis of a friendly agreement. With this view, he sought (a) unification of territory; (b) unification of army; and (c) unification of administrative control, civil and military, in himself. He desired to lead the country politically and the army in its military defence. He made it plain as to who was the authorized leader in the task he took on himself. Nobody could in the least doubt that. Hence the mistake of foreign writers of the period that he was "Sovereign" while he was only asserting a right vested in him by virtue of his office, both as Dewān and as Generalissimo. He had gone so far as to make known to foreign circles that if necessity arose he would know how to strike for his country. He made his peace army his war army supported by military stores, commissariat, arsenals and a navy even to protect the coast and the frontiers. Much as he desired peace, he said, in effect, that he would not suffer any weakening of the one instrument he possessed, which was best fitted to maintain peace. With the army he rose, and with the army he remained, worked and died.

The policy of unification of the country was only a means to an end. That end involved the execution of the policy of expansion initiated by Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar and sought to be given fuller effect to by Nanjarāja, his (Haider's) Chief. To it Haider was fully wedded. Indeed, it would be right to say that the unification of the country under one ruler was with him the first step in the execution of the larger policy of natural expansion southwards, in which Mysore had been lately thwarted by Muhammad Ali and the English at Madras. Haider, to overcome the odds against him, would seem to have

Policy of unification only a means to an end.

evolved a workable policy of unification coupled with expansion. The first aim of that policy was to secure the country, adding to it all such parts, within and without, in the immediate vicinity, as to make peace at home possible and maintain that peace at all cost. Next, to make Mysore internally so strong that every one casting covetous glances at it would be afraid to attack it. His newly evolved army was to function in such a way as to make possible attacks on the integrity of the Mysore realm impossible. Not only that. He aimed at using the favourable home position, the strength of his army and the new-born ardour of his forces for prosecuting Mysore's advance southwards. That, at any rate, was the load-star that guided his military and territorial ambitions in the first instance. Vengeance, always sweet, was sweeter in this case. The diplomatic intrigue which had made Mysore lose Trichinopoly had left a deep impression on him. He had made up his mind definitely as to what he was after, and all his preparations had for their objective, its realization. His aim, briefly put, was : " Our goal is the South, to which Trichinopoly is the key. With its capture, our goal will be reached. One people from Mysore to Cape Comorin ; one State ; one Ruler." ¹⁴¹ He was anxious to avoid conflicts in the South with the English at Madras ; with the Nizām ; and with the Mahrattas. Neither did he want to get himself involved in conflicts with the Dutch and the Portuguese. With all these nations, he tried to make offensive and defensive alliances. But all this was only to effectuate the more easily his objective, if possible peaceably, if not, by the application of force. He would not accordingly agree to the British protest to his friendly overtures, time and again, either on behalf of themselves or their ally Muhammad Alī ; or to their intervention in

141. *Vide*, on this point, Chs. XVII, XXI below.

the name of the Imperial House of Delhi, or its representative, the Nizām. Such a protest, such an overture, such an intervention carried no meaning to him. It did not possess any moral weight with him, nor did he consider it of even formal importance. His appeal was to the sword.

Haidar well knew what such an appeal meant. It plainly suggested to him the reduction of his opponents by every means open to him. Experience had taught him that it would not do to stay still and hope for the much desired advance towards the South. He felt it his duty to take hold of every opportunity to prosecute that aim ; to take every active step to further its realization ; and to remove every obstacle that stood in the way of its achievement. He thus came to evolve a policy which might help him to attain the end he had in view. That policy may be summed up as the policy of peace at home and force abroad. Its rapid evolution was rendered possible by the power that came to be vested in him ; by the immediate sensible use he made of it, especially in getting together a cabinet of ministers who gave to it a national character ; and by the creation of conditions which would not mean anything detrimental to himself, or provoke any enmity in court circles, or outside the State, especially among the Mahrattas who were ever ready to intervene, ostensibly in the interests of Mysore but actually in their own, as competitors for the vacant Southern Empire.¹⁴²

This move at unification was necessitated as much by political as by economic causes. The free movement of armies was not the only thing aimed at ; nor was the suppression of petty chiefs who might be got at by a designing enemy the only concern. The State was expanding and

The policy both a political and an economic move.

142. See Chs. XIII, XVII-XIX below.

the free movement of goods and the free interchange of merchantable articles from one part of the country to the other was also found necessary in the interests of the people who had come increasingly under the sway of Mysore since the days of Chikkadēvarāja. Trade was seeking to find new outlets and there was no reason why the demands of trade—both local and foreign—should not be met. Haidar knew that he would meet with opposition—strenuous opposition—in the working out of his policy. There was, first, the new Muhammadan element from the north, let loose by Aurangzib's subjugation of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa; he knew also the forces of the Nizām, who claimed as much as the agent of Imperial Delhi as in his own interests; he knew also the invented claims of the Nawāb of Arcot; and he knew the ambitions of the Mahrattas. But he had no regard for the pretensions of any of these. He regarded all of them as interlopers, as poachers in a field not their own. Though the first three of these professed the same religion as himself, he felt that any toleration of their claims in the South and their existence in the South for any length of time was a source of danger to the peace and prosperity of the South. He conceived it his duty, as the representative of the biggest organized State in the South, despite the fact that he professed the same religious faith with them, that he should maintain the long recognized political and territorial integrity of the South. He was ready to treat with them so long as they were ready to peaceably deal with him in the matters he was interested in. Immediately they showed a tendency to thwart his aims, or to work against him by any combinations, he made no secret of his determination to take all steps necessary to put them down. It was this determination—a determination which dominated his unification policy from first to last—that brought against him the combined wrath of all his enemies, the English, the

Nizām and the Mahrattas. In his policy of unification of the South, they saw their own ruin, their own fall, and their own final disappearance from the land, which each of them had desired to dominate. Each of these thought—rightly or wrongly—that he had a right to consider the effect of Haidar's policy of the unification of the South of India on his own fortunes. They jointly and severally disputed Haidar's right to dominate the South. They failed to note that he, in prosecuting this particular policy of the unification of the South, was only asserting the right of Mysore to stand forth as the natural successor of the Vijayanagar Empire and for its traditional policy of keeping the South outside the ambitions of extraneous powers, whoever they were, Muhammadan, Mahratta, or from over the Seas. Haidar did not stand for himself personally in this matter but for Mysore, just as much as Nanjarāja did before him or even Khanḍē Rao or any other minister would have done in his place. This simple fact affords the key to Haidar's whole political and military policy, and why he ever had his eye fixed on Trichinopoly and why he adopted a ruthless policy of internal subjugation and outward expansion from sea to sea.

Haidar's views and objectives were soon perceived by his contemporaries, though some would not believe in his capacity to prosecute or realize them. Among these, the English at Madras easily stood first, despite the persistent goading of their ally Muhammad Ali. Haidar's means, however, for the realization of his objectives were many and among them the chief were: the building up of a strong army, disciplined and equipped on modern lines; the adding of an artillery wing to each army corps; the rapid manufacturing of weapons and implements of warfare; the perfecting of a well-ordered system of commissariat; the opening up of communication by sea

The means he employed to carry it through.

and fixing up contacts with friendly nations beyond it; and making the country self-sufficient and stronger and stronger daily, so that Mysore may be listened to with respect by the powers fighting for supremacy in the South, among whom she had not been an insignificant figure so far. When Haidar put into operation his policy, the English saw, for the first time, to their dismay, what it would mean to them and to their very existence.

There is, so far as it is at present known, no contemporary description available of the Mysore army as it was developed by Haidar. But there are indications in the writings of the period as to how it was evolved by him and how he came to be influenced by what he had seen of and learnt from the army systems in vogue among the French, the English and other foreign nations with whom he had come into close personal contact during the earlier part of his career. He had seen that the efficiency of the armies maintained by these nations depended on the personal loyalty of the men forming it; on the systematic manner in which they were trained and officered; on the punctuality with which, so far as it was possible, their salaries were met; on the regularity and readiness with which their needs were satisfied while in the field; and on the confidence that the army commanders, and in the last resort the head of the army, infused into the rank and file by their general disposition and conduct towards them. He had seen also that though the armies of these nations had been drawn from different races and even different nationalities and creeds, they were held together by discipline; by the inculcation of personal loyalty and by the interest shown in the welfare of those composing them. Haidar, shrewd as he was, saw that if the foreign nations could build up well-trained armies from the material available in the land, there was no reason why he should not attract unto himself suitable

men for carrying out his aims and objectives. There is hardly any doubt that he remodelled the Mysore army broadly on the lines on which the English and the French had modelled their own.

As regards the French, Haidar was, as we have seen, a careful student of the French army and its discipline. The French not only undertook to train Indian troops but also to keep them entirely Indian in character. The European part was recruited in France itself, though it was diluted by men chosen in Bourbon and Mauritius. They also recruited men of mixed parentage, known as *Topasses*, who were mostly of Portuguese extraction. They also imported *Coffres* from Madagascar. Locally, they chose recruits from the different Hindu castes and from the Muhammadans. The first sepoys appear to have been recruited in 1740 for carrying on a petty local war in Mahé. Dumas brought over three companies of them to defend Karikal against Tanjore. La Bourdennais, who had been greatly impressed with their valour, induced a further importation in 1746.¹⁴³ Dupleix who saw the advantage of possessing such troops—raised at a cost considerably lower than European or imported—left the discipline and command to Indians themselves, except when they were fighting in conjunction with European troops under European officers. Haidar had personal knowledge of French discipline and valour and was from all accounts greatly impressed by both. When Pondicherry fell in 1761, Haidar took over all the

143. Ananda Ranga Pillai represents Dupleix as raising the first set of Indian troops—see *Di. A. Pi.*, VII. 163 *et seq.* But see *Ante* p. 112. *Coffres*: Natives of Madagascar and of the west coast of Africa, first recruited by the French for service in their settlements in India and later by the English at Madras. The name is a corruption of *Kāfir*, a non-believer; a non-Muslim; a name given to non-Muslims by Muslims. *Kāfiristan* in the N. W. of India is a part of what is now Afghanistan which did not yield to Muhammadans. A company of *Coffres* served with credit during the Karnātic War, 1751-1754.

available French troops—European and Indian—for service under him. His brother-in-law Mokhdum brought with him all the French cavalry under Mons. Allen and Hughes together with such workmen as were at Pondicherry, “a precious acquisition” which highly contributed to the success of Haidar by furnishing him with skilful armourers, carpenters and other workmen from the arsenal of Pondicherry, collected with much expense and trouble by the French.¹⁴⁴ Among these was Mons. Lally who joined him with 100 European infantry; 1,000 Indian infantry; 50 European cavalry and 2 guns.¹⁴⁵

The English raised troops for the first time shortly after September 1746, when Madras the English at capitulated to the French under Madras. Admiral De La Bourdonnais. Haidar was in his twenty-fourth year then and had held for six years an independent command in the Mysore army. The troops raised were European cavalry, artillery and infantry, and Indian infantry. Of these, the European cavalry never rose above the strength of a squadron, and were not maintained for more than a few years.¹⁴⁶ The Nawāb of Arcot opposed its strengthening because such a step would have thrown out of employment most of his adherents to whom it was the main source of sustenance and social distinction. Besides, the English found that though the cavalry were useful and efficient, they were too expensive. The English accordingly depended, during their first and second wars with Haidar (1767-1769 and 1780-1784), entirely on their infantry and artillery, while Haidar's forces consisted principally of cavalry.¹⁴⁷ The first troops which were raised by the

144. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 64.

145. Wilks, *Mysore*, I. 756.

146. Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, I. 6, 22-23.

147. The French general De La Tour, writing about 1782, observes that the “English have never yet succeeded in the attempt to form a good

English were for the defence of their settlement at Fort St. David at Cuddalore,¹⁴⁸ to which they had transferred themselves after the surrender of Fort St. George to the French in September 1746. The first levies, being drawn from classes unaccustomed to warfare, knew no discipline. They were armed with matchlocks, bows and arrows, spears, swords, bucklers, daggers and other weapons, much like their brethren in the Hindu and Muhammadan armies of the time.¹⁴⁹ They consisted of

troop of European horse in India." He attributed this not so much to lack of interest in forming one as to their desire to subject such a troop to "good discipline" (*Ayder Ali*, II. 18). He adds: "The excellence of the English cavalry is sufficiently acknowledged in Europe; and its advantages consist less in the goodness of the horse than in the choice of the horsemen. The pay of a horseman in England is such as renders his situation very eligible; so that the sons of rich farmers and tradesmen are very desirous of entering into the service. This being the case, it is in the power of the officers to select handsome, well-formed men of good character, and to keep them in good discipline, merely for the fear of being dismissed. The officers who were first entrusted with the formation of a body of cavalry in India, thought to establish and preserve the same discipline among them without attending to the great difference of time, place and persons. The recruits sent from England to India are in general libertines . . . and as the Company will not dismiss a soldier, all the punishment inflicted on a horseman is to reduce him to serve in the infantry; so that a man is no sooner put in the cavalry than he is sent back again to his former station." Contrasting English and French modes of recruiting to the cavalry division, De La Tour says: "The French have succeeded in forming very good cavalry in India, by attending more to their horsemanship, and less to their discipline and manners" (*Ibid*, II. 19-20). Col. Smith's despatches of September 1767 contain earnest complaints against the want of cavalry. The complaints continued till 1792. The English at Madras considered this subject of the deficiency in cavalry again and again but the expense involved in the forming of a cavalry force seems to have always stood in the way. As mentioned in the text above, the true reason was that the Nawāb of the Karnātic would not agree to the development of a cavalry force by the English because that would have meant the extinction of his own cavalry force and with it the means of employment of his followers and dependents.

148. About 100 miles south of Madras, and 12 miles from Pondicherry. When Madras fell, the garrison at Fort St. David consisted of 200 Europeans, 100 Topasses, a few Mahratta horse and about 2,000 Indians, who were mostly undisciplined and only partially supplied with fire-arms (Wilson, *Ibid*, 24).

149. See below for descriptions of the armies of Haidar and of the Nizām.

bodies of varying strength, each under the command of its own chief, who received from the authorities the pay of the whole body and distributed it to the men, or was at least supposed to do so. Not infrequently these chiefs were the owners of the arms carried by the men, and received from each man a rupee a month for the use of the weapons. This system, though seemingly lax, was sound in principle and worked well. The salary due was paid regularly to the chiefs and was, relatively speaking, so good as to make dismissal from the service a punishment. But the English took time to perceive the value of the South Indian as a fighter. They had, indeed, such a poor opinion of him that despite what the French had, before their very eyes, made of him by discipline, they looked, at least for twelve more years (1746 to 1758), to other fields for recruitment. During this period, they continued to prefer any material to what lay immediately by their hand. They enlisted European adventurers of all nations, the refuse of their respective countries; they tried Topasses and Coffres; they sent to Bombay for Arabs, Rajputs and Hindustānis; they imported and purchased slaves from Madagascar; and, indeed, exploited all sources except the country in which they had settled and lived in for over a century. In 1756, however, the Nawāb of Bengal took Calcutta and they were compelled to send every man they could spare under Lieut.-Col. Clive to retrieve their fortunes there. They did this with great reluctance, for it was known that war between France and England was imminent, and a large French force was expected daily on the coast of Coromandel. But the position in Bengal was so pressing that they resolved to run the risk, giving, however, the strictest injunction that the Madras troops should be sent back as soon as Calcutta was retaken. This, however, was found impossible; the French force did arrive; and the English at Madras found themselves in great danger.

Fort St. David fell and the French proceeded to lay siege to Fort St. George. Under this severe pressure, the English for the first time realized that they should make the most of the South Indian sepoy a better fighter by discipline. In August 1758, the Indian forces in their employ were formed into regular companies of 100 men each, with a due proportion of Indian officers, Havildārs, Naiks, etc.,¹⁵⁰ and sound rules were also evolved for regulating their pay and promotion. Next, the companies were formed into battalions, five being formed in September 1759, a sixth being added shortly after. Others were raised during the next eight years, the establishment standing at sixteen battalions in February 1767. Shortly after, the battalions were drawn together (by Col. Joseph Smith, a master of both strategy and tactics) and brigaded and placed under picked officers, European and Indian. Necessary regulations were also adopted in January 1766 for the better management of the force, the same being made into a code and published for the information and guidance of the officers.¹⁵¹

The example of a South Indian army thus brought into being by the English at Madras, at the English at Madras very time that Haidar was rising to as it stood in 1761. power and watching the development of the events in the country, cannot have been lost on one so shrewd and observant like him. By about 1761, the English had organized an army made up of European Cavalry, Indian Cavalry,¹⁵² Artillery, Engineers, European Infantry and Indian Infantry. The European Cavalry was a small one. It consisted of 100 privates drafted from the battalions of infantry and divided into two troops of 50 privates each, though as a matter of fact each troop did not actually exceed 40 men. The Indian

150. Spelt as *Naigues* by the writers of the 18th century.

151. Wilson, *Ibid.*, 6-10.

152. Then called *Native* cavalry. In conformity with modern terminology, the word *Indian* has been substituted for *Native*.

Horse consisted of about 900 men, quite undisciplined. They had seen no service during the war except as scouts and foragers, and in the way of laying waste the enemy's country. The Artillery consisted of two companies, each suitably officered. The train consisted of two 12 pounders, ten 6 pounders and three 5½ inch Howitzers. The establishment of Indian officers attached to Gun Lascars was fixed at one Tindal to each gun and one syrang to every two guns, this establishment being required to make the lascars do their duty satisfactorily. The superior corps consisted of one Chief Engineer and three officers. The European Infantry at the time Fort St. George surrendered in 1746, consisted of about 200 men. This was raised in 1747 to 550 by drafting 100 each from Bombay and Bengal and 150 from England. In the same year, an adaptation of the English articles of war was introduced, in order to keep the troops under control and in proper discipline. These provided against mutiny and sedition, the use of violence against superior officers, disobedience, show of force, desertion, escape from lawful custody, misbehaviour, etc. These articles enjoined trial by Courts-martial.¹⁵³ In June 1748, the Infantry was, under the orders of the Court of Directors, formed into seven companies, further regulations being introduced, at the Court's instance, for maintaining strict discipline. The war in the Karnātic necessitated additional troops. The Court of Directors, in 1750, offered inducements to secure recruits. They also arranged for the raising of two companies of Swiss in Protestant cantons, and detachments of these arrived at Madras in 1751 and the following three years. These altogether numbered about 500 men, besides eight officers. These two companies enjoyed for a time certain privileges, the

153. Major Lawrence was in January 1748 appointed President of all Courts-martial, Lieut. James Ope being nominated to be Judge-Advocate. In October 1753, Major Lawrence was empowered to assemble and appoint Courts-martial when in the field (*Wilson, Ibid.*, 52).

men being triable by their own officers and according to their own martial law.¹⁵⁴ These privileges, however, were withdrawn early in 1757, the Swiss Companies being placed in all respects on the same footing as the English infantry and made subject to the same Courts-martial. Besides these mercenary troops, there were from time to time drafts of regiments newly raised in England, granted to the Company by His Majesty's Government in England, and they were sent out for service. There were also Royal troops despatched for service, whose officers took rank before the Company's officers of the same grade, a source of much discontent until its removal.¹⁵⁵ The need for men was so great that the deserters from the French were eagerly entertained and absorbed into the English and the Swiss Companies,¹⁵⁶ or formed into separate companies with officers conversant with their own languages.¹⁵⁷ In or about 1758, the Infantry companies were formed into two battalions and officers were posted to them, thus making for increased efficiency. Then, as regards Indian Infantry, the first Indian foot-soldiers raised by the English in South India was about

154. These two companies evidently belonged to the class known as "mercenaries." Enlistment to these two companies was stopped about the end of 1754. A few of the men belonging to these two companies came from Hanover and Alsace, while the majority belonged to Zurich, Geneva and Basle. Among the officers of the first company was Lieut. George Frederick Gaupp, who became a captain in the Madras European Battalion, and commanded the Madras troops at Plassey (Wilson, *Ibid.*, 63). The employment of mercenaries was well known in Europe long before the 18th century. Mercenaries were originally hired soldiers as distinguished from feudal levies, though the name is given now to bodies of foreign troops in the service of a State. The Scots Guards in France from the 15th to 18th centuries were famous, and Swiss auxiliaries once belonged to most European armies. William III had Dutch mercenaries in England. Under the Georges, Germans were hired and were used in the American War, the Irish rebellion, and the Napoleonic struggle. In the Crimean War, Germans, Swiss and Italians were enrolled.

155. In 1788.

156. In 1754, a number of Germans were thus entertained and absorbed.

157. In October 1758, one such company was formed with Capt. Monchanin in charge (Wilson, *Ibid.*, 122).

1746. They were called Peons. There were about 300 of them in February 1747, at Fort St. David. Of these, about 900 were armed with muskets. Coming as they did mostly from classes not bred to war and being untrained regularly in military discipline, they were at first of little use. But with the training given to them¹⁵⁸ by carefully chosen commandants—they were mostly drawn, with rare exceptions,¹⁵⁹ from the Royal Army—and the opportunities afforded to them to serve in the field with European troops, they rapidly improved and won repeated approbation for their good behaviour and gallantry.¹⁶⁰ About 1755, the average establishment of a company of Indian Infantry consisted of 1 Subādār, 4 Jamādārs, 8 Havildārs, 8 Naiks, 2 Colourmen, 84 Privates, 2 Tom-tom men, 1 Trumpeter, and 1 Conicopoly.¹⁶¹ The Subādār received a monthly salary of Rs. 60 and field batta at 8 faṇams per diem;¹⁶² the Jamādār, Rs. 16 per mensem and 4 faṇams per diem; the Havildār, Rs. 16 per mensem and 2 faṇams per diem; the Naik, Rs. 8 per mensem and 2 faṇams per diem; and the Private, Rs. 6 per mensem and 2 faṇams per diem. European Serjeants commanding companies of sepoys were granted an extra allowance of Rs. 20 a month. The dress was made of broad-cloth.¹⁶³

158. Among these were Major-General Lawrence, Brigadier-Generals Caillaud and Smith, Captains Brown, Mackenzie, Calvert, Baillie and Fletcher. The state of efficiency attained by the Indian Infantry at the time of the first war with Haidar in 1767 is testified to by General Smith and others (see Wilson, *Ibid*, 72-74).

159. The exceptions were Robert Clive, who began his career in the Civil Service in Madras, and Major Preston, who was originally an Engineer (*Ibid*, 72).

160. Wilson, quoting from Orme and *Fort St. George Consultations* dated 26th March 1753.

161. Tamil *Kanakkupillai*, an accountant, or writer.

162. 12 faṇams—1 Rupee.

163. Called "Europe Cloth." This helped, it was said, "to take off a considerable quantity of Woollen goods." This clothing was introduced, it is said in a *Fort St. George Consultation*, "without compulsion," the President, "the better to establish the custom," taking over "the management of the clothing himself," of course, not without profit to himself (see Wilson, *Ibid*, 126).

For distribution of pay, a Paymaster was appointed,¹⁶⁴ and it was his duty to muster the men that he may see the rolls are just, and to pay them himself, drawing upon the Commissary for the money.¹⁶⁵ In December 1758, the sepoy's at Fort St. George and near about in garrison, were formed into four battalions with a European subaltern to each, and a captain to command the whole. In the following year, 1759, a scheme of reorganization was carried out, which put the Indian Infantry into an establishment of seven battalions, each battalion to consist of nine companies.¹⁶⁶ They were distributed over the stations under the control of the English at Madras. The battalions were ordered to be clothed, numbered and distinguished by their colours. Each sepoy was to pay Rs. 6 per mensem for his clothing. The clothing of the Havildars and Naiks was to be of some distinction, and their stoppage was fixed at Rs. 8 per mensem. Promotions were to go by seniority, except where the person to succeed is held unfit for the station in question. A fund was to be created for providing "for the families of those who may be killed in action and for the maintenance of such whom wounds or length of service may disenable." Each sepoy was to pay from his subsistence allowance one fanam *per mensem* towards this fund. Officers were to pay in proportion to their subsistence. Inspections were to be carried out by captains and subalterns every month. They were to look into the conditions of the sepoy's arms and ammunition, to see that their discipline had not been neglected, that there had been no defrauding of the men of their pay and that they had not been charged without the knowledge of the officers. All crimes were to be tried by Courts-martial, Regimental Courts-martial being composed

164. Appointed in January 1757 (*Ibid.*, 127).

165. *Ibid.*

166. Actually only six battalions were eventually formed as the result of this reorganization.

of one Subādār, two Jamādārs, two Havildārs, one Naik and one Colourman, who were to be chosen, as far as possible, "out of different companies to the prisoner." Only authorized drills were to be followed, and battalions were to change quarters often, at least once in four or six months. Maintenance of discipline among the troops was to be insisted upon, European officers "to infuse as much as possible the spirit of command amongst them and endeavour, by encouragement and good treatment to the active, and punishing the remiss, to make them keep up a good command amongst their sepoy, and to support them well in it."¹⁶⁷ A Surgeon-General to the army was appointed in 1760, necessary regulations being issued for his guidance. This reorganization of the Indian Infantry troops helped the English during the war which ended with the fall of Pondicherry in April 1761, by which time the new discipline had done its work and the sepoy begun to distinguish themselves.¹⁶⁸

The English army that had grown up at Madras before Haidar's adaptation of European discipline, his very eyes within the short period of fifteen years (1746-1761) and had defeated the French at Pondicherry and seized all their territories in the South, made Haidar a confirmed believer in the new discipline which had contributed to its success in the field.¹⁶⁹ Haidar's plan appears

167. Wilson, *Ibid.*, 142-149, where the text of the scheme for the formation of the Indian sepoy companies into battalions is set forth *in extenso*.

168. *Ibid.*, 152-153, where the places in which the Indian sepoy first distinguished themselves will be found. Orme notes the fact that the example of Coote proved infectious. "By constantly exposing his own person with the sepoy," Coote "had brought them to sustain dangerous services from which the Europeans were preserved." Wilson briefly comments thus: "Like examples have been followed by the like result" (*Ibid.*, 152).

169. See *Ante* p. 299, f.n. 116. Innes Munro, writing in 1789, noted that "Experience had taught him (Haidar) in the course of his frequent conflicts with the English, that European discipline was absolutely essential to that end" (*i.e.*, the establishment of a good army). He therefore endeavoured, he says, to allure European military adventurers of all nations to his standard, more particularly "European artificers and sepoy that had been trained in the (English) Company's

to have been to introduce the new discipline by stages. This evidently was the only course possible, seeing that officers could not have been available for training all his forces simultaneously.¹⁷⁰ The army as thus reconstituted was made up of cavalry, infantry and artillery. By the time of Haidar, the elephant, though in use for riding and even perhaps commissariat purposes, had disappeared as an arm of the army. Haidar, however, found a new use for them under the changed conditions. He attached them to the infantry—every piece of eighteen

service (at Madras) to whom he held out the most tempting rewards." He had emissaries for this purpose "in every battalion in the Company's service, as appears from the words of command, which are now given in English throughout his army." Though friendly to the French, Haidar appears to have copied more the English than the French in military matters (see *Narrative*, 121). That Haidar actually undertook an army reformation with a view to action is fully borne out by Kirmāni. Thus, at one point, he writes: "The Nawaub, with his newly reformed army, was holding himself in readiness, and looking out for times and opportunities." (*Neshauni-Hydruri*, 232). At another point, he writes: "As the Nawaub, after his return from his last expedition (against the Mahrattas), employed himself in collecting arms and stores of all descriptions, and also in raising horse and foot, in a very short time, he collected and kept ready in a very perfect degree the means of attack and defence; for troops of brave and experienced soldiers, with horses and arms complete, flocked to his victorious standard, where they were entertained in his service, and placed in the receipt of pay according to their merits." (*Ibid*, 242-243). Next, he writes: "The noise of his victories, and the destruction of his enemies, resounding through all parts of the world, troops of brave men, well equipped and mounted, flocked to him, not only from Hind, and the Dukhun, but even from Iraun and Tooraun; and, giving them high pay, he retained them in his service." (*Ibid*, 243). At another point, Kirmāni writes that Haidar "employed his time in collecting warlike stores, and soldiers of approved valour (like Roostum and Isfendiar); so that, in a short time, he assembled under the shade of his victorious standard experienced and able men from all tribes; and, giving pledges of safety and aid to merchants, and the leaders of Karwans of all countries, he attracted (many of those persons, bringing with them) bales of precious stuffs, droves of fleet horses from Irak and Daman, and troops of the bravest men from Iran and Tooran, who had been invited to enter his service, and whom by liberal treatment he made the slaves of his will. He also appointed active disciplinarians, to exercise and teach his troops." (*Ibid*, 309).

170. Haidar's army in 1781, a year before his death, consisted both of well-disciplined infantry and irregulars. Well-disciplined infantry of the new type numbered in 1781, according to one authority, 30,000.

pounds or upwards being provided with an elephant. These elephants proved themselves highly useful. The skill and intelligence they brought to bear on their work has been much admired and written about by contemporary observers. De La Tour says that when a piece of artillery was drawn up a hill, the elephant was behind it, and sustained it with his foot, while the oxen paused to take breath. If the piece was going down a hill, the elephant retained it by a rope fastened to his trunk. If the tackle got entangled, or if a piece got overset, or stuck fast, the elephant assisted the oxen according to the circumstances. A French Artillery-Major affirmed (in 1782) that he had seen the elephant of a piece of cannon—out of patience to see that the oxen did not draw, in spite of the whips of the drivers—cut a branch of a tree and beat those animals till they acted as he thought proper. When an artillery piece was brought before the battery, the elephant himself placed it in the embrasure without any assistance.¹⁷¹ The military training given by elephant *mahouts* during Haidar's time stood as high as ever before.

Haidar appears to have received some help in the matter of improving the army, especially in the discipline and the interior economy of the infantry regiments, from Razā Alī Khān, son of Chandā Sāhib, who had escaped to Ceylon before the fall of Pondicherry in 1761. He joined Haidar while in Canara, in November 1763, and

171. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 239-240, f.n. The elephant has been used in Indian warfare since the earliest times. Kautilya has several chapters on elephants, of which one of the most important is that treating of the "training of elephants." (See *Artha-Sāstra*, Chap. XXXII). The military training of elephants was of seven kinds: drill, turning, advancing, trampling down and killing, fighting with other elephants, assailing forts and cities, and warfare. (*Ibid.*). Haidar never made use of the elephant in any battle (See De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 180). Camels also seem to have been used by Haidar in warfare. Nearly a thousand head of them, taken from the Mahrattas, were, it is said by Kirmāpi, trained to carry swivels. (See *Neshauni-Hyāuri*, 249).

was received by him with distinction and granted a *jahgīr* worth Rupees one lakh. Trained under French auspices, he showed considerable spirit in military skill. It was under his advice that the infantry in Mysore came to be clothed in an uniform manner and classed into first and second,¹⁷² corresponding to grenadiers and troops of the line. The first was in conformity to the suggestion of Razā Alī, a distinction not exclusively regulated by stature and physical strength, but by tried steadiness and courage; and was rewarded by a superior fixed pay.¹⁷³ The infantry consisted of Indians and Europeans, and of the Indian part, there were those who had come under the new discipline and called *regulars* and those who did not and called *irregulars*. The regular infantry, called *Bārr*,¹⁷⁴ really cut a good appearance, being clothed in red and green with different coloured facings.¹⁷⁵ They were armed with French and English muskets and bayonets of a good kind. The

172. *Avval*, first; *Duyyam*, second. See also *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 80.

173. On this subject, see Wilks, I. 513. Razā Alī is also mentioned by De La Tour as one interested in the adoption of European discipline (*Ibid.*, I. 121, f.n.).

174. The derivation of this word is uncertain. *Bārr*, or *Bar*, means, in Kaunaḍa, a line, or row, from which it might be inferred that it refers to a line of foot-soldiers arrayed for being disciplined to war, by drill and other military training. *Bārr* or *bāru* also indicates a charge—one who is in charge of a musket or one who charges a musket for gun, and hence a musketeer. The *Bārr* infantry was armed with muskets (see text above). The proverb goes "*Bārinavanige bēre yōchane yāke?*" i.e., what other thought is there to a musketeer? The suggestion seems to be that there is none other thought to a musketeer but to use his weapon and fight. Among other derivatives from the word are, *Bārkoṭhu*: Infantry-barracks; *Bārinava*: a musketeer or foot-soldier; *Bāru-cuchēri*: the head-quarters or office of the infantry, etc.

175. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 105) states that they were dressed in red shirts or jackets (*kempu kuḍate*). Innes Munro confirms this statement (see *Narrative*, 131). During the invasion of Malabar (1765-1766), Haidar's men are said to have struck the Nairs with awe by their red shirts (*kempu kuḍate*), black turban (*karī pāgu*) and bayonets (*sanṇu*)—see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 35. This is confirmed by Kirmāṇi, who says that the infantry were clothed in red, yellow, green, or black broad cloth (*Neshawti-Hyduri*, 243), the latter part being rather a bald summary of the "different coloured facings" referred to in the *Haid. Nām.* and in Innes Munro's *Narrative*.

recruitment to the regular infantry was based on standardized lines and governed by set rules. Those who were young, strong and well-built, and aged between 20 and 30, were grouped in one class. They were uniformly to dress in first class green jackets.¹⁷⁶ Those between 30 and 40 years were to dress in ordinary green jackets,¹⁷⁷ while those aged between 55 and 60 were to dress in black woollen jackets.¹⁷⁸ All these three groups, however, were to use only one kind of head-dress. This was a turban in black of a recognised pattern, mounted on an iron frame.¹⁷⁹ It appears that for seven men there was one *Pahare* (guard) and one *Havāldār*;¹⁸⁰ for fifteen *Pahare*, one *Risāldār*¹⁸¹ and one *Varādī* (reporter).¹⁸² For two *Risāldārs* there was one *Cummundār*,¹⁸³ one *Mutsaddī* (writer), two cannons and one elephant. This was the established organization (*khāyide mōkarūr*). The irregular infantry consisted of three different classes of men. The first of these were the *Ahashām* foot, who corresponded to those described as matchlockmen by the English writers of the time.¹⁸⁴ They were used in the manner of light-infantry and guards for baggage or

176. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 105) calls it *avval hasaru kuḍate*, jackets of genuine green colour.

177. *Ibid.* The word used is *duyyam*, second class.

178. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) calls it *kari banatu kuḍate*.

179. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) describes it thus: *vandē jinasāgi kari mūṇḍāsu*. The steel-frame on which it was mounted is spoken of in it as *kabbināda paṭṭe*.

180. *Havāldār*: corresponding to the *Havildār* of the contemporary English army at Madras. In his duties, he resembled the Serjeant in the European Infantry, next to the Captain.

181. *Risāldār*: the head of a *Risāla* or a battalion of (regular) infantry.

182. *Varādī*: probably corresponds to intelligence officer; one who ferrets out information about the enemy, while the army is on the move.

183. *Cummundār*: French Commander, from Latin *Commendare*; corresponding to the English Commander. Cf. French Commandant, a Commanding officer of a place or of a body of forces.

184. See Innes Munro, who refers to them (*Narrative*, 181). The *Ahashām* foot are referred to by Kirmāṇi under the name *Ishām*, translated by Col. Miles as "irregular infantry", see Kirmāṇi, *Neshannī-Hyḍaurī*, 422; see also *Ibid*, 398, where they are referred to correctly as "Ahashām foot."

convoys. Besides the sword, they carried a log-barrelled gun, not wider in the bore than a small pistol, with a trigger which conducted the match by the slightest touch into the pan, which was covered by a slider, excepting when in use. With these, they hid themselves behind bushes and old walls, and killed the enemy at a great distance, being excellent marksmen.¹⁸⁵ These were generally accompanied by the Bēḍar levies, who formed the troops of the Pāḷegārs, whose only weapon was a pointed bamboo spear, eighteen to twenty feet long. They were a brave lot of men, spoken of as "almost savage" in their attacks.¹⁸⁶ When they were attacked by horse, they formed themselves into a close ring, placing the *Ahashām* foot with matchlocks in the centre, and pointing their pikes at the enemy. In this order they all would sit down, and fix the nether end of the pike into a hole in the ground betwixt their legs, whilst the *Ahashām* foot with their matchlocks kept up an irregular fire over their heads.¹⁸⁷ In this manner, they resisted the most violent charges of cavalry and sometimes of infantry as well.¹⁸⁸ The third class of infantry was made of the *Juzail-burdars* or rocketmen, no command being complete without them.¹⁸⁹ Their main weapon was the rocket and their duty was to throw it amidst the advancing enemy. The rocket was a massive weapon, made in the same form as those used by schoolboys, with this difference that the stalk was a thick bamboo, eight or ten feet long with a tube of iron, from six and twelve pounds weight, fixed to its end, in which the fuse and

185. *Ibid.* See also Kirmāpi, *Ibid.*, 398.

186. Innes Munro, *Ibid.*, 131; also Kirmāpi, *Ibid.*, 153. *Bēḍars*: a body of 300 served under Haidar when he joined Muzaffar Jang's troops, and carried off two camel loads of gold coins belonging to Nāsir Jang (Wilks, I. 300, 734-737, where he describes at some length their infatuation as fighters).

187. *Ibid.*

188. *Ibid.*

189. See Kirmāpi, *Ibid.*, 7; Innes Munro, *Ibid.*, 132. The name *Juzail-burdar* is perhaps identifiable with the *Janjalu* of the *Bhāshā-patra* (see *Ante* p. 202), and the *Genjalls* of Peixoto (*Memoirs*, 144).

the powder were placed. In wet weather, or marshy grounds, they were set off flying in the air and reached usually a distance of a mile and a half. Upon dry grounds they were, however, pointed horizontally, and bound in a very uncertain direction, often creating great damage, particularly amongst cavalry and ammunition tumbrils of the enemy.¹⁹⁰

The cavalry consisted of regulars and irregulars. The regulars were known as the *Savārs*.
 Cavalry. They were clothed in thick quilted cotton gowns, sufficient to repel a blow from any sword.¹⁹¹ They wore velvet caps;¹⁹² steel helmets wrought on steel frames for the forehead;¹⁹³ body-armour inlaid with red *Kincob* and cotton, with tassels hanging down below the elbows;¹⁹⁴ trousers of *Kincob*;¹⁹⁵ arched wrappings on the back;¹⁹⁶ badge and dagger at the waist,¹⁹⁷ besides large and heavy sabres, that were almost semi-circular in form and kept as sharp as a razor, and pistols on either side, in front of the horse.¹⁹⁸ The horse was decked in red-coloured woollen cloth and furnished with a superior kind of saddle.¹⁹⁹ The irregulars were of many different kinds. They were engaged for service during the period the war lasted. Among these were the *Kuzzaks*, corresponding to the *Looty-Wāllahs*, or hussars, who were armed with the matchlock, usually in the style of a carbine, though they

190. See Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 132.

191. *Ibid.*, 130. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 105) describes it as *kashe*, which is a well-stitched long coat of due proportions.

192. *Makhmal ṭopi*, see *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

193. *Ukkina chandravanki*, see *Ibid.*

194. *Chilate*, see *Ibid.* This is confirmed by Kirmāṇi, who describes the select cavalry as "clad in complete armour." (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 243).

195. *Pāyijāma*, see *Ibid.*

196. *Kamānu hoḍe*, see *Ibid.*

197. *Davāli* and *Tāku*, see *Ibid.*

198. *Kudure mumbhāga yeradu kaḷegū pistālu*, see *Ibid.*; also Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 130-131.

199. *Kempu bandātu* and *Jīnu*, see *Ibid.*

sometimes carried a sharp-pointed spear, about six feet long, which they threw with great dexterity.²⁰⁰ Another class of irregulars were the *Sillāhdārs*, independent horsemen who were engaged horse and man.²⁰¹ Besides, there were the *Paigah* or the personal body-guard, who sometimes were as many as 12,000 in number.²⁰² Some of the irregulars used only a bow and a quiver of strong arrows.²⁰³ Haidar appointed twenty European (French) officers to serve him as a guard, after the campaign against the Zāmorin of Calicut. They were each given a horse free of cost and were to accompany him everywhere.²⁰⁴

The artillery was chiefly composed of French and Danish guns of different calibres, but most commonly heavy metal, which were doubly yoked with trained bullocks. They had been bought at different intervals of time and, in 1781, numbered one hundred pieces.²⁰⁵

200. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*, 272, 380; see also Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 131. Innes Munro's work has for its frontispiece a picture headed "A Looty-Wallah Chase," which gives an excellent idea of the dress and accoutrement of a Looty-Wallah. The Kuzzaks may be described as forming light troops, sometimes mentioned as predatory horse. When the occasion demanded, they engaged in plunder and hence the sobriquet *Looty-Wallah* or plunderer.

201. A *Sillāhdār* was a trooper hired with his horse and arms at a certain rate of pay both for himself and his horse, see Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*, 380.

202. Kirmāṇi, *Ibid*. They appear to have been mostly Abyssinians. De La Tour calls them "Abyssinian horse-guard" (*Ayder Ali*, I. 30, f. n.).

203. Innes Munro, *Narrative*, 131.

204. De La Tour, *Ibid*, I. 142.

205. Moens in his *Memo* (p. 165) says Haidar had "numerous guns." In 1781, they numbered 100 pieces (from 4 to 24 pounders). Also Sir Eyre Coote, *Letter to Fort. St. George*, 6th July 1781 (see *Forrest, Selections, Maratha Series*, III. 792). The Dutch and the Danes, at peace with the English, had, since 1761, under the sanction of the English at Madras, carried on a brisk business in the sale of military weapons and stores. Anybody with his wits about him could continue to get supplies of these weapons and stores so long as he could pay the price that might be asked for them (Governor Pigot to Yūsuf Khān, the Commandant at Madura, in *Fort St. George Records, Count. Corres.*, September 6, 1759. Yūsuf Khān got his secret supplies from the Dutch and the Danes). The Danes particularly brought out arms as merchandise and sold them as such ("The foreign Companies, particularly the Danes, bring out arms as merchandise,"—*Ibid*, *Letters to Court*, 14th October 1765, Para 80).

They were served as well and as expeditiously as those of the English, being entirely worked by Europeans in the employ of Haidar.²⁰⁶ Some of the lighter variety seem to have been also employed by Haidar for service as light guns—evidently as gallopers—at short notice.²⁰⁷

Haidar aimed at a well-equipped and well-trained army for achieving his aims and objects. He was experienced enough to realize that military officers were to be prized for their capacity and not for their caste or creed. For his cavalry, he generally recruited from among the better classes of horsemen in the Deccan, whether Mussalman, Rajput or Mahratta.²⁰⁸ When he heard that Persian horsemen would improve the composition of his army, he at once made up his mind to arrange for obtaining recruits from the Persian nation. He sent one Shah Nūrulla, the son of a resident Persian, on an embassy to Persia on this errand. The embassy was well received by Karīm Shah at Shirāz and permitted to raise recruits for service in Mysore. One thousand men accompanied Shah Nūrulla on his return. Each of these was duly enlisted and assigned a horse. A second embassy was sent with considerable funds to recruit a further number. But ship, ambassador and treasure were, however, lost in the Gulf of Cutch. Haidar did not renew the experiment.²⁰⁹ In Cuddapah, where the Afghans were then in power,

206. *Ibid.* Moens' *Memo*, l. c.

207. Kirmāpi, *Ibid.*, 388; also 107, 108.

208. Wilks, I. 709; also Kirmāpi, *Ibid.*, 118, 239.

209. Wilks, I. 718-719. Somehow, Haidar was later so much prejudiced against these Persian recruits that he would neither give them any preferment nor permit them to return home. "The climate," adds Wilks, "successively thinned their ranks; and I have not been able to trace one survivor of this thousand men" (*Ibid.*). Kirmāpi also notes the steps taken by Haidar to recruit from Persia and other countries. Haidar, he writes, attracted "droves of fleet horses from Irak and Daman, and troops of the bravest men of Iran and Tooran, who had been invited to enter his service and whom by liberal treatment he made the slaves of his will" (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 309). There seems to be some just doubt about his liberality. See Wilks on this point (I. 719).

Haidar once recruited 5,000 to his cavalry.²¹⁰ That Haidar prized cavalry is seen from the fact that he had always a select cavalry, accompanied by some light artillery, to act with him. This select cavalry was composed of regular stable horse, and was under his immediate direction.²¹¹

The medical needs of the army were looked after by professional physicians and surgeons called *Vaidyas*, to whom a special department was devoted. These physicians and surgeons followed the army and were in attendance in the camp. The wounded were usually brought in and their wounds sewn up and dressed by the physicians ready for their work.²¹²

Compensation for wounds received. The wounded were also allowed compensation money for wounds, a special *patti*²¹³ being drawn up for the purpose. Haidar had in his personal employ a French surgeon, who generally attended on him. It is not known whether his services were availed of for army purposes. There is some evidence, however, to believe that there were French surgeons in

210. Wilks, I. 748. He effected this recruitment through Mīr Sāheb, his brother-in-law.

211. On this point, see Wilks, II. 56, 59.

212. Kirmāni, *Ibid.*, 172.

213. *Murhum patti*, as it was called; it included the names of all the wounded. The wounded at the sanguinary action at Chinkurji (1771) were so many that Haidar is said to have brought in all the wounded himself into the camp for treatment and to have passed the *Murhum patti*, money compensation for wounds, to every one (Kirmāni, l. c.). Among the wounded in this action was an English gentleman (afterwards known by the appellation of *Walking Stuart*), Commandant of one of the corps, who was most severely wounded after a desperate resistance. "Others," says Wilks, "in the same unhappy situation, met with friends, or persons of the same sect, to procure for them the rude aid offered by Indian surgery; the Englishman was destitute of this poor advantage; his wounds were washed with simple warm water by an attendant boy, three or four times a day; and under this novel system of surgery they (the wounded) recovered with a rapidity not exceeded under the best hospital treatment" (I. 699-700). Wilks notes that the information pertaining to this mode of treatment of wounds was given to him by Sir Barry Close (*Ibid.*, f. n.).

Haidar's service and that they were utilized, at any rate at times, to dress the wounds of the injured. Thus, in 1782, when Col. Braithwaite's troop surrendered, Tipū sent "one of his French surgeons to dress those that were wounded." Capt. Robson who notes this fact states that Tipū, who was then serving in his father's army, ordered all the English officers to be brought to him and after examining them, he sent them into a village close by accompanied by one of his French surgeons. The next morning, Tipū sent the officers "a few pieces of fine calico cloth, to make them clothes; also four pieces of a coarser sort, for bandages for their wounds; likewise thirty pagodas, 12 £ sterling, with further assurance that they should have whatever they wanted." Evidently both Haidar and Tipū carried the main requisites for medical treatment in the field on civilized lines. Similarly after the defeat of Col. Baillie in 1780, when the British wounded "prisoners were brought in, all over mangled and covered with wounds," they "were dressed by his (Haidar's) surgeons." In the action at Perambākam, on the English side one surgeon was killed on the field of battle, another died of his wounds soon afterwards, a third was wounded and taken prisoner, and one Assistant Surgeon was taken unwounded.²¹⁴

The Army department under Haidar appears to have grown to dimensions unknown before, except probably during the time of Chikkadēvarāja. It had many sections,

The Army department.

214. For Haidar's French surgeon, see De La Tour, o. c., I. 176, II. 26, f. n. etc. Moens, the Dutch Governor, in his *Memo* states that his chief informant about Haidar and his doings was this French Doctor, whom he calls his "body physician." It would seem that this Doctor was daily with Haidar "for twelve full hours, toured with him and at last out of antipathy and dissatisfaction on account of his difficult character quitted his service in the year 1778." He remained with Moens for "some weeks" at Cochin about April 1781, and left him to rejoin Haidar, being desired to do so through M. Bellecombe, then Governor of Pondicherry (Moens, *Ibid*, 164-165). As to the other French surgeons in Haidar's service, noticed above, see Robson, *Life of Hyder Ally*, 117-118, 119-120, 147-148.

chief among which were, so far as at present known: the *Bār-cuchēri*, infantry office; the *Kandāchār-cuchēri*, office of the local militia; the *Savār-cuchēri*, cavalry office; the *Ahashām-cuchēri*, office of the irregular infantry; and the *Shāgirdupēsh-cuchēri*, office of the military paraphernalia, which consisted of as many as seventy-seven units including one devoted to *Chattēgārs*, i.e., officers of mixed European parentage; another to *Gōlandauzes*, Indian artillery officers; a third to *Vakils*, i.e., authorized agents sent abroad on public duty; a fourth to the *Habish* or Abyssinians; a fifth to Brāhman *Harkārs*, intelligence officers recruited from the Brāhman community; a sixth to *Kaḷla-bhaṇṭaru*, spies who passed as soldiers for collecting information useful to the army; a seventh to *Mahaldārs*, those in charge of buildings and fortifications; an eighth to *Vaidyas*, physicians and surgeons; a ninth to *Dhōbis*, washermen; a tenth to *Munshis*, writers, etc.²¹⁵

Enured as he was to the rigours of field life, Haidar took care to see that he was well equipped in every respect before setting out on a campaign. Indeed his army, while on the march, presented the spectacle of a moving city. At the first beating of the drum at about 3 A.M., the entire camp kit (consisting of tents, provisions, beddings, etc.) would be conveyed to the next intended place of encampment at the head of 4,000 horse and foot. Next day tents would be elaborately laid out on the site reconnoitred by the *Harkārs*. At the second beating of the drum at 4 A.M. that day, the Chōpdār would awaken the men asleep. They would cook their victuals and, after breakfast, begin their march, at 6 A.M., and move towards their destination. At the third beating of the drum, at about 8 A.M., Haidar, having got up, would

215. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 101-102.

finish his meal, and seating himself in a *howdah* on the back of the elephant *Pongaj* or *Imām-Baksh*—decorated in yellow and black garments—would proceed to the encampment, accompanied by all the military paraphernalia and the officers of the different sections of his army. Among the special items of his dress on the occasion were a filigreed turban of *Paithān* cloth, 120 cubits in length; a diamond necklace; a *Sirpah* of diamonds; trousers of *Kincob* cloth; rings, etc.²¹⁶

As in olden days, the military department was under a *Bakshi*, who corresponded to the European Minister for War. He was in charge of the finances of his department, though he could not act without the precise orders of his master. He was assisted by a Secretary, who enjoyed the confidence of Haidar. These were usually Brāhman officers in whom Haidar placed great trust.²¹⁷

The payment to the troops was regulated according to the Hindu Calendar, which provided for an intercalary month every leap year. For this intercalary month, there had been no payment to the troops. Haidar, to allay discontent, arranged, in place of a monthly payment, two half-monthly payments. The arrangement varied with the nature of the troops concerned, though the manner of making the accounts was the same. Each person who belonged to the army, from the general to the drummer, received a *patti* or an account made out in his name. It may be described as a warrant of payment

216. *Ibid.*, ff. 102-106.

217. About 1766, one Shāma Rao was Military Bakshi and another Nārāyaṇa Rao, Secretary for War. Shāma Rao (the "Cham Rao" of De La Tour) was formerly attached to Mons. Bussy and had subsequently entered service under Haidar. He enjoyed the confidence of Haidar (De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 128, 137). Nārāyaṇa Rao's name appears in De La Tour as "Narimrao" (*Ibid.*, I. 158).

issued in his name. It contained the name of the person, his father's name and his grandfather's name, for identifying him easily; a description of his person, and of his horse, if he was a horseman; the date of his entry into service; his station and his pay; the amounts paid from time to time, with the dates of payment. In the case of officers, the *paṭṭi* contained simply the name, the station and the sums paid out from time to time. The *paṭṭi* was made out in triplicate and in three different languages—in Haidar's time—in Persian, Marāṭhi and Kannaḍa. Haidar signed the accounts personally from month to month, which helped him to know the strength and financial cost of each kind of troop. Each *paṭṭi* and each account passed the scrutiny of three different offices, and were accordingly maintained in the greatest order. During Haidar's time no payment could be made by the Bakshi without his first obtaining the signature of Haidar to the accounts, or in his absence, of the General Commandant.²¹⁸ The pay of a *Bārr* sepoy—the best in the infantry class—was Rupees twenty-five *per mensem*. Deductions were made in respect of dues from *jahgīrs* enjoyed by him, advances made to him, etc. These deductions were, however, made only once a year

218. De La Tour, *Ayḍer Ali*, I. 143-144, f. n.; Wilks, *Mysoor*, I. 756-757. De La Tour calls the *Paṭṭi* as *Baṭi*, which is a corruption. Wilks suggests that the two half-monthly payments, though welcomed by the "improvident soldiers," made them lose their salary for 15 days as the *paṭṭis* covered periods of more than 15 days, varying from 16 to 20 days, "thus reducing the year of account to nine or ten months." The troops, however, were from the first habituated to some irregularity in the period, and there was no calculation for arrears; "it was a fixed rule that whenever a *puttee* or half-*puttee* was issued, it was a payment in full of all past demands (*Mysoor*, I. 757). Mirza Ikbal, the author of the Persian work *Ahwālī Hyḍur Naik*, says that Haidar "gave his troops only a month's pay in six weeks, and this also with the deduction or difference of *shumsī* and *kumri*, or solar and lunar months. For instance, if a man was in the service, nominally at five hundred rupees a month, he was paid for a period of six weeks (called there a month), by *Putṭie*, order, three hundred rupees only. So that, in fact, he received but two hundred rupees a month, and so with the rest in proportion" (see Mirza Ikbal in *Kirmāṇi*, *Ibid.*, 494-495).

and set off was also allowed. Payments in kind were also not unknown.²¹⁹

The *Savārs*, who belonged to the regular cavalry, were mounted on horses which were owned by the State. The payment of salary was regulated on the same principle as in the case of the *Bārr* sepoy who represented the regular infantry, except that they received their *pattis* for the same periods as the *Sillāhdārs* did. The *Sillāhdār* cavalry were mounted, as we have seen, on horses owned by themselves. They received *pattis* once in thirty-five days at first, and later for forty or even forty-five days. They received payment in Rupees calculated at two-thirds of their actual value. These *pattis* were called nominally *bīsrōs* (or twenty days), two-thirds of the month which ought to have been paid for, the remaining third being treated as an arrear to be settled at the end of the year, or sometimes two years. The mode of payment of these arrears was generally in kind—turbands, silks, chintz, or articles obtained in plunder, perhaps by the very men to whom they were returned, and estimated to the troops at about double their actual value.²²⁰ The *Savār* stood at a distinct advantage as against the *Sillāhdār* in the mode of payment adopted in his case. He got the full value of the Rupee and there were no arrears in his case.²²¹ It would appear that the regular cavalry was paid at the rate of Rupees forty a month (man and horse) and that the irregular cavalry at Rupees twenty-five.²²² A good many of the cavalry portion of

219. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 106.

220. Wilks, *Ibid.*, 757.

221. *Ibid.*

222. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 141. This is also partially confirmed by Orme who says that Haidar Ali paid his horsemen, who provided their own horses Rs. 40 per mensem; to ordinary horsemen, sepoy and artificers he gave Rs. 10 per mensem, and to peons or irregulars Rs. 5 per mensem (see *Orme Mss.*, 33, P. 115). Evidently Orme was not well informed in regard to the salaries paid to the ordinary horsemen, sepoy, artificers, peons and irregulars, and lumped them together under the two rates of Rs. 10 and Rs. 5.

the army were evidently Mahrattas, recruitment being, however, open to all.²²³

In regard to the European troops employed by Haidar, their pay and allowances were regulated
(c) To Europeans. by contract,²²⁴ though Haidar was usually shrewd enough to see that he got full value for the salaries he paid. When Mons. Lally left Nizām Alī and joined Haidar, he stipulated to go over with a large force but actually brought in only 100 European infantry, 50 European cavalry, 1,000 Indian cavalry, and two guns, about one-fifth of the number which he had agreed to. Haidar, in consequence, reduced the pay of Rs. 5,000 a month he had promised to Lally as the Commanding Officer. When the first month's pay was issued, Lally received Rs. 2,000, and, rather aggrieved, demanded an audience, and talked and gasconaded. "Be quiet," said Haidar, "and be grateful for getting so much—you have not fulfilled your stipulation; and I have overpaid you in proportion to your numbers. I do not give an officer Rs. 5,000 a month for the beauty of his single nose!"²²⁵ Haidar, indeed, refused to pay fancy salaries to the European officers he engaged. In fact, contemporary European opinion is naively suggestive of his parsimony. "Although he has in his service Europeans of different nations," Moens wrote,²²⁶ "he shows little consideration for them." He paid them, he adds, but not much. This seems a biased view.

223. *Ibid.*, I. 128-142. At about the time Haidar marched against the Zāmorin of Calicut, he recruited 4,000 Mahrattas for his cavalry. De La Tour gives a vivid account of the troubles they gave in the matter of their salary (*Ibid.*).

224. In their case, the salary agreed to was paid on the fifth day of every lunar month after the moon had appeared (De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 151).

225. Wilks, *Ibid.*, 756. This story is recorded by Wilks and shows the wide-awake character of Haidar in making bargains, military or other. *Aprpos* of Haidar's sarcastic reference to Lally's nose, it is of interest to note the significance that Napoleon attached to noses. He said: "When I want any good head-work done, I always choose a man, if suitable otherwise, with a long nose."

226. See Moens' *Memo*, (P. 165) in *Dutch Records* No. 13.

Rupees two thousand a month for Lally—considering the high purchasing power of money then—cannot be called a low salary. Haidar's commissariat arrangements were well conceived. They were probably cunning to a degree but had regard to the convenience of the army. He had a number of sutlers²²⁷ and pedlars who supplied the army what it required. All those who belonged to the army, European and Indian, had to buy everything they wanted from these suppliers according to rates fixed by Haidar. These suppliers had to give a strict account monthly to Haidar's officials, and to pay for the goods sold. Thus, the greater part of the stipends paid out to his soldiers came back to him and most if not all the Europeans probably kept little or nothing over for themselves.²²⁸ Those who imagined they could make a fortune with Haidar and to that end took service under him or deserted to him, were, it is to be feared, sorely deceived, without daring to allow their chagrin to appear in the least degree. For, as soon as this was observed by their guards—and there were guards all over—they were conducted inland and were so well watched that escape proved a sheer impossibility. Though Haidar allowed his European officers to go when they desired to leave his service for lawful reasons,²²⁹ there is reason to believe he was generally disinclined to relieve them from his service. When any were caught after having deserted, the punishment was "certain death."²³⁰ The situation of Mysore territories, as they then were, also prevented deserters to easily escape; it was such that one could not "get out of them without the greatest danger

227. Persons who follow the army and sell provisions and liquors to the troops.

228. Moens (l. c.) remarks that the Europeans in Haidar's service could not, in the circumstances mentioned, save anything for themselves. Of course, he writes as one with some prejudice against Haidar.

229. De La Tour, Peixoto and others are good examples of persons whom Haidar allowed to go.

230. Moens' *Memo* (l. c.) is definite on this point.

and exposure to many risks.'"²³¹ Haidar was also severe on those who tried to deceive. It is recorded that when one Turner, an Irish officer, whom he had treated well and put in command of the first battalion of Topass grenadiers under him, tried to run away with the salary of his men with a young Swedish officer, whom he had seduced, he was caught and brought before Haidar, who directed that both should be tried as they would be in a similar case in Europe. A Court-martial was assembled,²³² at which the two criminals were tried and convicted of carrying off the public money. Sentence was accordingly pronounced that they should be degraded and hung and their bodies afterwards exposed on the high road. The Council, however, in compassion for the youth of the Swedish officer and the fact that he had been seduced by Turner and did not himself carry away any property, interceded on his behalf and got from Haidar a commutation in his case of the sentence of death to one of imprisonment. Turner, when taken to the place of execution, confessed to his being a spy, and begged to be shot in place of being hanged. This request was allowed him and he distributed all his money among the soldiers appointed to shoot him, and faced death quite determinedly at their hands. After his death, his body was suspended on a tree near the roadside, conformably to the latter part of

231. *Ibid.*

232. Haidar granted to the Europeans in his service, the right to determine by themselves, with the aid of their own usage and laws, all matters in dispute among themselves (see De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 250, f. n.). The man who undertook to pursue Turner was one Sieur Minerva, who was also an Irishman. He was the first Captain of Turner's corps. He pursued him instantly with a party of fifty Europeans. He departed at two in the morning and arrived at the Cochin frontier at eight. He surrounded the house in which Turner and his associate were both at sleep and immediately secured their persons and conducted them to Coimbatore. It is recorded that Turner, before he suffered the extreme penalty, gave his sword and watch to Sieur Minerva (*Ibid.*, I. 150-155.)

the original sentence passed on him²³³ Haidar had no compunction for such men as cheated, especially where a bargain had been made and kept up by him.²³⁴

Haidar was, however, ever careful to treat well such European officers as faithfully did duty in his service. In the case of Turner himself, he had been treated well, had been made Commander of the first battalion of Topass grenadiers, and in that capacity was regarded as the general of 5,000 men. He had been entrusted with the most important operations and had won the goodwill and affection of Haidar. Though his treachery accordingly seems to have deeply affected Haidar, still he allowed him to be judged by his own compeers and did not interfere with their judgment. When Col. Mequinez, the head of a regiment of Topasses, who had faithfully served under him, died in the war against the Mahrattas, Haidar, in recognition of his service, appointed his widow to the command of the regiment with the rank of a Colonel until the adopted son of her husband came of age and assumed command. She accompanied the regiment everywhere; the colours were carried in her name; and she had a private sentinel at her door. She received the pay; inspected the regiment; ordered out the detachments; and caused deductions to be made in her presence from each company. She, however, permitted the second in command to exercise the troops and lead them against the enemy. Though she was treated

233. It is noted by De La Tour that Turner had been recommended by Boschier (? Bouchier), then Governor of Madras, to Haidar and was in fact a spy of the English in Haidar's army. He had had news at the time of his escape of a promotion in the English army at Bombay—as Major of a regiment on that establishment—and was deserting to join it. He gave out the information that the English and the Nizām had designed to conjointly attack Haidar (*Ibid.*, I. 154). The Bouchier referred to was Charles Bouchier, who succeeded Robert Falk as Governor on 25th January 1767. He made over charge on 31st January 1770.

234. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 153-155.

in this markedly kind manner by Haidar, she proved herself unworthy of the respect shown her. She brought a false complaint against a Jesuit Father but even then she escaped the punishment she well merited. Haidar tried to control her vagaries by getting her married to Minerva, the Swedish accomplice of Turner, but that officer refused to have anything to do with her. He would rather die than marry her. The woman married, later, a Portuguese serjeant of mixed parentage. Haidar having learnt of this, reduced her to serjeant's pay, as she had dishonoured the name of her former husband, whose faithful services had demanded that she should not be without the means of subsisting in a respectable manner.²³⁵

Haidar utilized the European officers in his employ to the fullest extent. In view of the wars he expected to wage or defend himself against, he prepared himself for garrisoning the places taken. With this view, he made constant levies for the augmentation of his troops. He got the European officers to exercise these troops, himself assisting every day with his own officers and sons at the different exercises and evolutions.²³⁶ With the active aid of the European Commandant, Haidar established a corps of 5,000 grenadiers, divided into battalions of 500 men, composed of four companies of 125 men each. Two of these battalions were selected out of the Topasses, and the rest from the sepoys, each being commanded by an European officer. There was, besides, in each company, an European adjutant or serjeant-major. The officers and private men of every company were chosen by Haidar himself, who, it is recorded, regarded tallness less than martial air, and the activity and robust temperament of the individual. The

^{235.} *Ibid.*, I. 157-169 (f. n.).

^{236.} *Ibid.*, I. 146.

grenadiers received Rupees ten a month, instead of eight, the pay of the other sepoys. They were exempted from all other labour—not even that of mounting guard, except that of their own Commandant. To keep them ever ready to march at the first signal, every *esconade*, composed of seven men, including an inferior officer, was allowed a cook and an ox to carry the tents and baggage belonging to it. Each company was further augmented by an *esconade* of seven men, solely to guard the baggage. These were all youths of but seventeen, intended to replace the grenadiers who fell, and to make the corps capable of rendering beneficial service by the rapidity of its motions. From the time of their first establishment, they were required to exercise every morning in handling their arms by their own officers; and every afternoon, from three till six, five battalions, by turns, were exercised in their evolutions by the French Commandant. After this, they were made to move about from six to eight, marching at the ordinary pace, and returning home at a quick step. All the officers, without exception, were obliged to do this exercise as well as the common soldiers. This direction caused at first much murmuring among them but soon they became accustomed to it—either through a sense of duty or from example and their assiduity afforded great encouragement to the sepoys. It was thus that Haidar formed a body of troops, to whose rapid movements the English afterwards attributed all his success.²³⁷

237. *Ibid.*, I. 146-148. While at Coimbatore for some time, Haidar, it is said, "continued to exercise his troops, and train them to all kinds of evolutions" (*Ibid.*, I. 155). This spectacle, it is added, was so "entirely new to the Indians" that it drew "so great a concourse of people to that place, that their number amounted to more than 10,000, exclusive of the army, which exceeded 60,000" (*Ibid.*). In view of the intended war, Haidar not only caused all the troops and artillery in his service to be exercised by the European officers, but also he himself assisted every day with his sons and generals at the different exercises and evolutions (*Ibid.*, I. 146). See text above.

Haidar thought ahead and prepared for the coming fight. That was the reason why he made so much of the new discipline. Haidar's belief in the value of military discipline.

Indeed there is ground for the belief that he was a firm adherent of the doctrine of iron discipline being the corner-stone of sound military policy. Apart from what he did in adapting the French and English army discipline to his own army purposes, he was ever on the look out for men who could enhance the virtues of his fighting force by imparting even superior discipline to it. Haidar, indeed, was ever anxious to improve the discipline of his troops. Once, being informed by Razā Sāhib, who had resided at Colombo for two years after the capture of Pondicherry (1761), that all the Europeans had introduced the Prussian exercise among their troops, Haidar wrote to Goa, Bombay, Pondicherry, Madras, Colombo and other places, where European military training was in force, to send him officers to discipline his troops. The Portuguese Lieut.-Colonel at Goa arrived accordingly with his officers, and Haidar put under his charge four thousand of the best sepoys in his army forming the right wing. The left wing, composed of Topasses, was commanded by an English officer, while Haidar himself commanded the main body, having behind him a reserve of Europeans, almost all of them French, with whom were joined his select few (*Bara Ademīs*, or Great Men, as they were called), a corps composed of all the best of his troops—including generals—who had no appointed posts or command on the day of battle. The Portuguese officer, however, proved unequal to the occasion, his "improper manœuvre" then proving disastrous to the troops he led. Haidar was enraged at him, and agreed to his "dismission."²³⁸

²³⁸. *Ibid.*, I. 119-123.

Haidar's good treatment of the Topasses was not only characteristic of his attitude towards those who tried to render faithful service but also his sagacity in not neglecting those on whom he could depend as people of the country as distinguished from foreigners who had their own national interests to serve. The Topasses were of Portuguese descent,²³⁹ being the descendants of marriage unions of Portuguese settlers with Indian women. They called themselves Portuguese, and had the names of the first families in Portugal. De La Tour rather uncharitably suggests that they were the children of slaves, born and brought up in the homes of the Portuguese. The Portuguese treated them favourably and with great humanity, calling them *Creanza de Casa*, or the children of the house. The French recruited them first for military service and used them for guarding their treasure while in transit. It is to be feared that both the French and the English did not possess a high opinion of their martial spirit. De La Tour goes so far as to suggest that "Europeans have never been able to form good troops out of those

Encouragement
given to Topasses
as a military
counterpoise.

239. *Topasses* : semi-assimilated Portuguese half-castes and Indians. There were 10,000 of them at Cochin when it fell to the Dutch in 1663. The Portuguese Topasses continued to serve their new European masters, Dutch, English and the French. Though they were Portuguese in their nationality, they were employed as commercial residents, interpreters, soldiers and schoolmasters. Portuguese remained the *lingua franca* of the West Coast and was the language of correspondence between the different foreign nations in that region. Base Portuguese is still spoken at Cochin (see Galletti, Van Der Burg and Groot, *The Dutch in Malabar*, Selections from Madras Records, *Dutch Records* No. 13, Introd. p. 15). Topasses wore hats, which fact gave them their name, which means "those who wore hats." The fact of their wearing hats is referred to by De La Tour (*Ayder Ali*, I. 136). De La Tour also notes the fact that Mahfūs Khān, brother of Muhammad Ali, Nawāb of Arcot, who was in the employ of Haidar for some time from about the time of the war against the Zamorin of Calicut, spoke "very good Portuguese" and interpreted in a controversy that arose in connection with a dispute over the amounts due to 4000 Mahrattas who had been recruited for service in the cavalry section under Haidar (*Ibid.*, I. 141).

people."²⁴⁰ But Haidar, seeing the use he could put them to, always placed them on an equality with the sepoy and even preferred them to his other troops. They were invariably put under European officers, though this did not come in the way of their distinguishing themselves or earning their promotion in the army. In consequence of the special regard shown to them, they came soon to be regarded as Haidar's "best troops, and those he can most rely on."²⁴¹

The army was financed, when urgently required, through the aid of Sowcārs (*Sāhukārs*). At each court in India, during the 18th century, there was a banker attached to it, and much of the financing was carried out through him. There were others beside him financing the trade and commerce of the country as well. They often stood surety to the rulers or their ministers and made up the amounts advanced from the revenues subsequently raised. They appear to have been mostly from the Guzerāt country. Every great city in India had its own Sowcārs, some of them being rich and doing large business. Their integrity and credit was as great as their skill in business. They were, properly speaking, bankers, borrowing or lending money, furnishing letters of exchange on all places, not excepting even those at which they had no correspondents. In these latter cases, they made use of money-porters, who carried

240. De La Tour, *Ibid.*, I. 136, f.n. Wilks mentions that a number of Topasses had been entertained in the service of Muhammad Ali, Nawāb of the Karnātic, while in 1790 a small corps of them had been collected for the English service and placed under Lieut. Chalmers, who gallantly defended Coimbatore against Tipū's forces. Wilks, indeed, writes that "general opinion, not very favourable to their military prowess, was destined to receive a remarkable refutation" on this occasion (*Mysoor*, II. 503). The earliest recruitment of Topasses into the English army appears to have been at Fort St. David, Cuddalore. When Madras fell in 1746, the garrison at Fort St. David consisted of 200 Europeans, 100 Topasses, a few Mahratta horse and 2000 Indians. (Wilson, *o.c.*, 24).

241. De La Tour, *Ibid.*

money to any distance, charging their carriage at so much per league. They were highly dependable and universally respected for carrying out their promises. It is related that one of them having carried off a large sum belonging to a banker at Madras, the rest of his community assembled and reimbursed the banker, though under no obligation to do so. Two of them, having got scent of the whereabouts of the runaway Sowcār, repaired to Goa, where he was reported to have taken refuge, and cutting off his head, brought it to Madras, where it was carried to all the bankers to be seen, in order that the punishment meted out for the crime might ensure a continuation of their confidence.²⁴² Besides dealing in money, these Sowcārs dealt in precious stones, coral, pearls, and gold and silver plate. Some of them also developed a system of insurance to ensure the safety of valuables, and specialized in this kind of business. There were, during the 18th century, such insurance offices of great credit at Sūrat, Madras and Calcutta, entirely composed of Guzerāt bankers. The Gujerāti-pettah, near Chicacole, in the Madras Presidency, and Sowcārpet in Madras City derive their origins from the association of these Guzerāti bankers with these

242. Letters of Exchange are probably of more ancient date in India than in Europe. In India, however, such a letter is not drawn to order, which creates difficulties in case of death or absence of the person in whose favour it is drawn. To obviate these difficulties, the names of several persons are mentioned in the same bill, the letter of exchange being in this case drawn in these words:—"Pay to John, or in his absence to Peter, or in his absence to James, etc." (De La Tour, o.c., I. 73-74, f.n.). Orme, the historian, mentions the fact that Major Allen, the French officer, and the so-called Bishop of Halicarnassus offered "substantial shroffs as security" for the delivery of Thiaghur (Tyāgadurg) and Gingee, and Rs. 50,000 to the Mahratta general for his assistance against the English who were besieging the French at Pondicherry in 1761. Commenting on this, Orme expresses surprise, saying, "how this wary tribe of money-changers were induced to this venture, when there was not so much in Pondicherry, nor likely to come, remains unaccountable." He suggests that either the Mahratta general put up the bankers to increase his demand on the Nawāb of the Karnātic or it was the work of Haidar, who stood to gain by the Mahrattas passing into the Karnātic (*Indostan*, II. 715).

places. Some of them were very rich and were thus in a position to have large dealings with States, lending and making money by such lending on a scale which should have helped them to wipe off the effects of plunder to which they were not infrequently subjected during troublous times. Thus, Haidar, at the very commencement of his regime (in 1761) is known to have called on the Court Banker to render an account of his dealings with the Royal House. On the ground of making a correct account of the State revenue and the treasure and jewels, he made inquiries. He found the greatest part of the Royal jewels with the Court Banker, who had advanced money to buy Salābat Jang and Bussy. Having heard that this banker had made his immense fortune in the service of the State, Haidar felt displeased that he had demanded pledges for lending money to it. He ordered the jewels to be taken out of his hands and his dues paid to him. At the same time, he appointed a commission to make an inspection of his accounts. The commissioners having adjudged him guilty of fraud and extortion in his dealings with the State—the grounds are not stated—Haidar condemned him to perpetual imprisonment and confiscated all his property to the State. But Haidar allowed him, at the same time, a pension to subsist on, and placed his sons in the service and showed them preferment.²⁴³ Haidar was evidently

243. De La Tour adds that the luxury of this banker was enormous. It is said that his children had cradles of gold suspended from the ceiling by chains of the same metal (o.c., I. 75), a proverbial way of describing a very rich man in India. Evidently De La Tour was misled into believing an obvious exaggeration as a fact. On the question of Bankers about a hundred years ago, see Prof. V. G. Kale's paper on *Poona Banker and Bombay Branch Manager*, read before the 21st session of the Indian Economic Conference, Hyderabad (Deccan), December 1937. The "Chinapatan" referred to on pp. 5 and 6 of this paper must be identified with Madras which is also known as *Chennapatnam*, corrupted into *Chinapatam*. Haidar's credit and influence with the Sāhukārs was great. On his personal security, they rendered themselves responsible for the money agreed to by him (Wilks, o.c., I. 412-413). See also, on Bankers, Kirmāpi, o.c., 117.

anxious to restore the finances of the State and took some extra-judicial steps to induce the Court Banker to part with the excess profits he presumably had made during a time of crisis. However that might be, the Court Banker was a great factor in maintaining the army in a contented and satisfactory condition.

In later times, to meet his heavy army expenditure, Haidar devised modes of raising money, unknown to his predecessors. Land revenue was the primary source.

Other financial
sources tapped.

Though Haidar left the fiscal institutions of Chikkadēvarāja as he found them, he seems to have countenanced any secret additions made to the established revenue by the local revenue authorities. As much was taken from the cultivator as would not render him destitute or compel him to reduce the area he cultivated. The plundering of local chiefs and their territories added much to the State coffers. Thus the conquests of the Pālegār chiefs and the Bednūr country brought in vast amounts, Bednūr alone contributing something like 12 millions sterling. He indulged in confiscations of private fortunes, some of his most trusted officers not escaping this favourite mode of replenishing falling revenues. His demands on the tributaries brought a large *peshkāsh*. Thus Anegondi, the old capital of Vijayanagar which represented that ancient Empire, paid, from 1776, 7000 pagodas, raised subsequently to 12,000 pagodas. He also levied upon the whole country forced contributions under the name of free gift (*Nazarāna*) for the support of the war he waged. Sometimes he did not spare even the bankers, with whom he carried considerable credit. When he did this, he appears to have dealt the most destructive blow to all future confidence. But the exigencies of the army requirements were such that Haidar, in looking to the needs of the immediate present, forgot to calculate the consequences for the future. His

excuse must be that if his aims and objectives were good and patriotic, the steps he took to achieve them might be more than ordinary.²⁴⁴

Haidar also aimed at forming a fleet, largely influenced by the free use that the European nations who had settled in India were making of the sea both for bringing in troops and for trading purposes. He had a double motive in organizing it: to defend the West Coast, to which Mysore's territorial area extended under him, against the Mahrattas and the pirates who infested it, and to make use of it for warlike purposes. In view of the greater efforts put forth by Tipū, his son, we may note the fact that Haidar led the way in this matter as well, quite early in his career. After 1761, he tried to extend his influence to the West Coast as far as Mangalore, both to get the aid of the Portuguese and the Dutch settled here and to subdue Cochin and Travancore as soon as he could. The conquest of the South included the absorption of these kingdoms; indeed the conquest of Travancore was undoubtedly part of Haidar's plan of operations, which was eventually put into execution by his son and successor Tipū. With this end in view, immediately he took Bednūr (1763), Haidar fortified it. Thereafter, he occupied the four ports of Canara, *i.e.*, Honāvar, Basrūr, Bārakūr and Mangalore, with the frontiers of the uplands.²⁴⁵ He tried to make himself strong at sea by building some ships, *palens*, *gallevats* and other vessels.²⁴⁶ When Alī Rāja of Cannanore sought his aid, Haidar created him his High Admiral on the

244. *Vide*, on this point, Wilks, *Ibid.*, I. 171, 508, 705-709, 729. The case of Fuzzul-Ullāh Khān is quoted by Wilks as the most striking example of Haidar's "ingratitude and oppression" (*Ibid.*, I. 706-708). See also *Ibid.*, I. 754, where the case of Appāji Rām is mentioned. Haidar's credit with even his enemy's bankers was very great (*Ibid.*, I. 412).

245. See Moens' *Memo* (p. 151) in *Dutch Records* No. 13.

246. *Ibid.* *Palens* evidently indicates what the English records call *balloons*, from Portg. *Ballao*. *Gallevats* are large row-boats.

West Coast, and made his brother, Shaik Ali, intendant of the marine of the ports and of the maritime commerce of Mysore. He also entrusted him with considerable sums for the purposes of buying or building vessels. Ali Rāja formed a fleet bearing the Mysore colours, and invaded the Maldives and took possession of it in behalf of Mysore. But he was so foolish as to put out the eyes of the Sultān of those islands, that Haidar, greatly annoyed at his wanton cruelty, deprived him of his command of the fleet and bestowed it on one Stanet, an Englishman.²⁴⁷ Haidar used to some purpose his fleet in his war against the Zāmorin of Calicut, when crossing the river at Cannanore.²⁴⁸ Haidar made also friends with the Portuguese who assisted him on the sly by allowing him many private soldiers and even officers to enter his service, evidently to keep him as their friend. During the course of his negotiations with the Dutch in 1766, Haidar was so far advanced with the organization of his fleet that he proposed to aid them—in case they agreed to a perpetual alliance with him and accomodate him whenever he stood in need of anything—not only with 30,000 troops but also with his fleet. At this time, Haidar's fleet could not have attained any respectable size. De La Tour, indeed, says that he would not “reckon the fleet of Ayder among his forces” at about this period of his career. It was then composed of a ship purchased from the Danes, pierced for sixty guns, but furnished with no more than fifty; three others of thirty-two guns; eighteen *palens*, vessels both for rowing and sailing, and carrying fourteen guns; and about twenty large *gallevats*, carrying eighty men and two cannons.²⁴⁹ Haidar had selected an Englishman and appointed him admiral of his fleet, and he evidently had designs of

247. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 96-98.

248. *Ibid.*, I. 107, 110.

249. *Ibid.*, II. 15.

improving and augmenting the fleet.²⁵⁰ Three or four of the English Company's frigates that were always ready armed in the Indian Ocean, would have been sufficient to disperse this little fleet. Still the fact that Haidar was bent on organizing a fleet to serve his purposes may be noted here as showing the very comprehensive view he held in the matter of equipping himself for warfare against the Europeans who had settled themselves in the land and had made the navy their chief source of strength.

Haidar maintained depots at various centres for military and naval arms and stores.
Arsenals.

These were located in well-chosen places, intended to serve large areas adjacent to them. Thus there were arsenals at Seringapatam, Dinḍigal, Calicut, Bednūr, Ārpi and Mangalore. Naval stores were concentrated at Mangalore and Calicut.²⁵¹

Though Haidar adopted the new European discipline to remake his army, he did not depend on the French from whom he received great aid in this connection. He knew well that he could not rely on the French as against the English or any other European nation. He well remembered how the French had conducted themselves at Trichinopoly. Then, again, the French troops under his employ had refused to fight in his

250. The story goes that when Stanet, Haidar's admiral, took one of the larger vessels to Bombay to refit, it was seized and declared good prize as soon as the commencement of hostilities (in 1767) was known, an action Haidar "always regarded as perfidious on the part of the English" (*Ibid*, II. 15-16).

251. The magazine at Ārpi was evidently a big one. It is described by Robson as the "grand magazine at Arni" (*o.c.*, 150, 152). In the war of 1782, Col. Coote chose Ārpi for inflicting a crushing defeat on Haidar, because Haidar was anxious "to save his grand magazine" there (*Ibid*). Major Charles Stewart also speaks of the "grand depot of military stores and supplies" at Ārpi (*Memoirs*, 40). Ārpi was evidently an artillery arsenal. At Mangalore and Calicut, Haidar seems to have established dockyards.

behalf in the taking of fort Rama, a fortress on the point of a cape of the same name, the only barrier that could stop his progress to Goa.²⁵² They, in fact, refused to give him the least assistance, preferring rather to retire into the fort than to combat with the Portuguese. Mon. Hughel, siding with the French troops, also abandoned him. Haidar, finding he could not take this fort unaided, made peace with the Portuguese who surrendered Kārvār to him. "This inconstancy of the French," as De La Tour plainly acknowledges,²⁵³ and other similar events gave Haidar to understand that he could not well support a war with any European power unless he was well organized from a military point of view, and that he could not depend upon any class of Europeans in his service, excepting when they themselves were at war with his enemies. He knew that the French were interested in his friendship only to the extent that it served their own purposes. The French knew, at the same time, that his friendship would prove useful to them because he was against Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of the Karnātic, whom the English had espoused. The French and Haidar agreed in their dislike for Muhammad Alī and they both desired to see him ousted from his place. While his friendship for the French brought to Haidar some able French officers and troops, besides much war material, Haidar's friendship enabled the French to keep so powerful a person on their side, with a view "to make use of him in time and when circumstances changed."²⁵⁴ Haidar fully understood this fact and kept his powder dry. The key to his military policy is to be found in this fact; he took French aid for reorganizing his army but did not depend on them solely.

252. It was about this time that the well-known incident took place, *viz.*, that 400 of these Frenchmen, cavalry and infantry, deserted with their horses and weapons and sought refuge in Goa, being discontented on account of ill-treatment (Moens' *Memo*, 152).

253. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 92-93.

254. Moens' *Memo*, l.c.

He took in men of other European nations as well for the same purpose; and he did not depend on them either. He treated all equally as men who worked for the dignity and salary they severally enjoyed, and he was always supreme. He wanted the discipline they represented, but he was the master they should always look to for orders and directions of any kind. The French found themselves powerless before him. Contemporary opinion fully confirms this. Moens²⁵⁵ indeed goes to the extreme of saying that he respected no one, not even those who had been good to him. The French had, as a fact, done many a kind turn and assisted him with ammunition when he was engaged in war with the English. But they never obtained anything useful or advantageous from him. On the contrary, Moens says they had had to submit to insult, first at Calicut when the Zāmorin transferred his kingdom to them and later on at Mahé, when he not only seized the territory of a certain Kunjan Nair²⁵⁶ who had long been under the protection of the French, but also demanded from the French, because they opposed this, Rupees one lakh. The French had not only to meet this exaction but also to abandon Kunjan Nair to Haidar's violence. Despite all this, the French continued to seek Haidar's friendship in order in course of time to do harm to the English through him. The French attitude was dictated by their policy. They could not well act otherwise; they could not embroil themselves with Haidar on account of their policy.²⁵⁷ The Portuguese at Goa did not fare better at

255. *Ibid.*, 165.

256. See Moens, who spells the name as *Cunje Nair* (*Ibid.*).

257. Moens' account is most instructive at this point. Writing in 1781, he says: "I remember still how a French Lieutenant-Colonel, who was sent as an envoy to him (Haidar) to settle the case of Cunje Nair (Kunjan Nair), stayed here (Cochin town) a few days on his way back to Pondicherry. When he related the case to me, he was nearly bursting with rage, because he had not been able to bring the fine down to less than one lakh of rupees. He added these words in substance:

his hands. He had had secret help from them against the Mahrattas when they attacked him after his conquest of Canara. But when the danger had been overcome, he extended his territory to the north of Goa. Here he made the Indian chiefs, so far under the Portuguese suzerainty, to pass under his yoke. The Portuguese had to acquiesce. They had even to surrender a stretch of land to the north of Goa, of which they had been in possession till then, Haidar claiming it as formerly belonging to the kingdoms he had conquered. When the Portuguese refused to allow him to pass within range of the guns of their fortresses on his march against Murāri Rao, he showed his displeasure in a variety of ways against them, including the tearing up of the Portuguese flag in front of their residence at Mangalore.²⁵⁸ The Dutch did not feel that they could make common cause with him. They feared he would not treat them better than he had treated the French and the Portuguese. Moens plainly states that "far from allowing himself to be made a tool of to further the interests of others (like Muhammad Ali), he would not allow himself to be made to do anything except what would be in his own and not in our interests." It was clear to Moens' mind that Haidar had his own objectives to attain and that he would use those whose aid he sought only as pawns in his own game, and not prove their pageant as Muhammad Ali had proved to the English at Madras. In this estimate, Moens was correct. Haidar was determined to use the European nations established in India, if necessary, with the aid of offensive and defensive alliances, to further his own aims and ambitions,

what can we do, we cannot embroil ourselves with him on account of our policy." Moens' account of Haidar's personal character was based on information gathered from deserters who visited him and from Haidar's French physician who stayed some weeks with him in 1781 and is not always just to Haidar. It has to be taken *cum grano salis*.

namely, the expansion of Mysore in all directions and avenging the treachery of Muhammad Ali, which had made Mysore lose in the South what she was justly entitled to both by right of conquest and by virtue of the terms of the secret treaty which had been grossly violated.

Haidar thus aimed at a revolution, not so much internal as external. He clutched at power in order to avenge the wrong that had been inflicted on Mysore. He prepared for the coming struggle—for the struggle was there—in a deliberate and calculating manner. His policy of unification within and force abroad was one intended not only to impress his possible adversaries but also to help towards a smooth working out of the ideas that dominated his mind. One thing is clear. He had no wrong notions about what he could expect as help from outside. He had realized that neither the Mah-rattas nor the Nizām could be expected to idly look on while he executed his plans. He also had begun to perceive that the European nations would stand apart unless he impressed them. The use of force abroad was thus to impress first and then to make headway. Force, however, could prove effective only when backed by careful organization. The key to Haidar's army reform—for it was no less—is to be found here. He modernised it because it was to be used with a definite objective—to conquer, to annex, and to extend Mysore territory. His internal policy of unification was the counterpart of the external policy. He gathered power in his hands with a view to action. Though he set himself certain limits in regard to his public acts, there is no doubt that he transgressed them sometimes and involved himself in dangerous situations, which cost him dearly. But there can be no doubt that he was moved less by personal ambition than by zeal for the public good. We shall see

Character of
Haidar's Revolution.

him as he progresses from stage to stage during the twenty-two years that cover his period of office as *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore (1761-1782). We will see as much the sagacity and skill he displayed in diplomacy and war as the weakness and vanity he displayed in yielding to the baser instincts to which man so often succumbs. We will see how in the moment of success he is unable to gather in the fruits of the victory he has won. We will also see what stood between him and the realization of his central aim and object. And when he failed, we will see why his son Tipū could not succeed.

To correctly appreciate the work of Haider as the creator of a new army in Mysore, we have only to turn to two other indigenous armies of the period, and note their organization and equipment. These were the armies of the Nizām at Hyderabad and of the Mahrattas at

An appreciation of Haider's work as the creator of a new army: comparison between the armies of Haider, the Nizām and the Mahrattas.

Poona. A study of this kind is the more necessary because of the strong line taken by Haider in evolving a new army. While he displaced materially the old discipline, or what was left of it, by the new western discipline he had imbibed, he did not break away from the old system wholesale but adapted it in an artful way to the exigencies of his own times. He was more a practical reformer than a crazy innovator. The system evolved by him resembled at many points Śivāji's as will be shown presently, but it differed from Śivāji's in certain important aspects. The essential point to remember is that these two great military heroes lived a century apart from each other, and each formed an army system suited to his own particular times. The army of the Nizāms of Hyderabad, however, stood on a footing of its own. It showed no signs of improvement despite the French influence at their court from 1748 to 1766, and thereafter of the English.

Asaf Jāh, the founder of the family of the Nizāms of Hyderabad, was the son of Ghāzi-ud-dīn, a favourite officer of Aurangzīb, under whom he had seen personal service. Subsequently he rose to be Viceroy of the Deccan. During the reign of Muhammad Shah, who succeeded Farruksiyar in 1719, Asaf Jāh felt so disgusted with affairs at Delhi that he returned to Hyderabad, where he virtually declared himself independent about 1724. Glad to get rid of him, Muhammad Shah bestowed on him the title of *Vakīl-i-mutlak*, or Lieutenant of the Empire. But a turn of events, chiefly influenced by the vigour shown by Bāji Rao, the Pēshwa, drew him forth once again to Delhi, where he, in 1737, became *Vazīr*. Two years later, in 1739, when Nādir Shah invaded India, Asaf Jāh, in conjunction with Sādat Khān, the Viceroy of Oudh, opposed him. But both failed, and after Nādir Shah's return home, internal dissensions broke out at Delhi and the position became intolerable to Asaf Jāh. The Mahrattas also resumed their offensive. Nāzir Jang, Asaf Jāh's second son, beat off the Mahrattas for the time being, but himself rebelled against his father in 1741, with the result that Asaf Jāh turned his back on Delhi and returned to Hyderabad. Here he put down his son's insurrection and took over the reins of government. He also made terms with the Mahrattas by agreeing to their claim to *chaut* in his area, agreeably to what had been allowed to them by Aurangzīb. During the next seven years, he engaged himself in trying to restore order in his own dominions, but hardly had he commenced his task than he died, in 1748, at the age of 72 years. A man so steeped as Asaf Jāh was in the Mughal system of government cannot but have been a reproducer in his own charge of what he knew and what he had practised for long. The *mansabdāri* system was thus fully planted in Hyderabad, having been already in vogue there

The Nizām and his
army organization.

in one form or another. The army was thus made of the contingents furnished by the *mansabdārs*, who were required to pay the cost of their quotas of horses and elephants and also to provide their own transport. The *mansabdārs*, in return, were paid liberal salaries, usually in cash, but more generally by assignments of land revenue. These troops, as fighting troops, had no value. There is an extraordinarily striking description of them, as they appeared as late as 1792, when the Nizām supplied a corps of cavalry to Lord Cornwallis to serve with his army. The men were some ten thousand in number, though rated as fifteen thousand. They were well mounted on horses in excellent condition—and that was the best part of the show they made. Their arms and equipment were novel and interesting because of their age and antiquity. “It is probable,” wrote Wilks, describing them evidently from personal observation,²⁵⁹ “that no national or private collection of ancient armour in Europe contains any weapon or article of personal equipment which cannot be traced in this motley crowd; the Parthian bow and arrow, the iron club of Scythia, sabres of every age and nation, lances of every length and description, and matchlocks of every form, metallic helmets of every pattern, simple defences of the head, a steel bar descending diagonally as a protection to the face; defences of bars, scales or chain work descending behind or on the shoulders, cuirasses, suits of armour, or detached pieces for the arm, complete coats of mail in chain work, shields, bucklers, and quilted jackets, sabre-

259. Wilks was born about 1760: joined at 22, the military service of the E. I. Co., at Madras, 1782; became Deputy Secretary to the Military Board, Fort St. George, Madras, 1786; Secretary to Sir Barry Close's Mission to Mysore, 1787; A. D. C. to the Governor, Madras, 1789; A. D. C. and Military Secretary to Col. James Stuart in the war against Tipū Sultan, 1790-1795; Military and Private Secretary to the Governor, Lord Clive (afterwards Earl Powis), 1798-1803. He had thus served in the Cornwallis campaign, while as regards the final campaign against Tipū, he occupied the most important post on the Governor's staff.

proof.”²⁶⁰ The ostentatious display of these antique novelties would appear to have been equally curious in its way. “The free and equal use,” adds Wilks,²⁶¹ “of two swords, the precise and perfect command of a balanced spear 18 feet long, of the club which was to shiver an iron helmet, of the arrow discharged in flight, but above all the total absence of every symptom of order, or obedience, or command, excepting groups collected round their respective flags; every individual an independent warrior, self-impelled, affecting to be the champion whose single arm was to achieve victory; scampering among each other in wild confusion. The whole exhibition presented to the mind an imagery scarcely more allied to previous impressions of reality, than the fictions of an eastern tale, or the picturesque disorder of a dramatic scene.” The impossibility of relying on such a body for the execution of any combined movement was sufficiently obvious to the English in the Cornwallis campaign; they were found to be useless even for the limited purposes of enlarging the limits of observation; for relieving the regular cavalry from the duties of the light troops; and for an extended command over the sources of the country to be traversed. Fifteen days of experience, under an officer known for his skill, conciliation and example, showed the total disappointment of the meagre hopes of success.²⁶² They were so ill-trained even for self-defence, that those who opposed them practised on them on every successive day of their advance some enterprise or stratagem, always successful. What was worse, they showed themselves unequal even to the protection of their foragers on ordinary occasions.²⁶³ Haidar discerned the uselessness of the Nizām’s troops even earlier than those who took part in the Cornwallis

260. Wilks, *Mysoor*, II. 444.

261. *Ibid.*, 444-445.

262. *Ibid.*, 445. The officer referred to was Brigadier-Major Dallas.

263. *Ibid.*

campaign. On the eve of the battle of Tiruvaṇṇāmalai (1768),²⁶⁴ Haidar sent word to the Nizām about his impressions of the forces which he had brought with him. If Kirmāṇi is to be believed, he was plain to him to a degree. He sent him (the Nizām) a message to the effect that the expectations formed of his brave troops and the ability and experience of his Amīrs and officers had been well proved, inasmuch as that, in time of need, not a thousand of men with their arms, nor one Amīr of respectability had remained with the stirrup (*i.e.*, the Nizām); that with such troops, therefore, strong only in numbers and show, it was evident, he said, they could never expect to conquer the stormy, warlike English.²⁶⁵ Haidar, accordingly, advised the Nizām to retire to a safe distance and leave him—"his particular friend," as he called himself—"by every art and device which knowledge could supply," to oppose and defeat the English and put them to flight. The Nizām was wise enough to adopt the advice and marched off to a safe place.²⁶⁶ Kirmāṇi also records what impression the Nizām's army left on General Richard Smith and the English officers with him when they acquainted themselves with its strength and description, as distinguished from the troops of Haidar. "They did not," he deliberately remarks,²⁶⁷ "estimate the Moghul army at the value of a grain of barley." In another place, Kirmāṇi is equally emphatic. Comparing the Nizām's troops with those of the Mahrattas, he says that the "Moghul (*i.e.*, the Nizām's) soldiers are a motley assemblage of proud, indolent, and effeminate men," that they could not stand against the Mahrattas in the field, that

264. *Trinomali* of Wilks and *Turnamul* of Kirmāṇi.

265. Kirmāṇi, *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 255.

266. *Ibid.*

267. *Ibid.*, 252. "The Moghul army" means the army of the Nizām, the Nizām being the representative of the Mughal Emperor.

they were "in one battle overthrown," and that they fled "leaving their master at the mercy of the Mahrattas."²⁶⁸ De La Tour, an eye-witness to the conditions of the times, writes equally plainly of the ineffectiveness of the Nizām's troops. "The cavalry," he says, "was good, but much better for show than service; every chief being proprietor and absolute master of his own troop." Following the army of the Nizām, for the most part, only as his vassals, they were, he adds,²⁶⁹ very little disposed "to risque their life and their cattle in any war, except when animated by the desire of revenge, the hope of plunder, or some other passion." The Nizām's artillery was all fine European brass cannon, but ill-provided with ammunition, badly mounted and served by unskilful Indian gunners.²⁷⁰ Wilks suggests that the contemptible state of the Nizām's cavalry may, in some measure, have arisen from the effeminacy and decline which marked the general character of the government to which they belonged and partly even from men of no military pretensions being put in charge of them. It is true that most of these owed their commands more to court intrigues than to military ability, or capacity to manipulate accounts in their master's behalves than to military knowledge. But there can be no question that the *mansabdāri* system had so far degenerated as to be perfectly incapable, at the time we are writing of, of providing soldiers of any capacity. The system had nearly exhausted itself and the credit of understanding

268. *Ibid.*, 280-281. This description of the Nizām's army occurs in Kirmāni's account of the fight between the Mahrattas and the Nizām, which ended in the latter's agreeing to the payment of the *chaut* of Bidar, Aurangabad, Berar, etc.

269. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, II. 12.

270. *Ibid.*, II. 14. Thirty of these were, it is recorded by De La Tour, French pieces, cast in the reign of Louis XIV, being the remaining artillery of the squadron of M. de la Haye, which was lost in a hurricane at Masulipatam. They were recovered from the sunken vessels by the Nizām, to whom this port then belonged (*Ibid.*).

that point clearly must go to Haidar among the Indian military leaders of his day.²⁷¹

It is a trite saying that the Mahrattas were welded into a nation by Śivāji. He achieved this great result by organizing them for civil and military purposes in a manner unknown to the Mughals. His army system was, indeed, more strict and methodical than that of the Mughals.²⁷² The army, both infantry and cavalry, was formed into uniform divisions, commanded by a regular chain of officers, from heads of ten, fifty, etc., up to heads of five thousand, above which there was no authority but that of the general nominated to command a particular army. It is necessary to note that these officers were not feudal chiefs—as under the *mansabdāri* system—but servants of the Government placed over soldiers mustered and paid by its agents. Both troops and officers received high pay and were obliged to surrender their plunder of every description to the State. Śivāji not only paid the closest attention to economy in every department of public service but also provided for the suitable combination of civil and military authority in its highest ranks, with a view to obtain the advantages of centralization and efficiency. He may be said to have anticipated Haidar in some of these matters. His system of civil Government effectively aided the administration on the

271. The interested reader will find a vivid description of the effeminacy that had set into the Imperial Mughal army about the time of Aurangzīb in Elphinstone, *History of India*, 659-661. There was, according to him, both individual inefficiency and a total relaxation of discipline.

272. On this subject, see Elphinstone, *Ibid.*, 631. Apart from Grant-Duff, Elphinstone was the first to write with an adequate appreciation of Śivāji's system of civil and military administration. He published his *History* in 1841. Elphinstone's account is in keeping with Grant-Duff's and may be described as an abstract of it, see Grant-Duff, *History of the Marathas I.* 164-174. Elphinstone was probably indebted to Grant-Duff for his material. Grant-Duff was Assistant to Elphinstone when the latter was Resident at Poona, 1811. He published his *History* in 1826.

military side. It was thoroughly regular, highly vigorous and uniformly strict, both towards its own officers and village heads, as much in checking oppression of the cultivator as in suppressing frauds against the State. The civil officers were all Brāhmins, those of the highest rank being often invested with military commands as well.

The foundation of Śivāji's power was his infantry. It was raised locally, partly in the Ghāt-

(a) Infantry.

Mahta and partly in the Konkan.

Those from the former tract were known as Māvlis, those from the latter Hētkuris. These men provided their own arms, the ammunition being furnished by the government. Their dress generally consisted of a pair of short drawers coming half way down the thigh, a strong narrow band of considerable length, tightly girt about the loins, a turban, and sometimes a cotton frock. Most of them wore also a cloth round their waist. They were commonly armed with the sword, shield and matchlock. Some of the Hētkuris, especially those from Sāwantwāḍi, used a species of firelock, the invention of the lock for the flint having been early received from the Portuguese, with whom they had come into contact. Every tenth man, instead of fire-arms, carried a bow and arrows which were useful in night attacks and surprizes, when the fire-arms were kept in reserve or prohibited. The Hētkuris excelled as marksmen, but they could seldom be brought to desperate attacks, sword in hand, for which the Māvlis became famous. But both of them possessed an extraordinary facility of climbing, and could mount a precipice, or scale a rock with ease, where others would have run great risk of being dashed to pieces. Every ten men had an officer called *Nāyak*; over five *Nāyaks*, a *Havāldār*; over two *Havāldārs*, one *Jūmladār*; and over ten *Jūmladārs*, one *Ēk-Hazāri*. There were also officers of

five thousand, *Pānch-Hazāri*, between whom and the chief commander, called *Sar-i-naubat*,²⁷³ there was no intermediate gradation. The pay of a private in the infantry, a *Māvli* or *Hētkuri*, varied from one to three pagodas a month. A *Jūmladār* received seven pagodas. All plunder, as well as prize, was the property of Government. But its surrender was followed by some small compensation and, being made openly in *Durbār*, was followed by praise and promotion.

The cavalry was of two kinds, *Bārgīrs* and *Sillāhdārs*.²⁷⁴

(b) Cavalry.

Under Śivāji's system, the *Bārgīrs* were mounted on horses, the property of the State. They were really household troops and called *Paigah*.²⁷⁵ Śivāji placed greater reliance on the *Sillāhdārs*, or any horse furnished on contract by individuals. With both these latter, he usually intermixed a proportion of his *Paigah*, to overawe the disobedient, to perfect his system of intelligence, to prevent embezzlement, and to frustrate treachery. The dress of the cavalry consisted of a pair of light breeches covering the knee; a turban which was commonly fastened by passing a fold of it under the chin; a frock of quilted cotton; and a cloth round the waist, with which generally the swords were girded in preference to their being secured with their belts. Their arms consisted of a sword and a shield, a proportion carrying matchlocks as well, though the national weapon was the spear, in the use of which and in the management of the horse Mahratta horsemen showed both grace and dexterity. The spearmen generally wore also a sword, sometimes a

273. The *Surnobat* of Grant-Duff, *Ibid*, 164.

274. The *Bargeers* and *Sillidars* of Grant-Duff, *Ibid*.

275. The *Paigah* of Grant-Duff, *Ibid*, 165. The *Paigah* troops maintained by the *Paigah* Amirs of Hyderabad, may be traced to these *Paigah* troops of the Mahrattas. In Hyderabad, they date from the time of Rukn-ud-daula, Dewān of Nizām Ali Khān, 1761-1803. They were intended to counterbalance the military strength of his regular troops. Large tracts of the country were alienated for their maintenance.

shield, though the latter being unwieldy they only carried in case the spear should be broken. The gradation of officers was much like what was ordained for the infantry. Over every twenty-five horsemen, there was a *Havāldār*. To one hundred and twenty-five, there was a *Jūmladār*; and to every five *Jūmlas*, or six hundred and twenty-five, there was a *Subedār*. Every *Subedār* had an accountant and an auditor of accounts attached to him, who were liable to be transferred. To the command of every ten *Subehs*, or six thousand two hundred and fifty horse, which were only rated at five thousand, there was a commander styled *Pānch-Hazāri*, with whom were also associated a *Mazumdār* (auditor of accounts) and *Amīn* who acted as registrar and accountant. These were Government agents, while each *Jūmladār* and *Subedār* had a *Kārkūn* (or clerk) or two in his own pay as well as others in the pay of Government. Above the *Pānch-Hazāris*, there was no superior officer except the *Sar-i-naubat* (or chief commander) of the cavalry, who was different from his namesake of the infantry, there being one such for each section of the army. The pay of the cavalry varied. The *Bārgīrs* were paid two to five pagodas; and the *Sillāhdārs* from six to twelve pagodas a month. A *Jūmladār* received twenty pagodas a month, while a *Subedār* got fifty pagodas a month with a palanquin, and a *Pānch-Hazāri* 200 pagodas a month, besides an allowance for a palanquin and other perquisites. Śivāji was from the beginning against paying the military (and civil) servants by permanent assignments on portions of the revenue of the village. He is said to have objected to it not only because he feared it would lead to the oppression of the cultivators, but also because of the apprehension that it would ultimately cause such a division of authority as must weaken his Government and encourage the village and district authorities to

resist it as they frequently did that of Bijāpur.²⁷⁶ Nor did he approve of the Jahgīr system, though he confirmed many and adapted it for certain purposes in connection with the administration of his forts. He seldom, if ever, bestowed any new military *jahgīrs*, and gave away very few as personal assignments. Śivāji, however, made it easier for his cavalry to maintain itself. During the fair season, the horse subsisted in the enemy's country. During the rains, they were generally allowed to rest at State cost, being cantoned in different situations near pasture lands, under the protection of some fort or other, where the grass of the preceding season was stacked and the gram prepared by the time they returned. For this purpose, persons were appointed, to whom rent-free lands were assigned hereditarily.²⁷⁷ The troops were mustered and reviewed once every year at the time of the Dasara festival, which was observed by Śivāji with considerable pomp. Each horse was examined and an inventory and valuation of each soldier's effects were taken for comparison with what he brought back, or eventually had to make good. If a horseman's effects were unavoidably lost, his horse killed, maimed or destroyed in the service of the State, they were replaced on due proof being given. But all plunder or articles discovered, of which no satisfactory account could be given, were carried to the credit of the State, either by confiscation of the article, or by deduction of the amount from the soldier's arrears. Accounts were closed annually and balances due by the State were paid either in ready cash or by bills on the collectors of revenue in favour of the officers, but never by separate orders on villagers.²⁷⁸

276. In later Mahratta times, the system of assignments was adopted with the expected consequences, see Grant-Duff, *Ibid.*, 168.

277. This is the only instance in which the grant of land rent-free is said to have been adopted by Śivāji, see Grant-Duff, *Ibid.*, 167-168.

278. See, on the whole subject, Grant-Duff, *Ibid.*, 160-174; J. Sarkar, *Shivaji and his Times*, 415-416. Wilks, who published his work

Such, in brief, was the system gradually evolved by Śivāji. It underwent no change by the extension of his territory, until he assumed the ensigns of royalty. Even then, the alterations were rather directed in matters of form than innovations on established rules. When the Pēshwa's power increased from 1727 onwards, the national character of the Mahratta army changed rapidly until it came to be composed partly of non-Mahrattas. The Mahrattas still held fast to the cavalry, for which their national genius fitted them. Though destitute of all pretensions to tactical discipline, the better part of the Mahratta army still retained its admirable arrangements for forage and subsistence as also its well-known interior organization, which enabled the commander to wield and dispose his seemingly disordered masses. The attraction to the infantry, however, languished with the lapse of time, largely by the dilution of this section of the army by persons recruited from among northern Indian races. This motley crowd of new soldiers broke the solidarity of the original Mahratta army and led partly to its disorganization. The artillery too fell, as may be expected, into foreign hands, being manned and officered by persons recruited from among the Portuguese and Indian Christians drawn from the adjoining Portuguese territory.

between 1810-1814, does not give any detailed account of the Mahratta army administration, though he has some references to it, sometimes critical (see *Mysoor*, II. 623). Grant-Duff has based his account on original documents then in the possession of the Rājā of Satāra and a mass of records belonging to one S. Baboo Rao, an official at Satāra, where Duff himself was Political Resident. Dr. S. N. Sen's account in his *Administrative System of the Marathas* (2nd Edn., 1925) is the latest available. But his tacit endorsement of the conclusion that the constitution of the Mahratta government and army was "more calculated to destroy than to create an Empire" seems too large a generalization and contradicted by the evidence furnished by himself. Mr. S. M. Edwards' study of the subject, largely based on Dr. Sen's work, in the *C. H. I.*, V. ch. XXIII, is heavily destructive in spirit and is still reminiscent of the old attitude that treats the Mahrattas as a nation of "freebooters."

It will be seen that the Mahratta system, unlike the Mysore and Mahratta army systems: a comparison and a contrast. Mughal, made for centralization of army control. Under it, all divisions of the army had to look to one master for orders. Śivāji broke through the *mansabdāri* system and established direct relations with his troops. He created a standing army and provided for its maintenance on stable lines. But Haidar went one step further by modernising both discipline and equipment to a large extent. In another point also, Haidar differed from the Mahrattas. He entertained foreign officers and men and made them part of his army, though they were permitted a certain amount of self-governance. They were part of his fighting forces in all units of the army. There can be no doubt that while Haidar derived much advantage by this association of European forces with his own, the habit of looking to the support derivable from the European wing had the ultimate effect of demoralizing the spirit of his own forces. It weakened their national sentiment and narrowed their patriotic outlook, with the result that when the crisis was reached in Tipū's time, the fighting capacity of the indigenous forces was found to have been completely broken down. It must, however, be owned that during Haidar's lifetime, this adverse effect was not yet visible. On the other hand, he was masterly enough to keep the European commanders and forces under his control and allowed them no chance or ground either to overawe or to disobey or even pretend to any kind of independence. The Mahrattas did not depend either on the aid of such foreign units or on the discipline to be derived through their aid. Still, they were uniformly successful in their warfare with Haidar, who was not only strong in his own indigenous forces but also made them stronger through the new discipline he had imparted to them. It is, however, incontrovertible that the new technique he

developed and the new forces he built up from the derelict European nations in the South of India helped Haidar to counter the many Mahratta blows aimed at him and to try conclusions with the strongest of the European nations that tried to build an Empire in the East.

Haidar, at the time we are writing of (about 1767), had developed a standing army which stood him in good stead throughout his later career. If a contemporary writer is to be believed,²⁷⁹ he aimed at the establishment of an army of about 180,000 or 200,000 men, of which about 25,000, all told, were to be cavalry and the rest, *i.e.*, 1,75,000 men, infantry. After providing for the garrisoning of forts and the guarding of the frontiers, he appears to have got ready a field army, about 50,000 to 55,000 strong. Of this number, 18,000 formed cavalry of the regular type and about 8,000 cavalry of the irregular kind, made up of Mahrattas, Pindāris and others.²⁸⁰

279. This account is based on De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, II. 6-7. De La Tour's exact words are: "In the year we speak of (1767), all the forces of Ayder Ali Khan were estimated at about one hundred and eighty or two hundred thousand men." His account seems substantially correct, though it has to be followed with care. At the time he wrote, De La Tour was at the head of the artillery section of Haidar's army. There are figures available from other sources--also contemporary--for the same year, but they relate to the actual forces present or supposed to be present on a particular battle-field and not to the army as a whole maintained by him as a regular standing army, including the garrisoning, frontier guarding, and fighting forces. All the sources on this subject will be found collated and discussed at some length in Appendix III to this Volume, to which the attention of the interested reader is invited for further details.

280. Of these, De La Tour (*Ibid.*, II. 7) says that they "cannot be better compared than to the Cossacks who follow the Russian army, being fit for no service but to ravage the country, or rob the baggage of an army." They corresponded to the "Looty-Wāllahs" mentioned by Innes Munro, see *Narrative*, 131. They are described as hussars or light-armed cavalry, who slung an old rusty matchlock in the style of a carbine. They are referred to frequently by Kirmāñi in his *Neshāunt-Hyādurī*, *e.g.*, 207, 239. They embraced various classes of people including the Mahrattas, Pindāris, Bēḍars, Rajputs, etc. The most celebrated commander of irregular infantry and cavalry during

The remaining 26 to 31,000 represented the infantry. Of this number, about 20,000 were Topasses, or sepoy, armed with 16,000 good firelocks,²⁸¹ and the rest—6,000 to 11,000—were men drawn from the people of the Karnātic, armed with matchlocks and lances.²⁸² There were, besides, 3,000 men armed in the old style—i.e., with arms out of use, or unknown in contemporary Europe—mounted two and two on running camels, each with firelock of very great length, which threw a ball of about three ounces to a prodigious distance.²⁸³ Another 3,000 men carried rockets of iron.²⁸⁴ Haidar had,

Haidar's time was one Ghāzi Khān, who was secretly put to death in prison by Mīr Sādak, the Dewān of Tipū, just before the final fall of Seringapatam in 1799. See Kirmānī, *Tipu Sultan*, 189, f.n. 1. In his earlier work, Kirmānī refers to Ghāzi Khān always with respect, styling him "the gallant Ghāzi Khān," see *Neshauni-Hyduri*, 207, where one of his exploits will be found detailed.

281. According to De La Tour (*Ibid*), all the officers in the infantry section, down to the corporals, had no muskets.

282. De La Tour (*Ibid*) refers to them as "*Carnates*, or *Caleros*." The former stands for *Karnātakas*, or those belonging to the Karnāṭaka country; the latter name *Caleros* is probably identical with *Kallars*, spelt by Kirmānī as *Kullers* and by Orme as *Colleries* (*Neshauni-Hyduri*, 278 gives it as *Collurics*). See Orme, *Indostare*, 343, 365, 381-382, 383, 385, 391, 399, 423. Kirmānī calls them "irregulars" (i.c.). Later, De La Tour describes the Carnates as "irregular troops." These have to be identified accordingly with the *Ahashām* foot. These, as we know, were armed with matchlocks. According to De La Tour, as mentioned above, all the officers in the infantry section, down to the corporals, had no muskets.

283. De La Tour's further description may be noted: "These arms have an iron rest fixed to the barrel; and the soldiers, who are excellent marksmen, follow the cavalry, and plant themselves in covered places to flank the enemy, among whose cavalry they keep up a very destructive fire. This body of troops have the singular privilege of an ensign for every ten men; whether it be an honour, or a piece of policy to deceive the enemy into an opinion, from the number of standards, that they are opposed by a very numerous corps of infantry. The troop is very ancient, being, according to all appearance, the first among the Indians that bore fire-arms (*Ibid*, II. 8-9).

284. De La Tour describes these rockets of iron at some length. They were, according to him, boxes of plate-iron, made in the form of fusees, and attached to direction rods. They were of various sizes, some containing more than one pound of powder or composition, and flew to the distance of a thousand yards. Many were charged to burst. Others were sharpened at the end; and others, again, were pierced at the foremost end, being so charged that the wind acted strongly on the flame, and set fire to the things it stuck in its course. De La Tour

besides, a contingent of Nairs, recruited in Malabar after his operations there. The Europeans numbered some 750 men, divided into two companies of dragoons or hussars, 250 cannoneers, and the officers and serjeants dispersed among the regiments of grenadiers and Topasses.²⁸⁵ The train of artillery was a large one consisting of at least 100 pieces of large cannon,²⁸⁶ and

remarks that this implement was, on the whole, more expensive than useful, because of the lack of care and attention shown in making it up. He admits, however, that its use was productive sometimes of "dreadful effects," as it set fire to ammunition waggons. He quotes, as a notable example, the battle won by Haidar against Cols. Baillie and Fletcher. In this battle, he says, a rocket having set fire to an ammunition waggon, which in blowing up set fire, in its turn, to two others, the battle was lost to the English. The English infantry was thrown into disorder, as the result of the explosion, and Tipū fell on them with his cavalry, with the result that the English were defeated (*Ibid.*, II. 9-10, f.n.). This is confirmed by Kirmāqī (o.c., 891). Another purpose for which these rockets were put is also indicated by De La Tour. They were, he says, very well adapted for setting fire to towns and villages in which the enemy had magazines. A body of cavalry, not commonly used to them, would be quickly thrown into disorder by them. The rockets that fell at the feet of the horses emitted a flame resembling that of a forge furnace, which frightened them; and when they burst, they did considerable mischief. It is no small advantage that they described a curved line, and they could therefore be thrown by people that were covered by a line of infantry. De La Tour notes the fact that the English made use of these rockets against the cavalry of Haidar—presumably in 1767—but "as it was habituated to the fire by various exercises performed with paper rockets, the horses, instead of being frightened, marched fiercely over them" (De La Tour, *Ibid.*, II. 10).

285. Peixoto, in his *Memoirs*, 154, says that in 1770 the Europeans of all nations in Haidar's service numbered only 250 and that they were distributed among the infantry, cavalry and artillery. The reduction of 500 in the number deserves to be noted. Peixoto's figure is the more remarkable because in 1767, apart from the figure of 750 given in De La Tour, there were 400 French and Portuguese troopers at Bangalore alone, according to the information available to the English at Madras (*Mily. Cons.*, XXVII, 736—August 11, 1767). Those in the infantry were, in Peixoto's opinion, useless, as they were not in one body but divided into several battalions in the station of serjeants. Peixoto failed to note that they were so distributed with the double object of securing the benefit of the new discipline to the various units to which they were posted, and keeping the Europeans out of harm's way.

286. Later, De La Tour states that Haidar and the Nizām, his ally, in 1767, "possessed a very considerable train of artillery, consisting of at least one hundred and ten pieces of large cannon" (*Ibid.*, II. 13). According to Peixoto (*Memoirs*, 188), Haidar got ready 120 field-pieces

well provided with ammunition, well mounted and well served by good European cannoneers. According to this account, the total army strength was fixed at about 2 lakhs of men, while about a fourth of it was kept ready to take the field. According to De La Tour, Haidar actually led an army of 50 to 55,000 men against the English at Madras in 1767. Undoubtedly the actual number of his effectives was much more. For we know from another source that the Mysore forces on the field in 1767 numbered 70,000 men.²⁸⁷ The details of Haidar's forces given by Chevalier St. Lubin, for the same year, however, confirm De La Tour's total of 50,000 as it approximates Europeans and Indians, regulars and irregulars, all told, 40,500.²⁸⁸ But, as three years earlier, in 1763-64, Haidar put up against the Mahrattas at Raṭṭihalli a force which was 50,000 strong, it is possible that St. Lubin's forces refer only to the field forces, the more so as he wrote from Haidar's camp. These were made up of 10,000 cavalry (*savār*), 20,000 infantry (*bārr*) and 20,000 irregulars (*akashām*).²⁸⁹ The same figures are repeated, for each section of the army, for the year 1768.²⁹⁰ In 1770, his "whole force" *i.e.*, effective force, is said to have consisted of 15,000 "fire-arms," *i.e.*,

and 10 large cannons for use by the army. De La Tour has, therefore, to be understood as restricting his figure to "large cannon." In any case, Haidar and the Nizām jointly should have had more than 110 pieces of field-pieces and large cannon. This view is confirmed by the figures given by Col. Joseph Smith in his letter to Fort St. George, dated January 22, 1767. He states that Haidar had, in 1767, 50 heavy artillery, 50 medium artillery and 100 field-pieces (*Mily. Cons.*, XXVI. 66). If Chevalier St. Lubin, who gives full details of Haidar's forces of 1767 and who wrote from Haidar's camp, is to be believed, Haidar contributed only 47 pieces of cannon from 32 to 2 lbs. manned by 180 Europeans divided into four companies (*Ibid.*, XXVII. 958-960). This is confirmed by Robson, who gives the figures as 49 pieces (*Life of Hyder Ally*, 42). In 1764, in the Mysore-Mahratta War, Haidar had, on his side, already a train of artillery consisting of 100 pieces of cannon (*Mily. Cons.*, XII. 174).

287. *Mily. Cons.*, XXVI. 66—Col. Joseph Smith to Fort St. George, January 22, 1767.

288. *Ibid.*, XXVII. 958-960.

289. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 31.

290. *Ibid.*, ff. 41

Topasses, 12,000 "horse," *i.e.*, cavalry (*savār*), 2,000 "rocket boys," those of the infantry who carried rockets of iron, as above described; and 60,000 "matchlocks," *i.e.*, *akashām* foot, who formed the irregular infantry. These made a total of 89,000 men, infantry and cavalry put together.²⁹¹ A portion of it may represent additional recruitment between 1767 and 1770, but it is possible that the figure 50 to 55,000 for 1767 is an underestimate of the total effectives actually forming part of the standing army of that year. However this might be, there is ground for believing that Haidar had by 1767 a total standing army of 2,00,000 men, while his effectives, quite apart from the troops intended for garrisoning and other purposes, numbered at least 50,000 men. The garrisoning troops and frontier guards cannot have been small in number, considering the number of hill and other forts to be looked after and many frontier parts to be guarded. The garrisons were composed partly of the infantry, independent of the separate establishment which each fort had for itself, this being semi-military in character. It is thus clear that all the 200,000 men were not brought under the new discipline. According to Peixoto, the contemporary Mahratta army, which was mostly composed of cavalry, totalled 300,000 horse. It would seem that Haidar had not yet the advantage of the Mahrattas in the matter of artillery, in which their strength was much more, but, according to Peixoto,²⁹²

291. Peixoto, *Memoirs*, 159.

292. Peixoto, *Ibid.* Peixoto, however, did not on this account rate the fighting power of the Mahrattas the lower, on account of their lack of the new discipline that Haidar imparted to his troops. Indeed, he remarks almost immediately that despite the new discipline, Haidar and his troops could not prove a match to the Mahrattas in certain circumstances. "If he (Haidar)," he adds, "resolves to give battle in the plain, or to retire into some stronghold, he is ruined without remission" (*Ibid.*). As against Peixoto's opinion must be set that of De La Tour, who remarks that Haidar's cavalry almost always had the advantage of the Mahrattas. And he adds that Mokhdum, Haidar's brother-in-law, had, during Mādhava Rao's campaign, had "the most decided success" (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I-210). Wilks

"in what he has the advantage is that all his troops are better disciplined." One objective aimed at by the formation of the new army was, as we have seen, to do away with the old *mansabdāri* system and the worst evils connected with it. The new army contributed towards the centralization of power in the hands of Haidar, not only military power but all kinds of power, for the control of the army meant the control of everything else needed for effective governance. The new army provided the requisite weapon for keeping order at home, for carrying on aggression abroad, and for avoiding the rise of rival revolutionaries in the land and preventing the development of military forces under their control. It was the new army and the new discipline that largely contributed to the continuance of Haidar's power in Mysore during the two decades following the events of 1761, and even helped Tipū to maintain himself in power, despite his faults, during nearly two other decades immediately following the death of Haidar.

As his conquests increased, the capacity to add to his standing army by levies from tributary chiefs also increased. Haidar is known—at least after his capture of Gooty (1776)—to have done this fairly systematically. Thus, the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug furnished 1,000 horse (cavalry) and 4,000 peons (irregulars); the Pāḷegār of Raidurg, 200 horse and 2,000 peons; the Pāḷegār of Ānegondi (representing the derelict Empire of Vijayanagar), 100 horse and 1,000 peons; the Pāḷegār of Kanakagiri, 200 horse and 1,500 peons; and the Nawāb of Cuddapah, 2,000 horse. To these troops, Haidar paid at the rate of four *Haidari Pagodas* (equal to Rs. 16 a

describes the Mahratta cavalry as entirely "destitute of all pretensions to tactical discipline" though good in its "interior organization" (*Mysore*, II. 623).

month) for each mounted horseman, and one Pagoda (equal to Rs. 4 a month) for each peon, while absent from their own territorial limits. It may be added that he only paid these troops when called to the field. This system of adding to the effective strength of his standing army enabled Haidar to call into the field, when required, a fairly dependable and numerically not negligible force, the cost of whose maintenance he did not bear but made it part of the duty of the tributary chiefs.²⁹³

Such was Haidar and such his conception of the greatness of military power. Haidar indeed stands out as an exceedingly capable organizer. He virtually built up a new army; developed a new technique of warfare; and provided for the proper guarding of the Passes that could lead the enemy against him. Even more than all this, he developed a policy that subordinated everything to the single idea of expanding Mysore and making Mysore stand out for the South against foes, whoever they were. If his policy of force did not succeed, it was not because he did not use it but because he failed to use it along lines which would have meant the greatest benefit to him and to his country.

293. See Wilks, I. 727 (f.n.)-729. According to the *Haid Nām*. (ff. 74), the total number of troopers contributed by the Pālegārs of Ānegondi, Harapanahalli, Jarimale, etc., places, in 1780, was about 15,000.

CHAPTER XIII.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*)

Haidar at the helm of affairs—Haidar and the idea of a Southern Empire—His policy of action—His immediate aims and objectives—Giving effect to the policy—Limitations to his policy of force—Haidar's plan of operations—Political situation in India in 1761—Territorial expansion: acquisition of Hoskote and Sira, 1761—Asaf Jah and his sons and grandsons, 1748-1761; their internecine quarrels; Salabat Jang's succession, 1751; Basalat Jang, his brother and Minister, 1758; his displacement by Nizam Ali, 1760; Basalat Jang's activities; his invasion of Sira province, 1761—His siege of Hoskote; its defence by Mukund Sripati, the Mahratta killedar; Basalat Jang's Treaty with Haidar for the conquest of Sira province; the terms of the Treaty; significance of the Treaty; Wilks' criticism of the terms of the Treaty; Haidar's act justified; capitulation of Mukund Sripati—Siege of Sira; Triambak-Krishna's stout resistance; he marches out with the honours of war; Haidar seizes the military stores; Basalat Jang hands over possession of Sira province to Mysore; his departure to Adoni—Annexation of Dodballapur, 1761-1762—Reduction of Chikballapur, November 1761-March 1762: the Palegars of Chikballapur; Chikkappa, the Palegar, and his valiant defence; Haidar's discomfiture and attempt at composition; Murari Rao's advance; his defeat and retreat; Pettah and Fort besieged; two successive assaults beaten off; Haidar's ingenuity at work; Haidar's fresh attempt at composition: terms agreed to; Haidar's withdrawal to Devanhalli—Chikkappa's fresh confabulation with Murari Rao; Murari Rao's occupation of Chikballapur fort—Haidar's detachment attacked—Haidar's forced march on Chikballapur; his chastisement of Mahratta forces; he takes Chikballapur fort—Chikkappa besieged at Nandidurg; Haidar's pursuit of the Mahrattas; capture of Gudibanda; fight at Kodikonda; Murari Rao's

retreat to Gooty—Haidar's advance northward into Murari Rao's territories : capture of Kodikonda ; capture of Madak sira—Capture of Nandidurg and capitulation of Chikkappa—Review of Haidar's conduct of the Sira and Chikballapur campaigns—Administrative arrangements for the new territories : Mir Ali Raza Khan appointed Faujdar of Sira ; campaign against the Palegars of Rayadurg, Harapanahalli, Chitaldrug, etc.—Conquest of Bednur, 1763 ; Haidar's motives—Rani Virammaji's rule—The story of the Pretender—Bednur and its surroundings—The city of Bednur—Haidar's preparations—Haidar's Treaty with the Pretender—Haidar's advance on the place—The progress of the siege and conquest—The destruction of the city—The fate of the Rani—A vindication of her character—A parallelism in point—The fate of the Pretender—Haidar's idea of an asylum for himself ; his aims on Thiaghur—His selection of Bednur—His settlement of Bednur—The garrisoning of places, etc.—Haidar's State entry into Bednur—Attempted assassination of Haidar—Reflections on the Bednur episode—The vicissitudes of Bednur—Dewan Venkappaiya's degradation and death—Further conquests in the north, 1763 : Sode—Savanur—Effects of Haidar's forward policy on the Mahrattas—Virammaji's appeal for deliverance—Peshwa Madhava Rao's first invasion of Mysore, 1764-1765—The battle of Rattihalli, May 3-6, 1764 ; Haidar's retreat on Anavatti—Rattihalli and after—Haidar's defeat at Anavatti, December 1764—Haidar at bay—Opens negotiations for peace, February 1765—The Treaty of Bednur, March 1765 ; reflections on the Treaty—A retrospect and prospect—The Peshwa's first campaign and after—Overtures for the cession of Madura and Tinnevely countries, 1763-1764 ; Muhammad Yusuf's adventurous career (down to 1754)—The history of Madura, 1736-1754—1754-1755—Muhammad Yusuf's subsequent career (down to 1764)—His rebellion, 1763—His appeal to Haidar for help—Haidar's dilatory attitude towards him—A critique of Mr. Hill's position—Haidar's loss and gain from the Yusuf Khan episode—Conquest of Balam, 1765—Attempt on Coorg, 1765—Insurrections in the east and north-east,

1765—Invasion of Malabar, 1765-1766: Early history of Malabar—Alliance with Ali Raja of Cannanore—Further relations between Haidar and Ali Raja—Haidar sets out on the campaign; his plan of operations; his objective—The Nairs retaliate—Their tactics; Haidar's progress against them—Seeks to negotiate with the Zamorin; settlement of the Kolattiri country; Haidar advances against the Zamorin's kingdom—Invests Calicut; proposes terms to the Zamorin, April 1766; Haidar's precaution; the Zamorin temporizes; the Zamorin confined in his own palace; and burns himself to death; Haidar's exactions from the Zamorin's ministers—The settlement of the Zamorin's country—Haidar advances further south-west; reduction of Cochin and other chiefs; return to Coimbatore—Rebellion of Nair chiefs and its suppression—Territorial limits of Mysore in 1766.

THE usurpation of Haidar, thus far noticed, has to be reckoned an epoch-making event in the long reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar. Indeed,

Haidar at the helm
of affairs.

enough has been said to show how Haidar was as much an usurper of supreme authority in Mysore as his master Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, with this difference that while the latter had sought to maintain his position by recourse to conventional means, the former had come to know that the secret of success was best guaranteed by a direct appeal to arms in times of crisis. The usurpation of master and servant was, in fact, not one of kind but one of degree. If the causes which brought Haidar to the forefront were revolutionary in character, the state of the times (from 1761 onwards) was eminently suited to his furthering the work of the Daḷavāis and the early rulers of Mysore in the true spirit of a virtual Regent or *Sarvādhikāri* of Krishnarāja.¹ For, as we have

1. *Vide* Ch. XII above, for the evidence on this point. A Persian *Memoir* from Hyderabad (c. 1800) is reminiscent of the above aspect of Haidar's work when it tells us that Haidar, on acquiring the supreme power in

seen,² though a Muhammaḍan by faith, Haidar was every inch a Hindu alike in temperament and training.

There was nothing strange in Haidar following in the

Haidar and the footsteps of Nanjarāja and endeavouring
idea of a Southern to step into the breach and resuscitate
Empire.

the dying Empire of Vijayanagar.

Nanjarāja, born in or about 1704, the very year in which Kōḍaṇḍa-Rāma, the nephew and successor of Śrī-Ranga VI, died, had seen the chaos that had been wrought in the land by the lack of a central power. The idea of an Empire did not thus originate full-fledged in Haidar's active brain. The seed of Imperialism was latent amongst certain of the States which had formed old Vijayanagar, though the urge towards its realization had been great only with Mysore. The wars of king Chikka-dēva and Daḷavāi Nanjarāja were the natural expression of that spirit of adventure that had taken them beyond their own territorial limits. This was one of those matters in which Haidar was a close and devoted disciple of Nanjarāja. The idea of a new Empire had taken firm hold of Haidar. Two factors governed the situation. The first of these was the opportunity he had in Mysore to develop a centralized power, which he could use for realizing his objective; and the second was his self-confidence, confidence in his own character and capacity for action. The fall of Nanjarāja prepared the ground for Haidar developing a new technique in State-craft, which soon seems to have terrified all people round about him. His dictatorship became rapidly all-embacing in character. It concentrated all power in his hands; and it involved the complete control of every form of activity in the country. It was as nothing that, as we

Seringapatam, "continued his respectful behaviour to the titular prince (the Rāja of Mysore)," "made all conquests in his name," and sent to him "presents on such occasions." [See *Asiatic Annual Register* (1800), pp. 2-7.]

2. *Ibid.*

have seen, he tried to remodel the army; to create a navy; to be friendly to the merchants; and gather in treasure. It was the objective behind all these activities that made those who saw or heard of him, or his zeal, feel that here was a man who was quite unlike what they had seen or heard so far. He could not have been more surprised than they at the fear he had begun to inspire into them and the effective—very effective—bargaining power that he was fast developing in the threat of war that he was continually offering them for the settlement of disputed questions.

What encouraged Haidar in the policy of expansion—even aggression—he resolved upon, may be briefly touched upon. If we are to judge from the situation in which he found himself, we can picture to ourselves the state of his mind. First of all, there was the chagrin he, with Nanjarāja, felt at the manner in which Mysore had been despoiled of what was due to her under the secret Treaty. The English at Madras had dealt a death-blow to the cession of Trichinopoly by alleging reasons and arguments which showed to him the utter impossibility of diplomacy proving successful where the use of other more telling means was needed. There can be no doubt that the Trichinopoly affair rankled in his heart as much as in that of Nanjarāja or any other Mysorean of the time.³

3. It is instructive to note here the causes of the First Mysore War (1767-1769) as set down by Kirmāṇi—by himself and by another historian quoted by him. According to himself, the operative cause starts with "the violation of the treaty" made with the Chief of Mysore (Nanjarāja) by Muhammad Ali, and Muhammad Ali driving him away from Trichinopoly after such violation, and rebelling against the Nizām of Hyderabad and usurping the Karnātic-Pāyanghāt. Quoting the other historian's view, Kirmāṇi adds that Muhammad Ali was "apprehensive that the affair of Trichinopoly, where he had so grossly violated his faith, still rankled like a thorn in the breast of the Nawaub (Haidar Ali), and God forbid! lest he should consequently turn his views towards Arkat (Arcot), and with the energy of the Khodādād, seize his country and wealth . . ." (*Neshauni-Hydari*, 245-246). See also, on this point, Ch. XVII below.

Lives had been lost and treasure had been poured on this venture and all, it seemed, to no purpose. Was that to go unavenged? To Haidar, revenge seemed a kind of justice—may be, wild justice; still, some kind of justice, which is as the balm to the pained heart. He studied revenge, and so kept his own wounds green. The country's man-power had been drained off by the war. Trade had suffered. Public discontent had to be appeased. It was not enough that Nanjarāja had been humbled and put out of authority. The losses sustained by him had to be made good. The dues to the army had been met but the Sāhukārs had to be paid off. The treasury had been depleted and had to be filled in. A new army had to be organised, if the scheme of reconquest was to succeed. The spirit of depression which had seized the people and which had brought Nanjarāja back to Mysore had to be banished, if the new policy was to get even a sporting chance. Haidar judged of the situation before him as anyone else would have, if he had been in his place. If anything, he realised quickly that he had to do something striking, something impressive, and something even drastic to remove the defeatist spirit which had taken possession of the people. The situation called for a new policy of action, action which would keep the entire nation at work. In the then conditions, it was only military adventure—on popular lines, on lines the populace can understand—that would impress. And what would impress better than the idea of revenge for wrong done or believed to have been done? Such an idea would find a ready appeal in every human breast. Haidar grasped clearly this single fact. His own personal inclination or ambition apart, he instinctively appreciated human psychology and resolved upon a policy which would make the people hold fast to him. It was this policy of action that helped to keep Haidar, despite the faults of his character and his diplomacy, and his

differences of race and religion, at the helm of affairs for over twenty years. It glorified Mysore abroad, wiped out the unhappy memories connected with Nanjarāja's failure at Trichinopoly, and made the name of Mysore one to be feared. A man less capable than Haidar could not have hit on a policy of action which at once transformed a position so destitute of hope into one so full of promise, and granted ordinary diplomatic skill and some political prescience, so sure of success. Two other factors helped Haidar in his active policy of aggression. One was that he was, both by predilection and by upbringing, one on whom religion sat lightly. He befriended generally the Hindus and respected their scruples, their beliefs, and their religious observances. The characterisation that he was "half-a-Hindu" was not inapt in its application to him. This friendliness towards the Hindus in a Hindu state ruled by a Hindu sovereign made him, if not exactly a *persona grata* with the people generally, at least one who was regarded with a feeling akin to goodwill. This initial goodwill proved a great asset to him. It enabled him to gather strength during the beginnings of his career as Regent, and later it helped him to win over the only possible opposition that might have proved an obstacle to his progress as a conqueror.

Haidar's first objective on attaining to the Regency was the unification of the country. His immediate aims and objectives. Towards this end, he tried to keep well with the Royal House as represented by King Krishnarāja II and his adoptive mother, the dowager.⁴ His initial step was to secure the friendship of his erstwhile master Nanjarāja, whom he deceived

4. De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 68. De La Tour refers to the Dowager thus: "There was a lady at Syringpatnam, commonly called the old Dayva because her husband, brother of the King and of Nand Raja, had been regent or Dayva of the Kingdom" (*Ibid*). The reference here to "old Dayva" is probably to Dēvājamma (or Doḍḍamma) of Kalale, a relation of the Daḷavāi brothers and dowager queen of Krishnarāja I and adoptive mother of Krishnarāja II. De La Tour does not seem to

into the belief that he was still his best friend. He appeased him by making every submission to him. He assigned territory to him and made a promise, both in writing and by oath, that he would never make any attempt on his liberty, property or life, but would always regard him as his father.⁵ Nanjarāja, old and gullible, was deceived once again. Then he secured Khandē Rao and despatched him to Bangalore, where he was exhibited in a cage, in which he was soon reduced to bones.⁶ Next, he caused an exact account of the Royal revenues to be made, together with the treasure and the jewels. The Court Banker was examined and the jewellery pledged with him was taken back. A commission was appointed to look into his accounts and for the frauds practised by him—or alleged to have been practised by him—his property was confiscated. But this somewhat harsh judgment was tempered by his sons being appointed in his place as Court Bankers, and himself being allowed a pension to subsist on.⁷ Haidar next turned his attention to the subjugation of the Pālegārs and certain of the principalities to the north-west. In regard to the first of these, the Pālegārs, his policy was not to antagonize those who yielded easily. Towards them, he professed friendliness; and as against those who showed fight, he used force. This policy of force when required

have well understood, or was ill-informed about, her exact relationship. She figures prominently in the local sources, the *Haid. Nām* and the *Annals*, and should have been about 55 years of age in 1761. She was the senior queen of Krishnarāja I and was married to him on March 17, 1716 (*Annals*, I. 159). Though politically grasping, she is known to have been of a pious and religious disposition. A grant in her name to Brāhmans was made by Krishnarāja II in August 1761 (see Ch. XV, f. n. 82). She appears to have lived at least till 1767, if De La Tour is to be believed. Some of De La Tour's references to her appear to be from hearsay and seem wholly lacking in foundation

5. *Ibid.*, I. 72.

6. *Ibid.*, I. 72-73; also Robson, *Hyder Ally*, 23. The latter wrote in 1786 "The cage with the bones is to be seen to this day, in the publ bazaar of Bangalore" (*Ibid.*).

7. *Ibid.*, I. 73-75.

and friendliness where possible, enabled Haidar at once to keep the country free from insurrections and to raise the levies he required for carrying out the external wars, which he well realized he could not long avoid. The first external wars he engaged in were those by which he sought to secure the natural frontiers of Mysore. Thus, his invasion of the territory of Virammāji, the Bednūr Rāpi, detailed below, was intended to absorb the old Keḷadi chief's territory, which extended towards the west as far as the sea. The kingdom of Kanara, as it was known at the time, had been encroached upon by the Portuguese, who had wrested from it the kingdom of Sunda and the country of Kārvār, with its fortress of Opir, well known for its strength.⁸ Haidar tried friendly overtures but, failing in them, attacked them with the superior troops at his command, and annexed all the dismembered parts of the old kingdom of Keḷadi, with the result that he extended at one bound the territorial limit of Mysore in the north-west to very near Goa. Even Goa would have been taken but for the French who were with him failing him in his attempt on the fort of Rāma. On his way back, he met Alī Rāja of Cannanore; and this opened a way for him, as we shall see, to lay the foundation for securing the western coast lower down as far as Travancore.

The diplomacy of Nanjarāja, during the Daḷavāi regime, had failed because he could not carry it through in the position he found himself. The English perceived he could not make any further appeal to the sword. The

Giving effect to the policy.

8. *Ibid.*, I. 92; also Moens' *Memo in Dutch Records*, No. 13, p. 151. Moens wrote in 1781: "Meanwhile he (Haidar) was hankering after the very rich kingdom of Canara, which at that time was governed by a queen." As to the Portuguese, he writes: "The Portuguese assisted him on the sly allowing many private soldiers and even officers to enter his service in order to keep this dangerous conqueror their friend. They have however since found that he has respected or spared them on this account no more than any other European nation."

moment to strike had passed and troubles nearer home called him back to his native regions. Haidar, always quick to learn and improve on what he learnt, grasped the central fact in the situation. He saw how Nanjarāja had reduced his own position and that of his country to one of misery and degradation. He realised quite clearly that weakness in armed strength means weakness in diplomacy. Demands—particularly territorial demands—are best pressed home with the backing of a strong army. Whether God is on the side of big battalions or not, there is reason to believe that Haidar was fully convinced that man cannot enforce even his just claims without a strong army to back them. He was thus led to prepare a new army to strengthen his diplomatic power. He addressed himself to this imperious duty—to recast the whole army policy of Mysore—with alacrity. He should have seen, during the course of the fight for Trichinopoly, the deficiencies and shortcomings of the Mysore army and desired to put himself in such a state of defence from attacks from outside as would make Mysore, not indeed immune—that may have been impossible—but secure against the danger of a knock-out blow immediately on the breakout of hostilities. Foremost among the necessities reckoned by him were the introduction of European discipline, ample supplies of guns of the most effective type, and sufficiency of Europeans drawn from every possible source. By assiduous application to duty, Haidar built up quickly a large army, well-disciplined and well-armed, and made it the rampart of his country's independence. At first, at any rate, his military measures were intended to reach a peaceable solution of the problem—who is to rule over the South? The question would no longer be merely the capture of Trichinopoly. Hence it is he extended his eyes to either end of South India. He made known that a great and strong Mysore would mean a peaceful Southern India.

If the English, the Nizām or the Mahrattas started a war, it would not, he felt sure, be over a minor concern over which they differed but because there existed once more a great and strong power in Mysore in the South of India, which would guard its interests. In such a case, Mysore, he held out, would fight not only for her own existence but also fight passionately for the whole of the South of India. Thus the choice for him lay between the method of reason and the method of force. Nanjarāja had tried to reason but had been worsted again and again. There was thus no alternative left for Haidar but the method of force. So at least he felt; but before using it, he tried the method of peace.

Haidar's external policy was no doubt governed by force. But there was an important qualification to that policy. He did not want to suppress all his neighbours but desired to subordinate them to Mysore. He wanted Mysore to have its full sway over them all, since that was the only way by which the quiet and happiness of the South of India could be secured. Strange as it may seem, he was giving effect to a policy that meant the annihilation of "Moghul" extension in the South in the manner Nizām-ul-mulk intended as the pretended representative of the Mughal Emperor at Delhi, the sovereign head, against whom he himself had revolted. Haidar was, in fact, giving effect to Chikkadēva's and Nanjarāja's policy of one Empire south of the Krishna, with Mysore as its centre in place of old Vijayanagar. That was what he aimed at, not merely as the sum of his political philosophy but as a practical scheme of action. He built on the theme that if one Empire is gone, the next one should get ready without delay. In treating of Haidar, one suddenly perceives the daring ingenuity of his solutions to the troubles that confronted him repeatedly.

Limitations to his
policy of force.

Haidar's plan of operations was to isolate the English at Madras and encircle them. With this end in view, he fixed the river Krishna as his northern boundary. The whole of the west coast from Goa to Travancore was to become his western boundary.⁹ This meant the conquest of Bednūr, Mangalore, the whole of Malabar (with the ports of Cannanore, Calicut and Cranganore), Cochin and Travancore. Contiguous with these territories, he aimed at the conquest of Coorg and Coimbatore. Inland, towards the South, he already held the strong fort of Dinḍigal and he befriended Mahfuz Khān, brother of Muhammad Alī, who had been appointed to the charge of the Madura and Tinnevely countries.¹⁰ At the same time, he kept close touch with Muhammad Yūsuf Khān, the rebel Commandant of Madura, in order to use him, if possible, in his own interests.¹¹ In the country immediately south of the Tungabhadra, including Bellary and Anantpur, and in Mysore itself, he resolved on breaking up the Pālegārs who held sway and were found to prove a source of weakness in times of warfare.¹² He further aimed at the subjugation of the Paṭhān Nawābs of Cuddapah and Kurnool, thus seeking to establish a circular cordon along the whole extent of his northern frontier.¹³ Nearer home, to the south-east, he was already master of the entire area known as the Bārāmahals, which took him half way up to the confines of Trichinopoly, besides the whole country as far as Vellore. The English had but a strip of country between Vellore and Madras, including Arcot and the country as far as Trichinopoly to the south, nominally in Muhammad Alī's possession. Tanjore was an uncertain factor. In between Dinḍigal

9. See Chs. below.

10. See under *Madura and Tinnevely* below.

11. See under *Yusuf Khān* below.

12. See Chs. below.

13. See Chs. below.

and Madras lay Trichinopoly, the disputed possession. The French, however, though disabled for the moment, were active in his interests and soon expected to get back Pondicherry, their capital, and they would thus be within striking distance of both Madras and Trichinopoly.¹⁴ The country from near Masulipatam to the northward was in the hands of the Nizām, whom Haider determined on turning into an ally of his own.¹⁵ He desired first to digest the west coast kingdoms from north to south, settling accounts with the Portuguese and the Dutch in this region incidentally; then, turn first on the English; next, on the Mahrattas; and finally on the Nizām. If the English were done with, he felt sure he could deal with the Nizām easily. The sea-roads he desired to cut by developing a navy. For this he laid out dockyards and naval arsenals for the construction of ships of war at Honāvar, Mangalore, Calicut and other places.

The year 1761 was an eventful one in the history of India. It saw the translation of Haider to the supreme position of *Sarvādhi-kāri* in Mysore, a departure from tradition as striking as it was full of portent. It marked the disappearance in the south of the final remnants of Vijayanagar rule by the death of Śrī-Ranga VII, the last of that famous dynasty known to the inscriptions.¹⁶ In the north, the Mahrattas, who had reached the pinnacle of their power in India, were attacked by Ahmad Shah Ābdālī, the Afghan, and sustained a defeat which may

Political situation
in India in 1761.

14. Pondicherry surrendered to the English on the evening of the 15th January 1761. It was restored to the French by the Peace of Paris in 1763, though with a territory less extensive. Pondicherry is by road just 102 miles South of Madras *via* Tindivanam and Chingleput; and about 128 miles N. E. of Trichinopoly *via* Volcondapuram, Vriddhā-chalam and Cuddalore.

15. See Ch. XVII below.

16. Śrī-Ranga VII probably bore an attenuated rule up to about 1761, as we have no inscriptional or other records referring to him beyond 1759. Tentatively he has been assigned to 1717-1759. But probably he lived a year or two more (See *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 2416-2418).

fairly be described as closing the period during which they had tried, under the leadership of the Pēshwas at Poona, to establish imperial rule in India.¹⁷ The Anglo-French War in South India, the counterpart of the Seven Years' War in Europe, ended, in that year, with the fall of Pondicherry and the destruction of its fortifications by the English. The French were left without a home in India, and, dispossessed of all their possessions, were compelled, if they were at all to remain in it, to seek service under independent Indian rulers, awaiting a turn of events in their favour.¹⁸ This great French reverse, however, proved of infinite advantage to Haidar, who took over the whole of their forces into his services, an accession welcome not only as adding to his military strength but also as a means to better the discipline of his own forces, present and future. The year 1761 also marks definitely the break-up of the Mughal Empire and the decline of its authority wherever it had held sway. Ahmad Shah's invasion of India in that year did even more damage to the Mughals than even to the Mahrattas. Whereas the Mahrattas recovered later what they had lost, the Mughal power was completely broken. In the words of Elphinstone, "the history of the Moghul Empire here closes of itself."¹⁹ Its territory was broken into

17. See Elphinstone, *History of India*, 752-753.

18. Pondicherry surrendered to Coote on 15th January 1761, the French officers and soldiers becoming prisoners of war. (See f. n. 14 above). Refugees in neutral settlements and those who had escaped into the interior and sought service with Indian rulers were the only French that remained to represent their nation's interests in this country. The Madras Council, in a letter dated the 26th March 1764, estimated the total number of these at 1,500 (*I. O. Records, Madras Letters Received*, I. A.). In the Court's letter dated 9th December 1762, the number is set down as 500. Some took service in Mysore, some in Tanjore and some under Yūsuf Khān, the rebel Commandant of Madura. One M. de Maudave, who had served under Lally, became representative of France in India, from 4th April 1762, when he arrived at Negapatam from Mauritius. He was commissioned by the French Council at Mauritius to resuscitate the French party in India among the Indian States. All Frenchmen in India were to obey him (see M. de Maudave's *Relation* in S. C. Hill, *Yusuf Khan*, 246).

19. *History of India*, 753.

separate states; its capital was deserted and its Emperor became an exile.²⁰ Among the foreign traders settled in India, the English had triumphed over the French, and from 1761 they began to shed their trading character and assume more and more the position of territorial rulers, first as agents and then as principals.²¹ The Mahrattas, worsted in the north, found it impossible to regain their power either for combination or for action. The Mahratta confederacy was broken, with the result that Haidar found that he had either to fight alone the English or yield the place to them, thus making room for foreign ascendancy.

In prosecuting his aims and objectives, Haidar proceeded from point to point, the nearer or easier objective first and the farther or more difficult one next. Thus, he first subdued the local chiefs round about Bangalore and Kōlār, thus clearing the immediate neighbourhood both of Mahratta allies and subordinates or possible hostile chiefs. Then, he turned his attention to chiefs farther away and reputed stronger.²² Among

Territorial expansion: acquisition of Hoskōṭe and Sira, 1761.

20. Ahmad Shah Ābdālī recognised Ali Gōhar, the eldest son of Alamgir II, as Emperor, under the title of Shah Ālam II. Najib-ud-daula, however, remained the imperial deputy at Delhi until his death in 1770. Shah Ālam returned to his capital, by the aid of the Mahrattas, in December 1771. But the Delhi of 1771 was a very different place from the Delhi of Aurangzib and his forbears.
21. The English deposed, in October 1760, Mir Jāfar in Bengal and set up Mir Kāsim in his place. In the South, they stood by Muhammad Ali throughout his struggle with his competitors.
22. *Haid. Nām.* (1784), ff. 24-25. For an account of some of Haidar's early campaigns (1761-1766) from the military and strategic points of view, see *Memoirs of Hyder Ally* by Eloy Joze Correa Peixoto (1770), pp. 27-82. This work, though perhaps the earliest available contemporary authority for the period, only occasionally dates the campaigns described, and merely records the author's impressions of them without a correct appreciation of their background. Among other authorities on the subject, see also and compare De La Tour, *Ayder Ali* (1784), I. 75-114; Robson, *Hyder Ally* (1786), 23-37; Kirmāni, *Neshauni-Hydruri* (c. 1800), 105-187; Charles Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan*, 15-17, etc. In these sources, there is generally a mixing up of the details of events, which are not satisfactorily dated. De La Tour, in

the first places to be taken were Sira and Hoskōṭe, in the possession of the Mahrattas. The events that led to these conquests will necessitate a little diversion into Hyderabad affairs.

During the twelve years that followed the death in 1748 of Kamar-ud-dīn, surnamed Asaf Jah, the Subādār of the Deccan, affairs in Hyderabad were in a constant state of flux.²³ The domestic rivalry among his sons and grandsons added to the contests for supremacy in the south between the English and the French, who had been established for some time on the East Coast, and kept Deccan in continued turmoil. Asaf Jah left four sons. The eldest of these was Ghāzi-ud-dīn, who held high office at the court of Delhi. The second was Nāsir Jang, whose claims were disputed by Muzaffar Jang, his nephew, who was supported by Duplex, the French Governor of Pondicherry. But he had the misfortune to fall into his uncle's hands and was imprisoned by him. Nāsir Jang, however, was himself murdered treacherously by Pathān rebels in 1750. Muzaffar Jang was, after this, set at liberty, and he succeeded his uncle with the support of the French. To mark his appreciation of

Asaf Jah and his sons and grandsons, 1748-1761.

Their internecine quarrels.

particular, is aware of his own limitations when he says: "The true reason why the former actions of this celebrated conqueror have not been given in a more ample manner in the present work, is, that the Author, not having joined the army of the Nabob before the time of the war on the coast of Malabar, did not think it necessary to speak largely concerning military operations he could only know from the communications of others." (*Ibid*, II. 1-2). De La Tour makes Basālat Jang's campaign, which occurred in 1761, come after the conquest of Savanūr by Haidar, which occurred in 1763, after the conquest of Bednūr. In fact, he represents Basālat Jang as sending an "embassy" to Haidar as the result of the latter's victory over the Savanūr Nawāb. See De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 76. Compare also Wilks (*Mysoor*, I. 487-534), who cites no authorities for his statements. For a detailed critical notice of the sources of Mysore History for the usurpation period (1761-1799), *vide* Appendix IV.

23. Asaf Jah was appointed Nizām-ul-mulk and Subādār of the Deccan in 1718. He later became independent and died in 1748. See *ante* P. 363.

French aid, he received a body of French troops, commanded by General Bussy, into his service, and assigned large territories near Pondicherry, the district of Karikal, and the town and district of Masulipatam.

He was, however, soon killed, in 1751, in a personal encounter with the Nawāb of Kurnool. His only son

Salābat Jang's succession, 1751.

being a minor, Salābat Jang, the third son of Asaf Jah, succeeded, again under French auspices. He confirmed, in 1753, many of the privileges enjoyed by the French, and assigned several districts in the *Northern Circars* for the pay and equipment of the French auxiliaries in his service. Salābat Jang was served as Minister by one Rāja Raghunāth Dās. He being murdered in 1752, was succeeded by Sayid Lāshkar Khān, who, in his turn, was followed, in 1755, by Shāh Nawāz

Basālat Jang, his brother and Minister, 1758.

Khān, who, being treacherously murdered in 1758, was succeeded by Basālat Jang, Salābat Jang's own brother, who was then Governor of Burhanpur. He was, however, supplanted, in 1760, by Nizām Alī Khān, his younger brother, who became all powerful at

His displacement by Nizām Alī, 1760.

Hyderabad thereafter. In his hands, Salābat Jang became before long a mere puppet, and later, in 1761, was first imprisoned and two years later murdered by him. In the year 1760, Nizām Alī was engaged in a

Basālat Jang's activities.

defensive and unsuccessful campaign against Bālāji Rao, the Pēshwa, between the rivers Krishna and Gōdāvari.

Basālat Jang, who, since 1759, had nursed a feeling of ill-will against his brother Nizām Alī, and had unfolded in his negotiations with Mons. Bussy his views of independent sovereignty in the south and his desire, if he could effect that object without compromising his independence, of obtaining the aid of the French to

oppose the better fortunes of his brother Nizām Alī, saw his opportunity come. But as he could hardly move in any direction beyond the limits of his *jahgīr* of Adoni, without coming into contact with some Mahratta territory, dependency, or army and he found it expedient to maintain amicable relations with the actual opponents of his rival, he passed the early part of that year at his own capital in inaction. The distraction that called away the Mahrattas northwards and which subsequently ended

in the famous battle of Pāṇipat on 7th January 1761, gave him an opportunity to move out on a venture of his own.²⁴

His invasion of
Sīra province, 1761.

In August 1760, he began to draw within the circle of his own possessions the most convenient and accessible fragments of the shattered states around him. The success that attended this first independent effort of his proved encouraging. Although checked now and again, he had greatly enlarged his limits and about the month of October 1761,²⁵ he had planned a campaign which included the reduction of Sīra, then in the possession of the Mahrattas, but, as we have seen, formerly the capitale of the Nawāb, and as such held to be dependent on the Subādār of the Deccan. The plan of his projected campaign appears to have been to march straight from Adoni to Sīra and take it and from there proceed to Hoskōṭe, the other strong outpost of the Mahrattas, and drive them out of the Karnāṭak-Bālagḥāt, and establish himself in their place. He seems to have marched *via* Gooty-Pāmaḍi-Penukonḍa-Hoskōṭe-Dodballāpur.²⁶

24. The statement of Robson (o. c., 24) that Basālat Jang was "dispatched" by his brother Salābat Jang with an army to recover Sīra from the Mahrattas is without foundation. It was essentially an attempt of his own to establish himself in the Karnāṭak-Bālagḥāt.

25. This is the date given in the *Haid. Nām.*, ff-24-25: *Vishu-Āsvija*. Robson gives no date but correctly places the event before the conquest of Bednūr. Wilks sets it down to June 1761, o. c., I. 490. Kirmāpi antedates the events connected with Basālat Jang's campaign and sets them down to 1757 (A. H. 1171).

26. There is some doubt whether this was the route followed by Basālat

Arrived at Hoskōṭe with a large force, he seems to have moved to Sira, the capital of the province, and reconnoitred the citadel there, but thought it most prudent to leave it alone. His coffers were empty and the long drawn siege that the place promised did not prove attractive to him. He, therefore, evidently turned his back on the place and retired to Hoskōṭe and laid siege to it.²⁷ It was his arrival there that called Haidar to Bangalore, immediately after his success over Khandē Rao at Seringapatam.

On his arrival at Bangalore, Haidar found Basālat Jang engaged in his siege of Hoskōṭe, but unable to make any headway against it. Though the works were rude and

His siege of Hoskōṭe.

Its defence by Mukund Śrīpati, the Mahratta killedār.

Jang. Wilks' narrative (l.c.) would suggest that he proceeded to Sira first. If so, his route would be from Adoni to Sira *via* Bellary and Rāyadurg and after taking Sira pass on *via* Maddagiri and Chikballāpur and then to Hoskōṭe. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 24-25), the earliest authority, makes Hoskōṭe the first objective. Robson confirms by his direct statement that Hoskōṭe "being the first place on his route" was "immediately invested" by him. Robson's account (o.c., 24) would suggest that he came by the other and more direct route from Adoni, which is by way of Gooty, Pāmaḍi, Rāmdurg, Dharmāvaram, Nāgasamudram, Venkaṭagiri-pālayam, Penukoṇḍa, Hindupur, Kōḍikoṇḍa, Chikballāpur, Nandidurg, Dēvanhalli, Hoskōṭe, Doḍballāpur, Tumkūr and Sira. Robson's version seems to be confirmed by Kirmāṇi (o.c., 106-111), who makes Hoskōṭe Basālat Jang's first objective, he and Haidar marching on, separately, to Sira, after the capture of Hoskōṭe. Robson's account renders unnecessary a double visit to Sira, necessitated by Wilks' version. The *Haid. Nām.* version, which is the earliest and is adopted here, may be reconciled with Wilks' version by understanding it to mean that Basālat Jang came not by the Adoni-Bellary-Rāyadurg-Sira route but by the Adoni-Gooty-Hoskōṭe route but after proceeding further to Sira and reconnoitring the place, and finding it difficult to take without a siege, marched back to Hoskōṭe and laid siege to it first.

27. See note 25 above. Wilks says that finding a siege of Sira unprofitable, from the immediate view of quickly filling his "military chest," Basālat Jang "passed it" and "moved farther south, over an undulating country, alternately strong and open, the plainer parts having been fortified against sudden incursion by walls and towers by kneaded clay, which surrounded every village." A little later, Wilks makes us infer, Basālat Jang moved to Hoskōṭe, where Haidar found him "engaged in the siege" (l.c.). These details suggest, as stated above, that Basālat Jang came to Sira by a route other than the one to be inferred from the *Haid. Nām.* and Robson. Wilks, as usual, does not quote his authority.

consisted mainly of village bulwarks, the fort possessed the great advantage, bestowed on it by nature, of being unassailable on one face. What was worse for Basālat Jang, it was defended by a garrison which defied and derided his attempts to subdue them. Though garrisoned only by 700 regulars with country arms, the garrison defended itself for two months, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Basālat Jang.²⁸ Mukund Śrīpati,²⁹ the Mahratta officer, who commanded it, was a brave man. He had strengthened the works with care and stood the siege well. So gallantly indeed did he defend it, that Basālat Jang was put to the necessity of calling in the aid of Haidar.³⁰ His mortification at being thus foiled in his attempt was extreme, but he had no funds and he had to look as brave as he could.³¹ This was the opportune moment for Haidar. He had not only arrived at

Basālat Jang's
Treaty with Haidar
for the conquest of
Sira province.

Bangalore in time but had also been watchful of what was happening around him. He at once set to work. Hoskōṭe being only 18 miles to the north-east of Bangalore, the first communications were rapidly opened.³² Basālat's emissary had hardly reached Haidar's camp, when Haidar despatched Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān as the

The terms of the
Treaty.

Mysore ambassador to Basālat Jang. The talks ended in the conclusion of a treaty, Haidar all the while keeping himself in the background.³³ The terms were that

28. Robson, *o.c.*, 24. According to Kirmāṇi, he was assisted in the siege by Murāri Rao of Gooty and the Nawāb of Cuddapah, from whom Hoskōṭe had been taken in 1757 by Peshwa Bālāji Rao. See Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 106; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 490-491.

29. Kirmāṇi styles him "Mokhund Sripot", *l.c.*

30. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 106-107.

31. Wilks, *l.c.*

32. *Ibid*; Kirmāṇi, *l.c.*

33. Kirmāṇi (*o.c.*, 107) states that Haidar declined a personal interview with Basālat until he had known what service was expected of him although he had executed the same. Though Haidar could afford some times to be very humble and assume an air of obedience which would

Haidar was to actively help Basālat with his large army and a sufficiency of artillery in the conquest of Hoskōṭe and Sīra, in fact, in retaking the lost Mughal province of Sīra; that they were both to carry on the sieges of the two places, till they were taken; that as soon as each place should surrender, each army should take possession on its respective side of attack; that all the artillery, ammunition, and other things taken possession of should be the share of Basālat Jang, who should either take it in kind or receive their value from Haidar; that the places should be taken possession by Haidar; and that Basālat was to invest Haidar with the *Subāh* of Sīra in return

for a *nazar* of Rs. 3 lakhs.³⁴ This meant, so far as Haidar was concerned, the extermination of the Mughal from Mysore, a much desired end, and for Basālat, a sum of money which he badly required. Basālat could do little with a territory he could not keep as against Haidar. So, he determined to make him his pretended vassal, which he could not well avoid. Incidentally he may, if Haidar sided him, keep his brothers, Salābat and Nizām Ali, out of this area. The treaty was signed and the money was paid,³⁵ and the *sanad* for investing him with the title of "Nawāb" was duly executed by Basālat Jang and handed to Haidar. These documents designated Haidar as *Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr*, a name which he from about

at the same time serve his own ends, this statement is probably a refinement of Kirmāpi. Both Robson and Wilks discountenance it.

34. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 491; Robson says Rs. 5 lakhs, *o.c.*, 24-25. According to Robson, Basālat desired the help of Haidar only for the "reduction of the capital" i.e., Sīra, he himself "engaging to compleat the rest with his own force." (The name of "Sīra" is given as "Sirpi" by Robson wherever it occurs in his work). De La Tour gives the conditions of the Treaty entered into and confuses it as applying to Sīra only, which Basālat could not reduce by himself. But the Treaty is a general one and applies both to Sīra and Hoskōṭe, both of which Basālat found it difficult to take—De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 78-79.

35. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 491-492; Robson, *o.c.*, 24-25.

this time assumed, though the latter title had been bestowed on him earlier than this by his own sovereign³⁶

Wilks' criticism of the terms of the Treaty.

The Treaty, which confirmed these titles, if it did not grant them actually, has been half humorously criticised by the military historian of Mysore. "The distress of this Chief (Basālat Jang) and the whole

36. The title "Bahadūr" was bestowed on him by King Krishnarāja II in 1758 (see *Ante* P. 225). According to Wilks and Robson, the *sanad* was granted and the treaty was executed and delivered before Haidar began to give his aid in the taking of Hoskōṭe. According to the *Haid-Nim.* (ff. 24-25), the *sanad* conferring the title was given after he had given his help and taken Hoskōṭe, in recognition of the skill he displayed in taking this fort. According to this source, the title bestowed on him on this occasion was "Haidar Jang." (The text runs: *Basālat Jangaru santōshapatṭu Haidar Jangaru endu Nawābarige kitābu koṭṭaru*, etc.) This would suggest that he had already had the titles of *Nawāb* and *Khān Bahadūr* and that the *Sanad* and *Treaty* only recited these titles in them. Kirmāṇi (o. c., 112-113) suggests that the title was given to Haidar by Basālat Jang "some three or four days after" the taking of *Sira* and that the title was conferred on him in person by Basālat Jang. This chronicler says that Basālat Jang sent for Haidar, on the day appointed for his march back to Adoni, and he "saluted him with the title of Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān Bahadūr Chuckmak Jung," "Chuckmak" meaning in Turkish the flint and steel of the musket. Kirmāṇi adds the remark that he is not anxious to conceal the fact that at the time Basālat conferred on Haidar the titles mentioned, he did not wish to displease him by rejecting them and so remained silent. But after Basālat departed, "he rejected the title of *Jang* and styled himself *Khān Bahadūr*" (o. c., 113). Wilks records a modified version of this story as an incident that took place during the negotiations that followed anterior to the conclusion of the treaty that preceded the capture of Hoskōṭe and *Sira*. His version is thus characteristically told: "In the course of the negotiation, Basālat Jung proposed . . . to honour Hydr with a title of the order distinguished by its terminating Persian word '*Jung*' (war). Among the lowest vulgar this word is pronounced as *Zung*, which also signifies the tinkling circular kind of bell, commonly strung round the necks of camels and oxen; and Hydr, among other remains of the society of his youth, retained this faulty pronunciation. When Fuzzul Oolla Khan came with this proposition, Hydr laughed in his face, and repeating four or five times the word *Zung*, 'Let me have nothing to do with your ornaments of a beast of burden,' said he, 'but if the great man insists on giving such a decoration, you may take it to yourself.' Fuzzul Oolla, who loved a title, and was not fastidious in scrutinizing authorities, took Hydr at his word; and returning to Ooscota did receive the title of *Hybut Jung* (terror of war), which he ever afterwards retained." (Wilks, o. c., I. 492). Cf. Peixoto, *Memoirs*, I. c.

character of the negotiation may be inferred from the fact," he says,³⁷ "that for a *nezer* of three lakhs of rupees, he agreed to invest Hyder with the office of Nabob of Sera, an office, a country, and a capital, which were yet to be conquered! The alleged rights which Hyder acquired from this instrument of investiture have been gravely discussed and defended.³⁸ The right of the grantor seems to have been inferred from the act of granting, for no other source of right can be readily discovered, the right of the sword, to which most political claims may be ultimately traced, was absolutely wanting in this case; and the decision of this arbiter, pronounced three years afterwards by Nizam Ali, *de facto* Soubadar, or ruler of the Deccan, shewed his sense of the authority of Basalut Jung, by restricting him by force of arms to the single district of Adwanee (Adoni)." As to this

Haidar's act justified.

suggestion, it may be stated that at the time of his expedition to Mysore,

Basālat Jang had elected to take his chance against his brother Salābat Jang. Haidar—or rather Mysore—acquired rights over the conquered area just because they were conquered and not by virtue of the alleged grant by Basālat Jang any more than they were when Nizām Alī was later bought off by Haidar just as his brother had been on the previous occasion. The fact of possession was more important to Haidar than the grant, though the alleged grant made possession more secure in the sense that it helped towards a formal settlement, and, what is more, made other claims against Mysore less moral, if not less legal also. If Haidar had dreamt that he had any rights under this alleged grant for Mysore, he knew quite well he would have to defend them with his sword. He knew full well that Basālat Jang had neither the right to make the grant, nor

37. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 491.

38. By whom, Wilks does not mention.

acquired the right to make it, nor could back up the assertion of such a right by an effective appeal to the sword. But he was prudent enough not to think beyond the immediate present. He had just got out of the ordeal with Khandē Rao and there was no need to court trouble from Basālat Jang or his brothers. Each was to be dealt with in his turn, if it came to that.³⁹ Basālat Jang, happy with his money, pretended to show his appreciation of Haidar's solicitude by investing him with a title of honour, evidently to exact an additional sum from him. But Haidar artfully refused himself the gratification of a high sounding tittle and with it the further cash gift that was expected of him.⁴⁰ Immediately the treaty and the *sanads* were duly made out, Haidar, in October 1761, joined his forces to those of Basālat Jang before Hoskōṭe and prosecuted its seige with vigour. He first reconnoitred the fort and the nature of the ground. He then attacked the fort and took it at the first assault. Having raised his batteries there with the aid of his French officers, he gave orders to his artillery to fire at the walls of the fort. They soon drilled them so full of holes as a bird's cage. Basālat Jang, against whose camp Haidar directed a few shots, got so upset that he, it is said, immediately changed his ground of encampment to another, beyond the local tank, northward of the fort.⁴¹ The firing on the fort continued for another two or three days, and the walls battered. Haidar, appreciating the gallantry of the defenders, proposed honourable terms of surrender. He said that if they surrendered immediately, they might, without molestation from any one, proceed with their property where they liked; if not, he would

39. As a matter of fact, when, in 1767, Nizām Ali had to be appeased in his turn, Haidar was equally ready to buy him up for the moment and turn against him immediately thereafter, see Chapters below.

40. Wilks (l. c.) says that Basālat expected an enhanced payment for giving the title.

41. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 107-108.

storm the fort, and that in that case, the garrison with their wives and children would be put to the sword. The Killedār, Mukund Śrīpati, at last yielded, though not without protestations, and marched out with his men and property, Haidar providing him with the necessary transportation for his baggage as far as Poona. Haidar at once placed a garrison of his own in the fort and next day called upon Basālat Jang to send his own garrison, so that he might withdraw his.⁴² But the prudent Basālat Jang, though thus declared "the reputed captor of a mud fort," declined the honour, either through lack of convenience or policy, and left the fort with its dependencies to the charge of Haidar, and marched towards Sira.

42. Robson's account (o. c., 25) is very brief. "The treaty signed, and the money paid," he says, "Hyder marched with his army and joined the party lent him by Basalat Jung, attacked Ouscottah afresh, and in a few days carried the place by composition, which he garrisoned with his own people, and immediately marched to the reduction of Sirpi (Sira)." Wilks is equally short (l. c.). "On receiving these honours (the honours conferred on him), he (Haidar) in October (1761) united his army to that before Ooscota (Hoskōṭe) and in a few days gave to the great Basalat Jang the honor of being the reputed captor of a mud fort." De La Tour fails to note the capture of Hoskōṭe. The *Haid Nām.* is pointed to a degree. On his aid being sought by Basālat Jang, Haidar, it says, proceeded thither and loading up the cannons, battered the fort and reduced it on *cowle* (or agreement). The Kannaḍa original puts it tersely thus: *mārchi haṭṭi tōpugaḷa peṭṭininda hoḡaḍu ājju māḍi kavalininda iḷisalāgi*. The account given in the text above is based on Kirmāṇi (o. c., 107-109), which is confirmed by all the other sources as indicated above. Kirmāṇi fails to note, however, the help received from French artillery officers. Robson, *Haid. Nām.* and Kirmāṇi agree that the fort was surrendered as the result of a mutual agreement. But none of these mention the fact that the French artillery officers in Haidar's service were useful to him in this connection. As Col. Miles, the translator of Kirmāṇi's work, puts it, "Basalat Jung knew well to whom Hydr owed his fame, although he (Hydr) himself had not the candour to acknowledge it" (o. c., 112, f. n., t.). De La Tour makes it plain that one condition of the Treaty between Haidar and Basālat was that Haidar should help him with his camp army and numerous artillery.

Haidar followed Basālat Jang two or three days later and joined him with his well-disciplined army and a grand train of artillery served by Europeans, though he kept

Siege of Sira.

aloof from him.⁴³ Arrived at Sira, Haidar encamped near the Īdgah, to the north-west of the fort, while Basālat Jang and his troops took up their position on a tank, to the east of the fort, which they surrendered.⁴⁴ Batteries were next thrown up, and approaches dug and carried, a sharp fire, with explosion of mines, being kept up continuously. The town was soon taken by Haidar, though only by degrees, the defence being more than equal to the attack on it. Batteries were soon erected, again with the aid of French officers; and the heavy cannon mounted on them did their work, with the result that the walls of the fort were completely knocked down. By successful undermining, two of the bastions were also blown up together with the curtain. This induced the besieged to consider their position seriously. Despite

Triambak-Krishna's stout resistance.

all this, neither Lakshman-Hari, the Mahratta Governor of Sira, nor Triambak-Krishna, the Killedār, showed any sign of yielding.⁴⁵ Though they knew that no relief was

43. Kirmāṇi says that Haidar passed on and took his post with Basālat Jang's advanced guard. "Still, however," he adds, "no visit or meeting had passed between them, nor had they ever spoken to each other except through a medium"—Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 109. As to the grand train of artillery brought up by Haidar—see De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 79.

44. The account which follows is based partly on the *Haid. Nam.* (ff. 24-25) and partly on Kirmāṇi (*o. c.*, 109-111) and De La Tour (*l. c.*). Robson includes no description of the warfare, while Wilks dismisses equally summarily, stating that the place "made but a feeble resistance." (I. 493). The text above shows the stout resistance offered. The siege lasted for "a month," according to both Robson and Kirmāṇi. De La Tour says that the blowing up of the bastions and the curtain "forced the besiegers to surrender at discretion." This seems a clear exaggeration on his part as also the statement that this surrender "increased the terror his (Haidar's) arms had spread over the extensive Empire of India." (*l. c.*).

45. The *Haid. Nam.* (*l. c.*) mentions the name of Lakshman-Hari. Kirmāṇi (*o. c.*, 110) says that "Trimuk Kishon" (Triambak-Krishna) was

possible, the Mahratta power being temporarily on the decline, they both held out for a month,⁴⁶ during which they offered a stout resistance. The walls were being nearly levelled with the ground and an assault seemed

imminent. Both parties were evidently ready for a composition, and Triambak-Krishṇa, mainly to save the garrison's

lives, marched out with the honours of war. Haidar immediately placed in the fort a garrison of Mysore troops. He seized at the same time the depot of provi-

sions and military stores, which the Mahrattas had gathered here for the conquest of the whole of the Karnāṭak,

and secretly buried underground all the heavy artillery and such stores as he desired to reserve for himself. He then sent a congratulatory message to Basālat Jang, announcing the fall of the place. Basālat arrived the

next day, only to find a few pieces of damaged artillery and some useless stores in place of the large magazine of military stores, guns, etc., of which he had heard so

much from his spies! Haidar having met him, for the first time since his arrival in Mysore, and talked to him "with fool-deceiving words," presented him

with the keys of the fort, and showed him, one by one, the articles he had allowed to remain! Basālat selected three guns from among these, these having belonged to the body-guard of the murdered Nawāb Nāsir Jang, and

sent them to his camp.⁴⁷ He then handed back the keys to Haidar and with it the fort and Suba of Sira to

the "Chief of the Sonba" and describes him also as "Killadar." This is possibly an error, Lakshman being evidently the Chief of the Suba (i.e., Governor), while Triambak-Krishṇa appears to have been the Killedār or the military officer in charge of the fort.

46. There can be no doubt that the siege lasted for a month. Both Robson and Kirmāṇi mention its duration as a month. (Robson, *o. c.*, 25; Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 110). See f. n. 22 above.

47. According to Kirmāṇi, of these three guns, when Basālat Jang finally

Mysore,⁴⁸ and departed back to Adoni by way of Rāyadurg. Indeed, his presence was needed urgently there to defend his province against his brother's impending invasion. While Basālat Jang was engaging himself in Sira, Nizām Alī, his brother and general of Salābat Jang, had imprisoned the latter (18th July 1761) and openly assumed the office of Subādār of Deccan and prepared himself to punish Basālat Jang for the encroachments he had committed. Haidar stayed on for ten or fifteen days for the settlement, and after appointing one Mir Ismail Hussain as Governor, with instructions to repair the fort, he passed on to his next adventure.⁴⁹

departed from Sira, he "left two on a river to the northward of the fort." (Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 112). The third one, however, which belonged to the bodyguard of his father Asaf Jah, "he, with a thousand difficulties, contrived to carry with him." (*Ibid.*, 112-113).

48. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 111. Col. Miles, the translator of Kirmāṇi's work, notes the fact that "the author of another life of Hydr states that Hydr bullied Basālat Jang into the surrender of the fort and the stores." He does not, however, mention the name of the author or his work. But the statement may be taken to represent the actual truth, as Basālat was not in a position to protest against any of the doings of Haidar. But Haidar usually managed such things with such consummate skill that the deceived never realized he was at every stage yielding to his enemy, who, for the time being, pretended to be his best friend.
49. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 113. The *Haid. Nām.* (l. c.) says that the amount of Rs. 3 lakhs agreed to be paid was given at the time of the departure of Basālat Jang and that he gave a *sanad* then to Haidar for both Sira and Hoskōṭe, indicating the transfer of their possession to him. De La Tour adds the interesting detail that Basālat preferred "receiving money for his share," and that for this reason Haidar called him ever after as "the merchant" who preferred money to territory (l. c.). De La Tour also states that it was "now that the Emperor (at Delhi)" sent to Haidar "an embassy with all the highest honours annexed to the title, and marks of the dignity of Suba, such as the rich round palankeen, and *Mahes Muratib*, the fish's head, set with precious stones, etc." (*o. c.*, I. 80). This conferment of a Prince's dignity on Haidar by the Emperor of Delhi is not confirmed by any other authority. Kirmāṇi confirms the *Haid. Nām.* by saying that Basālat not only presented Haidar with the *sanad* for the entire revenue of Sira with the tributes due from the Pālegārs, but also the district of Gurrampōṇḍa, with its forts and dependencies, and that Haidar, in return, gave Basālat "a large sum of money, horses and elephants" (*o. c.*, 112).

The acquisition of Sira and Hoskōṭe soon paved the way for a series of operations in central and northern Karnāṭak, which was fast slipping out of the hands of the Mahrattas or torn asunder by internal feuds and dissensions among local chiefs. Doḍballāpur, the *jahgīr* of Abbās Kuḷi Khān, was the first to be absorbed. Abbās, the son of Abdul Russool, the first *jahgīrdār*, had illtreated Haidar and his brother soon after the death of his father and dreaded the name of Haidar.⁵⁰ Basālat Jang, in his negotiations with Haidar, had tried to exclude Abbās' *jahgīr* from the province of Sira as ceded to Mysore. But Haidar would not agree to such exclusion. He had threatened even to break off all negotiations if Basālat showed any tendency not to agree. The story is told that Haidar broadly answered that his honours would be worthless if they excluded a full and a deep revenge; that he accepted and paid for the *sanads* as a mutual accommodation, not from any diffidence of being able to achieve his own objects without them; and that another syllable indicating the exclusion of Doḍballāpur would terminate the negotiation.⁵¹ Basālat saw the impossibility of the situation and gave up the show in favour of Abbās as a vain and inconvenient one. Shortly after the capture of Sira and its delivery over to Mysore, Haidar prepared to bring under control several of the adjoining places.⁵²

50. See *Ante* P. 265, where the story of Abbas' cruelty towards Haidar and his brother will be found referred to. See also Appendix III. Wilks mentions Abbas' father's name as "Abdul Russool" (I. 268), while Kirmāṇi calls him "Durga Kuli Khan" (o. c., 109).

51. See Wilks, o. c., I. 493.

52. See *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25. Kirmāṇi (o. c., 109) antedates the event and makes it come *before* the conquest of Sira; in fact, he puts it in between the taking of Hoskōṭe and the capture of Sira. He says that "two or three days" after Haidar had made his arrangements for the safety of Hoskōṭe, he marched towards Doḍballāpur and encamped there. Wilks (o. c., I. 492) says Doḍballāpur "next engaged" the attention of Haidar—"next" after the taking of Hoskōṭe and before investing Sira. According to him, Basālat Jang and Haidar "moved to Sera" from Doḍballāpur after its fall (o. c., I. 493). This would make the taking of Doḍballāpur fall about October 1761. Robson and De La Tour do not mention this event in their works.

Dodballāpur was assigned the place of honour in this series. When, about November 1761, while Haider was yet in Sira, Abbās heard of this project, fearing of retribution, he fled precipitately with his wife and children and a few indispensable baggage to Arcot.⁵³ Haider, quickly garrisoning the fort, found the object of his vengeance had escaped. He then showed himself in a manner quite unlike himself. He showed that he sometimes could act like a man blessed with the most amiable qualities that a human being could be associated with. Tradition says that he presented himself at the gate of the dowager, the widow of his father's lord, and the mother of the fugitive. In a message full of gentleness and delicacy, he exhibited a remembrance of kindnesses conferred in the days of his infancy, and assured her of his gratitude and respect. Though he appropriated, without hesitation, everything that for political purposes might be considered public property, he kept up entirely to the assurances he had extended to the dowager, and continued through life to treat the unoffending branches of her family with distinction and generosity.⁵⁴ The dowager, in particular, was allowed a special pension to enable her to maintain herself independently and well during the rest of her life.⁵⁵

Haider next turned his attention to Chikballāpur, 14 miles to the east of Dodballāpur. Its chief was related to the Pāḷegār of Dēvanhalli, who had, since 1749, retired to that place and conspired to take it

53. Wilks says that Abbās "fled with the utmost precipitation to Madras, a distance of 220 miles, leaving his family to their fate" (o. c., I. 493). He adds the note that such was Abbās' terror, that when Haider in 1769 "presented himself at the gates of Madras, he (Abbās) embarked in a crazy vessel, and did not venture to land until Hyder's army had re-ascended the passes of the mountains." (o. c., I. 493, f. n.).

54. Wilks, l. c.

55. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25.

back.⁵⁶ Haidar considered the reduction of that place, accordingly, a necessity, more especially as such reduction was, besides, required to secure the safety of the Mysore frontier on this side. Chikkappa Gauda, the Pālegār, offered one of the stoutest defences known to Pālegār annals in Mysore. Chikkappa had become

The Pālegār of Chikballāpur. Pālegār about 1758, in succession to

Baiche Gauda, his nephew, who had been deposed after having been in power for only nine months.⁵⁷ His family was an old one, tracing its origins to the fifteenth century and had built up a reputation for itself in and around Chikballāpur by annexing or purchasing various adjoining places. Chikkappa had also the advantage of treasure which had been amassed during many years, Anni Gauda, one of his predecessors, having left a fortune estimated at twelve lakhs of pagodas.⁵⁸ Chik-

Chikkappa, the Pālegār, and his valiant defence. kappa had a well equipped army; knew the use of fire-arms and had cultivated the friendship of the Mahrattas, with whom he kept general intercourse.⁵⁹ Haidar accordingly found in him a hardy and resourceful man to deal with. Haidar advanced against Chikballāpur with a large

56. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 495. Robson notes the further fact that he had not only proved himself intractable but also "in the course of two or three months," the Pālegār of Chikballāpur "had destroyed upwards of one thousand of his (Haidar's) troops"—*o. c.*, 25. The name of the Pālegār is not mentioned by any of the sources, including Wilks, Robson and Kirmāṇi. We know from other sources his name was Chikkappa Gauda, who was the younger brother of Venkaṭanārāyaṇa Gauda, who had been in power for 35 years. Venkaṭanārāyaṇa Gauda had been succeeded by his son Baiche Gauda. The latter was in power for 9 months, after which he was deposed and his uncle Chikkappa Gauda took over the Pālegārship. The latter was the Pālegār who resisted Haidar and eventually lost his life in prison. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 305-308, for the history of the Chikballāpur Pālayam.

57. See *Mys. Gaz.*, I. c., for details of the family history.

58. *Ibid.*, V. 307.

59. It is said that when Haidar, with the aid of his French artillery officers, tried to carry the fort of Chikballāpur by storm and mining, Chikkappa counter-mined in such a way that Haidar's attempt proved unsuccessful (*Ibid.*).

army⁶⁰, consisting of 8,000 horse, 10,000 regular infantry and 12,000 irregular foot, with abundance of stores and artillery. When he approached the town, it was open to Chikkappa to retire to the impregnable rock-fortress of Nandidurg, only 3 miles off his place. But the brave and patriotic man that he was, he thought proper to await the attack in the rather open town of Chikballāpur, which was provided with a weak citadel, so placed that an assailant must previously possess himself of the town. He had nothing to help him in the matter of the defence of his place; nothing to protract its defence and all to accelerate its fall. But he was determined to establish the truth of the doctrine that all places are impregnable, so long as the moral energies of the defenders can be upheld.⁶¹ He contested every inch of the

Haidar's discomfiture and attempt at composition.

ground in this open town; every successive house became a fortress; and at the expiration of two months, Haidar could scarcely yet be said to have commenced the siege of the citadel.⁶² Disappointed, Haidar tried every means in his power to induce the Pālegār to submit, but he prepared to defend himself the more bravely.⁶³ He kept the spirit of the defenders at its stretch by mentioning to them the relief he expected from Murārī Rao Ghōrpade of Gooty, who, he said, was now approaching

60. Kirmāṇi says that Haidar moved with his "whole force" (*o. c.* 114), whereas Wilks says his army was "superior" in numbers to that of the Pālegār (*o. c.*, I. 497).

61. Cf. Wilks, who writes thus of the defence set up by this Pālegār:—"Regular science, in its legitimate application to the defence of places, is calculated to protract resistance, but in its practical effects it seems more frequently to have excused or accelerated their fall. This Poligar verified the better doctrine that all places are impregnable, so long as the moral energies of its defenders can be upheld."—*o. c.*, I. 496.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 115, where he records that Haidar "took great pains to induce him to obey his orders" and that he "rejected all his advances and prepared to defend himself,"

the place.⁶⁴ The town was well furnished with the means of subsistence though not of defence. Its defenders too fought valiantly for their dearest rights, independence and property. The efforts of the invader were not inadequate to the difficulties he encountered and the value of the prize. Chikballāpur was likened to "the garden of Eden" at the time and reckoned valuable from a strategic point of view as well. Haidar prepared himself to meet the new emergency that threatened him.

Murāri Rao, with his whole army of 12,000 horse and foot, advanced rapidly to Guḍibaṇḍa, some 25 miles off to the north-east of Chikballāpur,⁶⁵ and there stationed himself and despatched some 7,000 men under the command of one Timmappa, son of Bhānōji-Pant of Maḍaksīra, to attack Haidar and his forces. They, however, foolishly engaged themselves a few foraging parties and retired. When he heard of this, Haidar was much irritated but quickly resolved upon a settlement with the Mahratta first. His superior numbers enabled him to leave a strong corps for maintaining his ground in the town, and, by an unexpected movement of the remainder of his

64. All the sources agree in noting the help given by Murāri Rao to Chik-kappa Gauḍa. See Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 497-498; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 115 *et seq.*; Robson, *o.c.*, 26, to whose accounts the version in the text owes much. An attempt has been made to reconcile their statements in reconstructing the story. Kirmāṇi's account is the most informative on this affair, though it requires careful checking. The *Haid. Nām.* gives only the main items, see ff. 25-25-A. See also on this head *Fort St. George Records—Mily. Count. Corres.*, X. 195-197. De La Tour and Stewart are silent on this topic. The date given by the *Haid. Nām.*, March 1762, seems correct. Kirmāṇi, as usual, antedates the event, placing it down to 1758 (A. H. 1172). Robson sets it down subsequent to 1763.

65. Guḍibaṇḍa: headquarters of a sub-taluk of the same name in the present Bāgepalli taluk, Kōlār district. It is situated on the Nandidurg range of hills; now a municipality. For an account of the place, see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 319-320. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 25-25-A) furnishes the detail that the detachment sent by Murāri Rao was under the command of Timmappa.

army against Murāri Rao, followed him and tracked his route, and on a plain to the west of Nandidurg, he fell in with his troops and at the first charge inflicted a signal defeat on them, putting most of them to the sword.

His defeat and retreat.

The few who escaped with their lives, left their horses and arms behind them. It is said nearly two thousand horses⁶⁶ were taken by Haidar on this occasion. The Pālegār was now left to his own resources. Haidar, returning flushed with his victory over the relieving Mahratta, fixed his attention solely on the reduction of the place. Its complete investment followed. At a suitable moment,

Pettah and Fort besieged.

Haidar's troops attacked and took the Pettah at long last, and raising batteries there, employed themselves in firing at the walls of the fort and exploding mines.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, Murāri Rao was not inactive. He kept ravaging the adjoining areas, though he did not attack directly Haidar's forces and thus attempt to relieve the besieged. Haidar took no notice of his acts for the time being and rivetted his attention solely on the reduction of the Fort. The Pālegār met Haidar's mining of the walls by counter-mining, which he did from his knowledge, and thus rendered unsuccessful Haidar's attacks against him. But further exertions followed on Haidar's part, and after a short time, the walls of the fort, which were of earth, were completely battered down and breached on one side. Haidar now gave the order for the assault, without calculating in the

Two successive assaults beaten off.

66. Kirmāṇi, o. c., 115.

67. *Ibid*, 116. The term "exploding the mines" is explained by Col. Miles, the translator of Kirmāṇi, as meaning "perhaps throwing shells into the town." It is possible, however, that Haidar's artillery men "mined" the walls of the fort and the Pālegār "countermined" and neutralized the effects of "mining." See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 307. A "mine", in the sense used here, appears to indicate an underground passage in which gunpowder or other explosives can be lodged for destructive purposes.

least the spirit of the defenders. Notwithstanding the state of the walls and other disadvantages under which they were suffering, the besieged fought so bravely in the breach that they beat off the storming party and put them to flight. The next day another storming party tried their luck but with no better result.⁶⁸

Haidar had recourse to his ingenuity now. With great

Haidar's ingenuity
at work.

labour, he put up a new battery in front of the gate of the fort, and ordered the gate to be battered. In the next one or two days, his experienced gunners beat down the two walls which masked the gate. As soon as the Pālegār and his forces saw that the defences of the gate had been beaten down, they began to reflect on the probable result. The spirit of the defenders, which had so far been maintained at a high level, seemed for the first time to give way. It dawned on them for the first time that their attitude had not only been of defence, but also defiance. But it would be wrong to say they were downhearted or had yielded to despondency. Their leader, the Pālegār, saw that it would not do to waste either his opportunity or the valuable lives of his men. What boots it at one gate to make defence, and at

Haidar's fresh
attempt at composition : terms agreed
to.

another to let in the foe? That was the thought uppermost in his mind. Three months had elapsed and Haidar too was tired of an operation that seemed never to end in a victory.⁶⁹ He was intent on composition. Negotiations ensued, both sides being ready for it. Bankers and neighbouring Pālegārs did the

68. Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 116-117.

69. Wilks says that Haidar was so stoutly resisted that he could not be said to have begun *the siege of the citadel* even after the lapse of two months from the time he initiated the attack on the Pettah—*o.c.*, I. 496-497. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) says that the siege occupied three months. This seems correct, reckoning from the date of arrival of Haidar before Chikballāpur and its final capture.

rest.⁷⁰ A ransom of rupees nine lakhs was agreed to and Haidar consented to raise the siege and leave the place.⁷¹ He clearly saw that so large a sum could not be paid without time being allowed for its realization. He was also anxious to vacate a town which was reeking

Haidar's withdrawal to Dēvanhalli. with the evil smells of a close conflict. It was mutually agreed that Haidar should leave the town with his troops

and artillery by way of Dēvanhalli and Bangalore to Seringapatam, the amount fixed being paid in three instalments, the first at Dēvanhalli, the second at Bangalore and the third at the capital.⁷² The siege was accordingly raised and Haidar marched out of the town and encamped on the plain near Dēvanhalli, preparatory to moving forward agreeably to the settled plan. Haidar, however, took the precaution of posting in the batteries and suburbs a thousand matchlock men, under the command of two of his Afghan officers, Juhankhān Khōkur and Hussain Khān Lōḍi, with seven or eight boxes of ammunition in their charge, ostensibly to secure the payment of the ransom but really to await eventualities.⁷³

Murāri Rao, hearing of this accommodation, immediately made—either on his own initiative or as the result of previous arrangement—a forced march during the night, arrived in the rear of the fort, and apprized

70. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 117. The *Haid. Nām.* (*l.c.*) mentions the name of Chikkappa, Pālegār of Koratagere in this connection.

71. So Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 498; Kirmāṇi says Rs. 7 lakhs, *o.c.*, 117. The family history of the Pālegār says that Haidar demanded 500,000 Pagodas (equal to Rs. 17,50,000) and a golden head of Kaṇṭhīraṇa, the Daḷavāi, who had fallen in an attempt to take Chikballāpur. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 307. Robson says that the amount agreed to was 5 lakhs of Pagodas (*o.c.*, 26).

72. The family history says that part of the sum was paid on the spot (*Mys. Gaz.*, *l.c.*). Robson says that Haidar received Rs. 1½ lakhs in hand (*l.c.*).

73. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 118.

the Pālegār of his arrival. The two drew together and decided upon further resistance to Haidar. It was agreed that the Pālegār and his family should at once ascend Nandidurg while Murāri Rao, in return for rupees five lakhs—which had been collected to pay up Haidar's instalments—should occupy the fort at Chikballāpur and with fresh troops drafted in from Hyderabad and Poona, give Haidar the punishment of his life.

Murāri Rao's occupation of Chikballāpur fort.

This agreement was sooner put in action than signed. A body of Murāri Rao's forces soon threw themselves into the fort, while the Pālegār and his family went up the invincible fort of Nandidurg, not far away from the town,⁷⁴ holding Chikkappa Gauḍa of Koratagere a close prisoner.⁷⁵ The project of the Pālegār was to leave Haidar to waste himself afresh in a contest with new troops drafted for the purpose; and when the garrison should begin to show signs of weariness, to descend once more with his select followers and by a vigorous effort compel Haidar to raise the siege.⁷⁶

Murāri Rao, after garrisoning the ruined fort with 2,000 foot and providing it with sufficient ammunition, left it with suitable instructions to defend it to the last man.⁷⁷ On the following morning, the garrison manned the walls, beat their drums, and sounded their trumpets in the true Mahratta style, and then assembled suddenly in large numbers at the gate. Perceiving these movements and apprehending treachery, Haidar's detachment manned their batteries and were standing ready for

Haidar's detachment attacked.

74. *Ibid.*, 118-119; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 499; Robson, *o.c.*, 26. Robson says that Murāri sent 500 of his troops to occupy the fort (see note 77 below).

75. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

76. Wilks, l.c.

77. The strength of the troops left by Murāri Rao as mentioned by Kirmāṇi differs from that mentioned by Robson. Robson's seems an underestimate. See note 74 above.

action, when all at once, 1,500 of the Mahrattas left the fort and advanced against them. Haidar's men, being few and scattered about, left the battery and assembled in the Pettah, and, making one gate strong, held fast to it. The troops from the fort now formed a circle round them and showered a brisk fire of musketry and rockets. Haidar's infantry, resolved on selling their lives dearly, strengthened a large building near the gate and defended it gallantly, while Jahān Khān Khōkur, the Afghan officer, with a few brave fellows, made an attack on the Mahratta forces and with the sword and spear killed a great many of them. The prisoners taken told the rest of the tale. They were duly despatched the next night to Haidar, with a full narration of what had occurred since he raised the siege and left the place.⁷⁸

Haidar's rage knew no bounds when he found himself

Haidar's forced a dupe at the hands of the Pālegār.
 march on Chikballāpur. He became, it is said, "as furious as
 an enraged lion," and he returned with

renewed vigour to the attack. With his troops and artillery, he made a forced march back from Dēvanhalli. Arrived at the fort, he saw the Mahratta cavalry stationed round it and attacked them. He inflicted such a crushing defeat on them that they fled in different directions, unable to stand the onslaught of the light cavalry. The chastisement was so

His chastisement of
 Mahratta forces.

severe that they never looked behind them until they reached Gudibānda, their temporary headquarters. Perceiving this, Jahān Khān Khōkur and Hussain Khān Lōdi immediately hoisted the Mysore standard on the gate. Seeing this, Haidar advanced rapidly and occupied the Pettah. He then began working the batteries he had before raised, and ordered his infantry and artillery to give the fort a

78, Kirmāni, o.c., 119-120.

shower of shot.

He takes Chikballāpur fort.

The spiritless defence of the mercenary garrison did not long protract the fate of the place. In about ten days, it was carried by assault.⁷⁹ (March 1762).⁸⁰ To inspire terror in the neighbourhood, he put to death some of the garrison, while, for an example, some among the Mahratta garrison had their noses and ears cut off and were turned out bleeding to join their comrades with Murāri Rao.⁸¹ He then appointed Mīr Ali Razā Khān to command the fort and attend to its future defence.⁸²

Haidar next turned his attention to the Pālegār on Nandidurg and to Murāri Rao himself. He made no immediate attempt on Nandidurg, except to ask Mīr Ali Razā Khān to have an eye on it and leaving a light corps under Ibrāhim Sāhib, his maternal uncle, who had his headquarters at Bangalore,⁸³ with orders to destroy the surrounding country, and in communication with the garrisons of Dēvanhalli and Chikballāpur, to cut off all supplies to it. With the double object of furthering this project, and retaliating on Murāri Rao, he determined on extending his conquest over a large area of country to the north of Chikballāpur and to the east of the old Mysore frontier. With this view, he marched off with a sufficient

79. Wilks says ten days, *o.c.*, I. 500; so also Robson, *l.c.*; but Kirmāpi says "two days," *o.c.*, 121.

80 *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 25-25A.

81. Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 121; the family history confirms this statement, *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 303; also Robson, *o.c.*, 26-27.

82. So says Kirmāpi, *l.c.* Wilks, however, states that Bādr-u-zamān Khān was appointed to look after the future defence of the place. Kirmāpi is probably correct here. While Bādr-u-zamān Khān was appointed later as the Faujdār of Chikballāpur, it was Mīr Ali Razā Khān who was nominated to complete the capture of the place after Haidar left it on delivering the assault. He also reduced Nandidurg later, as will be seen from the text above.

83. Wilks, *l.c.*,

force towards Guḍibaṇḍa, the temporary headquarters of Murāri Rao. Hearing this, Murāri Rao, unequal to the occasion, retired towards his own territory and halted at Kōḍikoṇḍa.⁸⁴ Haidar, reducing Guḍibaṇḍa at the end of a siege of but forty-eight hours or

Capture of Guḍi-
baṇḍa.

so, and leaving a detachment there, marched on to Kōḍikoṇḍa in search of Murāri Rao. Here Murāri Rao took

his post with all his troops, infantry, cavalry and artillery.

Fight at Kōḍikoṇḍa:
Murāri Rao's retreat
to Gooty.

Haidar, taking in the situation at a glance, placed his regular and irregular infantry and artillery in ambush, in the

dry bed of a river close by, ordered off all his light horse to the front, with instructions to attack immediately the enemy's troops. When Murāri Rao's cavalry attempted to charge them in a compact body, Haidar's horse, before the enemy could come near, turned their backs and fled at speed. Murāri Rao's horse, who were misled by this evolution, were rendered bold by it and followed them. While they were in pursuit, however, the troops in ambush rose up, all at once, and received them with such a volley of cannon and musketry, that they suffered incalculable loss in their ranks. Murāri Rao's troops were scattered like "grain shaken out of a slit bag, and they did not drink water until they arrived at the walls of Gooty." Murāri Rao followed them, thus accepting

84. Kirmāṇi spells this place as "Gurikonda." The contemporary work *Haid. Nām.* correctly mentions it as Kōḍikoṇḍa, an extant town in Anantpur district. The family history of the Chikballāpur Pālegārs refers to it as Kōṭikoṇḍa among the places taken by Haidar. The other places, besides Nandidurg, were Kalavaradurg, Itikaldurg, Kōṭikoṇḍa and Guḍibaṇḍa. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 308. Kirmāṇi mentions the conquests in this order: Guḍibaṇḍa, Gurikoṇḍa, Penukoṇḍa and Maḍaksīra (*o.c.*, 121-123); while the *Haid. Nām* (l.c.) adopts the following order: Maḍaksīra, Penukoṇḍa and Kōḍikoṇḍa. Robson mentions only Penukoṇḍa but adds that Haidar made a conquest of such parts of Murāri Rao's country as lay most convenient to his new acquisitions of Sirpi (Sira), nearly to the value of three lacks (lakhs) of pagodas yearly."—*o.c.*, 27.

the decisive character of the defeat he had sustained in the war.⁸⁵

Haidar, however, advanced further northward. After a siege of seven days, he took Kōḍi-koṇḍa, the erstwhile retreat of Murāri Rao. From that place, he marched towards Penukoṇḍa, the ancient capital of the Vijayanagar kingdom, where Murāri had placed a garrison. After first fortifying the passes near about, he delivered successive assaults on the hill fort of Penukoṇḍa and took it after a hard fight lasting over a month. He then proceeded to attack Maḍakśīra, an equally strong hill fort. Its commandant, a brave man, gave Haidar a warm reception here and by the continual fire he kept up from his guns and musketry, he killed a great many of his troops. The fort was accordingly invested immediately. Under the cover of the rocks, the assault was delivered, Haidar taking his position on a hill to the northward of the fort, but next adjoining to that on which it stood. Mounting some large guns on that hill, he sent to the killedār word suggesting a composition. The proud commandant rejecting the terms of surrender, Haidar gave orders to his artillery men to fire at a particular part of the rocks which rose above the middle of the hill, and beneath which stood the houses and buildings of the fort, full of inhabitants. As these rocks were knocked to pieces by the cannon balls, the fragments killed a number of the besieged, and scattered the rest so effectually.

85. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 120-122; Wilks, *l.c.*, *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25A; also *Fort St. George Records, Milly. Count. Corres.*, *l.c.*, *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXXVII, *Letter No. 7*, very briefly touching on this campaign. De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 81) and Robson (*l.c.*) hardly refer to it. Stewart is silent on it. Kirmāṇi antedates the event and sets it down to 1758 (A. H. 1172). Wilks adopts the following order of conquests: Kōḍikoṇḍa, Penukoṇḍa and Maḍakśīra (*l.c.*)

ally that the garrison of the fort got unnerved and lost the power of defence. Alarmed at this state of affairs, the commandant surrendered on the condition that he and his garrison were to march out with their lives and property.⁸⁶

The position at Nandidurg had developed as expected. The Pālegār Chikkappa and his family had been reduced to such extremities that they were without resources to continue the defence. They had not even the necessities of life to sustain them. Mīr Alī Razā Khān had exerted great skill in stopping all supplies, and, as for help, the flight of Murāri Rao had ended all possible chance of it. Chikkappa thus forced to surrender, he and his family, including his nephew Baiche Gauḍa, were sent under Haidār's orders to Bangalore, where they were kept close prisoners.⁸⁷ Here Chikkappa died, some say leaving no issue, while others state that he left a number of sons, of whom two were made Mussalmans, according to the directions issued by Haidar.⁸⁸ Later, a report being

86. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 122-123; Wilks (*l.c.*) barely mentions the names of the places taken, without attempting any description of the fighting connected with them.

87. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 123-124; *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 308.

88. The family account says he died "without issue" (*Mys. Gaz.*, *l.c.*). Wilks has nothing to state on this point. Robson and Kirmāṇi are specific, however, on it. Robson gives his name as "Chinapah" (Chinnappa), which is another form of "Chikkappa," and says that he would never have surrendered himself to Mīr Alī had he not been in the utmost distress for want of the necessities of life, being almost starved on the Nandidurg Rock.—*o.c.*, 34-35. (Robson gives the name of the rock as "Nandegoody Rock," which is an obvious error). Robson says that the Pālegār had been "solemnly" promised to be released on his agreeing to the several conditions enforced on him, "Yet he (Mīr Alī) was so perfidious," Robson continues, "as to send him a prisoner to Bengaloor, where, in a few days, he died through grief" (*o.c.*, 34-35). Then Robson adds: "Hyder, to secure himself against any future attempts of Chinapah's son, who was then a young man, caused him forthwith to be circumcised by force, and taught the principles of Mahometan religion." (*o.c.*, 35). Kirmāṇi says: "The Meer (Mīr Alī), agreeably to Hydur's orders, despatched the captive Poligar and his family to Bangalore; and of his sons two were made

circulated that a rescue would be attempted, the other prisoners were removed to Coimbatore.⁸⁹

Haidar's campaign against Chikballāpur and his subsequent conquest of the country adjoining it to the north and to the east, helped to make for the unification

Review of Haidar's conduct of the Sira and Chikballāpur campaigns.

of the country on the one hand and on the other to secure the frontiers of Mysore. It cannot be said that he did not try to make Sira a larger and a more compact province, while he was sincere and whole-hearted in treating it as part and parcel of Mysore. He had no doubt pretended to obtain *sanads* and contract treaties for his Nawābship and titles to signify his control over his conquests from Salābat, but that was part of the routine of the day, when everybody in the South pretended to hold land by sub-infeudation as it were. But its true significance had been wholly lost long back and it meant no more than paying sums for buying peace or ransoming places, where that seemed the more easy or cheaper course from a relative point of view. As to the terrorism he indulged in, that, again, was part of the war practice of the time. But it was rapidly dying out and Haidar's use of it, though a sign of barbarism in which he was brought up, is, perhaps, mitigated by the reflection that he used it in the present instance with some discrimination, restricting mutilation to but a few individuals. His forcible

Mussalmans. One of them died, but the other Sufdar Khan is now living (*i.e.*, at the time Kirmānī wrote his work, about 1,800) and with his troops was received into the Nawaub's (*i.e.*, Haidar's) service."—*o.c.*, 124.

89. When Haidar visited Coimbatore, sometime later, they all waited on him except Baiche Gauḍa, who refused to salute the conqueror. Unwilling to hurt the old man, Haidar asked him to be admitted through a low door, intending to accept the bending down with his head forward in passing through it as a salute and return the salute. But the obstinate old Gauḍa, to prevent Haidar from having even that gratification, presented one of his feet first, on which he was put into irons and close confinement. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 308.

conversion to the Muslim faith of Chikkappa's two sons seems hard to justify, more especially as such conversion was against Haidar's usual policy. The highest that could be said by way of explanation or in extenuation of this mark of fanaticism on Haidar's part would be to say that it was not religion but politics that dictated this course of conduct on his part. Evidently Chikkappa seemed vicious in Haidar's eyes. When he attacked him he defended himself. And what would not his sons do, if left alone? So evidently thought Haidar, and he determined on attaching them to himself by making them one with him in their faith! And in his crude way—and every one becomes crude where religion enters—he thought he could forcibly change them into Muslims to keep them ever away from asserting themselves against himself! In this he was wholly mistaken, for, as history records, others rose in the family of Chikkappa to claim the Pālayam, and they were recognised too!⁹⁰

Immediately after the fall of Chikballāpur and the annexation of a large part of the country to its north and east, Haidar made arrangements for their administration as parts of Mysore territory by appointing suitable men for their civil and military administration.⁹¹ Amīls and Killedārs were duly posted and as things assumed a normal shape, he proceeded to Sīra to provide for its government.⁹² Mīr Ali Razā Khān was appointed as its Faujdār.⁹³ After a short stay at Sīra, he resolved on reducing to subjection those who had long been held to be subject to its jurisdiction.⁹⁴ Among these were reckoned the chiefs of Rāyadurg, Harapanahalli and Chitaldrug,

90. For the subsequent history of the Pālayam, see *Ibid.*

91. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 124.

92. *Ibid.*; Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 500.

93. *Ibid.*, 147.

94. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 500-501.

situated to the north and north-east of Sīra, and Bednūr and the territory dependent on it, to the west.⁹⁵ Accordingly, in the prosecution of this objective, he proceeded, about the middle of 1762, on an expedition north-west wards, taking on the way Sannakki-Bāgūr, Hosadurga and other places.⁹⁶ Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān

Campaign against
the Pālegār of
Rāyadurg, Harapanahalli, Chitaldrug,
etc.

was detached to other places near about. He took Kanakagiri, levying a tribute of Rs. 2 lakhs,⁹⁷ and then proceeded to Harapanahalli and there, "by fair and foul means," he not only made him yield but also to pay Rs. 3 lakhs.⁹⁸ At Rāyadurg, he met with a show of force⁹⁹ and excuses combined but by a counter-show of force, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān brought him to terms. He paid in Rs. 3 lakhs as tribute, Rs. 2 lakhs as a fine for his show of force and Rs. 1 lakh "as a present for his life" being spared. Medakere Nāyaka, the Pālegār of Chitaldrug, however, attempted to evade and procrastinate. His country was overrun, with the result that in a few days, he found it prudent to compromise. He paid Rs. 4 lakhs as tribute and 2 lakhs of pagodas for a fine.¹⁰⁰ The result of the campaign so far was two-fold:

95. *Ibid*; also De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 82, where he states that the "kingdom of Kanara" was comprised in the Subaship of Scirra (Sīra)".

96. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 26.

97. *Kirmāṇi, o.c.*, 144.

98. *Ibid*. The phrase "by fair and foul means" is *Kirmāṇi's* own. According to Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 501), the Pālegār of Harapanahalli was among those who obeyed the first summons, a remark which is in agreement with *Kirmāṇi's* version.

99. *Ibid*, 144-147. According to Wilks (*l.c.*), the Pālegār of Rāyadurg, on the approach of Haidar, came, it is said, "spontaneously to offer submission and allegiance, and for this conduct he was ever afterwards distinguished by Hyder above all his Hindoo dependants." This statement, however, is directly contradicted by *Kirmāṇi*, who gives a long account of how he procrastinated and offered excuses and even attacked a detachment sent by Fuzzul-ullāh to join Haidar on his way from Bednūr and had to attack Kanikal, one of his places "for an example" (*Kirmāṇi, o.c.*, 144-147).

100. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 502. According to *Kirmāṇi* (*o.c.*, 144), the Pālegār of Chitaldrug appears to have offered no opposition on this occasion. *Kirmāṇi's* version would indicate that during the whole of this campaign

it added territory to Mysore and replenished the war-chest materially, making possible the greater conquest that was to come next, the conquest of Bednūr.

Towards the close of 1762, Haidar, accompanied by Medekere Nāyaka of Chitaldrug, marched against Bednūr (*i.e.*, the kingdom of Kanara or Ikkēri), ostensibly supporting the claims of a pretender, popularly known as Gaibu Rāja Channabasappa Nāyaka, aged about seventeen years, to the throne of the State, but really by way of punishing her for not supporting him against Chitaldrug under the agreement between the States of Bednūr and Mysore.¹⁰¹ Bednūr had Haidar's motives. been reputed a wealthy city and it is possible that Haidar had had his eye on it for sometime, both to extend Mysore influence on that side to the sea and to acquire the hoarded

in the north-west, Haidar was actively assisted by Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān. According to the *Haid. Nam.* (ff. 26), Medakere Nāyaka was mulcted of 8 lakhs of *Durgi-varahas* by way of contribution. Robson says that Haidar exacted Rs. 8 lakhs from him (*o.c.*, 27). He adds that he made the Pāṇegār agree "to assist him with 1,500 horse and 10,000 foot in a new expedition," the reference being, of course, to the next one against Bednūr.

101. De La Tour literally refers to Bednūr, the capital of Kanara, as "Rana Biddeluru" (*Ayder Ali*, I. 83, 87, 88, 89), perhaps after the Queen who ruled over it. It is, however, quite distinct from Rāpi-Bednūr or Rāpi-bennūr, in the present Dharwar district. In one place, he seems to identify Bednūr with "the kingdom of Bisnagar or Bassapatnam" (*Ibid.*, I. 81), and in two places he speaks as if Chitaldrug was identical with "Bisnagar" (*Ibid.*, I. 82, 85). This looseness in identification is, perhaps, to be attributed to the fact that Bednūr, Chitaldrug, etc., were still nominally recognised as part and parcel of the old but defunct Vijayanagar Empire. The "Gaibu Rāja" referred to is "the Rajs of the resurrection" of Wilks (I. 509), because he was represented to be the same as Channabasappa Nāyaka (1754-1757), the first adopted son of Virāmmāji, strangled by orders of the latter in 1757 but alleged to have escaped for protection to Chitaldrug while half dead (*Haid. Nam.*, ff. 27; also *Wilks*, I. 503, etc.). On the subject of Pretenders in history, see *f.n.* 120 below. The agreement referred to, in the text above, seems obviously to be the *Bhāshā-Patrikē* of c. 1700 (*vide* Vol. I. P. 321 of this work), which was never strictly adhered to by Bednūr.

money in its coffers. One account says that the news-writers of the day described to Haidar in glowing terms, saying "that from its beauty and verdure, it bestowed splendour on the Bālaghāt country, nay, that it might be said to be equal to the gardens of Paradise." The fertility of the country was, it was reported, the envy of Kāshmīr, while its beautiful fields and meadows gave delight, it was said, to the heart of the beholder. And its charms were such that if any one burned with grief entered it, were he even as a bird roasting on the spit, he would, it was remarked, regain his wings and feathers.¹⁰² Such a country Haidar wanted to secure for Mysore. He set about, we are told, sending out in advance some "searching spies" to study the situation.¹⁰³ Coming to know of the dissensions existing between the Rāṇi and the person who was ambitious of obtaining the government of Bednūr and who, to attain that object, had sought refuge with Haidar at Chitaldrug, Haidar, we are told,¹⁰⁴ marched into Bednūr. The pretender engaged, through the

102. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 126-129. This high-flown description of Kirmāṇi of Bednūr is pleasing no doubt to the ear but it is spoiled by the suggestion at its end that such a country was not fit to be ruled by a Rāṇi but only by a "just and distinguished chief" like Haidar. As Col. Miles remarks, Kirmāṇi here seems to justify in advance Haidar's invasion of Bednūr. Indeed, one would think, from the language used by him, that Haidar "had a right to dispossess the unfortunate Rani of her territory and wealth, and perhaps to take her life" (*Ibid*, 129, f. n.). The beauty of Bednūr, amidst its magnificent Malnād setting, evidently was too impressive in those days to have been missed by the casual traveller. Its comparison with Kāshmīr by Kirmāṇi is echoed in many literary works and lithic inscriptions, which go back to many centuries. One of the verses translated in the text above was thus rendered by Mr. Davenport from the Persian original for Col. Miles :—

If burnt with grief, into Bednūr, you enter,
Though as bad as a bird's on the spit he your plight,
In that beautiful country, of pleasure the centre,
Your wings and your feathers you'll renovate quite.

(See *Ibid*, 126, f. n.)

103. *Ibid*, 129-130.

104. *Ibid*, 130-131.

medium of the chief of Chitaldrug, "to gird his loins in the service of the Nawaub," which in plain terms meant that he would become a vassal of Mysore.¹⁰⁵ There is, no doubt, some truth in this story, and it is not improbable that Haidar made the case of the pretender his own and used it artfully later against both the pretender and the person against whom he had carried complaints. Haidar's march was distinguished throughout, if we are to believe the annalist of the times, by his affability towards the people, his gifts to them, his assurances to them of future welfare and prosperity, and his promises of safety. At the same time, those who opposed him—"those who left the circle of obedience to his commands" as the panegyrist puts it—were evidently made examples of; they were made prisoners or destroyed.¹⁰⁶ Whatever his motives, Haidar put through his objective in a determined manner, yielding neither to sentiment nor to appeal.

Bednūr, at the time we are writing of, had been the capital of the Ikkēri kings for a hundred and twenty-three years. After it became the capital of that well known line of kings, it had been ruled in succession by about ten chiefs, of whom Śivappa Nāyaka I (1645-1660) was the first. He improved and enlarged it and made it and the kingdom of which it was the capital famous by his wise rule. He made good roads; he fixed the revenue assessment of the country, which is still remembered for its moderation; he provided for the safety of the country by maintaining a standing army of 50,000 troops; and he extended the area of his rule by conquering the adjoining district of Kanara. This conquest brought him a great deal of booty which he expended wisely. He gave asylum to some 30,000 Christians, who, persecuted in

105. *Ibid.*, 131.

106. *Ibid.*, 132.

Goa and Salsette, sought protection at his hands. To these he granted many great privileges¹⁰⁷. To Ranga Rāya (Śrī-Ranga VI), the Vijayanagar Emperor, he gave a place of residence in his kingdom. He also encouraged trade, maintaining a friendly intercourse with the Muslims. So famous did he become in India at about the middle of the 17th century that his kingdom attracted foreign travellers—Father Leonardo Paes and Father Vincent, the barefoot Carmelite friar—who have left laudatory accounts of his rule. Third in succession to him was Sōmasēkhara I (1664-1671), whose widow Channammāji gave shelter to Rājā Rām, the son of Śivāji, when he was in hiding from the Mughals, until he could escape to his own country. Her adopted son Basappa Nāyaka I (1697-1714) was a pious man devoted to works of charity. His son Sōmasēkhara II (1715-1739) attacked Sīra, the Mughal capital in the Karnātic, and took Ajjampur, Sante Bennūr and other places from the Mughals. He was entitled *Buddhi* or the Wise (Ruler). Jacobus Canter Vissacher, writing of his period of rule, commends him as a “magnificent and powerful” king—much more so than those of Malabar. He calls Bednūr the granary of all Southern India. “The city (of Bednūr),” he writes, “where the Raja holds his court, lies some leagues inland, and is connected with the sea-port by a fine road, planted with trees, which the inhabitants are obliged to keep in excellent order. This road is so secure that any stranger might go and sleep there with bags full of money, and nobody would molest or rob him, for, if such a thing occurred, the people in the neighbourhood would not only be severely punished but would also be forced to make good the money.” Sōmasēkhara II was succeeded by his nephew Basappa Nāyaka II (1739-1754). In 1748, Basappa Nāyaka II sought the aid of Chandā Sāhib, who, at the intervention

107. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 83.

of the French, had just been released from his Satara prison by the Mahrattas, against Medakere Nāyaka of Chitaldrug, who had also in his turn sought for Chandā Sāhib's help against Basappa Nāyaka II. But Chandā Sāhib joined Medakere Nāyaka and in the decisive battle at Mayakonda¹⁰⁸, fought on 24th March 1748, the Chitaldrug forces were signally defeated, Medakere Nāyaka himself being slain on the field of battle, together with Chandā Sāhib's son, and Chandā Sāhib himself was captured by Basappa Nāyaka. While being transported in triumph to Bednūr, Chandā Sāhib artfully won over his Mussulman guards by informing them of his prospects if they only set him at liberty and they marched him off to the French¹⁰⁹. Basappa Nāyaka II died in 1754, leaving Channabasappa Nāyaka, his adopted son, and Rāṇi Virammāji, his widow. Rāṇi Virammāji, sometimes described as Channa-Virammāji, ruled in her adopted son's name, keeping him under control, for about three years, at the end of which she, it is said, plotted against him and contrived, on July 18, 1757, to put him to death.¹¹⁰ Thereafter, it is stated,¹¹¹ she took in adoption, on August 4, 1757, another boy—Sūmaśekhara III of history—who was the youngest of the four sons of her maternal uncle Paṭṭaṇa Setṭi Channa-Virappa of Bankapur.¹¹²

108. About 26 miles S. E. of Harihar and about 20 miles N. W. of Chitaldrug; now a Railway Station on the Mysore State Railway.

109. How he joined as pretender to the position of Nizām of Hyderabad and both of them were successful against Anwar-ud-dīn at Āmbūr, and how he became recognised as the Nawāb of Arcōt under French auspices, and how he later, in the fight for Trichinopoly, fell into the hands of Mānāji, and how he was treacherously stabbed by him and his head was despatched by Nanjarāja to Seringapatam, where it was suspended on the Mysore Gate, will be found referred to in Ch. VI., pp. 115-131 above.

110. This is the traditional story as narrated in Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 503. The *Ke. N. V.* does not make mention of it, though it represents him as having died on the date mentioned.

111. See *Keḷadi-Nripa-Vijāyam* of Linganna-Kavi (c. 1800), Ch. XII, pp. 217-223, from which the details in this section of the text are taken.

112. About 60 miles N. E. of Bednūr; and about 5 miles S. W. of Savanūr; now a Railway Station on the M. & S. M. Ry., Bangalore-Poona Section, It is situated in the present North-Kanara district.

She was evidently well connected, her father's position socially and probably otherwise being high, as he is spoken of as *Paṭṭaṇa-Setti*. Sōmasēkhara III being, however, quite a youth, Vīrammāji conducted the affairs of the State with the aid of her ministers and officers. Her rule is spoken of as having been beneficent and just, being in accordance with the standard of true *dharma*.¹¹³ Though an ardent Virāśaiva in her religious persuasion, she was, in keeping with the traditions of the Bednūr house, friendly with the *Gurus* of the Śringēri *maṭh*.¹¹⁴ It is said that having learnt that the *maṭh* was involved in heavy debts, she invited to her capital, in January 1758, the then *Guru*, Abhinava-Sachchidānanda-Bhārati-Svāmi¹¹⁵ and accorded him not only the religious welcome due to him but also presented him with a crystalline image of Śiva (*sphaṭika līṅga*) and an image of Gōpāla set in rubies (*ratnakhachita Gōpāla-kriṣṇamūrti*), together with the gift of a piece of land valued at 74 *varaḥas*. She endowed the Śringēri *maṭh*, besides, with another piece of rent-free land valued at 300 *varaḥas*. She also generously undertook and arranged for the progressive liquidation of the debts of the

113. *Ke. N. V.*, I. c. The text goes: *saddharmadim rājya pratipālanam geyyuttumirdu*.

114. Several inscriptions attest to these friendly relations between the Keḷadi (i. e., Bednūr) chiefs and the Śringēri *maṭh*. *Śringēri* 5, dated in 1621, in the time of Venkaṭappa Nāyaka, records the re-establishment of the Śringēri *maṭh*; while *Koppa* 61, dated in 1627, in the same reign, describes Venkaṭappa Nāyaka as the establisher of the *Vaidikādvaitasiddhānta*, one of the titles of the Śringēri *Gurus*; this inscription speaks of him as *devoted to the faith of Śiva and the Śringēri Guru*, i. e., the Virāśaiva faith and the Śringēri *Guru* who followed the Vēdic faith. Two other inscriptions (*Śringēri* 11 and 13), both dated in 1652, belonging to the time of Śivappa Nāyaka, record the restoration of the endowments of the Śringēri *maṭh*. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1305.

115. This *Guru* of the Śringēri *maṭh* has to be identified with Narasimha-Bhārati, who became *Jagadguru* in 1758, according to inscriptions (see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1179). According to the Śringēri *maṭh* list, however, Abhinava-Sachchidānanda-Bhārati was *Guru* from 1741-1767 and Narasima-Bhārati from 1767-1770 (see *Mys. Gaz.*, I. 307). The *maṭh* list and the data afforded by inscriptions do not always agree.

math, which had then evidently become a great burden to it.¹¹⁶ Vīrammāji was, however, not only religiously inclined but also possessed of the valour of a warrior-queen. She is said to have organised a campaign against the Mahratta ruler of Miraj and to have captured, through her general Vīrabhadrappa, the fort at his very capital.¹¹⁷ This event should have occurred before Vīrammāji came into conflict with Haidar in 1763. We may probably set it down to about 1760 A. D. Vīrammāji is, however, depicted to us in a rather unfavourable light by other writers. These will be found referred to in an Appendix to this volume together with an indication of the reliance to be placed on them. It ought to suffice here to state that she was a woman-ruler of considerable talent, brave and daring in character and highly patriotic by temperament. While she might not have been a saint in her virtues, it is easy to see that her easy manners with one Nimbaiya gave occasion to gossip, which seems to have given her quite an evil reputation in her own time.¹¹⁸ What proved an undoubted invitation to Haidar to interfere in her affairs was her alleged keeping out of the kingdom her husband's adopted son. Whether that son's death occurred or not, it opened the way for the creation of a "Ghyboo Raja"—Resurrection Rāja—Channabasappa Nāyaka, probably the artful creation of the Chitaldrug Pālegār, either by himself or set up by him at the instigation of Haidar's emissaries who were undoubtedly at work in and about Bednūr for some time prior to its conquest.¹¹⁹

116. The text runs thus : *ā mathāda ruṇabhArakkam uchita varitu khaṇḍita kāyakangaḷam māḍisi koṭṭu*—see *Ke. N. V.*, l. c.

117. Miraj is described as "*Mīḍije*, near the West Coast". See *Ibid.*, 223. Miraj is 86 miles north of Belgaum and is near the Krishṇa river.

118. Nimbaiya mentioned above may be identified with Nambaiya, described as *Gurikār* of the Lingāyat faith, who is said to have served under Vīrammāji. As he is spoken of as *Śivabhakta Gurikār*, he should have kept up to the formalism prescribed by the Virāṣaiva faith. See *Ke. N. V.*, 218, f. n. 2.

119. Kirmāṇi specifically refers to the spies hovering about Bednūr prior to its invasion. The *Haid. Nām.* confirms this.

The young Pretender's arrival was, it is said, announced dramatically to Haidar by the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug, when he himself, on rendering his submission, was received by Haidar in his camp.¹²⁰ The circumstances of this introduction were somewhat novel. Basavappa Nāyaka, the last reigning Rāja of Bednūr, had died in 1754, leaving as his heir an adopted son named Channabasava,

The story of the Pretender.

120. Wilks says that the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug, on the Pretender's arrival at the camp of Haidar, mentioned to him in the course of his conversation "the arrival at his own camp of a singular visitor, whose history opened to Hyder new objects of ambition" (Wilks, *o. c. l.* 502). This statement, though theatrically put, is not correct historically. Haidar had, as mentioned above, had his eye on Bednūr for sometime and had sent out his spies to tour the country and prepare the grand programme for his conquest. Kirmānī's version seems to enshrine the true version in this respect. Pretenders to thrones, it is interesting to note here, are well known in English and French histories. The alleged death of Louis XVII, the nominal king of France, gave occasion to the rise of a number of "pretenders". Louis XVII, as is well known, was the son of the unfortunate Louis XVI and Mary Antoinette; became Dauphin in 1789, when his elder brother, proclaimed king by the same grants, died. He was only 4 years then, having been born on March 27, 1785. He was put in prison with the other members of the Royal family, and kept there after the execution of his parents. He was reported to have died in the Temple, Paris, then a prison, on June 8, 1795, perhaps of poison, but some thought the report was untrue. Several pretenders came forward, claiming to be the Dauphin, the most notable a German, Karl Wilhelm Naundorff, who appeared in France in 1833. He died in 1845. The two "pretenders" known to English History were the son and grandson of James II (Prince Charles). They claimed the right to the throne of England. They were called respectively the Elder and the Younger "Pretender"; the Elder, who made one or two attempts to secure his claim, surrendered it to his son, who in 1745 was defeated at Culloden. They did not *personate* any but pretended they had a *claim* to the throne; they were unlike the "Gaibu" of Bednūr and Karl Wilhelm Naundorff of Germany, who personated a dead man. A true "pretender" was the so-called "claimant" in the famous Tichborne case. During the seventies of the 19th Century, a butcher from Waggs Waggs, in Australia, named Thomas Castro, otherwise Thomas Orton, laid claim to Tichborne, a village and property of Hampshire, in 1866, on the death of Sir Alfred Joseph Tichborne. He represented himself as an elder brother of the deceased baronet, supposed (and rightly) to have perished at sea. The imposture was exposed after a lengthy trial, and a subsequent trial for perjury resulted in a sentence of 14 years' penal servitude. Orton, after his release, confessed his imposture in 1895.

aged about seventeen years, under the care of Vīrammāji, his widow. Vīrammāji had formed an illicit connection with one Nimbaiya, a connection which had become so public as to be noticed by a stray European traveller, who passed through Kanara during 1757.¹²¹ The young Rāja protested against the misdoings of his adopted mother, with the result that he was—so the story goes—secretly strangled to death in his bath by a *jetṭi*, a professional athlete who used to shampoo him. Vīrammāji selected a young man, on whom she bestowed the name Sōmaśekhara, and adopted him as son and heir to the throne. The visitor who was introduced to Haidar, however, was announced as Channabasava, who, it was reported, had been saved by an artifice of the *jetṭi*, concealed in his preserver's house for five years, and now escaped to implore the protection and aid of his neighbours in the recovery of his ancient throne. Thus introduced to Haidar, the plan was quickly evolved to fit out an expedition to reinstate him in his alleged rights on terms and conditions mutually agreed to between the three parties.

Situated on the summit of the Western Ghats, Bednūr overlooks what are to-day the districts of Kanara and Malabar. The country round it is one the most picturesque in the Mysore State, surrounded as it is on its three sides by high ranges of hills, whose drainage flows north-west

Bednūr and its surroundings.

121. Wilks notes the fact that Anquetil du Perron, who visited Kanara in 1757, had heard of it. Anquetil du Perron (1731-1815) was the enthusiastic Orientalist, to whom we owe the discovery and the first translation of the *Zend-Avesta*. Schopenhauer derived his knowledge of Hindu philosophy from his writings. Anquetil du Perron was, it might be added, the brother of the more famous French historian in holy orders, Anquetil Louis Pierre (1728-1806), who wrote *Précis de l'Histoire Universelle*, and a *Histoire de France* in 14 vols., which has been continued by Bouillet in 6 more vols. Anquetil du Perron's *Des Recherches Historiques et géographiques sur L' Inde* was published in Berlin in 1786. The truth underlying this story is examined below.

into the Śarāvati. The hills by their height intercept the clouds of the South-West Monsoon, with the results that for nine months in the year the country experiences a climate that may be described as one of incessant rain, the rainfall in the southern portion being as much as, or even more than, 190 inches, while in the northern it is something near 102 inches and in the east it averages from 70 to 80 inches. In the old days, half the year usually used to be spent by the people in preparing provisions for what remained of it. The extraordinary moisture favours the growth not only of abundant crops of rice and areca, pepper and cardamoms, always the main wet and garden cultivation known to this part of the country, but also timber of luxuriant stature, with underwood scarcely penetrable, and a foliage which, added to a cloudy sky, has rendered it proverbial among those who visit it, that a man may pass the greater part of the year in Bednūr without a sight of the Sun. The capital and fort of Bednūr—remains of which may still be seen—were situated in a basin formed by a perfect cluster of hills, the crest of which, about 6 miles from the city, had been fortified in its weakest parts by lines, which, with the woods and natural protection of the hills, constituted its only strength, the fort itself being, from its very position, incapable of a good defence. The city walls were about eight miles in circumference, pierced by ten gates, named Delhi, Koḍiyāl, Kauledurga, etc., while the Palace, situated on a hill in the centre, was surrounded by a citadel, the whole city and the Palace being encircled by woods, hills, and fortified defiles, extending many miles in circumference. The territory dependent on Bednūr, at the time we are writing of, included not only the mountainous region just described but also extended to the west over the present maritime districts of North and South Kanara and to the east over an area of more open country stretching as far as Santebennūr and

Holalkere, within about twenty miles to the south-west of Chitaldrug, whose Pālegār, the one who had evinced so much friendly interest in the reinstatement of the Pretender from Bednūr, had been its longstanding enemy.

The city of Bednūr itself, situated near a small hill, was, at the time of its conquest, not only a wealthy and beautiful city, but also one of the largest and best peopled in all India. It contained at least 60,000 souls in it, of whom at least half were Christians who felt perfectly at home in it. They had not only freedom to exercise their religion but also enjoyed many valuable privileges, which had been conferred on them on their first arrival from Goa and Salsette, flying from the horrors of the Inquisition there. This large population was, however, by no means proportionate to the extent of the city, whose circuit exceeded three leagues or about nine miles. That this could have been no exaggeration will be evident when it is remembered that there were streets in it, nearly in a straight line, of two leagues. The greatest part of the city was inhabited by great men and the nobility, whose homes were cast in the midst of a large garden, enclosing vast reservoirs of water, suited as well for the purposes of pleasure as utility. A prodigious number of trees, planted in these gardens, shaded all the streets, which were watered on each side by a rivulet of clear and limpid water, and possessed no other pavement than a fine gravel. The small mountain, near which this beautiful city was situated, had, as stated above, a considerable fortress on its summit. Situated in a plain about five or six leagues in diameter, it was environed by other mountains and forests that extended for more than twenty leagues every way. They could not be passed but by narrow passages, defended by forts at a small distance from each other. These circumstances rendered

the access to the city extremely difficult for an army, whose progress might be checked at every step by an inconsiderable force, and which could encamp but in the length of a stony passage, where it would be liable to be attacked by the people of the country who knew all the secret passages and could continually lay in ambush to annoy the enemy. The woods, too, could neither be cut down, much less burned, without infinite labour, being bamboos which cannot be burned without being first cut down and dried, nor traversed easily, for they were infested with tigers, bears, elephants and every other species of wild animals and venomous reptiles.

Such a mass of insuperable difficulties as presented themselves to Haidar would have deterred him from the enterprise he

Haidar's preparations.

had set his heart upon for some time, if he had not had the artful aid of the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug and his protege, the Pretender to the throne of Bednūr, who, whether he was the real adopted son or not of the last ruler, passed for such, thanks for the cunning propaganda of Haidar's emissaries and spies. Whether his mother Virammāji was liked or not, and whether the pretended young prince was the beloved of the people or not, there is no doubt the fact that he accompanied Haidar, making the cunning invader's work both easy and acceptable to the people of Bednūr.¹²²

122. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 84-86. Haidar would have been deterred from his enterprise, "if he had not been accompanied by the young prince, who was beloved by the people and the men in power; while the queen his mother was detested by them, as well for her haughtiness and pride, as for having contracted a second marriage with a Brahmin, contrary to the law of the place, which prohibits the widows of their kings from marrying a second time" (*o.c.*, 84-86). De La Tour was wrong in describing Nimbaiya, the person whose name was connected by wild gossip at the time with that of Rāṇi Virammāji, as a Brāhmin. He was a Lingāyat; nor was De La Tour right in stating that the Rāṇi had "contracted a second marriage" with him. Possibly cruel gossip was responsible for all these misdescriptions, for, as we shall see, Rāṇi Virammāji was a pious, religious and devoted Lingāyat and was evidently too strong for the men of her time, whether in her own kingdom or outside of it.

Haidar having determined on the enterprise, left Chitaldrug,¹²³ carrying the young prince with him at the head of 6,000 of his best cavalry and some *Kallars*,¹²⁴ who were well habituated to traverse mountains and forests. He had also a large number of oxen loaded with rice and with no other baggage; and advanced by forced marches towards Bednūr.

But before he started on the expedition, Haidar, as may be expected, came to an arrangement with the Pretender and the Pālegār. Under this arrangement, the young chief was to be re-established in his country, for which service Haidar, it was stipulated, was to receive, besides valuable presents, Rs. 40 lakhs for the expenses of the undertaking, besides the port of Mangalore, together with a tract of country to form a communication from thence to the kingdom of Mysore.¹²⁵ The Pretender swore, without reserve, to the faithful performance of the Treaty, while Haidar, on his part, promised to strictly carry out his part of the contract.¹²⁶ Haidar also obtained some aid from the supporters of the Pretender in the shape of men, the Pālegār of Chitaldrug evidently placing himself and his troops at the disposal of Haidar.¹²⁷

123. De La Tour says he started from "Bisuagar," identified with "Basavapatua," see f. n. 101 above. But Wilks says Chitaldrug. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 508.

124. The "Caleros" of De La Tour (*o. c.*, I. 85). Haidar had in his army a contingent of *Kallars* recruited from the Dindigal country, of which he was Faujdār at one time. See Ch. XII.

125. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 87.

126. See Robson, *o. c.*, 28-29. The Treaty was evidently made at Chitaldrug. Robson adds that it was here that Haidar received the first impression of reducing the Bednūr country, "the reinstating of the young Rajah being the most favourable circumstance and the most conducive to his secret design." Of course, Robson did not know that the design against Bednūr had been formed for some time before.

127. Robson speaks of the "combined armies" in this connection. As the young Prince is said to have been kept "in safety for eight years" by the Pālegār of Chitaldrug, the inference seems justifiable that it was he who placed his army at the disposal of Haidar. It is possible he raised levies in the name of the Prince and the people should have

The Pālegār was to receive his remuneration as well for the valuable help rendered by him.¹²⁸ All things thus arranged, the troops commenced their march towards Bednūr about the end of 1762, moving in four parallel columns, and preserving a distance from each other of from five to fifteen miles according to circumstances, for the purpose of reducing and occupying all the fortifications situated in the open country before they should attempt the fastnesses of the woods.¹²⁹ The young Pretender, who was with the combined armies, was attended with much ceremony, generally mounted on an elephant, in order to attract the eyes of his devoted subjects. This coincided with Haidar's artful design, and succeeded in attracting all the country people, who cheerfully presented themselves and furnished all the necessaries the armies stood in need of.¹³⁰ Haidar added another artifice to win over the people to his side.

On entering the territories of Bednūr, he issued a proclamation in the name of the Pretender, and called on the inhabitants to return to their allegiance. This had the desired effect. Several of the fortified places opened their gates to their lawful prince, while the opposition slackened in the case of several others. Marching by the Chitaldrug-Channagiri-Shimoga road, he first took Santebennūr, a place between Sūlekere and Sāsalu; thence marched on to Benkipur, modern Bhadrāvati; then he arrived at Shimoga, a fortified place just on the skirt of the woods, some 43 miles due east of Bednūr. He took it without striking a blow and found a lakh of pagodas

Haidar's advance
on the place.

joined his standard, whether from ignorance or from conviction that they were helping the person who was entitled to the Bednūr throne.

128. Wilks, l. c., who specially notes this part of the undertaking on the part evidently of the Pretender. At the end of the interview with Haidar, "the plan was," Wilks says, "quickly arranged of an expedition to reinstate him in his supposed rights, and to remunerate the services to be thus rendered by Hyder and the Poligar" (*Ibid*).

129. *Ibid*.

130. Robson, o. c., 29.

here,¹⁸¹ of which a fourth part he distributed among his troops to stimulate them to further endeavour. Rejecting an offer from Virammāji proposing to purchase his retreat for four lakhs of pagodas, he pushed on to Kumsi, 30 miles to the north-west. Here he got into contact with one Lingappa of Mūdabidare.¹⁸² He had evidently served successive kings of Bednūr and risen to be prime-minister to the late Rāja. But owing to differences of opinion between him and Virammāji, possibly over the fate of the adopted boy Channabasappa, he had been dethroned from office and imprisoned at Kumsi by Virammāji. He had lately escaped from his confinement¹⁸³ and was ready to intrigue against Virammāji and thus teach her a lesson. He volunteered to guide Haidar through a secret path by which Bednūr might be approached without encountering any opposition. At Ayanūr,¹⁸⁴ a petty place occupied by a hundred men, he first encountered opposition. The garrison here, fearless of consequences, fired at the troops. They were promptly surrounded and taken, their ears and noses being cut off, and in this state they were dismissed to spread terror before them. Proceeding still further, twenty-five miles in the north-western direction, he reached Anantapur (Ānandapur).¹⁸⁵ Here Virammāji sent a message offering twelve lakhs of pagodas. As Haidar approached the first

181. The Pagoda of Bednūr was equal to Rs. 4.

182. "Lingana" of Wilks (o. c., l. 505). He is probably identical with Śivalingappa, mentioned in the *Keśadi-Nripa-Vijayam* (XII. 217, v. 4) among the names of principal State officers of Bednūr (*mukhyaroḥ*) at the time of the accession of Virammāji and Sōmasēkhara in 1757. In another place in the same text (*Ibid.*, XI. 216, f. n. 1), he is referred to among the officers of the previous rulers, Basappa Nāyaka II (1739-1754) and Channabasappa Nāyaka (1754-1757), as *Angaḍi Śivalingappa*. Angaḍi and Mūdabidare being both situated in South Kanara district, the reference to Lingappa as having hailed from either of these places may be taken as tolerably accurate. He seems to have fallen from power subsequent to 1757.

183. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 27-28.

184. This must be identified with the "Eitoor" of Wilks (*l. c.*).

185. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 27.

barrier of the works of Bednūr, she raised her offer to eighteen lakhs. But, induced by the old, wily minister, he rejected these repeated offers without a moment's hesitation. The unexpected celerity with which Haidar had advanced, threw Virammāji into confusion.¹³⁶ Terrified at the prospect of an immediate attack, she negotiated once again for peace, offering this time to meet the expenses of Haidar's campaign, and promising the payment of an annual tribute of a lakh of pagodas and an appreciable share of the peculiar products of her country—arecanut, cardamoms, black pepper, *Kakul* (a kind of wood), Sandal wood and the like.¹³⁷ Haidar proved adamant and was determined on the final conquest of the country. He sent word demanding the Rāṇi's immediate surrender, guaranteeing honourable treatment to her as a pensioner in the fort at Seringapatam. Virammāji proudly rejected the proposal and preferred to defend her capital city with the aid of Abdul Hakīm Khān of Savaṇūr, a place about 150 miles off to the north-east. Abdul Hakīm agreed to her request and immediately despatched 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot to her aid; while he himself, with a large force and artillery, advanced and encamped on the river Bala. The troops sent in aid entered, meanwhile, the fort of Bednūr, from the hills and forests surrounding it. When intelligence of what Virammāji had done and was determined to carry through reached Haidar, his rage knew no bounds. He became, it is said, violently incensed, and moving forward, encamped within one stage of Bednūr. Then, sending for his officers, he despatched them to take the forts and towns near Bednūr,¹³

136. Thus far Wilks (*Ibid*). Wilks makes no mention of the help asked of and rendered by Abdul Hakīm of Savaṇūr nor of the difficulties encountered by Haidar.

137. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 133; also *Nagarada-Kaifiyat* (c. 1800), PP. 538-539—A Mackenzie Ms., Vol. No. 43, in the *Mad. Or. Lib.*

138. Kirmāṇi is here rather tantalizingly vague. The reference should be to the smaller forts and towns adjoining the capital. The reference may be to other troops operating elsewhere; according to Wilks—thos

while he himself with a body of his infantry and cavalry, commanded by his bravest officers, marched forward towards the fort of Bednūr with a view to invest it.¹³⁹

Arrived at the city's first barrier, Haidar ordered a noisy but feigned attack on the posts in his front; while he placed himself at the head of a column formed of his most select troops, and following the path pointed by the ex-minister, his guide, entered the city before an alarm was given of his approach¹⁴⁰. Haidar knew no rest, it

The progress of the
siege and conquest.

which were moving in parallel columns, as narrated in the text above, in taking Bednūr. Both these points are referred to by Kirmāṇi, who, indeed, furnishes us with a graphic account of how the fort and the citadel were taken. He definitely states that when her *vakil*s returned with Haidar's call for surrender, she, "free from restraint, proudly rejected the terms" of his proposal, and, "right or wrong, foolishly prepared to defend herself"; and "with this intent, she intrigued with Abdul Hakeem Khan of Shanoor (Savanūr), sending a large sum of money to him, and entreating his assistance" (Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 133-134). Wilks' account is so far misleading as to make one believe that with the advent of Haidar, Virammāji ran for her life to Baḷḷārāyan-durga with orders to her men to set fire to the capital on the approach of Haidar; and that on the entry of Haidar into the city, her servants set fire to it in a different place (Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 505-506). This is not only unjust to her memory but is historically inaccurate. Kirmāṇi's account is borne out by other contemporary authorities and may be accepted as both true and in keeping with the actual character and spirit of Virammāji. She left the city only when it became impossible for her to defend it any longer. See the text above. Also, Robson, whose account, though brief, seems accurate. He says that the city of Bednūr, being well fortified, surrounded by rocks and vast precipices, covered with impenetrable woods, held out only for one month "notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Queen and her brother, who had but little favour to expect from the resentment of the young Prince, as well as the faithless disposition of the conqueror, Hyder." Robson, *o. c.*, 29-30. But Robson does not appear to be quite accurate when he suggests that the people "affected at the sight of their lawful King, surrendered the place", unless we take it as meaning that they did so when they found that defence was no longer possible. This may be so, as he says that before surrendering the place, "they permitted the Queen with her brother, to retire to a place of safety, most agreeable to themselves." *Ibid.*, 30.

139. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 133-134.

140. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 506. Wilks states that immediately after this approach, the Rāṇi's "servants set fire to the palace in different places in conformity to their instructions." This is evidently a mistake, since his version wholly omits to make any mention of Virammāji's gallant defence of her city and citadel.

would seem, until he had completed the task he had set before himself. He employed himself and his troops day and night in the investment of the city. By raising batteries and taking up ground by degrees for the attack, he so strengthened the field of action on the garrison, that it became, to use the language of an annalist of the period, small as the eye of a needle. The garrison, thus tired out, quitting all the places they had fortified outside, retired into the fort, and manned the walls. Vīrammāji herself set the example by the manly courage and steadiness she displayed in defending her Capital, and her troops emulating her, remained steadfast at their posts and defended themselves in a brave manner. Despite Haidar's best efforts against them, and despite the fact that their ranks got thinned daily from the cannon and musket balls turned against them, and the miseries and calamities of the hour, both Vīrammāji and her faithful garrison continued to fight. Many of them were killed, it is true, but not subdued. Abdul Hakīm's troops—mostly Afghans—behaved splendidly, aiding in the defence of the fort and attacking the batteries of the besiegers repeatedly. The siege was so strict and close that the men determined to defend to the last. Haidar, seeing that the siege, "defended by a woman", had been protracted beyond his calculation¹⁴¹, and that the monsoon would soon be on him and his army, ordered the assault to be given. Free permission being granted that they might retain their plunder, all articles of gold and silver they might take, the cavalry dismounted to a man, and with the infantry, stepped out at the charging pace, marched up the breach, firing volleys, and mounting the walls and the bastions, made the air resound with the shouts of "Take and kill." Every opponent became the butt of the ball and bayonet, and the food of the

141. Kīrmāji says "one year", evidently a mistake for one month (o.c., 186); see also Robson, o.c., 29, who says the place held out only one month.

blood-red sword. When the manlike Rāpi saw her position grow worse, she first set her Palace on fire, her ornamented sleeping apartments coming first. These apartments had been built by her husband Sōmasēkhara II, a prince as powerful as enlightened, with Chinese bricks and tiles, washed and set in gold, the interstices being gold, while the doors and walls were ornamented with jewels. She next burned most of her boxes of jewellery, or beat them to pieces in an iron mortar; and then accompanied by only two or three attendants, she escaped on foot by the way of a water drain, with her life only, to Kūlidrug (Kavale-durga), about 15 miles off from Bednūr, a very strong place, surrounded by a thick forest. This place she strengthened at once and awaited there events, leaving the whole country, treasures and valuables of her husband and forefathers to the iron grasp of the invader¹⁴². It is said that Nimbaiya, her

142. Kīrmāpi, *o.c.*, 137. Kūlidurg, which is located by him 15 miles of Bednūr, has to be identified with Kavale-durga, west of Tīrtahallī, the stronghold of Bednūr chiefs, about 3058 ft. above the sea-level (*Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1303). It is actually about 30 miles south-west of Bednūr. According to other authorities (and among these is Wilks), Virammāji is said to have fled to Bajjālarāyan-durga, about 70 miles to the S.E. of Bednūr. This is a fine spreading hill in the Western Ghāt range, crowned with extensive fortifications going back to Hoysala times. The citadel is a small square fort on the highest point, overlooking the South Kanara district. The pass to Kanara, north of the *durg*, is tremendously steep, though in regular use in former days. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1133-39. Robson, however, says that Queen Virammāji chose "the fort of Derryabathar Gurr" for her asylum, "about twelve coss distant from the capital". This would make it about 36 miles from Bednūr. According to Robson, this was "exceeding strong, built on an inaccessible large rock, on one side surrounded by the sea, and the other by a deep river." This place might be identified with the "Darria Bahadur Gurr" of Wilks' Map, a little to the west of Brahmēśvar, which again is a little to the S. W. of Bārūr. It is identical with the "Daryā Bahadūrgarh Island" of the Survey of India Map, where it is shown a little to the south of St. Mary Isles. It is actually a little to the west of Udipi and on the sea. (A road from Nagar—ancient Bednūr—goes to it through Hosangaḍi, Basrūr, Coondapur, Hangarkatta, and Malpe, while another goes to it from Shimoga, Tīrtahallī, Āgumbi, and Malpe.) Whether Robson is right or not in his statement, it is difficult to say. It is possible, however, that the Rāpi first went to Kavale-durga and

secret lover, and her adopted son, the nominal Rāja, Sōmaśekhara Nāyaka III, were also part of her entourage¹⁴³. Immediately Haidar heard of the Rāṇi's flight, he placed a garrison in the fort of Bednūr, and followed her steps and invested the mountain fortress, and closely besieged it. After a time, and not without offering considerable resistance, the garrison surrendered, and the Rāṇi was taken prisoner¹⁴⁴. Accounts differ as to what place she was despatched as prisoner. One version says, she was sent in a palankeen to Seringapatam by way of Sīra, but from other versions we can safely infer that she was sent first to Bednūr, there to await Haidar's final decision¹⁴⁵. Haidar pushed on, and entering Bednūr at the head of Channabasappa Nāyaka, the Pretender, proclaimed him king, sent for the Rāṇi and her retinue, on the authority of a safe conduct (*cowle*) issued by Channabasappa, and pretended to be very considerate to them¹⁴⁶. He received the Rāṇi, indeed, in the most gracious manner and even tried to reconcile her with her son, the Pretender¹⁴⁷.

from there passed on to Daryā Bahādūrgarh, and from thence to Ballā-larāyan-durga. It would be otherwise difficult to reconcile the various contemporary statements found in the different sources. Evidently she changed places, having heard of Haidar's movements in pursuit of her and her party.

143. This seems correct, according to other versions.

144. Kirmāṇi says she was, after being taken, "brought to the presence" of Haidar, who sent her a prisoner to Seringapatam. But this is not confirmed by either contemporary accounts or otherwise. The fact that they were first sent to Bednūr and then transferred to Maddagiri seems correct, because it was from there they were ultimately released by the Mahrattas, when, in their next retaliatory war, they took that place. Virammāji died on the way to Poona, while Sōmaśekhara ended his days there unmarried (see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1238-1239). This point is further referred to below.

145. See Robson, *o.c.*, 30-31; De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 83, whose narrative presumes that Rāṇi Virammāji was at Bednūr until the insurrection against Haidar came about. This, however, is not confirmed by other authorities.

146. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 86. De La Tour writes that "Ayder used his victory (over the Rāṇi) with the greatest moderation". De La Tour says that Haidar caused "the new king to be crowned." (*Ibid.*, 87).

147. *Ibid.*

And if one version is to be believed, the Pretender was even induced to grant her a considerable pension and she was allowed all the freedom she required in regard to her private life¹⁴⁸. Whether all this actually occurred or not, there are grounds for believing that she had no reason to doubt that she would be treated otherwise than as became one of her dignity. But Haidar was too cunning a man to tolerate her existence any longer in her kingdom¹⁴⁹. Nor would he think of allowing the Pretender to reap the benefit of the Treaty he had entered into with him. As we shall see, he contrived soon to remove both of them from the place where their presence would mean no mean inconvenience to them. Thus fell Bednūr, after a protracted siege of one month, on January 19, 1763 (*Chitrabhānu*, *Māgha śu.* 5)¹⁵⁰.

148. *Ibid.* De La Tour says that she was allowed "to live with her husband". By this, he of course means Nimbaiya.

149. See below.

150. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 27-28. The date for the fall of Bednūr given in this work, as mentioned above, tallies with the date given in the *Ke. N. V.*, ch. XII. P. 223. Peixoto dates the event January 10, 1763 (*Memoirs*, 42). Wilks places it about the beginning of March 1763 (o. c., I. 506). The authority of the local sources is to be preferred here. See also and compare, on the entire topic, the *Nagarada-Kaifiyat* (pp. 538-541) with other authorities mentioned in f. n. 22 *supra*. Among these, De La Tour's account (o. c., I. 82-90) is interesting as giving one portion of the story in a vivid manner. According to him, the claims of the legitimate Prince of Bednūr and the refusal of his Queen-mother to appear before Haidar and explain matters as suzerain in his capacity as Nawāb of Sira, led to his (Haidar's) invasion of the State. Bednūr easily fell before Haidar's arms; the Queen was captured and conducted to his presence; the legitimate Prince, her son, was restored to the sovereignty of the State; and the Queen and the Prince eventually united in a projected attack on Haidar's life in the Bednūr Palace, which being discovered, the Queen and her accomplices were put to death, and the Prince sent a prisoner to Maddagiri, and his kingdom confiscated. Robson's account (o. c., 28-32) agrees in the main with the *Haid. Nām.*, but differs from the latter in regard to the manner in which Haidar put an end to kingly rule in Bednūr. Thus, according to him, Haidar ordered the pageant king Channabasappa Nāyaka (spelt as "Chinavas Appiah") into confinement immediately he found out that the latter contemptuously dismissed his (Haidar's) servants whom he had ordered to fetch a favourite woman possessed of by the king. The pageant king was a few days later sent with the old Queen of Bednūr and her

And thus ended also the political rivalry that had lasted between Mysore and the Bednūr Chiefs for nearly a century and a half (1630-1763), a rivalry which had had its origins during the last days of Vijayanagar and had persisted through the ages with alternate relations of war and peace.

The destruction of Bednūr which followed the fall of its citadel can, perhaps, be only equalled by the fate that befell mighty Rome at the hands of the incendiary Nero¹⁵¹, and its pillage to the pillage that the Eternal City experienced at the hands of the Vandal Genserik¹⁵². Bednūr, the richest commercial city of the East¹⁵³, the pride of Śivappa Nāyaka, who enlarged it and made it

The destruction of the city.

brother under a strong guard to Maddagiri, and Haidar assumed the government of Bednūr. Robson's version hardly finds any corroboration in the local tract entitled *Nagarada-Kaifiyat*, which merely mentions the confinement of the Queen and the pageant king in Maddagiri and the subsequent settlement of Bednūr by Haidar. Robson seems evidently to be narrating here from hearsay, especially as he wrote about twenty-three years after the event. Stewart's account (o.c., 16) is very brief and secondhand, and sets down the event to 1762. Kirmāpi too antedates the event, referring it to 1759 (A. H. 1173), but his account (o.c., 125-139) agrees in the main with, and supplements to some extent, that of the *Haid. Nām*. There is, however, a good deal of detail in his writing. In a long and vivid but somewhat partisan narrative (o.c., 125-129), he tries to justify Haidar's conquest of Bednūr on the ground of the Rāpi's dissoluteness, her withholding of tribute to the government of Sira, etc. Again, in certain places, he writes from hearsay; for instance, in regard to the capture of the Rāpi by Haidar and her despatch to Seringapatam (o.c., 138). Wilks' account of the conquest (I. 502-512), though secondhand, is in general agreement with the account given in the *Haid. Nām*.

151. Nero, Roman Emperor from 54 to 68 A. D. His vice knew no restraint; it hurried him into a course of profligacy and crime; he put to death his mother and wife and in 64 A. D., many Christians suffered death at his hands, with every refinement of torture, on a trumped-up charge of having caused the great burning of Rome, suspicion of which rested on himself. Gibbon's description of the first persecution of Christians in Rome is classical.
152. Genserik, king of the Vandals, and the founder of the Vandal kingdom in Spain; became king in 429 A.D.; took Carthage; and sacked Rome in 455 A. D. He died in 477 A.D., master of the seas, despite the strenuous efforts of the Roman Emperors to crush his power.
153. Wilks, o. c., I. 507.

the home of merchants and artisans drawn from all parts of the country¹⁵⁴; the beloved city of Sōmasēkhara II, who beautified it beyond words; and the spot most admired for a century and more by celebra'd travellers from the West¹⁵⁵; the one place in this whole sub-continent which for a century had not experienced the ravages of war, became the object of plunder¹⁵⁶. The terror-stricken inhabitants, secure in the safety inspired by its large standing army¹⁵⁷, accustomed to the conditions of everlasting peace and unaware for ages of the evils that accompany a devastating war, fled *en-masse* to the woods encircling the city, with no thought of the morrow. A city, eight miles in circumference, filled with fine, tall buildings, opulent traders and merchants and jewellers, picturesque gardens, a busy and industrious population, and numerous Hindu temples and Christian churches¹⁵⁸, suffered as much from the effects of fire as from the ravages of the pillage that followed at the hands of a soldiery that had reckoned on plunder as its peculiar privilege. Men of the cavalry vied with those of the infantry in looting the great city. They took, an annalist says¹⁵⁹, "what they could take, of heaps of gold and silver, valuable stuffs, jewels, pearls, arms of all kinds, and a great number of beautiful women, the

154. *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1234.

155. Father Leonardo Pæs visited it during the reign of Śivappa Nāyaka I (1645-1660). Father Vincent, a barefoot Carmelite friar, mentions in his travels the wealthy Mussalman merchant Shah Bandari Isak, who was a favourite of Śivappa Nāyaka, and traded on the Western Coast and at Bednūr (*Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1234-35). Jacobus Cauter Vissacher seems to have visited it in the reign of Sōmasēkhara II (1714-1739) and has left a description of its prosperous condition.

156. Bednūr had been taken only once by Bijāpur and that in the time of Bhadrappa Nāyaka (1661-1663). Śivāji's invasion in 1664 did not touch Bednūr.

157. Leonardo Pæs says that the standing army was from about 40,000 to 50,000 strong.

158. According to father Leonardo Pæs, Śivappa Nāyaka had among his subjects 30,000 Christians, originally natives of Goa and Salsette (*Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1234).

159. Kīrmāṇi, o. c., 139,

value of which was sufficient to place them above all worldly wants". More humane than Genseric, though not less intent on making the most of the situation for himself, Haidar did not allow the plunder to continue for an indefinite period¹⁶⁰. Nor did he permit or order, like Genseric, the transport of what remained of public or private wealth to own city¹⁶¹. The wealth of the Capital was allowed to remain in it; not, however, for its own sake nor for the use of its owners, but for the use and benefit of its crafty conqueror, who had determined on becoming the possessor of everything of any value or importance in it. Haidar not only first turned his attention to extinguish the flames of the Palace, but also personally assisted in its extinguishment. But the order for the cessation of plunder by the troops was coupled with a direction that enabled him to become the exclusive possessor of all the available booty. His arrangements for this purpose were so skilfully designed that in a few hours his official seals were placed on the doors of every public and private dwelling above the condition of a hovel, and guards were stationed to enforce respect to the only plunder that was to be deemed legitimate. The booty he thus secured, including property of every description, money and jewels of all kinds, is variously estimated, but it might, without risk or exaggeration, be valued at twelve millions sterling¹⁶². To Haidar, in view of the

160-161. According to Gibbon, Genseric's pillage of Rome lasted fourteen days and nights (455 A.D., June 15-29). All that remained of private or public wealth in it was diligently transported by Genseric to his vessels for being carried to his own country. It was, Gibbon adds, difficult either to escape or to satisfy the avarice of a conqueror who possessed leisure to collect, and ships to transport, the wealth of the capital.

162. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 508. According to De La Tour, when Haidar "took possession of the place, he found an immense treasure in gold, coined and in ingots, in trinkets and precious stones, that was indeed stupendous, if credit may be given to the accounts of the French, who accompanied him in that expedition. They say that the Prince caused

aims and objectives he had by then conceived, it came in as a God-send. Though, throughout his life, he habitually spoke of the wealth he thus came by "as the foundation of all his subsequent greatness¹⁶³, it descended as a curse on him and his son. The cries of a peaceful populace that had lost its all—its near and dear ones, its cherished valuables, its residential houses and what nothing can replace, its honour itself in some cases—could not go unanswered. Their cries were not loud but deep. Haidar vanquished the Rāṇi but he was vanquished by the imprecations of the Rāṇi's subjects. He neither could make the city he destroyed the capital of a new kingdom he wanted to found nor even live in it for any length of time. Its destruction opened the way to greater inroads against himself, which proved the destruction of his son and the ultimate extinction of his power. Never was heard, so readily and so quickly, such a terrible curse! the curse of a Queen and the curse of a fleeing population, a curse that has passed into a saying:

Bednūr is burnt ;
 Bednūr's Queen has fled ;
 Bednūr's glory is dead ;
 Bednūr shall be no Bednūr again¹⁶⁴.

The old Imperial City closed in sleep before the very eyes of the Rāṇi who had known it in its

pearls and precious stones to be measured in their sight with a corn measure ; and that, having made two heaps of gold ingots and trinkets, they surpassed the height of a man on horse back". On this happy occasion, Haidar gratified all his troops with half a year's pay, not excepting those that were in garrison in different parts of Mysore (De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 90-91).

163. *Ibid.*

164. The Kannaḍa original is as follows :—

Bidanūru suṭṭu maṇṇāyitu,
Bidanūru Rāṇi hōḍaḷu,
Bidanūru hesaru hōyitu,
Bidanūru innu Bidanūru alla.

palmy days: Well might she have said to her oppressor :

And sleep shall obey me,
And visit thee never,
And the Curse shall be on thee
For ever and ever.

With the flight of the Rāṇi, her fate and the fate of her country were sealed. All accounts agree she ran for her life after she set fire in anguish to the city of her forefathers, but she was followed to her hiding and, being taken, was sent, as we have seen, to Bednūr and there the pretence of a reconciliation between her and her son was sought to be made and she was even promised the consideration due to her rank and dignity¹⁶⁵. Too late, she discovered the mistake she had committed in surrendering alive and bewailed the imprudence of her own conduct in doing so. She was rudely stripped of her jewels; and the unfortunate Queen, the only surviving member of the great house of Ikkēri, was compelled, as a captive, to follow the servants of haughty Haidar, who immediately despatched her to the prison house on the mighty Maddagiri (now Madhugiri) hill. Here she stayed until she was released by the Mahrattas and accompanied them to Poona, but died before she could reach that place¹⁶⁶. Thus disappears from history this heroic woman. Her adopted son Sōmasēkhara followed her and reaching Poona, died there eventually unmarried¹⁶⁷.

165. Kirmāṇi writes that she was sent by way of Sira to Seringapatam. He probably means that she was eventually to be lodged in honourable confinement at Seringapatam. Probably that was Haidar's intention. But he appears to have first sent her to Maddagiri and before he could transfer her to Seringapatam, the Mahratta invasion of Mād̥hava Rao followed in 1767 and she was liberated by them, only to die on her way to Poona with them.

166. *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1238.

167. *Ibid.*,

There is a story told of Rāṇi Virammāji, which, before we close her chapter, deserves to be referred to here, not so much to add anything to it but if possible to redeem to some extent her character which has been needlessly soiled by earlier writers. We have referred above to the attempt made by the annalist Kīrmāṇi to describe the Rāṇi as "a low minded fearless woman wearing the dress of a man," exercising unlimited authority over her country;¹⁶⁸ as "dissolute";¹⁶⁹ and as "bad".¹⁷⁰ All this because she was "ambitious of being independent" and refused to yield to the claim of Haidar that he had refused to recognise her so-called subjection to the government of Sīra,¹⁷¹ to which he had himself succeeded lately. On these alleged grounds, not only the war against her was begun but also it was suggested that Bednūr was a country that Haidar had a right to take from her, and not only her country but also her life.¹⁷² While it is difficult to uphold every act of Rāṇi Virammāji, especially her *liaison* with Nimbaiya, there is hardly any evidence whatever to picture her as either having lacked patriotism or to have even attempted to sacrifice her country for vice or even mere pleasure. It is doubtful if she was the "geliebte" of Nimbaiya, though her intimacy with him was lawless in the sense that it was one outside the pale of Hindu marital law. As the classical saying goes,¹⁷³ virtue rejoices in temptation, and to such temptation, Virammāji had evidently fallen a victim. Channabasava, who had been adopted by her husband, and who was but seventeen years of age at her husband's death, became jealous of his adopted mother, in whose hands, as guardian, all power was naturally concentrated. Virammāji thus became exposed to every calumny which the malice of her enemies could suggest. Under such

168. Kīrmāṇi, o. c., 128.

169-171. *Ibid*; De La Tour, o. c., I. 82.

172. *Ibid*, 129. 173. The Latin text is : *Gaudet tentamine virtus*.

painful circumstances, the royal youth—who had come to engage to some extent the affections of the court, if not the army and people as well—was not always able to compose his behaviour or suppress his discontent. We may assume, in this position of affairs, that he was encompassed by a train of indiscreet, if not perfidious followers, who assiduously studied to inflame, and who were perhaps instructed to betray in the supposed interests of Vīrammāji, or with a view to earn her goodwill and to serve their own sordid interests, the unguarded warmth of his resentment. Vīrammāji, enraged at this conduct of the youth, is represented to have laid aside the tenderness of a mother—even an adopted mother—without assuming the humanity of a human being, and to have made up her mind to put him out of the way through the gentle operation of a massage given to him by a professional *masseur* (*jetṭi*). The story of the end of this unfortunate youth, the nature and evidence of the guilt of Vīrammāji personally in this affair, the manner in which his death was encompassed, the true circumstances of his death, are all buried in a mysterious obscurity. Except tradition, there is nothing to guide us.¹⁷⁴ And this tradition has come down to us through not very disinterested Muslim sources. We have seen above what Kīrmāṇi has recorded and what language he has used in speaking of her; but even he cannot but pay, all unconsciously, the meed of praise that is due to her for the undaunted fight she put up in defence of her country, how she inspired her troops who were throughout “faithful” to her, “remained steadfast at their posts, and defended themselves bravely,” how she secured the aid of a Muslim ruler against a Muslim leader of a large army, and how she “herself behaved with as much steadiness and courage as a man.”¹⁷⁵

174. See Appendix V.

175. Kīrmāṇi, *o. c.*, 135-136.

"Nay," he adds,¹⁷⁶ "even although the Nawaub's (Haidar's) brave soldiers daily killed troops of them with their cannon and musket balls, and the sword, and burned numbers of them with the fire of hopelessness and despair, still, notwithstanding all this calamity and misery, the garrison continued to fight; they were killed, but not subdued." A woman who could inspire such bravery, faithfulness, and zeal in her behalf and in behalf of her country, should have possessed certain traits which, even if she exhibited certain human weaknesses, should have redeemed her character to a large extent. Wilks, whose whole account is tinged with a feeling akin to disgust for her, has not a word to say, as we have remarked above, to the courageous defence she set up. His account, again, is patently based on Muslim sources of a tainted kind. One such source, which he specifically mentions, makes her behave in a manner which is, to say the least of it, wholly incredible, especially when we remember she was a devout Hindu and a brave woman. Even Kīrmāni, who is so critical of her conduct and character, does not represent her in this evil, unbelievable and unfavourable light. That is enough to show how much Wilks should have been prejudiced against Vīrammāji. His informant, Badr-u-zamān Khān,¹⁷⁷ who later became Subādār of Bednūr, seems to have had a warped mind. He is stated to have told Wilks that Vīrammāji "capitulated on the condition of being reinstated in her sovereignty on her conversion to Islam; that she accordingly went through the form of renouncing her caste by eating beef, and after this wanton degradation was sent to Mudgherry."¹⁷⁸

176. *Ibid.*

177. General of the Regular Infantry forces in Mysore and brother-in-law of Ali-zamān Khān. He became Subādār of Bednūr later. See Kīrmāni, *Tipu Sultan*, 49.

178. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 509, f. n. This recording of Badr-u-zamān's statement may be reckoned as a blemish in the otherwise great work of Wilks. It is as bad a blemish in it as that of setting out the offensive details about the vices of Theodorus by Gibbon in his famous *History*. If

Wilks seems to have felt some doubt about the memory of his informant and so by way of qualification offers a remark that should be quoted here. "I have no doubt," he says,¹⁷⁹ "of the main facts of the case, but I conclude that my respectable informant must have forgotten some of its circumstances. Hyder seldom adhered to the spirit of an inconvenient engagement: but he professed never to deviate from its letter, and the oracle of Delphos was not more skilful in framing an equivocal sentence. But a conversion to Islam certainly was never blended with his political views, and must have been the spontaneous offer of a woman to whom disgrace was familiar: the expectation may have been inferred, but it is probable that Hyder never made a promise on such a condition." Wilks thus suggests that Haidar should be acquitted of having made the Rānī's conversion to Islām the condition precedent to her reinstatement on the throne of her ancestor: he is definitely of the opinion that she herself offered to embrace Islām if Haidar would only agree to reinstate her. There is not, so far as can be made out, any the slightest evidence as to the truth of any of these suggestions. Neither contemporary writers nor writers who came a little later record either the proposal of reinstatement

even well authenticated, which it was not, Wilks need not have soiled his pages with such a *chraïque scandaleuse*. We are not sure, as shown above, they were not the impure inventions of a malignant calumniator. It was an occasion for a wise scepticism to register grave doubts as to the infamous stories of the eastern counterpart of the western Procopius. (If Procopius was the secretary of Belisarius, the Roman General, Badr-u-zamān was something more than a secretary to Haidar.) Wilks, as a thoughtful historian, should have pointed to the moral improbability of the account given to him. On the other hand, it is surprising, he should express his belief in it. "I have no doubt," he says, "of the main facts of the case," though he concludes that "his respectable informant must have forgotten some of the circumstances". But in mentioning these so-called "circumstances", he forgets to note that the stories chronicled by him are based on the unsupported testimony of a single person. (As to Gibbon, see J. C. Morison, in *Gibbon in E. M. L. Series*, pp. 159-161).

179. *Ibid.*

on conversion or the conversion itself of the Rāṇi to Islām, either voluntarily or on the promise of restoration.¹⁸⁰ No tradition has survived as to this alleged conversion. Nor does the story seem even probable. Vīrammāji fought hard to retain her country; she set fire to it when she was about to lose it; and she had finally fled. As the sequel showed, she was in touch evidently with the Mahrattas, who were bound to take action against the spoliation of her territory. In these circumstances, Vīrammāji would not have risked all chances of restoration by independent means by surrendering her name and reputation by offering to change her faith. The fact that she was found a Hindu still in her confinement at Maddagiri when the Mahrattas liberated her and took her with them to Poona, would seem to indicate that Badr-u-zamān's story was no more than an invention of his own palmed off by him on Wilks, who, despite his authority, refused to believe in it as narrated to him, but improved on it by accepting the Rāṇi's conversion as a fact, and putting the blame for it on her on the ground that she was "a woman to whom disgrace was familiar." That is a species of argument that is always too dangerous to adopt, more especially so where we have to judge of the possibilities of a case in which the chief person concerned is a high spirited woman like Vīrammāji, who braved to fight Haidar in person and risked her all in her fight against him. Verily, it was Juvenal who wrote: "no one rejoices more in revenge than woman."¹⁸¹ One would have thought Vīrammāji would have been credited, after

180. Kīrmāṇi is silent on this point. Robson, who records the conversion of the Pāḷegār of Chikballāpur, is also silent on this point. De La Tour is also similarly silent on this episode. He indeed represents her as staying at Bednūr until after the insurrection against Haidar, who, at the end of it, is spoken of as putting her, "her husband", and all her accomplices to death. (o. c., I. 90). This, of course, is wrong, as we know she survived the insurrection.

181. *Sat.*, 13, 191.

all that had occurred to her, with the desire for revenge, that "feminine manhood" which takes hold of women when they feel helpless.

The parallel case of Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra and the East, naturally occurs to one's mind. Like her, Virammāji was left a widow to fight for her country and her throne. Like her, too, Virammāji fought valiantly to the last her would-be conqueror. Like her, also, Virammāji had to fly for her life, at the end of the struggle. Finally, like her, she was caught and brought back a captive to her conqueror. Here the parallel ends. The conduct of Haidar towards his captive was far different from that of Aurelian, the Roman Emperor, towards his. Aurelian, on her surrender, treated her with unexpected lenity. A woman of surpassing beauty and great courage, she withstood the wordy onslaught of Aurelian against her for a time, but her fortitude deserted her soon.¹⁸² Her courage deserted her in the hour of trial; she trembled at the angry clamours of the Roman soldiers, who called aloud for her immediate execution, forgot the generous despair of Cleopatra, which she had proposed as her model, and ignominiously purchased life by the sacrifice of her fame

182. Gibbon's unsurpassable description of the conversation between Queen Zenobia and Emperor Aurelian should be read in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, I. chap. xi, to appreciate this remark. He writes:—"But, as female fortitude is commonly artificial, so it is seldom steady or constant." Gibbon remarks that "some very unjust suspicions have been cast on Zenobia, as if she was accessory to her husband's death" (Chap. XI). The fact is that she was instrumental in putting to death Mæorius, the nephew of her husband Odenathus, who, out of revenge, had conspired against his uncle and had assassinated him in the midst of a great entertainment. Mæorius had scarcely time to assume the title of Augustus (after the murder) before he was sacrificed by Zenobia to the memory of her husband (*Ibid.*). Gibbon says that she had "3 sons." He gives in a foot-note their names and says that two of them were dead before the war and that on the last (Vaballathus), he adds, Aurelian bestowed a small province of Armenia, with the title of King. Several of his medals are still extant.

and her friends. It was to their counsels, which in the main had governed the weakness of her sex, that she imputed the guilt of her obstinate resistance; it was on their heads that she directed the vengeance of the cruel Aurelian. Among these were included the famous Longinus, the pure blooded Platonist, her steadfast adviser, who was beheaded as a traitor by order of the Emperor. Far different was Virammāji in this regard. When caught by Haidar's soldiers, she refused to yield, and despite the malicious stories told in later times, preferred the horrors of hill prison to a life of freedom at the cost of the freedom or the lives of her political adherents or advisers. And she lived to see them, in her interests, if not at her instance, to raise the standard of revolt against the aggressor and destroyer of her kingdom. As at Palmyra, so at Bednür, the second rebellion, as we shall see, involved the execution of old men, women, children and peasants. Haidar, like Aurelian, ordered, and even tried, the re-building of the great city he had conquered. But it is easier to destroy than to restore. The seat of commerce, of arts, and of Virammāji, sank before long, like Palmyra, into an obscure town, a deserted fortress, and at length into a miserable village. Haidar's treatment of Virammāji and her son was not only cruel and in breach of his spoken word but also far different from that of Aurelian towards Zenobia. Though the Roman Emperor took Zenobia captive to his Imperial capital and paraded her through its streets on the occasion of his celebrated triumph, confined by fetters of gold, a slave supporting the gold chain which encircled her neck, she almost fainting under the intolerable weight of jewels, Aurelian presented her with a domain at beautiful Tivoli, so justly celebrated by Horace, where she spent the rest of her days with her children by her side. Haidar left Queen Virammāji to rot in her mountain prison, to be rescued by the Mahrattas, only

to die on the way to their capital, while her adopted son was left to his fate at that place by his rescuers, until Death claimed him as his own.

Haidar did not treat any better Channabasava, the Pretender, who had to be disposed of before any arrangements could be made for the governance of the newly conquered area.¹⁸³ On his arrival at Kumsi, some thirty miles off to the north-east of Bednūr, Haidar, who had so far treated him as if he were the legitimate ruler and shown all marks of external respect, pretended to have discovered the fraud that had been perpetrated on him, if, indeed, we are to suppose that he had at any time believed the tale that had been so artfully detailed in his camp by the Chitaldrug pālegār. Once Vīrammāji had been secured, there was an end to all the respect shown to him, a respect which had raised a smile among the Mysore soldiers, who amused themselves by saluting him with the title of *Ghaibu Rāja*, or the *Rāja of the Resurrection*, a name which became the standing joke of the camp.¹⁸⁴ Haidar, indeed, made up his mind to get rid of him as soon as he could after the Rāṇi had capitulated and had been secured in prison at Bednūr. He soon found reasons why he should keep Bednūr to himself. Immediately he reached the Capital, garrisoning all the places he had taken on the way, he created an opportunity "which at once would accomplish all his ambitious views."¹⁸⁵ The Pretender, it seems, was possessed of a favourite woman, for whom he had great affection. Haidar, wanting some plausible pretence for a rupture, sent, it would seem, some of his servants for this woman, which, coming to the Pretender's ears,

183. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 509.

184. *Ibid.* Wilks who records the story does not conceal his own astonishment at the simplicity of the Pretender, who had thought he had deceived his would-be deliverer and deceiver!

185. Robson, *o.c.*, 30-31.

he ordered them to be dismissed in a very contemptuous manner. This being reported to Haidar, he, it seems, immediately ordered the King into confinement; and a few days after sent him with Queen Virammāji and her retinue, under a strong guard, to Maddagiri.¹⁸⁶ Whether this story, which is given by a European chronicler writing within twenty-three¹⁸⁷ years of the fall of Bednūr, is true or not, there is no gainsaying the fact that as in the case of the Rāṇi, so in that of the Pretender, Haidar soon made up his mind to consign him to perpetual confinement. He was sent to the prison to which the Rāṇi and her associates were despatched.

Virammāji and her rival being thus put out of the way, Haidar took to the more serious tasks before him. The occupation of the rest of the country was easy enough.

Haidar's idea of an
asylum for himself.

It was more a business of arrangement than of conquest. The two principal detachments soon possessed themselves of Basavarājdurg, a fortified island, Honāvar and Mangalore on the coast; and a third, which went in search of Virammāji, took hold of the country to the south and south-west.¹⁸⁸ There remained the disposal of the conquered territories. Haidar had, since his rapid rise in the service of Krishnarāja II, always felt that he should be prepared for any contingency that might end in his flight from Mysore. He knew the conditions in which he had risen to power; and he realized full well that circumstances might arise at any moment necessitating his quitting Mysore and seeking shelter elsewhere. Orme, the contemporary historian, writing of the events

186. Robson, who gives this story at length—*Ibid.*

187. *Ibid.* The *Haid. Nām.* would have us believe that both the Rāṇi and her own adopted son and the Pretender were all three sent to Maddagiri pending a decision of their respective claims to the throne of Bednūr. Haidar may have given this out as the ostensible cause of their despatch to a safe place, there to await his decision.

188. *Ibid.* As to Basavarājdurg, see below.

relating to 1760-1761, when the French were besieged in Pondicherry, and were seeking an alliance with Haidar for effective aid for raising the siege, makes mention of Haidar's desire to have such a safe place somewhere below the ghāts. "Not unmindful, however, of a

reverse in fortune," observes Orme, His aims on Thiaghur.

"Hyder Ally cast about to get some place of refuge immediately for his treasures, and contingently for his own person; and judiciously preferred Thiagur in the Karnātic, as well for the difficulty of access to it from Mysore, as the inexpugnable nature of its fortifications.¹⁸⁹ How he negotiated for the acquisition of this fortress through the Portuguese monk Noronha, the so-called Bishop of Halicarnassus, by offering him a large bribe, has been narrated above.¹⁹⁰ Through in this excession, Lally agreed to enter into a treaty with Haidar, under which Thiagur was to be garrisoned by Haidar and that place and Elavasinore nad their dependencies were "to remain the property of the Mysoreans in perpetuity as long as the flag of France existed in India." Haidar's army was to be paid one lakh a day from the day of its arrival at Thiagur and supplied with ammunition whilst serving with the French. Another stipulation was that immediately after clearing the Karnātic of the enemy (i.e., the English and his ally Nawāb Muhammad Alī), the French were "to assist him (Haidar) in conquering the southern countries of Madura and Tinivelly". The first division of Mysore troops, consisting of 1,000 horse and 2,000 sepoys, arrived at Thiagur on 4th June 1760 and were later joined by small parties of the French from Pondicherry. They then marched towards Pondicherry, reaching Ariyankuppam, three miles to the rear of the French camp. From here, the officers

189. See Orme, *Indostan*, II. 636-633.

190. See *Ante*, Ch XI. p. 230.

appointed by Haidar to settle the treaty and the plan of operations in conjunction with the French government were escorted by a French detachment, and the treaty was signed on the 27th June 1760 and the Mysore troops returned promising to go back "with their whole force and abundance of provisions".¹⁹¹ But the English, coming to know of the arrival of Mysore troops in July 1760, effected a diversion into the Mysore territories from Madura and Trichinopoly, with the result they were prevented from aiding the besieged French. The fall of Pondicherry on 15th January 1761 frustrated all hopes of Haidar deriving any benefit from the treaty he had concluded with Lally.¹⁹² Thus defeated in his objective of establishing an asylum for himself in the Karnātic, Haidar cast his longing eyes on Bednūr and now that he had taken it, determined on making it his own for the future.

From its situation, its historical associations, its fortifications, its proximity to the sea and its fame and reputation, Haidar seems to have concluded that Bednūr would prove a suitable capital for a territorial area which he might call his own, quite apart from the kingdom which belonged to the Sovereign of Mysore, and of which he was only *Sarvādhikāri*. Since the attempt that was made against him through the agency of Khandē Rao, only a couple of years before, he had been more than ever confirmed in the view he should have such a safe asylum, away from Seringapatam and independent of it. In all the arrangements he made, accordingly, at Bednūr, he had this main objective in view. He affected to treat Bednūr as a separate kingdom; Seringapatam and its dependencies, he, on all occasions, professed to consider as belonging to the

191. Orme, *o.c.*, II. 648.

192. *Ibid.*, 648-739.

Kartar (Sovereign), the Ruler of Mysore; Bednūr, he avowed to be his own¹⁹³. Not that he wanted to change his personal *status* at Seringapatam or lessen the strength of his position there. He began to feel that his position might be endangered at any time; nor was he wrong in the sense of danger to himself that he developed so soon after he came to occupy the supreme administrative position in the State, if we are to judge from what actually occurred later. That danger was inherent in the position of an ambitious, strong and grasping person as he was. He therefore resolved on making Bednūr the capital of a new territory to which he might retire, if necessary, and hold on to, if he could conveniently do so, even after he was worsted at Seringapatam. Bednūr was, in every way, suitable for such a purpose. What was more, it was far away from Mysore, which, with its historical associations, could, he seems to have felt, never become his own, whatever the power or authority he wielded in it for the time being. That was the main idea underlying the differentiation he made between the dominions of his *Kartar* (Sovereign) and his own. He evidently realized that what he administered as the agent was his Sovereign's and he could not lay claim to it, revolutionary though he might have been in ousting Nanjarāja from his hereditary *status* and assumed even arbitrary powers as *Sarvādhikāri*. What he conquered—though through the men and money of his Sovereign—he seems to have claimed as his own; at least to the extent that he can treat it as his own for the time being. Whatever ideas dominated his mind at the time we are writing of, there is no doubt that he desired to continue to be the *Servant* that he had so far been of his Sovereign. While he created an asylum for himself to retire to at any critical moment, he did not fall off from his sense of duty to

193, Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 510,

his King and Ruler, whatever the authority or power he had assumed for himself in the exercise of the functions of his office. If that was the attitude of his mind, Haidar could not be charged, as he has been, with the desire of "blending Seringapatam with all its remembrances, among the general mass of his minor possessions" because of the importance he came to attach to Bednūr after its conquest¹⁹⁴. That would have been a suicidal policy to adopt for him, for it would have meant the extinction of his power at the ancient capital, which had even a more eminent history to boast of than Bednūr, famous as this was. Nor is such a theory consistent with the view, put forward by Wilks himself, that Bednūr was no place of military strength as Seringapatam was, and Haidar "could never have intended to establish his capital, his family, and his treasures, at a place of no military strength"¹⁹⁵. But, as he did so, Wilks draws the opposite inference that "the determination, therefore (to transfer the capital to Bednūr), in itself, confirms a suspicion", in his view, "of his deficiency in an important branch of military judgment; a deficiency which is the more remarkable in a mind distinguished in other respects by a degree of sagacity and penetration which has seldom been exceeded"¹⁹⁶. There is hardly any reason to attribute such a deficiency to Haidar if we remembered the fact that Haidar did not mean to transfer the capital of his Sovereign's territories to Bednūr, but only made Bednūr stand by for himself, if occasion required it. It was for that reason that he made it the capital of his private or rather personal estate, as it were, carved out of the conquests he made to the north-west of Mysore. These conquests were in keeping with the

194. *Ibid.*

195. *Ibid.*, 510-511.

196. *Ibid.*, 511.

forward movement of Mysore since ancient days in that direction, indeed for over a century and a half; and suited his own ideas of expansion up to the sea as far as Goa, ideas which he had, as it were, inherited from his master and predecessor in office, Nanjarāja, and which conformed also to his desire for securing in advance a safe and secure place for insuring his own and his family's safety in case of an exigency. After the Khanḍē Rao incident, this view had been greatly impressed on his mind. Whatever the reasons that might be assigned for the steps taken by Haidar, Bednūr became for the time being an important centre of activities for Haidar. He made it the second capital, as it were, of the larger kingdom of Mysore, while insuring by its foundation his own personal safety in case any need should arise for it. He accordingly gave orders for the removal of his family, the erection of a splendid palace, which was never finished, the establishment of a mint, where, for the first time, he struck coins in his own name (*Haidari-varaha*; *Bahādūri-varaha*),¹⁹⁷ and the preparation of a dockyard and naval arsenal on the Western Coast for the construction of ships of war. For this purpose, he fortified the outlying ports of Honāvar, Basrūr, Bārakūr and Mangalore, where he began the building of "ships, palens, gallevats and other vessels"¹⁹⁸. The last of these he put under the direction of Lutf Ali Bēg, a brave and excellent officer of cavalry, for whom he had great regard¹⁹⁹.

197. This was only a continuation of the old mint of the Ikkēri Kings. Haidar issued from this mint the *Ikkēri Varaha*, till then in circulation under the name of *Bahādūri hun*, retaining the old obverse of Śiva and Pārvaṭī—dating from the days of Sadāśiva Rāya of Vijayanagar—but putting on the reverse his own Persian monogram or initial surrounded with a circle of dots (see below).

198. Moens, *Memo*, 151.

199. Wilks, in mentioning this appointment, is somewhat satirical in suggesting the obvious fact that Lutf Ali Bēg was "eminently

For the military administration of the new territory, Haidar appears to have appointed ^{His settlement of} a Faujdār, while for the civil, he ^{Bednūr.} nominated, it is said, an old and trusted official of his, ennobling him for the purpose.²⁰⁰ The subordinates of this official were all persons taken over from the servants who had worked under Rāṇi Vīrammāji's government. The name of the chief minister appointed by Haidar is variously given. While Wilks does not mention him by name, he says that Haidar "gave" Bednūr "a distinct minister"²⁰¹. There is, however, hardly any doubt that the office of Dewān was first entrusted to *Pradhān* Venkappaiya of Maddagiri,²⁰² who by talent and training was well

ignorant of everything connected with his new duties of naval engineer and lord high admiral" (o.c., I. 511). But Bāg's appointment resembled more that of a civil Lord of Admiralty than of a naval engineer and Lord High Admiral. He was the head of the board of officials who were appointed to administer naval affairs. It does not appear that he was appointed the Chief Commander of the fleet or navy that was yet to come into existence. He was evidently to act as the head of the department created by Haidar at about this time to administer naval affairs. As we have seen (*vide* Ch. XII), one of Haidar's objects was to build up a navy and with that end engaged an Englishman to take over charge of a fleet of ships which he purchased. The idea received a further impetus when Bednūr was taken and Portuguese workmen became available for working out his ideas in this direction.

200. Kirmāṇi, in his *Life of Tipu Sultan* (P. 49), mentions the existence of such a post. Badr-u-zamān held it, but there is no evidence who was first appointed to it when it was created. There can, however, be no doubt that such an office was actually created from the date of the occupation of Bednūr.

201. Wilks, o.c., I. 510.

202. *Haid. Nām.* ff. 28. Kirmāṇi, however, who wrote later than the author of the *Haid. Nām.*, says that Haidar "selected a man of the name of Oojni, a Kolur, an old servant of his, and an intelligent and able man, and having given him the title of Raja Rām, committed the charge of Nuggur (Bednūr) to him, giving him orders to repair the fort and its defences" (o.c., 189). "Oojni" here is to be identified with "Ujjanappa" of the *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 47), and the description that he was a "Kolur" would seem to show that he belonged to Kollūr, in the present South Kanara district and formerly belonging to Bednūr itself. (There is a temple here, amongst whose endowments is the Honnār hōbī, an isolated bit of country which

fitted for that post. He had already seen service under Rāṇi Virammāji and possessed a close knowledge of the country. Under him was placed one Ujjanappa, a native of Bednūr, in whom Haidar had great faith²⁰³. Ujjanappa, as we shall see later, succeeded Venkappaiya in the office of Dewān, but did not prove a happy choice, being oppressive and extortionate in his methods.

Haidar also carried out all that was needed for garrisoning the more important places taken, especially in the country to the west of Bednūr on the sea coast. The garrisoning of places, etc. Mirza Hussain Bēg, Haidar's brother-in-law, and Karīm Khān, Haidar's youngest son, proceeded with a detachment to reduce Basavarājadurg, a fortified hill in the sea, about ten miles to the west, from the sea coast. Here was secreted immense treasure belonging to the Rāṇi. Hussain Bēg took hold of a few boats from the fishermen and sailed with his followers towards the island hill and there intimating that Bednūr had fallen, asked the garrison to surrender. The garrison, having heard that the worst had happened, surrendered after a siege of three days. Immediately the troops marched out, Hussain Bēg occupied it, and took possession of the property of Sōmasēkhara II, which had been deposited here for safety. This treasure, we are told, consisted

belongs to-day to the South Kanara district. The Kollūr Ghāt is named after this place. (See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1315). Ujjanappa was, according to the *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.), of the shepherd community (*Kuruba*), and succeeded to the administration of Nagar (Bednūr) about January 1770 (*Virūḍhi, Mārgaśīra-Puṣya*), on the appointment of Pradhān Venkappaiya to quell the risings of Pāḷegūrs of Hassan, Mahārājana-durga and other places. Peixoto, writing of Bednūr affairs in 1770, mentions him as "Uginape", who held the post of "Commissary and Trustee of Nabob's treasury", and refers to his oppression, etc. (*Memoirs*, 145-146). It would thus seem to be clear that the "Oojni" of Kirmāṇi became the minister of Bednūr next in succession to Venkappaiya, about seven years after its conquest by Haidar. During 1763-1770, he seems to have held a minor position under Venkappaiya, see text above.

203. See f. n. above.

of two or three boxes of pearls and diamonds, two boxes of jewellery, two elephant housings, richly embroidered and curiously wrought in gold and silver, a jewelled chain for the foot of an elephant, two sets of gold and silver bells for the Royal elephants, and two gold embroidered saddles. After garrisoning the hill, Hussain Bēg returned to Bednūr with all this treasure and presented it to Haider, who greatly complimented him for the skilful manner in which he had accomplished his task.²⁰⁴

Having despatched Rāṇi Vīrammāji and the rest of them, Haider made a State entry into Bednūr. Having fixed the right and auspicious moment for it, he, with the greatest pomp and display of force, made his entry into the fort of Bednūr, "bestowing," as the annalist puts it in his vivid manner, "honour on the seat of government". And for fifteen days, we are told, Haider held here a banquet, "during which season of festivity he enjoyed the sound of music and the abundance of good things provided for the feast." He then gave, it is narrated, "to the poor, the religious, the musicians, and dancing women, presents of gold, and silver, ornaments, valuable cloths, and shawls. Also, to the brave chiefs of his army, and his soldiers who had distinguished themselves by their gallantry, and had perilled their lives in this conquest, besides what they obtained in the assault of the place, which, by Haider's orders, was what they could take,.....to these valiant men he now gave costly presents and honorary dresses, gold bracelets, pearl necklaces, jewelled gorgets, splendid swords, and lastly *jageers* or fiefs (for conditional service), according to their rank and respective capacities".²⁰⁵ He then assumed his arrangements for the future administration of the

204. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 143-144. Kirmāni, as usual, antedates this event by referring it to 1761, though it took place in 1763.

205. Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 138-139.

country and in keeping with the intentions of the superseded dynasty, bestowed on Bednūr the new name of *Haidar-Nagara* and returned to his tent.²⁰⁶

Bednūr fell, as we have seen, about the third week of January 1763, and Haidar's arrangements for its future administration took about six months. In June, the rains commenced with their accustomed violence, and Haidar, a stranger to the rigours of the local climate, fell a victim to its dread disease, Malaria. He was in bed continuously and was no longer able to transact public business as usual. Here was the opportunity for the servants of the old dynasty to win their freedom back. Haidar had committed one mistake in fixing up his administration of Bednūr. He had omitted to find a suitable place in it to Lingappa of Mūdābidare, the ex-Minister of Rāṇi Vīrammāji, who had made common cause with him in its conquest. Lingappa bore a grudge against the man who had so artfully used him for his own purposes but had ill-requited him for the favors he had shown. Taking advantage of the position, Lingappa and his men, who had until recently been at the head of the civil administration of the State, entered into an extensive conspiracy with Nimbaiya and Rāṇi Vīrammāji and her son for the assassination of Haidar and his minister Venkappaiya and the officials, who had by their

206. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 28; also Kirmāji, l.c. The story is recorded by Wilks that a few days after the capture of Bednūr, some person, speaking of its population, said to Haidar, that it had been intended by the former dynasty to augment the houses to ninety thousand, the distinctive number which constitutes a *nagar*. "We will not mar the project," said Haidar, "and it shall be named Hyder Nuggur" (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 510, f. n.). The fact seems to be that being in the direct course of trade by the Hosangaḍi Ghāt, Bednūr, since its creation in 1640 as the capital of the Ikkēri kings, rapidly increased in size and importance, until there was a prospect of the houses reaching the number of a lakh, which would, according to Hindu conceptions of town-planning, entitle it to be called a *nagara*. Having heard of this, Haidar seems to have agreed to its being re-named after himself as *Haidar-Nagara*. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1318.

very presence as the agents of Haidar, made themselves odious to them, and the recovery of the Capital city. If Lingappa was undoubtedly the leader of the movement, the mainspring of it was certainly Rāṇi Vīrammāji. It is natural that this should have been so, especially when we remember she was the prime sufferer by the invasion. There is evidence to believe that she strived every nerve to put an end to Haidar's occupation of her kingdom. Having failed on the battle-field, she tried to put him out by any means available to her. If one authority is to be believed, she made up her mind to make friends with her first adopted son.²⁰⁷ She "pretended", it is said, to be reconciled to him, and to acknowledge him as king "with no other intention than to wait for an opportunity of destroying" Haidar. With this hope, and completely to gratify her vengeance, she resolved on his death. To accomplish this end, she endeavoured to gain the confidence—so the story goes—of her (first adopted) son, "whose feeble and pusillanimous spirit", it is added, "she well knew". She reproached him, we are told, with a dissembled tenderness, that, to hasten the beginning of his reign, he had inconsiderately delivered up his kingdom to barbarians, the enemies of his religion, who would leave him only the empty name of king, after depriving him of the most valuable part of his dominions, and most probably would finish by entirely robbing him of the whole. At length, by force of insinuations, and under the appearance of a highly disinterested person, who had resigned a kingdom to him, she succeeded in her endeavours to make him regret the treaty with Haidar, and continuing to act on his fears of Haidar's future intentions, she acquired such an empire over his mind, that he was brought to consent to the assassination of Haidar, which he resolved on in the most determined

207. According to De La Tour (o.c., I. 97), on whose version the statement in the text above is based, he was still alive. See also. f. n. 150 above.

fashion. The plot was so artfully laid that it was, in its very nature, almost certain of success. During his stay at Bednūr, Haidar had resided in the old Palace of the kings and it was expected that he would stay there on his return to the place after taking over Mangalore. From the Palace, there was, it is said, a subterranean passage to a great temple outside, known to very few except Virammāji. Virammāji had resolved on undermining the Palace and to blow up Haidar when he was at table with his principal officers at about midnight, as was his custom, hoping that at the instant the catastrophe was brought about, the troops and the people of Bednūr, animated by the Prince, who would thus be restored to the ancient throne, would easily put Haidar's forces to the sword in the resulting confusion and disorder.²⁰⁸ Accordingly, one night, Lingappa led through the streets of Bednūr a crowd of armed retainers, and was about to put his scheme into execution, when some obscure hints of it were conveyed to one of the officers of Haidar by a trusty servant.²⁰⁹ Haidar,

208. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 88-89. This story is detailed only by De La Tour. Wilks is silent on how the assassination was to be accomplished, except to the extent of suggesting that it was to be by means of a disturbance created.

209. So says the *Haid. Nām*. De La Tour's version is somewhat different. According to him, the project was to have been put into execution by Nimbaiya, who, he says, "belonged to the Pagoda", *i.e.*, the temple outside the city, with which the palace had a subterranean connection. On the day Haidar returned to Bednūr, the chief priest of the Pagoda—a Brāhman—who had been the first to know of the plot, made up his mind to apprise Haidar of it. Whether he was actuated by the detestation and horror of the intended crime, as the Brāhmins of the place affirmed, or whether his hatred for Virammāji and Nimbaiya, whose intimacy he hated, was his leading motive, he conveyed himself into the city of Bednūr, and presenting himself before Haidar, as if to compliment himself on his happy return, he advised him openly, in the presence of Virammāji and her son, of the conspiracy and the danger he was in. This astonishing recital—so says De La Tour—made the whole assembly tremble, but it made no impression on Haidar, who, looking round, discovered the guilty persons without difficulty. De La Tour adds that Haidar ordered these to be seized. The witnesses were then heard, and the truth being established on the spot, Virammāji, Nimbaiya and all their accomplices were—adds

hearing of what was being attempted, handled the situation with all promptitude. The crowd was hotly pursued by the infantry on guard at the old Palace gates and dispersed, with the aid of the available cannons, with the result that the attempt was quelled without difficulty. Order was soon restored, though Lingappa, the ring-leader, managed to escape.²¹⁰ Lingappa evidently had the active co-operation in this affair of not only the generality of the citizens who had suffered losses as the result of the plunder the city had sustained but also of the Rāṇi's adherents. Many were inflamed at the deposition of the Rāṇi and her confinement together

De La Tour—"put to death", except the adopted son—whom he calls the Prince of Canara—who was carried to Maddagiri, his kingdom being confiscated (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 89-90). The latter portion of the story is not correct. Neither Rāṇi Virammāji nor Nimbaiya was put to death, they being sent also as prisoners to Maddagiri. As a partisan of Haidar, De La Tour does not refer to the excesses committed by Haidar on this occasion, as narrated in the text above. Robson on the other hand, bears ample testimony to the terrible cruelties practised by him when he discovered the plot. According to him, the "infamous treatment" that Haidar meted to the Prince—the adopted son—"threw the whole country into a state of confusion, and occasioned many conspiracies against him". Haidar had the good fortune, he says, to discover them, and in order to prevent all attempts of that kind in the future, "he put to death one thousand of the principal inhabitants of the city of Biddenoor, in the most cruel, inhuman method he could invent; their mangled limbs were suspended on every tree in the environs of the city. His bloodthirsty rage not being satisfied with the above cruelties, he ordered the chief persons of every town or village, of whom he had the least suspicion, to be butchered in like manner; besides many others, for the most trivial offences, had their noses or ears cut off. So that, the inhabitants of the Biddenoor country, from the dread of his cruelty, were now—i.e., at the time Robson wrote, about 1786—reduced to the most servile obedience to his tyrannic will" (see Robson, *o.c.*, 31-32). Robson's version is to a large extent confirmed by Wilks who records that before evening "upwards of three hundred of the chief conspirators were hanging at the different gateways which issued from the city of Bednur", as mentioned in the text above. Wilks has, however, nothing to say about the other cruelties practised by Haidar outside the city of Bednūr, to cow down the inhabitants of the newly conquered area. But it is probable that the details furnished by Robson in this regard are true. At any rate, it is in keeping with Haidar's methods.

210. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 29-30.

with her adopted son, the Rāja, who, they expected, would succeed her on the ancient throne of Bednūr. Certain of the accounts²¹¹ which have come down to us through the medium of later writers make it plain that all who had any grievance against the change of the regime in Bednūr combined together and made this attempt on Haidar and his officials. Haidar, undismayed, sat up, it is said,²¹² on his sick bed, and directed an investigation to be made by a commission composed of some of his oldest, and, as he conceived, his most trusty civil officers. The report of the investigation was soon drawn up and read to Haidar while he was reclining on his couch and shivering in a paroxym of ague. But even in this state, his keen perception penetrated the veil which the commissioners had attempted to throw over the few facts which were known to him. Past master in the art of dissimulation, he affected not to understand anything for the moment, and detained the commissioners in a pretended conversation, until he recovered from his fit; he then rose from his couch, and, entering the audience hall, approached the witnesses and re-examined them himself, and came to his own conclusions. He forthwith ordered the commissioners to be hanged in his presence—in front of the audience hall. Further arrests followed with lightning speed, and before the shades of evening fell, upwards of three hundred of the chief conspirators were hanging at the ten different gateways which issued from the city of

211. Among these, De La Tour, as already mentioned (f. n. 150 *supra*), records a somewhat different version of the attempt on Haidar's life made by the Queen and the Prince of Bednūr. Robson, also writing evidently from hearsay, speaks of the revolt against Haidar's authority in Bednūr as having been the immediate result of his confinement of the Rāja (o.c., 81). Kirmāni and Stewart are silent on this affair, while Wilks' account (o.c., I. 511-512) is of a secondary character and agrees in the main with the *Haid. Nam.*

212. Wilks, (l.c.), whose account is evidently based on oral accounts furnished to him by Badr-u-Zamān and others.

Bednūr. This done, Haidar repaired to rest with the same serenity as if he had been discussing the ordinary business of the day, and arose on the following morning visibly recovered by the consequences of the unusual exertion to which he had been compelled. Bednūr knew no more of civil or other disturbances from that date.

Whatever Haidar's object in invading the territories of Bednūr, the manner in which the conquest was carried out and the methods adopted by him in quelling the petty attempt that was made against him, mark him out as one with whom sometimes the doctrine that the end justifies the means prevailed. It is also clear from his conduct that he was inclined to take extreme measures, not always commensurate with the requirements of the case, to put down popular rebellion. To say that he believed in terrorism would not be wrong. The war against the Rāṇi of Bednūr was undertaken on the alleged ground that she failed to keep up to the treaty obligation that was due from her when Haidar invaded Chitaldrug. The Rāṇi was undoubtedly right in refusing co-operation because Haidar's attempt against the Chief of Chitaldrug was an absolutely wanton one. But it is clear that the charge of her failing to help Haidar against the Pāḷegār of Chitaldrug was only the ostensible cause. The real reason was that he coveted the rich territory of the Rāṇi; her amassed wealth; her sea-coast towns; and the way that the possession of these would open to him to advance further north-westwards as far as Goa and possibly the reduction, if not the expulsion, of the Portuguese from the West Coast from north to south. That was his real objective and whatever stood or came in the way, was, in his opinion, an obstacle that was bound to go. When that determination had been made by him, he would not allow either sentiment or honor to militate against its execution.

Reflections on the
Bednūr episode.

What followed was the invasion of Bednūr on the pretext of restoring the rightful heir and the reduction of that country. The treatment meted out to the Rāṇi and the Pretender, her adopted son, is alike unjustifiable, while the cruelty inflicted on the leaders of the insurrection shows an aspect of Haidar's character, which was fully confirmed later by British observers of his conduct. It is possible to argue that, in any case, in the stress of the circumstances under which Haidar was acting, Bednūr was bound to lose her individuality but it is highly doubtful if she would have lost it in the manner she lost it at Haidar's hands. In any case, we cannot deny either the Rāṇi or her supporters the admiration that is due to them for the heroic fight they put up to save their independence. Even Wilks, who writes with little or no sympathy for the Rāṇi and her subjects, would seem to impress that they were both treated with a harshness that could be hardly justified even in the atmosphere that prevailed in the 18th century in India or Europe.

Under the fostering care of Venkappaiya and as the result of the special interest taken by Haidar in it, Bednūr grew for a while, in size. Its trade also increased.

The idea that Haidar had determined on settling down here and the fact that he began building in it a palatial residence for himself (outside the old fort area) and had brought down actually his family to live with him, and had established in it his principal arsenals, which employed many hands in the manufacture of arms and ammunition, continued the old mint, and issued the old Ikkēri *Varaha* with but a few minor alterations in its legends, inspired confidence in the people that there would be continuity in administration. Haidar also gave great encouragement to merchants, and endeavoured to introduce the cultivation of mulberry and the rearing of

silk-worms in and around Bednūr. But all to no purpose. Though for a time, the city and the country surrounding it showed signs of recovery, the charm would seem to have fled from the place and the curse of the Rāṇi had evidently taken sure hold of it. It was not long before Haidar discovered that the place was not suited to be the capital of a State. When he retreated, after the fight at Raṭṭihalli, towards it, he realized, as we shall see,²¹³ that the woods surrounding Bednūr would prove his ruin, as they had proved the ruin of the Rāṇi. He, therefore, made up his mind to give up the idea of making it the capital of his projected State. Sooner done than determined, he sent away his family and treasure through the woods—through a secret path—to Seringapatam. This act of Haidar gave a set back to the growth of the place for ever thereafter. Anticipating a little, we may add that what remained of its vanishing glory, it lost partly as the result of the wars with Tipū Sultān and partly through the Sultān's own acts. During the sieges it underwent—it was captured by the British in February 1783 under General Matthews and surrendered at the end of April of the same year—the palace and the town were burnt once again. Tipū tried to rebuild the town and to restore its trade but his regulations for the protection of the internal trade dealt a severe blow to its prosperity. The Kāzi he appointed added to his own mite to its further destruction by pulling down the Christian Church and the Hindu temples and breaking to pieces numerous inscribed slabs and erecting a mosque from the ruins. In 1838, a local officer recorded the great decline that had taken place in its “wealth and population,” its trade having been nearly all lost from the difficulty of access to it. *Sic transit gloria mundi*. No where do we realize as in ruined Bednūr the truth of

213, See below.

the famous Greek saying that a great city is a great solitude. But the city that Virammāji so valiantly defended is not, however, dead but lies sleeping. It may yet wake up when the trade routes change with the coming into being of the suggested harbour at Bhatkal.²¹⁴

This account of Bednūr since its conquest by Haidar may be fittingly concluded by a brief notice of the fate that overtook its first Dewān Venkappaiya (*Pradhān Venkappaiya*). Venkappaiya, who laboured for Bednūr during the first seven years after it passed under Mysore, was known also as Venkāmātya. He belonged to a family of ministers, his father being Rāmapuri Hampeyāmātya, a name which indicates the hereditary secular office held by his ancestors.²¹⁵ He was evidently a member of the Āruvēli Niyōgi sect of Brāhmins, and as such fit by birth and training for administrative office.²¹⁶ Well educated from early life in the arts and letters of the country,²¹⁷ he appears to have entered service under Rāṇi Virammāji, about 1757, as an agent.²¹⁸ After working under her personally for a time, he seems to have been transferred to Hosangaḍi, in the present South Kanara district but then included in Bednūr. What other posts he held after that, we do not know, but there is evidence to believe that to considerable administrative experience, he combined a high literary reputation that added to the well-merited

214. Bhatkal is but 30 miles N. W. of Nagar *via* Kallūrkaṭṭe, which in 1893 usurped the place of Nagar as the headquarters of the taluk named after itself.

215. His mother's name as given in his literary works was Vāmāmbā.

216. *Ke. N. V.*, XII. 218, f. n. 2, where he is spoken of as a Brāhman *niyōgi* under Virammāji.

217. As to his literary capacity, see his works referred to later in the text.

218. *Ke. N. V.*, XII. l. c. A recent attempt to identify him with Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya of Kannambāḍi (*Kanvapurī*), an earlier minister of the reign of Krishnarāja II, is merely fanciful and thoroughly fails to take note of the antecedents and details of the early career of Venkappaiya (see *Q. J. M. S.*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, pp. 36-38).

gubernatorial dignity that Haidar conferred on him. Haidar, who had always an eye for good men, should, indeed, have selected him as the fittest person to take over the administration of Bednūr at such a difficult time—shortly after its conquest and the quelling of a plot to assassinate him—thus making it appear that he but continued the administration of the country in the manner in which it had been conducted from time immemorial. Haidar, as was his wont, did not entirely leave all matters to him solely and wholly. He placed as second in command under him one Ujjanappa, a Kurubar by birth and a native of Bednūr, described as an old servant of his and one who had been ennobled by him with the title of “Rājā Rām”.²¹⁹ Venkappaiya carried on the administration for seven years and did much to infuse confidence in the people that the change in the rulership of the country would not mean any unhappiness to them. So efficient, indeed, were his services at Bednūr, that Haidar appointed him, while still in charge of Bednūr, to investigate certain alleged frauds attributed to an official of the name of Timmappa in the Mysore territory (*Kartara-sīme*). This work he carried out with such ability that his labours ended in adding materially to the coffers of the State. He was as good apparently as a general as an administrator. For the next duty to which he was deputed was the quelling of risings, in 1770, of certain Pālegārs in Hassan, including those of Mahārājan-durga, Bēlūr, Vastāre, etc., Ujjanappa succeeding him at Bednūr. We next see Venkappiya taking part, in April 1771, in the action against the Mahrattas near Mēlkōṭe, escaping from the battle-field there with Tipū. In the same year, about May 1771, he was deputed to the ruler of Coorg to negotiate for the passage of convoys to Seringapatam. Haidar showed his appreciation of

²¹⁹ See f. n. 202 *supra*.

his services by appointing him in 1772 to the post of Dewān of *Mahalāti Cuchēri*, and in April 1774, put him at the head of the embassy which visited Raghōba at Poona, the other members being Appāji Rām and Harikār Narasappa Nāyaka. Haidar next sent him, in the same year, as governor of Sīra, Maddagiri and Channarāyadurga. These eleven years of hard work, though they had brought him preferments and promotions, did not prove sufficient to win entirely Haidar's confidence. Haidar had indeed honoured him by his personal presence at his second marriage about November 1771, but did not, as was usual with him, entirely confide in him. He deprived him of his office, in 1779, on the ground of alleged misuse of power and forced him to make good revenues to the extent of 60,000 *varahas*, and after that sum had been collected from him, he was insulted and thrown into prison in Seringapatam, his authority (*amalu*) being withdrawn, though left with the empty title of *Pradhān* with an allowance of Rs. 1000. At the intercession of Appāji Rām, he was, however, released from prison, and summoned for military service, but died of diabetes before joining, in November 1782.²²⁰ Such was the manner in which Haidar requited his valuable services, services rendered under conditions which there is reason to believe Haidar himself highly appreciated at the time! There was, as we shall see, an element of suspicion in the make-up of Haidar's character, which always undid the best of his instincts and made him the most ungrateful man that the world had ever known. There can be no doubt whatever that Venkappaiya rendered services in Bednūr which smoothened matters greatly for Haidar while they reconciled the population to the new regime and made possible the rebuilding of the State which warfare had greatly unsettled and ruined. From all accounts,

220. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 28, 42-43, 47, 51-55, 69, 92.

Venkappaiya was not only a man of great capacity, both in the civil and military departments, but also of high integrity and honour. The charges trumped up against him—misuse of power and failure to collect revenue—were both unjust and incapable of proof. The object of preferring them was to put him out of the way, for he had grown big and may prove another Khaṇḍē Rao! Even if he had not entered the administrative service of the State, Venkappaiya would still have left a literary name behind him. He appears to have been the author of several Sanskrit and Kannaḍa works, some at least of them having been written before he took up office. Among these are the following:—*Alamkāraṇidarpaṇam*, *Kāmaṇilāsa-Bhāṇah*, *Mahēndra-Vijayāḍimah*, *Virarāghaviya - Vyāyōgah*, *Lakshmīsvayamvara - Samāvatārah*, *Sītākalyāṇa-Vīdhī*, *Rukmiṇī-Svayamvarāṇkah*, *Hanumājjayam* (*Hanumad-vilāsu*) and *Karnāṭa-Rāmāyaṇam* (*Rāmakathāmritasāra*).²²¹ Venkappaiya's name had spread far and wide at the time, as far as Poona on the one side and *Fort St. George* on the other, as both a skilful negotiator and an honourable minister.²²² Venkappaiya was succeeded in his office by his colleague Ujjanappa, in January 1770, when the former left Bednūr, as stated above, to quell the Pālegār disturbances in the Hassan country. As elsewhere noticed, a foreign observer, writing of Ujjanappa at the time, says that he held charge of the treasury at Bednūr and was oppressive and extortionate in his methods.²²³ But he passed muster under Haidar's regime because of those very habits, while the fate that overtook Venkappaiya, the honest and versatile officer

221. *Mys. Or-Lib. Mss.*, Nos. 2570 (P.L.), B. 341, 351, 360 and A. 142-143 (P.). See also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 129-133.

222. His embassy to Raghōba at Poona has been mentioned above. As to Madras, we note in the *Fort St. George* records, mention made of him as *Vingappa*, see *Mily. Count. Corres.*, XXV. 226.

223. See f. n. 202 *supra*.

who did much for Bednūr's revival in the new order of things, shows that Haidar could go wrong hopelessly sometimes.

With Bednūr as the base of operations, Haidar, about the middle of 1763, sent an expedition further northwards, under Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, against Sōde (the "Sonda" or "Sunda" of English and other sources), Ankōle and Panchmahal, former dependencies of Bednūr.²²⁴ The Rāja of Sōde fled, after offering a feeble resistance, from his more elevated possessions, to Tukkolighur, near Goa, in lower Sōde. In his distress, he surrendered the whole of his territory below the ghāṭs to the Portuguese, in return for a fixed annual subsidy to be paid to him, an arrangement which has been continued with his descendants to this day. This conquest helped to replenish the coffers of Haidar. Marching on, he took the fortress of Opir and, after an ineffectual attempt on the fort of Rāma, on the point of the cape of the same name, made the Portuguese yield to him the country of Kārvār, coterminous with Goa.²²⁵

The conquest of Sōde helped to stretch the boundaries of Mysore far to the north-west of the
 Savaṇūr. Tungabhadra. Haidar saw that if he could but attach Savaṇūr to his interest, and induce the

224. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 29. Cf. De La Tour (I. 91-92), where particulars which supplement the account of the *Haid. Nām.* will be found. Robson briefly refers only to the expedition to the "Sonda country, a little distance from Goa." (*o.c.*, 32). So also Stewart (*o.c.*, 16) and Wilks (I. 512-513). Stewart calls the chief of Sōde "Kirpa Raj, the Zemindar of Sunda," who submitted to Haidar. Wilks refers to the place as "Soonda". Kirmāpi is silent on this topic.

225. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 91-92. A stray Portuguese notice of Haidar (1764), lately brought to light by Dr. S. N. Sen, speaks of the "Nabobo himself" having "suddenly entered into the territories" of the Rāja of Sunda, while the latter "was negotiating with him for peace," and "corrupted the fidelity of his vassals with a huge sum of eight lacks of roupies," and taken "possession of his capital Sundem, and in the same manner of all his strongholds," etc. [See S. N. Sen, *Early Career of Kanhoji Angria And Other Papers* (1941)—*A Portuguese Account of Haidar Ali*, pp. 86-87.]

Pathān Nawābs of Kurnool and Cuddapah to join him, he would be establishing a sort of defensive cordon along the whole extent of his northern border, besides acquiring three corps of hardy Pathān cavalry to serve with his armies. In this view, he took the present opportunity of bringing round the Nawāb of Savaṇūr, the more so as he had, in the war against the Rāpi of Bednūr²²⁶, sided her against Haidar and had impeded the progress of Haidar's campaign. Haidar accordingly sent an envoy to him to win him over to his side by gentle persuasion. Abdul Hakīm Khān, the Nawāb, was, however, in a curiously difficult position in regard to the Mahrattas, his neighbours. His country lay between the rivers Tungabhadra and the Malprabha, in the direct route of all the Mahratta armies proceeding to Mysore or Arcot. Too weak to resist the Mahrattas, his position led him to adopt the policy of aiding them on the condition of being supported against the Nizām of the Deccan, who claimed his submission as the representative of the ancient State of Bijāpur. While thus bending to the interests of the Mahrattas, the Nawāb had made an effective arrangement for his own protection at but little cost to himself. Haidar's envoy could not break through this pact; at least his arguments failed to carry conviction to the Nawāb's mind. Doubtful of the issue of the negotiations, Haidar had directed Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, whom he had directed to attack Savaṇūr on his way back from Sōde, to play a waiting game until he was sure of the result of the envoy's mission. Neither terror nor persuasion, nor both jointly, would induce the Nawāb to yield to Haidar's proposal. He therefore determined to risk the consequences of a

226. Kirmāpi makes the help given by the Nawāb of Savaṇūr to the Rāpi of Bednūr the cause of the war undertaken against him by Haidar. But Wilks makes no mention of this fact, nor does he mention the help rendered by the Nawāb to the Rāpi in his account of the Bednūr war. See Kirmāpi, *Neshāuni-Hydr̥i*, 140; Wilks, I. 508-507; also 514-515.

positive refusal, with the result that Haidar moved his troops to form a junction with those under Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, who, on his way back from Sōde, had halted at Rāṇi-Bednūr, ready to advance on Savaṇūr, immediately he heard the negotiations broke off. Abdul Hakīm, unwilling to shut himself up in his town, set out with about 4,000 horse and a rabble of irregular foot. These latter were spread over the plain to make them appear more than they actually were, while the Paṭhān horse were preserved in a compact body to take advantage of events. Haidar, who had directed the main body of his troops to follow him from Bednūr, took no account of the infantry movements, and determined on a disposition whose object was to envelope the whole of the Nawāb's troops and to cut off their retreat. The Nawāb charged the principal column when in the act of deploying, cut through it with considerable slaughter, and with great coolness and judgment prepared to overset the infantry, already formed in line, by a charge on their flank. At this moment, a reserve of artillery opened with effect on this close and compact body of cavalry and produced such confusion as to compel the Paṭhāns to retire and disperse. Haidar saw his opportunity now and charged with his own cavalry. The fugitives were pursued to the very gates of Savaṇūr, while only a small remnant of the infantry, who stripped themselves bare and passed as peasants, escaped the sabre on the plain.²²⁷ The gallant but imprudent

227. Kirmānī's account of the fight is somewhat different. According to him, on the morning Haidar arrived at Savaṇūr, his Kuzzak (predatory) horse appeared wheeling round the Savaṇūr troops. These, mistaking the Kuzzaks as the troops of Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, advanced quickly and tried to attack them. Haidar gave orders to his troops who were posted in ambush immediately in front of them, to fire and charge. They, firing volleys, rushed upon the Afghan cavalry, most of whom lay dead on the field. What remained, fled, and "never drew the breath of courage until they reached the river Bala." Hakīm Khān, the Nawāb, "having also lost his senses," we are told, left the whole of his baggage, and, retired to the capital

effort of the Nawāb ended in his submission. Haidar secured all that he desired, besides a military contribution of Rs. 6 lakhs.²²⁸ But money not forthcoming, either because the Pathān could not hoard, or because the Mahratta horsemen had left none for others to take, the Nawāb, having no credit with *Sāhukārs* and moneylenders, was obliged to make payment in kind—in the shape of elephants, camels, tents of velvet, gold cloths, Burhanpur cloths of great value, costly arms, muslins, silks, shawls and the like, the whole representing accumulations made at the expense of hundreds of thousands of pounds, which, in actual value, perhaps, exceeded four times the amount of the contribution nominally levied²²⁹. The object of the campaign against Savaṇūr being thus accomplished, Haidar returned to Bednūr, charging Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān with a large force to march still further to the northward extending his conquests. The Mahrattas, least expecting any attack from the south, had left several of their strongholds in that direction uncared for.

The Kuzzaks, however, pursued him to the gates of the fort, and took many of his cavalry and their horses."—Kirmāpi, *o.c.*, 140-142.

228. Kirmāpi says that the contribution paid was Rs. 1 crore (*o.c.*, 142). According to Wilks (I. 516), it was Rs. 2 lakhs, but, being exacted in kind, it was probably as much as four times, or Rs. 8 lakhs. According to the *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 30-31), it was fixed at 3 lakhs of *varahas*, which at Rs. 3 per *varaha* would be equal to Rs. 6 lakhs. The Mysore *varaha* was equal to Rs. 4; the Fort St. George *varaha* was equal to Rs. 3½, though the Masulipatam one was, like the Bednūr one, equal to Rs. 4.
229. On the Savaṇūr war, De La Tour, Robson and Stewart are wholly silent. Kirmāpi, as usual, antedates the event, setting it down to 1761 (A. H. 1175). Wilks' account (I. 514-517) does vary much from that furnished by the *Haid. Nām.*, but he gives no date to the campaign against Savaṇūr. As he makes the campaign against Sōde begin in December 1763, the advance against Savaṇūr, which came shortly after that event, may be taken to have followed it immediately thereafter, say about the beginning of 1764. If De La Tour is to be believed from a casual reference he makes, Haidar owed his victory at Savaṇūr to "the bravery and spirited evolutions of the French cavalry under M. Hughel." But he is wrong in stating that it was a "signal victory" over "the three Nabobs near Sanour (Savaṇūr)", as he puts it, meaning the Nawābs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savaṇūr, for all the three did not take part in the fight at Savaṇūr. See De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 76.

By his recent conquests, Haidar had, to some extent, overshoot his mark. His ambitious mind had no doubt for the time triumphed over the resistance of the Rāṇi of Bednūr and the independent Pālegārs, who since the break up of Vijayanagar, had gathered strength, each unto himself. These victories, though they did not by any means always prove easy, brought trouble on him. They created jealousies and antipathies against him and Mysore. His policy of expansion brought him into collision directly with the Mahrattas on the one side and with Nizām Alī on the other. Haidar knew the trouble that was in store for him. Sīra, though really a conquest from the Mahrattas, he had pretended to receive in the garb of a formal investiture from Basālat, who, in his turn, pretended to be the Nizām and in that capacity the deputy of the Mughal Emperor. He realized perfectly well that the Mahrattas would not consider it as anything other than a wresting of territory that was theirs. At the same time, he had to reckon with the real Nizām, Salābat Jang and his more able minister and brother Nizām Alī, to whom the fictitious part of the transaction would only give offence, for it was a direct usurpation of his supposed authority. To ward off possible blows from both these quarters, he tried to win both of them off by despatching to them two different diplomatic missions.²³⁰ To the Nizām, he sent one

230. According to Wilks (I. 514), Haidar sent Appāji Rām to Nizām Alī, minister of Salābat Jang at Hyderabad, and Mehdi Alī to Mādhava Rao, the Pēshwa at Poona. This seems a mistake, as will be perceived from the references quoted from the *Madras Fort St. George Records* below for the years 1763 and 1764. As a matter of fact, Appāji Rām was the accredited Mysore Vakīl at Poona for many years during Haidar's time. See Wilks, o. c., I. 514, 554-555, 656-687, 703, 714. etc. As to Mehdi Alī, he was sent, evidently for the first time, to Nizām Alī in 1764 and it is in connection with that mission that Wilks mentions his name in his work (I. 514). As the year to which this despatch of ambassadors refers is 1763-64. both according to Wilks and the *Fort St. George Records*, it must be held that Wilks has transposed the names of both of them.

Mehdi Ali Khān, with public gifts and a private *Sāhukār* credit exceeding considerably the amount that he paid to Basālat Jang. Haidar's object in sending the mission to Nizām Ali was not only to appease him for the goodwill he had shown to Basālat but also to win him off and even play him off against the Mahrattas. During the years 1762 and 1763, Nizām Ali had carried out campaigns against the Pēshwa and had taken Daulatabad in the former year and had reduced to ashes the city of Poona in the latter. Such a person would be useful in the fight against the Pēshwa, who was bound to retaliate for the aggressions against Vīrammāji and the conquest of the countries until lately in Mahratta hands. Immediately after he effected the conquests, he sought the artful aid of diplomacy to get Nizām Ali's consent to them. Early in 1763, accordingly, he first settled with Nizām Ali the Sīra affair and then started "negotiating with him about finishing the affairs of Mysore" and even proposed to pay him a visit.²³¹ This suggestion was evidently nothing more than a pretended offer to show respect to Nizām Ali and was replaced by the despatch of Mehdi Ali Khān, his Vakīl, who, it is said, paid to Nizām Ali six lakhs of rupees *Nazar* and obtained *Sanads* for the districts of Sīra and Bednūr from him. Nizām Ali, in return, honoured, it would seem, Haidar, with a *mansab* of 7,000 horse, the *manki* (or fish) standard, a palanquin with a fringe to it and the title of *Bahadūr*. He also made the gift of an elephant to Mehdi Ali Khān and agreed that Haidar should later pay his respects to him on the banks of the Krishna.²³² Evidently Haidar had even higher ambitions, to obtain the supremacy over the whole of the South of India, under cover of Nizām Ali's pretended overlordship, for it was also given out at about this time

231. *Fort St. George Records-Mily. Count. Corres.*, XI. 46, *Letter No. 32*, dated February 5, 1763.

232. *Ibid.*, XII. 166, *Letter of Ānanda Rao, gumāsta to Nizām Ali*, dated April 3, 1764.

that Haidar obtained a *sanad* not only for Sīra, Sunda, Bednūr and Seringapatam but also for Cuddapah, Kurnool and Karnāṭak at the hands of Nizām Alī.²³³ Nizām Alī, all the better for the money, pretended friendship but held over further action. To the Mahrattas, Haidar sent, for the same purpose, and provided in the same manner, one Appāji Rām, an able and vivacious Dēśastha Brāhman. But not only was injury here more direct and substantial but also there were other complications. Added to these was the fact that Bālāji Rao, the Pēshwa who died in 1761, had been succeeded by Mādhava Rao, probably the greatest of his line, who, though young in years, carried a wise head on his shoulders. He was indeed little disposed to acquiesce in the conquest of any part of the Mahratta territories.²³⁴ Haidar had thus to prepare himself against an invasion of Mysore, more formidable, both from the number and quality of the troops as from the talents of their leader, than he had reason to expect from his experience of previous contests with the Mahrattas. Haidar did well in sending Appāji Rām to Mādhava Rao. Whatever the diplomatic skill of Mehdi Alī may have been, and he was evidently successful in his mission to Hyderabad, there is no doubt that Appāji Rām, of whom we shall hear further in the course of this narrative, was a witty, clever and astute man of great address, who knew how to shape his conduct to the needs of the passing hour. He was one of those honest men who knew and understood court life to a fault and was naturally gifted to be an ambassador sent to lie abroad in the interests

233. *Ibid.*, 171-172, *News-letter* from Nizām Alī's camp, down to April 3, 1764.

234. Mādhava Rao succeeded his father in September 1761, in his 17th year. He organised a campaign against Haidar immediately he was able to turn his attention to him. The vigour of his administration was such that within ten years he re-established the Mahratta ascendancy in the north. His death in 1772 at the early age of 38 proved a great blow to the Mahratta power (see below).

of his country.²³⁵ Though Haidar, by one of those instinctive acts of his, so characteristic of him, sent the right sort of persons to the two courts of Hyderabad and Poona, the result did not prove beneficial to him. That shows the enormity of the offence he had given them in their estimation. What, however, did great damage to Mysore with the Pēshwa was Haidar's conquest of the Mahratta territories in the neighbourhood of Sīra and part of those which lay within the jurisdiction of Murāri Rao. A worse affront he had offered was his war against Bednūr and its annexation and extending further his operations to the northward with the avowed object of extending the northern frontier of Mysore up to the Krishna by an alliance with the Nizām against the Pēshwa.²³⁶ Mādhava Rao had not only been not inattentive to the course of these transactions but had also been approached actively on behalf of Bednūr.²³⁷ Bednūr, indeed since the days of Śivāji, had been friendly towards the Mahrattas. Its rulers had come to a working understanding among themselves and had established cordial relations with each other. When Śivāji succeeded to the so-called rights of the Bijāpur kings, he did not assert any supremacy over Bednūr.²³⁸

235. Sir Henry Wotton (1568-1639), the diplomatist and scholar, came under temporary eclipse, it is said, for his definition of an ambassador as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth." It was written in Mr. Christopher Fleckamore's Album. Wotton was Ambassador of James I for twenty years, chiefly at Venice. He was the author of the famous saying "The itch of controversy is the seat of the churches," which, at his instance, became his epitaph.

236. See above.

237. See below.

238. Venkaṭappa Nāyaka of Keladi (1582-1629) beat off an invasion of the Bijāpur forces under Raṇadullā Khān. His brother and successor Vīrabhadra Nāyaka (1629-1645), by an embassy to Bijāpur, stopped a more formidable invasion by the same general. He transferred the capital to Bednūr. Śivappa Nāyaka (1645-1660), his successor, was a great ruler. He withstood several Bijāpur invasions, which did not end in any advantage to Bijāpur. His son Bhadrappa Nāyaka (1661-1664) was, however, successively attacked and he retired to Bhuvanagiri for a while. But peace was concluded and he returned to his capital. Śivāji's descent on the coast of Kanara in

When, after Śivāji's plunder of Hubli, in 1673, Channammāji, the widow of Sōmasēkhara Nāyaka I, who carried on the Bednūr government from 1672 to 1697, heard of the despatch of his fleet to take possession of Kārvār, Ankōle and other places, she solicited a friendly arrangement with him, and Śivāji readily agreed to it. She consented to pay yearly tribute and permitted a *Vakil* from Śivāji to reside at her Capital.²³⁹ In keeping with this arrangement, she gave shelter to Rāmarāja, the son of Śivāji, when he was in hiding from the Mughals, until he could escape to his own country.²⁴⁰ Even after the death of Śivāji, the Rāni continued her friendly attitude, paying the annual tribute agreed upon to his successor.²⁴¹ But Mahratta policy, however, changed for the worse with the death of Śivāji. The Pēshwa Bālāji Rao, in his campaign of 1753-1757, deputed Mahadāji Purandare, with a detachment, to attack Bednūr in 1755, but, though he plundered the place, he could do no more, because he quarrelled with Muzaffar Khān, the Commandant of the Mahratta Artillery.²⁴² In 1756, however, Bālāji Rao conceived designs against Bednūr and sent out one Balwant Rao to attack and take it. He asked him "to march to that place as soon as possible, that the garrison had been very sickly,

1664 did not touch Bednūr, though it included the sack of Barcelore (Kundapur) and the plunder of all the adjacent tracts, including most of the rich mercantile towns, including Kārvār, where the English factory paid £ 112 sterling as its part of contribution (see Grant-Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, 90-91; *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1235).

239. Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 201-202, quoting Marathi Mss. Duff, however, does not mention the name of the "Rana of Bednore", who, he says, agreed to pay the annual tribute and to receive a *Vakil* "at his capital." The "Rana" was actually a woman and it was Channammāji, who, doubtless perceiving that Śivāji waged war against the Sultān of Bijāpur, made a friendly adjustment with him.

240. *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1236. This Rāmarāja may be identified with Rājā Rām, the son of Śivāji the great, who was raised to the Mahratta throne in May 1680. (Grant Duff, *o.c.*, 134).

241. Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 231.

242. Kincaid and Parasnis, *History of the Maratta People*, III. 81. There is no reference to this event in Grant-Duff.

that the Rana's son, as well as the Rana, was dead, and that the whole would fall into his hands before the arrival of Gopaul Hurry, when they must conjointly attack Chittledroog."²⁴³ The Pēshwa had evidently news of the ill-feeling between Vīrammāji and the adopted son of her husband, Channabasappa, which, according to certain accounts, had ended in the murder of Channabasappa. But he was wrongly informed as to the death of Vīrammāji herself. The ruling Rāṇa at the time—1756-1757—was Vīrammāji, who had succeeded her husband Basappa Nāyaka II jointly with his adopted son Channabasappa Nāyaka, whose history has already been narrated. Bālāji Rao desired to take full advantage of the differences between the Rāṇi and her adopted son, just the very cause which had induced Haidar to intervene in Bednūr affairs. Balwant Rao having been detained in Cuddapah on levying contributions from the Pālegārs round about Sīra, Hoskōṭe, Muḷbāgal and other places, which he had taken, could not, until February 1757, turn his attention to this direction, and before that, events had occurred in Hyderabad, which called him away northwards. "Had this scheme" of Bālāji Rao "been practicable at the time", says Grant-Duff, the historian of the Mahrattas, "it would in all probability have prevented the rise of Hyder Ally."²⁴⁴ While undoubtedly the wealth of Bednūr helped Haidar in prosecuting his further campaigns, it is doubtful whether its non-conquest would have prevented his "rise." However this may have been, there is no doubt that the Mahrattas from the time of Śivāji had had a watchful eye on Bednūr, and its conquest by Haidar, in 1763, made them

243. Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 494, quoting a copy of an original letter from the Pēshwa to Balwant Rao Gaṇapati Mehendale. "Gopaul Hurry" referred to was Gōpāl Hari, who was at the head of a force intended to attack Mysore a little later during the same campaign, and with whom Balwant Rao was to act after reducing Bednūr.

244. Grant-Duff, *l.c.*

uneasy for the double reason that he had poached into ground which had been included exclusively in their own sphere of influence since Śivāji's time and had plundered it of its immense wealth and been using that very wealth in further aggrandizing himself and that too at their cost. They were thus fully in a mood to listen to the piteous cries of Vīrammāji and her adopted son, who were both captives in Haidar's hands.

It was in this state of affairs that many influential men of Bednūr, who had not been suspected of any complicity by Haidar in the previous attempt against him, made up their mind to make known to the Pēshwa Mādhava Rao what had transpired in their city.²⁴⁵ Haidar was away at the time from Bednūr and Vīrammāji's cause had gained evidently good supporters, who put themselves at the head of the movement in her favour. It is possible, though there is no direct proof for this, that the Rāṇi and her adopted son managed to send secret emissaries to him, for his subsequent conduct towards them would seem to indicate that he should have been previously in touch with them. However

Vīrammāji's appeal for deliverance.

245. Robson, *o.c.*, 32-33. Robson is plain on this point and there is nothing on record to doubt his version. His words are: "During Hyder's absence from Biddenoer country, many of the great men who had not been suspected in the former affair, plucked up courage and applied to Mahadorow, one of the Mahratta chiefs, and promised him all the assistance in their power, if he would march a strong body of troops to relieve them from Hyder's tyranny. Accordingly he marched into the Biddenoer country (where Hyder had but just arrived) upon his receiving information of this universal defection." De La Tour has nothing to say on this subject. Stewart, who dates the event in 1763, agrees with Robson (*o.c.*, 16-17). He says that the "Mahrattas, jealous of the near approach of Hyder to their frontier, and applied to for assistance by the inhabitants of Bednore, sent, in 1763, a powerful army, consisting of 60,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, to dispossess the usurper." Kirmāṇi suggests that it was Haidar's movement "towards Bednūr" that made Mādhava Rao turn against him, fearing "his own districts to be threatened" (*o.c.*, 167). Kirmāṇi, however, does not directly connect Mādhava Rao's invasion to any request from the people of Bednūr.

this may have been, Mādhava Rao made up his mind, both on his own account and on account of the Rāṇi of Bednūr, to invade the Mysore country and retake all the conquered territories.

Mādhava Rao, being for the time free from other cares, concentrated his attention on Mysore. The time was propitious. Basālat Jang, the friend of Haidar, was engaged in a conflict with his brother, Nizām Alī, in the direction of Kurnool and could not, even if he desired, help him, while Nizām Alī also could not, even in his own interests, think of a diversion towards Mysore to oppose the Mahrattas. Nor indeed would he desire such a diversion, for if the Mahrattas put down Haidar, it would be but a very desirable end in itself for the time being, especially as he had come to an accommodation with the Mahrattas, in 1763, after the sack of Poona.²⁴⁶ Haidar's phenomenal rise, within three years, had astonished the Mahratta world. The increase in his forces and resources made it incumbent on Mādhava Rao to provide with adequate care for the augmentation and equipment¹ of the forces intended to oppose him. A large army soon assembled at Poona. Mādhava Rao proposed to take personal command of it, while his uncle Raghunātha Rao was to remain at Poona and to conduct the government. But Raghunātha Rao—evidently in secret communication, if not in league, with Haidar—insisted on the command being vested in him. Seeing that right was with the nephew, and that he was supported in his claim by Sakhārām Bāpu, Prime Minister of the Pēshwa, at the

246. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 517. Wilks (I. 514-515, 517-518) makes Mādhava Rao undertake the invasion only to recover the Mahratta dominions. Grant-Duff, similarly, suggests that the Mahrattas were not unconcerned spectators of the rapid progress of Haidar and they assembled a large army at Poona for directing the same against him (*o.c.*, I. 544). Robson and Stewart as the earliest writers have evidently had independent sources from which they have drawn.

time we are writing of, he pretended to yield, but quitted Poona in anger and retired to Nāsik. These discussions and the time necessary to gather together a large army enabled Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān to extend Mysore's northern frontier across the Warda, Malprabha and the Gatprabha, nearly to the banks of the Krishṇa, all fordable rivers except during the rainy season. Gōpāl Rao Patwardhan, the chief of Miraj, which lies immediately to the north of the Krishṇa, reinforced by Mādhava Rao by a considerable body of troops to check the progress of Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, until the main army should arrive, determined to give him battle. Finding himself superior in numbers, he crossed the Krishṇa accordingly but was defeated with great loss in April 1764.²⁴⁷ Early in the succeeding month, Mādhava Rao crossed the Krishṇa with an army of 30,000 horse, about the same number of infantry, besides artillery. Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, leaving a strong

247. See Wilks, *o.c.*, 518; Grant-Duff, *l. c.* On the movements and position in general of Haidar and the Mahrattas up to April 1764, see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. 37, *Letter* Nos. 29 and 30. No. 29, dated February 21 or in April 1764, refers to the impending arrival of Burān-ud-dīn, one of Haidar's commanders, near Dharwar, and the consequent preparations made to check his aggression. From No. 30, dated April 17, 1764, we learn that Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān—referred to as Faiz-ullāh-Khān—was moving at the head of 10,000 horse on hearing of the Mahratta advance on the south; that Haidar, who was three nights' journey from Bednūr, had sent 2,000 horse from Bankāpur; that Mokhdum, his brother-in-law, also moved thither at the head of 1,000 horse; that Gōpāl Rao Patwardhan from Bankāpur and Dharwar awaited them; that the Pathān Nawāb of Savaṇūr was about to join the Mahrattas, who were to cross the Tungabhadra in a day or two to meet the Mysoreans at Savaṇūr, and that Haidar, while sticking to his post, was arranging to victual his army, &c. A *Fort. St. George* letter gives the following details relating to the military position of Haidar about this time: "Hyder Naigue has a train of artillery, consisting of 100 pieces of cannon; and has collected together immense quantities of powder, lead, etc., and about 25,000 bullocks for the carriage of water, grain, &c.; he has given to every soldier in his army also two leathern gurglets to carry water in, and ten measures of wheat flour. Twenty horses are always ready before his door for his own riding. Meer Phize Ullah Cawn is appointed to the command of the van of his army..." (*Mily. Count Corres.*, XII. 174, *News-letters* down to April 3, 1764).

garrison at Dharwar, deliberately fell back as Mādhava Rao advanced.²⁴⁸ Haidar, then at Seringapatam, hearing of Mādhava Rao's advance, ordered the assemblage of the troops. He marched towards Shimoga; from there proceeded to Basavāpaṭṇa; crossing the Tungabhadra, advanced to Harihar and from there passed on to Shikārpur *via* Māsūr-Maḍagu tank, where he encamped.²⁴⁹ From there, recalling all his detachments, he advanced towards Savaṇūr and took up a position near Raṭṭihalli,²⁵⁰ about 50 miles south of Savaṇūr and about 20 miles to the west of Harihar. He encamped there, on an eminence, which overlooked a vast plain towards the front. He chose this place deliberately, for the thick woods to his rear protected him, affording cover as they did for his infantry against the superior numbers of Mādhava Rao's cavalry up to the town of Bednūr, a distance of over 100 miles. Here, he mustered 20,000 horse, 20,000 irregular foot and his train of artillery, consisting of about 25 field-guns.²⁵¹ Mādhava Rao's army, which had by now been joined by the Nawāb of Savaṇūr with 1,000 horse and 12,000 foot and by Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe with 5,000 horse from Harapanahalli,²⁵² was thus three times stronger

248. Grant-Duff, *o. c. l.* 544-545. Wilks says that Mādhava Rao's cavalry was "reputed at 60,000" and suggests that this may be taken to be an "exaggeration" for a force 30,000 to 40,000 strong (*Ibid.*, 519).

249. Kirmāṇi, *o. c.*, 167-168. See also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, vol. 37, Letter No. 32, dated May 6, 1764, referring to Haidar's movements thus far.

250. About 20 miles due east of Beḷagāmi. It is on the Kumudvati, just across the present Mysore border and about 20 miles to the n. e. of Śīrālkoppa in the present Shimoga district. It may be said to be roughly midway between Śīrālkoppa and Harihar. Ānavatti, situated not far away from the south bank of the Warda, is about 30 miles n. w. of Raṭṭihalli and about 20 miles due north of Sorab.

251. Wilks, *o. c.*, 519, *f. n.* See also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l. c., which refers to Haidar's strength as 12,000 horse and 25,000 foot. The numbers may be taken to be relatively approximate, though Wilks, who has based his account on local writings, is to be preferred.

252. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l. c. Grant-Duff places this event subsequent to the action at Raṭṭihalli (*o. c. l.* 545). Murāri Rao, according to Duff, had been lately restored by Mādhava Rao to his traditional position of "Sēnāpati" in the Peshwa's army.

than Haidar's. His artillery was probably superior in number to Haidar's, while his regular infantry was perhaps composed of a better description of men though perhaps not so well-disciplined as Haidar's. His irregulars, composed of Arabs, were possibly also superior to Haidar's; while his pikemen were certainly inferior to those of Haidar, who were made up of Bēḍars from Chitaldrug from about this period.

Haidar's plan was, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān having retired before the advancing enemy, to make them attack him in the place he had chosen for himself. He, therefore, determined, after choosing his place, to be purely on the defensive. But his object was wholly frustrated by Mādhava Rao declining to attack him there. While his forces were pinned to the ground on which they had taken their stand, Mādhava Rao's forces had full freedom of movement. Mādhava Rao's superiority of cavalry indeed enabled him to obtain more correct information than his adversary, and assisted by the experience of Sakhārām Bāpu, he determined not to attack Haidar's united forces in the position they had chosen but to despatch detachments for recovering the places north of the Warda, driving out the Mysore garrisons from all the towns and villages they had lately occupied. This plan of operations, if left unchecked, would have ended in the investment of Haidar and his forces in his own camp and the interception of his supplies. Haidar quickly saw how the enemy's judicious plans had rendered useless his own dispositions. He instantly made up his mind to try a stratagem, by which he determined to bring on a general action, and if possible still lead the enemy by pursuit to attack him in his own chosen position. With this objective in view, he confided the command of the camp to Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, and moved out on the plain with a select corps of 20,000

The battle of Raṭṭi-
halli, May 26, 17-64.

men. His pretension to retire and draw Mādhava Rao towards the reserve, however, failed of its purpose. Haidar's manœuvres, indeed, terminated in his becoming the dupe of his own design. Such an artifice, shallow and petty as it was, would have succeeded with a general less capable than Mādhava Rao. It betrayed a lack of appreciation of the capacity of his enemy. Mādhava Rao's forces, which had by now advanced within three miles from Haidar's encampment,²⁵³ in keeping with their immemorial rules of warfare, showed themselves at first in few numbers; then, small bodies began to skirmish, and drew Haidar forward to the distance of six or seven miles, until their irregular swarms of horse assumed a more fixed distribution, and discovered to Haidar the whole of the enemy army closing upon him in every direction. Haidar quickly perceived how Mādhava Rao's army had gradually thickened and at last presented solid masses of horse moving round between him and his camp. He understood that his feint had failed of its purpose. Without hesitation, he tried to convert his feint of retiring into dispositions for a retreat to his camp. These he made with steadiness and skill. He forced the corps which was posted to intercept his retreat, and retired, hard pressed for a time, towards Raṭṭihalli, hoping yet to end a hardfought day by drawing Mādhava Rao to the ground which he had chosen for action. Mādhava Rao had too much penetration to be so easily deceived. Haidar was not only foiled in all his objects, but also sustained a severe loss involving the flower of his army.²⁵⁴

253. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 168. Kirmāṇi says that the Mahrattas marched towards Haidar and "encamped about three miles distant from him and the next morning advanced to attack him." This encampment can refer only to the last movements preceding the attack on the part of Mādhava Rao.

254. Kirmāṇi says that the Mahrattas surrounded Mysore troops, "forming a ring round them" and although charged desperately, still they (Mysore troops) constantly repelled the attacks with "the greatest

Distressed for supplies, he was forced to fall back the next day²⁵⁵ on Ānavatṭi, about thirty miles north-west of Raṭṭihalli, where he had prepared an entrenched camp, with his artillery mounted in batteries on all the rising grounds surrounding it,²⁵⁶ just where the thick woods begin, and effectively assured a communication with his supplies. Not to be outwitted, Mādhava Rao did not decline to follow him to this position. He would neither quit him nor allow him rest. Within a few days of Haidar's retreat, Mādhava Rao moved his flying columns in different directions to invest Haidar in his new camp. He placed on the top of a small hill all the guns of his artillery which carried farthest, and from there cannonaded the Mysore camp and caused no little inconvenience to it.²⁵⁷ Haidar, ever ready for an opportunity to show off his superior skill, imagined he perceived here an opportunity for cutting off one of Mādhava Rao's columns²⁵⁸. He moved out for this purpose with 2,000

steadiness and courage, and maintained their ground throughout the whole of the day" (l.c.). On the subject of the tough fight at Raṭṭihalli, see also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. 37, *News-letters* Nos. 31 and 32, dated May 6, 1764, from the Mahratta camp. The loss on Haidar's side, according to letter No. 32, was between four and five hundred men and 100 horses killed and 200 men injured; that on the Mahratta side, according to the same source, amounted to 500 men and 150 horses killed and many injured, no officer, however, being injured except Raghunāth Bāba, who died by a gunshot. The battle of Raṭṭihalli, in the light of this letter, is to be dated May 3-6, 1764.

255. So Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 520. Kirmāṇi, however, says that Haidar quitted the ground "at night" straight to Cheroli, Anoti and Jara, and there, placing his rear to the *jungul*, he encamped". Evidently the march began actually in the night and ended after daybreak. Of the places mentioned by Kirmāṇi, "Anoti" is Ānavatṭi, while "Jara" is probably Jedda, which is to its N. W., on the opposite bank of the Warda, almost facing it. "Cheroli" is probably Chincholi, now in the Bombay Karnātak—situated between Belgaum and Miraj on the M. & S. M. Railway line, 183 miles from Savaṇūr and 230 miles from Harihar, the present Mysore frontier.

256. Kirmāṇi, l.c.

257. *Ibid.*, 169.

258. So Wilks, l.c. Kirmāṇi, however, says that Haidar's object was to silence the Mahratta artillery, which was causing so much inconvenience to his camp. He describes it as a night attack (*o.c.*, 169-170).

regular infantry, 1,000 select horse and 4 light guns,²⁵⁰ all selected men, leaving the rest of his army under the charge of Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, and his treasury he entrusted to the care of Dilāver Khān. His aim was to make a night attack, not only to cut off one of the ever advancing Mahratta columns but also to dislodge the enemy's battery on the hill top. With this double object he marched, under cover of the thick jungle, straight on the Mahratta artillery. He was once again inveigled into advancing too far, with the result he was completely surrounded. The road was so bad that his troops were obliged to cut down the trees to obtain a passage. By the time they managed to arrive on a plain near which the Mahratta artillery had been set up, night vanished and the morning shone forth brightly. The Mahrattas, aware of the approach of the Mysore troops, immediately surrounded them and setting up their familiar cry of "Take and kill" and curveting and leaping their horses, charged on all sides. Haidar, as was his wont on occasions of this kind, had regularly and skilfully formed his infantry into a hollow square, so that the Mahratta onslaughts can be withheld. But as his misfortune would have it, although he gave orders to commence a fire from his guns, not one of them would go off, and fire seemed to take no more effect on them than so much ice. Haidar, utterly undismayed, at length dismounted from his horse, and taking a match in his hand, placed it on the touch-hole of one of his guns. It was, however, of no use, as the fuse did not take fire. Hopeless of any service from his artillery, he endeavoured to keep off the Mahrattas by a sharp fire from his musketry, and fought on to the very extent of his means. But it was in vain. He had been caught

259. Kirmāṇi gives the following figures: 5,000 matchlock infantry marksmen, about 1,500 horse, and 4 light guns, from his bodyguard (*Ibid.*).

in a trap, surrounded as he was on all sides. The Mahrattas, at no time outwitted, at last, charged in a body²⁶⁰ and mixed with the Mysore troops, shoulder to shoulder, and breaking through their ranks, threw them into confusion and slaughtered them mercilessly. Venkaṭa Rao, Haidar's Dewān, was killed in the mêlée, while Zamān Khān, his bosom friend, was wounded. Some of his troops, under pretence of bringing aid or ammunition, actually ran off to avoid destruction. The Mahrattas, seeing the field their own, pursued the fugitives, as long as they could do it, and plundered and slew them. Haidar, by his intelligence and awareness, just managed to escape from the general slaughter, followed by but fifty of his cavalry, mainly through the fleetness of their horses, the remainder being destroyed to a man.²⁶¹ Having thus escaped, Haidar sat down under a tree, and surveyed with wild passion the field so favourable to his enemy. Just at this time, a drummer with his drum arrived at the place where he sat, and stood before him. Haidar, recovering from his stupor, ordered him immediately to beat a charge. The Mahrattas, fearing that reinforcements had arrived, left the field hurriedly, leaving on it all the baggage they had taken. Haidar collected what remained of his forces and marched back to his camp, where he was joined by Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, who arrived there with his forces by a forced march. A further attack of the enemy followed but the Mahrattas retired with the guns

260. Kirmāṇi, never at a loss for curious metaphors, compares the Mahratta charge on this occasion to "a flight of crows". He writes: "At last, the Mahrattas, like a flight of crows, charged in a body", etc. (o.c., 170).

261. So Wilks, o.c., I. 520-521. Kirmāṇi, however, makes no mention of these fifty cavalymen who, according to Wilks, are said to have followed Haidar. On the other hand, his individual escape is thus emphasised by him in a striking simile:—"The Nawaub.....escaped from the slaughter, and like the Sun without a peer, and alone, sat down under a tree," etc. (o.c., 171).

they had taken.²⁶² Haidar was so impressed with the part played by his troops that he ordered the wounded to be brought to his camp for medical treatment and for the payment of compensation for the wounds they had received.²⁶³

Mādhava Rao could not continue operations any further, as the season was advanced, and the monsoon had burst, it being past the middle of June 1764, when the affair at Anavatti closed. He was compelled to retire to a place less exposed to the rains than that. He accordingly crossed the Warda and marching some 40 miles to the north-east, cantoned his troops at a place not far away to the east of Savanūr.²⁶⁴ As the rains began to abate a little, Mādhava Rao sent out detachments for reducing the whole of the eastern dependencies of Bednūr and the adjacent parts of Mysore. Haidar,

262. This account is based partly on Wilks (l.c.) and partly on Kirmāṇi (o.c., 168-172). Grant-Duff's version is based admittedly on Wilks and on certain Marathi Mss., which are not specifically referred to. Wilks' account, however, is a condensed one and does not include details of the fight between two forces after Haidar had been surrounded. Kirmāṇi's narrative, despite his desire to be partial to Haidar, disloses access to independent material. His similes make his version graphic to a degree.

263. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 172.

264. Wilks describes Mādhava Rao's place of retirement for the monsoon season "to the eastward of Savanore" (o.c., I. 521). Grant-Duff says that Mādhava Rao, "fixed his headquarters at Nurindra" and sent troops for shelter into all the villages 20 miles round. He adds the remark that he has been unable to find this place (Nurindra) by that name in any map known to him (o.c., I. 545 f. n. 2). Mr. S. M. Edwardes has no light to throw on the identification of this place in his edition of Duff's *History*, cited here. Kirmāṇi says that the Mahrattas retired to "Binkapore" (modern Benkipore, now Bhadravati) for the rains and there placed themselves in cantonment (o.c., 172). On the position and movements in general of the Pēshwa and Haidar during the period, see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. 37, *Letters* Nos. 84, 86 and 87 (down to June 1764). *Letter* No. 84 speaks of Pēshwa Mādhava Rao's intention of cantoning in the Karnāṭak in view of the approaching monsoon; No. 86 refers to his movement towards Savanūr, then reported to be threatened by Haidar; and No. 87 reports his having intended to canton his forces in the neighbourhood of Dharwar, &c.

on his side, could do nothing. Halting and staying where he was cantoning and had taken refuge (*i.e.*, at Bednūr),²⁶⁵ he could only look on with despair his troops, wretched, spiritless and suffering from sickness from the inevitable consequences of its situation. About the middle of July, the Pēshwa, having posted Gōpāl Rao Patwardhan at Savanūr, advanced with the main army against Haidar. Haidar, as was his wont, systematically retired into the woods, from which it became difficult for the Mahrattas to dislodge him. When, however, the Pēshwa moved away towards Gadvāl, Haidar, all of a sudden, appeared before Bankāpur and threatened to march upon Savanūr. To counteract Haidar, the Pēshwa fell back and encamped at Gajēndragadh, relieving Savanūr. Thereupon Haidar withdrew to Hāngal and eventually disappeared in the forests, suffering heavily in a skirmish he had with Gōpāl Rao.²⁶⁶ The Pēshwa, proceeding further, invested Mudhol,²⁶⁷ and it became his foremost objective to humble down Haidar²⁶⁸ by attacking him from the sea and reoccupying the key-states of Sunḍa and Bednūr with the help of the Portuguese and the Sāwant.²⁶⁹ Towards the close of September, Mādhava Rao invested Dharwar.²⁷⁰ As anticipated, Dharwar capitulated early in November, though only after offering a stout resistance, in which fell Hari Paraśurām Sōman, an able officer.²⁷¹ With it the whole of the country north of the Warda was in the hands of Mādhava Rao, with the exception

265. *Sel. Pesh. Dft.*, Vol. 37, *Letter* No. 37, dated June 23, 1764.

266. *Ibid.*, *Letters* Nos. 38 and 39, dated July 11 and 12, 1764; also *Letter* No. 40, dated July 13, 1764.

267. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 40 cited above.

268. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 41, dated August 20, 1764?

269. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 42, dated August 25, 1764.

270. *Ibid.*, *Letter* No. 44, dated September 26, 1764.

271. *Ibid.*, *Letters* Nos. 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54, dated November 1, 5, 6 and 8, 1764. See also Nos. 45 to 48, referring to the siege during October 1764.

of Mundagūr, which surrendered shortly after. A detachment, under Gōpāl Rao, despite the rains, not only plundered the country on the northern banks of the Tungabhadra but also levied tribute from the Pālegārs of Harapanahalli, Rāyadurg and other neighbouring places, and finally fixed his camp at Hosdurga, about 39 miles south-west of Chitaldrug.²⁷² Hearing of this, Haidar advanced with a detachment, consisting of 6,000 horse, 9,000 sillāhdārs, 4,000 regular infantry and six light guns, fell on Gōpāl Rao and scattered his forces in every direction.²⁷³ Gōpāl Rao himself escaped with what he could lay his hands on, and took the road to Sīra. Some of his camp followed him and sought refuge in the fort there, while others sought the road to Poona. Many others were, it is said, killed by Haidar's troops, who, disguising themselves as Mahrattas, joined the enemy's foraging parties and relieved them of their belongings, resulting in a loss to them of 5,000 horses, besides 19 elephants and 90 camels, besides slaying many of them.²⁷⁴ Feeling assured that the war would soon end, Mādhava Rao sent word to his uncle Raghunātha Rao to take over the command, a step which, though it proceeded from motives honourable to Mādhava Rao, were wholly detrimental both to his own interests and to those of his nation. He hardly realized the fact that Raghunātha Rao was in secret league with Haidar and that what had been won by him on the battlefield was to be lost almost immediately by the treachery of his uncle. Raghunātha Rao accordingly instantly left Nāsik and arrived with his troops as the army in the south was about to cross the Warda.²⁷⁵

272. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 172-174.

273. Kirmāṇi compares their flight to the "falling leaves before the desolating winds of autumn" (*Ibid.*, 174).

274. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 175. There is no mention of this fight either in Wilks or Grant-Duff. Barring some obvious exaggerations, there is no reason why we should doubt the fight itself mentioned by Kirmāṇi.

275. Grant-Duff, *l.c.*

Towards the close of the year, the weather began to clear and an approach to the thick forests of Ānavattī was rendered possible. Mādhava Rao, without delay, opened the campaign with the employment of a large body of pioneers, specially organised for the purpose and equipped during the rainy season. His main object was to cut, in the first instance, a wide opening, through the forests, to the south of Haidar's entrenched camp, and thus progressively build up a line of circumvallation, which would effectively surround the whole of Haidar's camp and cut off his communication with Bednūr. As Mādhava Rao's men began to fell the gigantic trees behind Haidar's camp, Haidar saw the inevitable fate that awaited him. As he could by no means allow his communication with Bednūr to be cut off, he forthwith abandoned his entrenched camp and began a hasty retreat. The close and vigorous pursuit that Mādhava Rao kept up during the first days, though it impeded Haidar's movement by making him halt often and fight the enemy with the whole of his forces, did not affect more than the rear of his army. What added to Haidar's trouble was the close nature of the country, which made Mādhava Rao's work easy for him but not effective. On the third day, however, the route lay through more open country and afforded to Mādhava Rao good opportunity to move a column between Haidar and Bednūr, the point on which he was retreating. This forced Haidar to stand a general action, which he by no means could avoid. He made his dispositions instantly and offered battle to the enemy. His troops, however, could not stand the onslaught made on them. Their impetuosity was so great that the action terminated in a disorderly rout in which he lost in killed alone, it is said,²⁷⁶ 3,000 horse and double that number of infantry,

276. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 522. Grant-Duff's account is a mere summary of Wilks.

while the shattered remnants of his army immediately sought refuge, in their dismay, in the depths of the woods near about. Haidar reached Bednūr with only 2,500 horse and 10,000 infantry, the rest of his army being, for the time being, scattered in all directions, while several thousands of them had actually been destroyed. Haidar felt the pulse for peace, but the negotiations broke down as evidently the terms offered would not suit Mādhava Rao. As Mādhava Rao advanced, garrison after garrison surrendered on the first call. Thus fell to him Hāranahallī without resistance; next fell Ikkēri without a fight; and Kumsi was reduced after a resistance of but two days, while Ānandāpur,²⁷⁷ between these two places, held out for a while and finally surrendered, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān retiring from it immediately he heard that Mādhava Rao's army was advancing on it. The despondency of Haidar's army had been communicated

Wilks' account seems based on what he evidently heard from the survivors of the action, from whom he seems to have had the details personally. "It is admitted by all who shared in the contest of this day", he says, "that although the dispositions of Hyder were respectable, the conduct of his troops was destitute of firmness and spirit". There seems a tinge of exaggeration here, for it does not obviously allow anything for the impetuosity of the Mahratta attack which admittedly determined the fate of the day. This rout at Ānavatṭi (called "Jadī Hanwati") was duly reported to Nānā Fadnis by Bālāji Śankar (see *Sel. Pesh. Daft. o.c.*, Letter No. 55, December 1764). It is not a little curious that on the whole of this final fight Kirmāni has not a word to say. He ends the war by saying that Mādhava Rao "found himself surrounded by such difficulties, his heart gave way", and by the mediation of Vakils and ambassadors, "the war was concluded," which is hardly correct (Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 176).

277. "Anantapur" of Wilks. Wilks calls this place throughout by this name. "Ānandāpur" is really its correct name and it helps us to distinguish it from "Anantapur," the headquarters of the district of the same name, one of those which goes to make up the Ceded Districts of the Madras Presidency. The *Sel. Pesh. Daft. (o.c., Letters Nos. 59, 60 to 63)* also refers to the place as Anantapur. The transition of the name from Anantapur into Ānandāpur in modern times is quite obvious, the letters 't' and 'd' in Kannaḍa being interchangeable. Ānandāpur, as elsewhere noticed, is now a railway station on the Shimoga-Arasālu section of the Mysore State Railway.

to them and their power of resistance was completely broken for the moment.²⁷⁸

Thus beaten back, Haidar occupied, by about the end of January 1765, those lines behind
Haidar at bay.

Bednūr, which, as we have seen,²⁷⁹ with the woods and the natural protection of the hills around it, formed its only strength. He now realized, for the first time, that the means by which he had himself achieved the conquest of Bednūr were also open to his enemies; that woods, although a protection to men individually animated in their defence, afford effective means of concealment to troops not forward in the performance of their duty,²⁸⁰ and that he had made the worst possible selection for an asylum for himself. Without any the slightest delay, indeed, before even he occupied the lines, he made arrangements to despatch in secrecy his family, by a route through the woods, to Seringapatam, while successive detachments with treasure followed them to the same place.²⁸¹

Haidar saw that there was only one way out of the difficult situation in which he found himself. After taking Ānandāpur, Mādhava Rao prepared to invest Bednūr itself.²⁸² Haidar saw all would be
Opens negotiations for peace, February 1765.

278. See Wilks, l. c.; Grant-Duff, l. c.; also *Sel. Pesh. Daft., o. c., Letter No. 59*, dated February 28, 1765. See also and compare Peixoto (*Memoirs*, l. c.), who refers to Raṭṭiballī as "Ratali", Ānavatṭi as "Anoutim", etc., and agrees in the main with the other sources in respect of the details of the course of the campaign of 1763-1765.

279. See *Ante*, P. 436.

280. Wilks' phrase is perhaps more impressive. He says "that woods, although a protection to men individually, animated in their defence, are equivalent to the concealment of night for troops who are not forward in the performance of their duty" (l. c.). He adds that "neither Hyder nor Tippoo Sultan, after this period, ever attempted to occupy a *jungle* (wood), although many opportunities occurred when they might (if not diffident of their troops) have done so with infinite advantage" (l. c., f. n.).

281. Wilks, l. c.

282. *Sel. Pesh. Daft., o. c., Letter No. 63*, dated March 30, 1765, from Mādhava Rao to Nānā Fadnis, in which he says he had established

lost, if he now persisted in further war. He tried to retain what he should if he cared for himself. He knew that Vīrammāji and her old courtiers and people were in touch with Mādhava Rao and the continuance of the war would prove disastrous to himself. Haidar, always ready to seize a favourable opportunity, saw in the presence of Raghunātha Rao an easy escape. With the coming into power of Mādhava Rao, Raghunātha Rao was deeply anxious to secure a retreat for himself, if perchance his ambitions were foiled in his own country by the superior talents and bravery of his young nephew. He had kept up, in consequence, a secret and treacherous intercourse with Haidar through his ambassador Appāji Rām.²⁸³ Haidar, with the cunning which characterized him, opened negotiations by sending a Vakīl, while the ground was being prepared by Naro Śankar and Gōpāl Hari, who had been entrusted by Raghunātha Rao with the duty of the final adjustment of the terms. Raghunātha Rao advised Mādhava Rao that the favorable time had arrived for the conclusion of peace and Mādhava Rao, quite unaware of his uncle's treachery, agreed to the suggestion, and what was more honorable to him, though wholly disastrous to him and the Mahratta cause, left the conduct and conclusion of the treaty to his uncle. Now, if ever, was the time to crush Haidar, his most dangerous foe. But Mādhava Rao, guileless as he was and unaware of the true character of his uncle, allowed himself to be deceived. Raghunātha Rao granted the most favorable terms to Haidar, considering the desperate situation to which Haidar had been reduced. Among these were undoubtedly some secret

outposts in the Bednūr province and had laid siege to and taken Anandāpur, and was preparing to invest Bednūr also, when Haidar sent his vakīl suing for peace.

283. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 714, where he refers to this intercourse thus: "An intercourse of civility had long subsisted between Hyder and Ragoba (Raghunātha Rao); it was through his mediation that the peace of Bednore had been effected in 1765," etc.

articles which became the foundation of that good understanding which ever afterwards subsisted between him and Haidar.²⁸⁴

This treaty became known as the "Peace of Bed-nore," having been dictated to Haidar under its walls.²⁸⁵ Under its terms, Haidar engaged²⁸⁶ (1) to restore to Gōpāl Rao of Miraj, Bankāpur, Harihar, Basavāpaṭṇa

The Treaty of Bed-nūr, March 1765.

284. That the treaty was concluded in pursuance of the advice of Raghunātha Rao is made clear from a letter addressed by Mādhava Rao himself to Nānā Fadnis (see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, o. c., Letter No. 63, dated March 30, 1765). Unfortunately the text of Raghunātha Rao's advice in favour of concluding a treaty has not been published in the extract made available in the *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, quoted above. Raghunātha Rao is styled "Dāda" in this letter, a term of filial respect, "Dāda" meaning "father", he being Mādhava Rao's uncle.
285. Wilks calls the treaty by this name, l. c. He, however, places it about the end of February 1765 (o. c., I. 523). From the *Haid-Nām.* (ff. 32), it would appear that the treaty was concluded before 23rd March 1765: *Pārthiva, Chaitra* sū. 2. Peixoto, who hardly specifies the terms of the treaty, dates it 23rd May 1765 (l. c.) But the date given in the *Haid-Nām* is in keeping with the Marathi letters cited here.
286. For the terms of the treaty, which are variously given, see Wilks, o. c., I. 523; Grant-Duff, o. c., I. 546; Kincaid and Parasnīs, o. c., III. 91-92; *Haid-Nām.*, l. c.; and Kirmāṇi, o. c., 176. Kirmāṇi says that "the war was concluded on the payment of two lakhs of Rupees" by Haidar. This Rs. 2 lakhs should be taken as referring to what was paid by him for other expenses, as mentioned in one of the *Letters* cited below, quite apart from Rs. 28 plus 5 lakhs paid as indemnity and *nazar*. Stewart (*Memoirs*, 16-17) says that Haidar paid Rs. 60 lakhs (£600,000), which seems wholly baseless. He himself cites no authority for his statement. See also *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, o. c., *Letters* Nos. 59 (February 28, 1765), 60 and 61 (March 12, 1765). In the first of these, letter No. 59, the first mention of peace negotiations is made. In the second, we have a report of the terms proposed. It mentions Rs. 28 lakhs as the amount agreed to be paid by Haidar for the expenses of the war; Rs. 5 lakhs as *nazar*; and Rs. 2 lakhs for other expenses, making a total of Rs. 35 lakhs. In the third letter, we have mention only of Rs. 28 lakhs as the amount agreed to be paid. This, however, does not mean that that was the only amount actually paid. The *Haid-Nām.* and Wilks mention thirty-two lakhs as the amount agreed to be paid and actually paid (l. c.), which seems not correct. Grant-Duff, following him, repeats the same figure and adds in a footnote (l. c., f. n. 4) that the only Mahratta Ms. where he found any mention of the terms, states 15 lakhs of tribute and the expenses of the war to be defrayed by Haidar. This, however, is not covered by the three letters quoted above. Kincaid and Parasnīs (o. c., III. 92) mention, in one place, that Haidar

and other places included in the Mahratta territories; (2) to relinquish all claims on Nawāb Abdul Hakīm of Savanūr and his country; (3) to cede back to Murāri Rao Ghōrpaḍe of Gooty all his places; and (4) to pay twenty-eight lakhs (*athārīs laksha khaṇḍaṇī jāhālī*) towards the expenses of the war, besides five lakhs as a gift (*nazar*) and a further two lakhs for other expenses, the total thus to be paid in cash amounting to Rs. 35 lakhs. Mādhava Rao, on his part, was to retire on receipt of the money.

When these terms were communicated to Mādhava Rao, he was by no means pleased with them. But, as an honorable man, having authorized his uncle to conclude the treaty, he felt bound to ratify its terms. There is no indication in the records of the period that he was at all aware of the secret terms of the treaty which Naro Śankar negotiated on behalf of Raghunātha Rao. It is possible he did not know of them; if he had known them, it is doubtful if he would have accepted

Reflections on the Treaty.

agreed to pay Rs. 32 lakhs by way of indemnity, but, in another place, state that Mādhava Rao withdrew his forces from the Mysore frontier after the receipt of Rs. 35 lakhs. (Both the statements occur on page 92). The fact seems to be that Haider agreed on the whole to an indemnity of Rs. 35 lakhs and actually paid before Mādhava Rao crossed the Tungabhadra. Letter No 61, quoted above, says that Hari Gōpāl and Naro Śankar, the Mahratta officers on the spot, are trying to see that these terms are carried out actually. Naro Śankar of this letter is the "Naro Shaunkar Dani" mentioned by Kincaid and Parasnīs (l. c.) and "Naroo Shunkur" of Grant-Duff (o.c., I. 521 and 538). He bore the title of "Raja Bahadur" and had been one of the principal officers with Sadāśiva Rao Bhao in his advance towards Delhi, and subsequently commanded for a time in the citadel of Delhi. He had been raised to the office of *Mutālīk* by Raghunātha Rao, which meant virtually the conferring of the office of *Pratinidhi* on him (*Ibid*, 538-539). It is no wonder that he placed implicit trust in him. He had been for long one of the principal officers in the Deccan before he was called northwards. (*Ibid*). On the entire subject of Haider's relations with the Mahrattas (1763-1765), see also and compare a recent article by Dr. N. K. Sinha, where he has mostly drawn upon Peixoto's *Memoirs* and the Marathi letters utilised here (see *Proc. I. II. R. C.*, Vol. XVI. pp. 76-79).

the treaty. Mādhava Rao, while respectful in his attitude towards his uncle and ready to conciliate him by yielding even power to him to the extent that he thought it would be consistent with his situation, was not one likely to yield to him, if he proved himself venal. That apart, the treaty was hardly just to Rāṇi Virammāji and her supporters and what is worse, hardly just even to Mādhava Rao, from whom a higher degree of respect for his own plighted word was bound to be expected. While it is regrettable that he should have agreed to a treaty of peace at the very time he could have taken Bednūr itself and released the Rāṇi and reinstated her or her adopted son, and turned back Haidar across his original frontier, he allowed himself to be practically superseded by his uncle and by him deceived of the full fruits of the campaign, which on the whole had proved successful to Mādhava Rao. It was Raghunātha Rao who stood in the way of the continuation of the war, because of the secret alliance he had set up with Haidar. Mādhava Rao did not want an open rupture with him, though his mother was for steps which might keep Raghunātha Rao under restraint. What induced Mādhava Rao to take a milder attitude was that by himself Raghunātha Rao was not intractable, though while under the influence of his ambitious wife, he was difficult to deal with. Moreover, Raghunātha Rao was in a position to obtain the help of the Nizām of Hyderabad or of Jānōji Bhōṁsle of Berar or of both even, as affairs then stood. This being so, he had to act with some caution and have some regard for himself. In these circumstances, he desired to be friendly with his uncle, until at least the time when he could win over the Nizām to his side. The fact that hardly after he wound up the Mysore campaign, he endeavoured to conciliate by a secret treaty the Nizām at the expense of Jānōji, shows that he had other plans on hand before

he could further continue the campaign against Haidar. He found the Nizām ready for an offensive alliance against Jānōji, with the ultimate object of engaging Mādhava Rao and his army in co-operation against Haidar. The fact that about the beginning of 1766 he entered into a secret compact with the Nizām is fully evidenced by their joint invasion of Berar, and the humbling of Jānōji by making him cede three-fourths of the districts he had recently taken during the last war he had waged was a politic moderation on the part of Mādhava Rao, who left Jānōji something to lose while he advertised to the world that it was the Nizām and not himself who had gained by the war.²⁸⁷ While thus the instinct of self-preservation led Mādhava Rao to lift the siege of Bednūr and conclude peace with Haidar, which was by no means unprofitable to him, there was other justification as to why he could not continue his campaign against Haidar. He had already spent over a year in its prosecution and had to refit his army if he was to continue the war. There is evidence to believe that apart from the losses of men and equipment incidental to a long campaign, he had had to requisition fresh supplies of equipment and fresh reinforcements to make good the losses sustained.²⁸⁸ Mādhava Rao thus desired to further strengthen his position before he attacked Haidar's and relieved Rāṇi Vīrammāji or restored her to her kingdom. At any rate, there is evidence to believe that he desired definitely not to risk another rainy season in Mysore which would soon be on him, if he continued his stay at Bednūr and prolonged his operations. Haidar evidently knew this and the other demands on Mādhava Rao's time and improved

287. The details of this war against Jānōji will be found narrated in Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 547-548.

288. *Sel. Pesh. Daft., o.c.*, *Letters*, Nos. 45 (October 15, 1764) and 58 (November 1, 1764), from Mādhava Rao to Nānā Fadnis, requisitioning a fresh supply of ammunition.

on it by being friendly to Raghunātha Rao and even yielding in his behaviour, especially in the matter of the excessive money demands made by Raghunātha Rao. To avoid an open rupture with his young nephew, the Pēshwa, who did not favour the easy terms offered by him, Raghunātha Rao had to successfully pretend that he was exacting from Haidar much more than what he could stand.²⁸⁹ Likewise, Haidar's occupation of Sīra appears to have been tacitly admitted in the negotiations that preceded the treaty of Bednūr, while all discussions relating to the Pālegārs of Chitaldrug, Rāyadurg, Harapanahalli, etc., seem to have been studiously avoided by both the parties to it. Mādhava Rao laid other contributions during the dry season from March to June 1765. A proper understanding with these Pālegārs and with Murāri Rao was not impossible, as the latter had been conciliated and the former had been beaten on the field. He considered further that the restoration of the places taken from Murāri Rao would furnish the certain means of regaining soon Sīra and the countries to its south-east, immediately he could find time to repeat his visit. To Haidar, who was not inappreciative of keeping silence on all these topics, it seemed best not to talk of them, for that would help him, from an opposite consideration of the very same reasons, to evade all these retrocessions.²⁹⁰ Though the termination of the

289. Stewart (*Memoirs*, 16-17), writing evidently on oral testimony, says that "Hyder Aly, finding himself unable to contend with the Mahrattas in the field, confined his operations to the defence of Bednūr, which being situated in a jungle or forest, and surrounded by several miles of strong entrenchments, enabled him to repel the attacks of his enemies, until the approach of the rainy season, when the Mahrattas consented to retire." This statement shows that Mādhava Rao was wholly unwilling to spend another rainy season at Bednūr as he was then circumstanced. But Haidar knew as well as Mādhava Rao that the Treaty of Bednūr that ended the war was not to be contemplated as a final settlement of accounts between Haidar and the Pēshwa at Poona.

290. On this particular aspect of the matter, see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 523-524,

war can thus be justified without doing any injustice to the reputation of Mādhava Rao, there is no doubt that it sealed the fate of Rāṇi Vīrammāji and her people. Though, as we shall see, she and her son were released in 1767, she was destined to be released only to die on her way to Poona and her adopted son to die later at the Mahratta capital. Her last hopes were blasted with the return of Mādhava Rao about the close of March 1765.²⁹¹

There remains one other point to consider in this connection. Did Mādhava Rao find it impossible, despite the men, money and time he had spent on the campaign, to subdue Haidar immediately he entrenched himself before the walls of Bednūr, after he was compelled to desert his entrenchments at Ānavatṭi and retreat on Bednūr? It will be recalled that Haidar had been beaten back successively from Raṭṭihallī to Ānavatṭi and from Ānavatṭi to Bednūr, and this apart from the withdrawal of his forces from Dhārwar to the southward until he was joined by Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, his general. The trench warfare at Ānavatṭi began early in January 1765 and went on for nearly a full year, indeed, until the treaty of Bednūr was signed. In this situation, if a contemporary account is to be believed,²⁹² Haidar was frequently attacked by the enemy, whom he, by the strength of his situation, as often repulsed with considerable loss. Mādhava Rao, seeing no prospect of an early termination of the war and the restoration of the

291. Wilks (o.c., I. 523) says that Mādhava Rao left Mysore territory after payment was made to him "about the end of February 1765." But he appears to have been in Mysore up to about 30th March 1765, when we find him writing to Nānā Fadnis about the conclusion of the treaty of Bednūr with Haidar (see *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, o.c., Letter No. 63, dated March 30, 1765). The *Haid. Nām.* is probably correct when it says that the Mahrattas retired to Poona on March 23, 1765 (*Parthiva, Chaitra śu. 2*) (see ff. 81-82).

292. Robson, o.c., 33,

Rāṇi of Bednūr, "proposed to return to his dominions and leave Hydur in quiet possession of Biddenoor country", Haidar agreeing to pay Rs. 40 lakhs to Mādhava Rao and twenty more to his minister.²⁹³ Though the latter portion of the statement is not true, the former would make possible the inference that Mādhava Rao resolved upon deserting the Rāṇi's cause finally at the end of his campaign and that he compromised on a basis which was profitable to himself, and that because, he saw he could not subdue Haidar on the field. Apart from the nature of the trench warfare, which Mādhava Rao succeeded after all in making Haidar to give up,²⁹⁴ there is little evidence for this

293. This story is told by Robson, l. c.

294. Trench warfare, as we know, from recent European experience, is to-day even less fruitful of quick results. Despite the assembly of masses of men and of materials, there is no progress. There is no evidence of that quick killing of each other, that evidence of the results of violence with which war has been so long associated in the peoples' minds. It does not conjure up the picture of unremitting military action, counter-action, destruction and desolation, which we associate with a general action. Nor does it facilitate the occurrence of those major military events, which not infrequently prove decisive factors. Men may be lost, but relatively to the loss, the territory gained is poor. Before many months elapsed, Mādhava Rao saw the uselessness of trench warfare and took to the gigantic feat of cutting through the forests behind Haidar's trenches. He swept round, in true Napoleonic fashion, the unprotected right flank of Haidar's forces. This supreme effort on his part resolved the deadlock that had been reached and compelled Haidar to protect his rear. This he did, as we have seen, by giving up his entrenchments and beating a retreat. If Mādhava Rao had not done what he did, there is no gainsaying the fact that he would have lost more men, incurred greater loss of ammunition and, what is worse, absorbed greater time in gaining the results on which he was bent. The lessons of modern trench warfare are yet to be learnt, despite the losses of men and material involved in the European conflict of 1914-18. Indeed the fact that fixed defences and intensified fire power have revolutionised war within the past twenty-five years seems hardly yet realized. It was the failure of the flank movement involved in what was called the Schlieffen plan in the war of 1914-18 that made trench warfare a permanent feature of war as conceived to-day in Europe. The Maginot and Siegfried Lines represent the second stage of this kind of warfare, which consists of the settling down of the opposing armies into an unbroken line of trenches, involving the loss of strategic mobility for both sides and

suggestion. Both Mādhava Rao's character and his subsequent campaign which he prosecuted vigorously and which led to the release of the Rāṇi of Bednūr and her son, show that he only postponed to a future date what he could not carry out conveniently in his first campaign, as the time occupied by it had been prolonged beyond expectations and his presence was required elsewhere for undertaking warfare in another region for the very purpose of continuing the war against Haidar in a more vigorous manner, with a view to humble him the more effectively. Whether the restoration of the Rāṇi or her son would as a matter of fact have come after that anticipated success, at his hands, is not difficult to say. Mādhava Rao's next campaign came off in the cold weather of 1767, when, after taking Maddagiri, he liberated the Rāṇi and her son. He ended it, as we shall see, by ceding back to Haidar the occupied territories on payment of Rs. 35 lakhs. On his march back after the receipt of this amount, he took the Rāṇi and her son with him. The Rāṇi died on the way to Poona, while her son died later at the Mahratta capital. Mādhava Rao's next Mysore campaign came off in the cold weather of 1769, which was the swiftest and the biggest one he undertook. But in the middle of this campaign, as will be narrated below, he fell ill and left its completion to one of his generals. The campaign ended by the treaty of Seringapatam between Haidar and Triambak Rao in June 1772. The result of this third campaign was that Haidar was compelled to surrender all the territory that formed Śivāji's conquests in Mysore, including Kōlār,

rendering opportunity of manœuvring almost impossible. It may be that this deadlock can never be broken by military effort alone. Mādhava Rao instinctively saw the impossibility of the situation and adopted the device of turning the right flank of his enemy. The Germans find it difficult to-day to adopt this old solution because of the existence of neutral territory on both sides, which they cannot break through.

Bangalore, Hoskōṭe, Chikballāpur, Doḍballāpur and Sīra, besides the fortresses of Maddagiri and Gurramkoṇḍa. This meant the reduction of Mysore to a smaller area; in fact, the loss of all its territories beyond the present districts of Mysore and part of Hassan. This retrocession in favour of Mādhava Rao included Bangalore, Kōlār, Tumkūr and Shimoga districts, thus comprising the whole of the old Bednūr territory. Mādhava Rao had thus an opportunity to restore Rāṇi Virammāji's adopted son or a *scion* of that family to the throne of Bednūr. He was still presumably alive at Poona but before Mādhava Rao could do any thing, he himself died on the 18th November 1772 and with his death all chance of his restoration vanished out of sight. After the death of the adopted son, which followed not long after, there were no claimants left on his behalf and the turn of events that came off in 1773 confirmed Mysore in the possession of all the territories that had been ceded back to Mādhava Rao only two years before, despite the adverse attempts made by the Mahrattas, as will be narrated below.

Mādhava Rao's first campaign in Mysore, however, impressed Haidar that he had to deal with a new force that had made itself felt on the Mahratta side. He had seen how under that influence the Mahrattas had recovered without difficulty and with all expedition from the rout at Pāṇipat and how they had equally quickly sought to recover their lost position in the Karnāṭak. Whether the relief of Bednūr was a mere pretext or a real objective, they had, under the leadership of the young Pēshwa, pushed forward and driven back Haidar to the south of the Tungabhadra. The campaign of Mādhava Rao had lasted, it is true, for over a year and had cost him men and money but the outstanding fact was that Haidar, though not crushed, had had to pay a heavy indemnity and meet other charges as well, and he knew

The Pēshwa's first campaign and after.

equally well he had not seen the end of his troubles on the Mahratta frontier. He knew also he had to reckon with Mādhava Rao. He had resolved on a friendship with Raghunātha Rao, the Pēshwa's uncle, to meet all possible contingencies that might arise, and, as we shall see, he was making up his mind to get into closer touch with the new Nizām, Nizām Ali, who had displaced his brother Salābat Jang and who, if he joined Mādhava Rao, would prove a combination which would mean a danger to Mysore generally and to Haidar personally. And Haidar was uncertain of the English at Madras and he had his own designs against them, especially as he had yet to square his accounts with them in the matter of the Trichinopoly deal. This was the position as he saw it and at the time the treaty of Bednūr was signed by both the parties to it, and the Mahrattas crossed the Tungabhadra satisfied, if not wholly elated, with their partial success.²⁹⁵ After the Mahrattas retired to their homelands, Haidar turned his attention to those who had conspired with them to bring this invasion on him from across the border. Many permanently fled from the country rather than fall into his hands. Those who had the misfortune to be caught were punished with

295. On the whole subject of this campaign of Mādhava Rao, see *Haid. Nām*, ff. 31-32; *Sel. Pesh. Daft*; o. c., *Letters* Nos 29-32, 34, 36-42, 44-55, 59-63; *Fort St. George Records, Mily. Coun. Corres.*, XII. 171-175, *News-letters* down to April 3, 1764; XIII. 32-34. Among other authorities on the Mysore-Mahratta tangle (1764-1765), De La Tour has nothing to say on the subject. Robson's account (o. c., 32-34) is very meagre, though, as mentioned above, he maintains that the Mahratta rupture with Haidar was the direct result of, and conditioned by, his conquest of Bednūr. Stewart antedates the event, referring it to 1763, while his account (o. c., 16-17) is very brief, based mostly on later writings, though he maintains the same point of view as Robson. Kirmāni postdates the event, placing it in 1766 (A. H. 1078? 1180). His account (o. c., 167-177) agrees in general outline with the account of the *Haid. Nām*. It, however, does not set down the sequence of events correctly and omits all mention of the rout at Anavatti. Wilks' account (o. c., I. 517-523) is in general agreement with the course of affairs described from contemporary sources, though he also omits all mention of material parts of the fight.

"the greatest rigour and barbarity."²⁹⁶ He then made arrangements for governance of the country during his absence. He does not seem to have disturbed the civil administration already fixed for it, but left Tipū, his son, in command of the place, while he nominated Lālā Mean, who had married Haidar's sister, to the command of a strong fort, a few miles off from Bednūr.²⁹⁷

During the time the Mahratta war was in progress, Haidar received a pressing message for help from Muhammad Yusuf Khān, who commanded Madura in the English interests and had rebelled against them and been, in consequence, closely invested by them at Madura.²⁹⁸ Muhammad Yusuf was, in some respects, a remarkable man. Commonly known as *Khān Sā*—an abbreviation of *Khān Sāheb*, a double title denoting dignity—he

Overtures for the
cession of Madura
and Tinnevely
countries, 1768-1764.

M u h a m m a d
Yusuf's adventurous
career (down to 1754).

296. Robson, *o.c.*, 33. Though he is the only person who furnishes any information on this head, he is most laconic in his description of what was perpetrated. His words should perhaps be taken as illustrative rather than descriptive of the fate that overtook those who were concerned in the affair. Knowing as we do Haidar's general character and remembering what he did after the insurrection that followed the conquest of Bednūr, we can picture to ourselves what he should have done.

297. The identity of this place has not been possible. But it may be Anantapur (*alias* Ānandāpur), which is about 25 miles to the north-east of Bednūr. It was in olden days a stronghold of Bednūr, with a fort, which, though now in ruins, figured much in the wars of the 18th century. See *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 1271-1274, for further information about its annals.

298. See, for the whole story of Yusuf Khān's adventurous career, S.C. Hill *Yusuf Khan, the Rebel Commandant*, which is both luminous in its treatment of the period and of the man, and well documented from the point of view of the critical historian. The sources relied on by Mr. Hill include the records at *Fort St. George*, Madras; the *Orme Mss.* in the India Office; papers in the Dutch and French Archives; Mss. in the British Museum; the Public Record Office, and the Bibliothèque Nationale. Among other authorities consulted by him should be specially mentioned Le Chevalier Marchand's *Precis Historique* (Paris, 1771), and Comte Louis Laurent de Federke Maudave's *Lettre* dated 20th April 1764 and *Relation* (*Archives du Ministère des Colonies*, Paris, unpublished).

was born of good Hindu parents and had turned a Muhammadan in his later life and taken the resounding name and title of Muhammad Yusuf Khān, a name and title that stuck to him ever after.²⁹⁹ His life history shows that he was eminently a product of his times. Early in his life, he ran away from his house,³⁰⁰ took service under Chevalier Jacques Law, the famous French General who figured on Chandā Sāhib's side from 1744 and afterwards became in 1767 Commander-in-Chief of the French East India Company. At the end of some three and a half years of service, he was dismissed by Law, evidently for misconduct. Through Law's aid, however, he learnt English and French, and probably also Portuguese. He then joined the service of the Rāja of Tanjore, with whom, however, he does not appear to have stayed for long. He next sought service under Muhammad Alī, the Nawāb of Arcot, and rose under him to the position of Subādār, corresponding to Captain in the then English army at Madras. He is believed to have married a Portuguese woman, of whom little is known.³⁰¹ Leaving Muhammad Alī's service, he

299. According to tradition, he was born of Vellāla parents. His Hindu name was, it would appear, Maruthanāyagam Pillai. He is said to have been born at Panīyūr in the present Rāmnāḍ district (see *Yusuf Khan*, 1). His predilection for Vellālas was great. His agent at Madras, during the siege in 1753, was a Vellāla named Moota Pillai, more correctly Moothu Pillai (see *Orme Mss.*, 278, P. 13). His guide when he visited the Minākshi temple at Madura and decided to restore its revenues, when he held Madura, was one Mutterugghu Pillai, evidently Muttalangu Pillai (see Taylor, *O. H. Mss.*, *Pandion Chronicle*, 41). On the birth of a son to him, he was presented with a golden cradle by Tāṇḍavarāya Pillai, Prime Minister of Rāmnāḍ (see *Mackenzie Mss.*, XVI. 5-13). For Yusuf Khān's early life, see *Yusuf Khan* Ch. I. He was always on good and friendly terms with the Maravas of Rāmnāḍ and they favoured him as against his opponents, see *Ibid.*, 1.

300. He is said to have been wild in his youth and disobedient to his parents (*Yusuf Khan*, 1).

301. The Tamil ballad, *The War of the Khān Sāheb*, gives her name as *Maza*, which is probably short for *Mazzaroth*, a distinctly scriptural name (*Ibid.*, 5).

joined Chandā Sāhib and in this new rôle, he served under one Muhammad Kamāl, who held Nellore in Chandā Sāhib's interests. With Razā Sāhib, he is known to have taken part in storming the trenches at Arcot, in 1751, when Clive commanded there.³⁰² He, later, however, deserted with his troops to Clive,³⁰³ and joined the English and served with distinction under Dalton, in 1752, in defeating Mons.d' Auteuil, the French Commander, at Utatūr and Volkonḍa.³⁰⁴ He helped materially Lawrence, the English General, in holding Trichinopoly against Nanjarāja and the French after the breach of the secret treaty by Muhammad Alī, especially by bringing in safely the convoys on which Lawrence so much depended.³⁰⁵ He proved himself so useful in this work that an attempt was made by the Mysoreans to get rid of him, so that the fall of Trichinopoly may be facilitated.³⁰⁶ Lawrence was so much impressed by his abilities and zeal for service, that he wrote more than once to the President and Council at Madras commending him to their approbation. "Besides his intelligence and capacity," he reported, "I cannot too much praise his zeal and alacrity for the service. He always prevents my asking by offering himself for everything; and executes what he goes about as well and as briskly as he attempts it. Some mark of your regard by a letter and some little present would keep up that useful spirit besides rewarding merit."³⁰⁷ In his own *Journal*, however, Lawrence had written of him in even higher terms. "He is," he noted down, "an excellent

302. *Ibid*, 10-11.

303. He seems to have raised troops while yet in the service of Muhammad Kamāl at Nellore. It was evidently for this reason—his service under Kamāl in the Nellore country—that he was known as the *Nellore Subādār* (*Ibid*, 3, f. n. 4). He joined Clive a little before the battle of Kāvēripāk (Orme, *Indostan*, I. 346-347).

304. *Ibid*, 10-11.

305. *Ibid*, 14-18; also Orme, *o. c.*, I. 357.

306. *Ibid*, 15-17, quoting Orme, *Mss.*, 13, pp. 115-181; see Orme, *o. c.*, 348-353.

307. *Ibid*, 19; *Mily. Cons.*, 20th March 1754.

partisan (i.e., an officer of the irregular troops), knows the country well, is brave and resolute but cool and sensible in action--in fact he is a born soldier, and better of his colour I never saw in the country. He never spares himself, but is out on all parties, and by his good intelligence brought in provisions to keep us in a moderate plenty we wanted much to prolong the time till Mahfuz Khan could join us."³⁰⁸ The President and Council at Madras, in view of this high commendation, appointed Muhammad Yusuf, on 30th April 1754, as Commandant of all the Company's sepoy and presented him with a gold medal "as a distinguishing mark and reward of his bravery and good service."³⁰⁹ Still higher rewards awaited him.

The history of Madura since the time it passed into the hands of Chandā Sāhib is briefly told. When he got it from Queen Minākshi in 1736 under a false oath, he put his elder brother Baḍā Sāhib in possession of it.³¹⁰ When Chandā Sāhib was in dire straits at Trichinopoly in 1741, Baḍā Sāhib advanced with a large convoy and escort to his brother's aid and was there defeated and killed.³¹¹ The Mahrattas next

308. *Orme Mss.*, 13, p. 78. Orme, in his *Indōstan* (I. 346-347), describes him in identical language. He speaks of him as "an excellent partisan, whose merit had raised him, from a captain of a company, to be Commander-in-Chief of all the sepoy in the English service.....he was a brave and resolute man, but cool and wary in action, and capable of stratagem: he constantly procured intelligence of the enemy's motions, and, having a perfect knowledge of the country, planned the marches of the convoys so well, that by constantly changing the roads, and the times of bringing the provisions out of the woods, not one of them was intercepted for three months." Orme evidently owed his description in part at least to Lawrence.

309. See *Yusuf Khan*, 19-22; *Mily. Cons.*, 13th May 1754; 14th May 1754; 23rd September 1754; 30th September 1754; 27th March 1755. See also Orme, *o.c.*, I. 421; and Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, I. 74.

310. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 39. Orme spells his name as "Buda Saheb." See also *Ante Ch. IV. pp. 72-73*, where this subject is noticed in an attempt to trace the Mysorean relations with the Mughals (1736-1737).

311. *Ibid.*, 44.

occupied it,³¹² but on the advance of Nizām-ul-mulk, in 1744, they yielded possession of it. But Nizām-ul-mulk's possession of it was more nominal than secure and Anwar-ud-dīn, the Nawāb of the Karnātic, claimed it as the representative of Nizām-ul-mulk in the South, though he too never took effective possession of it. On Anwar-ud-dīn's death and the coming into power of Muhammad Alī, Abdul Rahīm, his brother, was nominated to it. But it does not seem that any attempt was made to occupy either Madura or Tinnevely until two years later. In 1751, he marched with Lieut. Innis and took possession of Tinnevely. But while he was away in Tinnevely, Ālam Khān, a soldier of fortune, who had been formerly in the service of Chandā Sāhib, and afterwards in that of the Rāja of Tanjore, wrested Madura (in 1751) from Abdul Rahīm.³¹³ After taking possession of the place, he declared himself in favour of Chandā Sāhib and held it in his interests.³¹⁴ Captain James Cope, who was in charge of Trichinopoly, was sent by the English at the request of Muhammad Alī, to retake the place.³¹⁵ Muhammad Alī, however, repeated his request and put obstacles in the way of Captain Cope proceeding on his mission. Captain Cope at last

312. *Ibid.* Trichinopoly fell into Mahratta hands on the surrender of Chandā Sāhib on 26th March 1741, and the rest of the country was occupied by them shortly thereafter.

313. *Ibid.*, 169. Orme says that Ālam Khān "had lately left this prince" (i.e., the king of Tanjore) and gone to Madura, "where his reputation as an excellent officer soon gained him influence and respect, which he employed to corrupt the garrison (at Madura), and succeeded so well, that the troops created him governor, and consented to maintain the city and his authority for Chunda-sahab, whom he acknowledged as his sovereign." It seems fairly inferable from the latter statement that Ālam Khān was in close touch with Chandā Sāhib and that he took possession of Madura only in his interests. His subsequent conduct—his proceeding to Chandā Sāhib's succour in 1752—fully confirms this inference. The city of Madura, as it existed at about this period, is thus described by Orme:—"Its form is nearly a square 4,000 yards in circumference, fortified with a double wall and a ditch."

314. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, 169-171; see also *Pub. Cons.*, 17th Dec. 1750.

started in February 1751, with a force consisting of 150 Europeans and Coffres and 400 sepoys and one gun. He was impeded in his progress by "woods, poligars, rogues, etc.," as Orme facetiously puts it,³¹⁶ and by Muhammad Ali himself, who made requests that some minor forts should be subdued, which his own officers could not reduce. At Madura, Cope was joined by Abdul Rahīm, with 2,500 horse, 3,000 peons and soldiers and Topasses under Lieut. John Innis, and one gun. Cope was warned by Innis of treachery on the part of Abdul Rahīm's chief officers, who had sworn to deliver Cope's head into the hands of Ālam Khān. Undaunted, Cope took up a position, some 500 yards from the fort, but so well protected that no gun could reach it and opened a continuous fire against the fort from a twelve-pounder that he brought up and mounted. Soon he effected a breach but, despite his gallant efforts, was driven off with the loss of 90 men. Retreat became a necessity and Cope returned unmolested to Trichinopoly on 10th April 1751.³¹⁷ The greater portion of what remained of Abdul Rahīm's troops—500 horse and 1000 peons—went over to Ālam Khān. Ālam Khān continued in possession for a year and then left for Trichinopoly, where he died gallantly fighting.³¹⁸ Before his departure, however, he put Madura in charge of one Mayana, described as a relation of his.³¹⁹ In June 1752, Muhammad Ali, the Nawāb of Arcot, with a view to compensate

316. *Ibid.*, II. 268-276.

317. James Wilson's *Narrative*, *Orme Mss.*, 15, p. 4. Cope's retreat became known at Fort St. David 26 days after his arrival at Trichinopoly—see *Pub. Cons.*, 6th May 1751. Orme gives a full account of Cope's attempt—see *Indostan*, I. 169-171.

318. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 209, 216. Orme says his head was taken off by a cannon-ball, as he was encouraging his troops to advance—*Ibid.*, 216.

319. Orme states that when Ālam Khān proceeded to Trichinopoly in aid of Chandā Sāhib, he kept the countries of Madura and Tinnevely under the management of three Pathān officers, "named Mahomed Barky, Mahomed Mainach, and Nabi Cawn Catteek; the first of these was generally known by the appellation of Mianah, the second

the claims of Nanjarāja on Trichinopoly, "meant to give up the fort of Madura with its dependencies," which included, to use the words of Orme, "a very large district."³²⁰ But, as may be expected, this was but a patent fraud, for the place was not in his possession.³²¹ Alam Khān's deputy was in actual

of Moodemiah; but Nabi Cawn Catteck by his own proper name" (Orme, *o.c.*, 399). From this, it would seem not incorrect to identify "Mahomed Barky" *alias* "Mianah" with the "Māyana" of later writers. Barky was the son-in law of Nabi Khān. All these three were the signatories to a paper which Muhammad Ali, the Nawāb of Arcot, subsequently produced as evidence of title to the sovereignty of the Madura and Tinnevely countries (*Ibid.*).

320. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 244.

321. It was, indeed, acknowledged later, in 1755, that Muhammad Ali actually made over Madura to the Mysoreans, his offer being cancelled on the alleged ground of the Mysorean alliance with the French. (*Mily. Cons.*, 25th Aug. 1755). But, as we know from other sources, Alam Khān's deputy Miana was in charge, and he handed it over to Khoob Khān, the Mysorean officer, a Pathān, because they had both been friends of the French, the allies at one time of Mysore as also of Chandā Sāhib, his master's master. This explains the position as set down in the text above. It is possible—though there is no *direct* evidence on the point—that Nanjarāja bought up Miana and induced him to hand over Madura to Khoob Khān. The subsequent allegation of Muhammad Ali that Miana and his associates had acknowledged his sovereignty over the countries held by them or that they had "professed themselves his servants and subjects" is doubted by Orme, the historian of the time. "The writing" Muhammad Ali produced in support of the statement made by him was hardly believed by Orme and the President and Council of Madras. As Orme says, "at this time, Chundasaheb indeed had perished; but the Nabob (Muhammad Ali) himself was involved in such difficulties by the resentment of the Mysoreans, that there does not appear any reason why the Pitans (i.e., the Pathāns Miana and his two associates) should give such a declaration, unless they did it from a conviction of the very little advantage which the Nabob could derive from it. It is certain they never afterwards heeded these professions of obedience, but continued to act without controul, and acted only for themselves; granting immunities, remitting tributes, and even selling forts and districts for presents of ready money. This venality coinciding with the spirit of independence and encroachment common to all the Polygars, procured them not only wealth but attachments. In this mode of licentious government, they continued agreeing among themselves in the division of the spoil, and ruling with much power" (Orme, *o.c.*, I. 399). It is this "venality" that suggests the inference that they were capable of being bought up by Nanjarāja. But, as Orme adds that they were "ruling with much power" until the expedition

occupation of it and he passed it into the hands of Khoob Khān, a Jamādār in the service,³²² who had joined the Mysore army under Nanjarāja. He had been, before then, deputed by Nanjarāja to serve with Haidar Alī and his brother Śābās in putting down certain Pālegār chiefs—those of Rāyakōṭa, Hosūr and Bāgalūr—in the Bārāmahal area in 1751. When Muhammad Alī, in 1752, pretended to hand over Trichinopoly fort to Nanjarāja,³²³ Jamādār Khoob Khān Saiyid Budduni Dekhani and Umar Singh were despatched with Katti Gōpālārāj Urs and Venkaṭa Rao Beraki (Barakki) and an army consisting of 2,000 foot and 700 horse, to enter and take charge of it.³²⁴ They were deceived into entering it and confined there.³²⁵ They were later released.³²⁶ Khoob Khān's administration was evidently of a misguided character and it could not last.³²⁷ Whether this was so or not, there is no

of Col. Heron, when Miana, who commanded the city of Madura, abandoned it and took refuge with the neighbouring Pālegārs of Nattam while his two associates did the same with another neighbouring Pālegār and returned to their respective charges immediately Heron left Madura (*Ibid.*, 399-400), it is clear that Khoob Khān Sāhib's possession could not have lasted long.

322. He is mentioned by Kirmāṇi by name at least twice and by implication thrice in his work. (See Kirmāṇi, o.c., 82, 88 and 89). At p. 82 of his work, he gives Khoob Khān's full name and titles thus: "Khoob Sāhib Dukkuni Jamādār" i.e., Jamādār Khoob Sāhib, who belonged to Dekhan.

323. See Orme, o.c., I. 243, 246 and 271.

324. Kirmāṇi, o.c., 88.

325. *Ibid.*, 39.

326. *Ibid.*, 50.

327. One authority, the *Pandion Chronicle* (included in Rev. Taylor's O. H. Mss., 41) says that Khoob Khān defiled the town by killing and eating cows and by cutting down cocoanut trees. Khoob Khān has been identified wrongly with Cope (Nelson, *Madura Country*, III. 270-271). As pointed out by Hill, Capt. Cope was an English officer who was never in the Mysore service. He was mortally wounded at Kistnavaram and died on 4th February 1752 (*Mily. Cons.*, 10th Feb. 1752). Col. Heron speaks of a "Khoob Sāheb" as a Mysore officer, creating trouble with some horse and sepoys in Madura. This "Khoob Sāheb" may be justly identified with "Khoob Sāhib Dukkuni Jamādār" of Kirmāṇi. As stated above, Khoob Sāhib is mentioned by Kirmāṇi as a Pathān in the Mysore service. He is, besides, referred to by Nawāb Muhammad Alī as "Coob Saib" (i.e., Khoob Sāhib) Jamādār belonging to the "Mysorian" (see *Count. Corres.*, 1754, No. 22).

question that the Hindu chiefs—the Tonḍamān and the Maravan and other Pāḷegārs—urged on Muhammad Ali the restoration of the Hindu dynasty in Madura, but he, as might be expected, turned a deaf ear to them.³²⁸ The Maravan Pāḷegārs took advantage of the situation, took the lead, and re-established, for a while at least, the old Hindu reigning family.³²⁹ When Khoob Khān was turned out, Miana and his associates re-appeared on the scene and re-occupied Madura.³³⁰ They do not appear

328. There is some doubt whether Khoob Khān could have acted so foolishly as he is represented to have done in the *Pandion Chronicle*, especially as one acting on Nanjarāja's part. It is possible, his mistakes or his attempts at assertion of authority turned the local people against him, who took occasion to restore the native dynasty of rulers.

329. The *Fort St. George Records* for 1754 state that repeated representations were made to the English at Madras and to Muhammad Ali to restore the ancient dynasty to power by the Tonḍaimān and the Pāḷegār chiefs of the Marava country, but they both either refused to entertain the appeals or act by themselves for obvious reasons. The English were anxious to get the revenue collections to themselves so that the money advanced to Muhammad Ali may be paid off, while Muhammad Ali wanted to secure the country to himself as against every other claimant or demandant. That was the reason why his brother Mahfuz Khān schemed against him, and that was also the reason why Chandā Sāhib and his representatives had their eyes on the Madura and Tinnevely countries. That gave an opportunity to Nanjarāja, the Mysore Dalavāi, and his agents to get hold of it in their scheme of southern conquest. Their previous connection with these countries helped them to execute their designs on them from time to time.

330. We do not hear of Khoob Khān any further even in Kirmāṇi's work. Orme seems right when he suggests that the three Pathān officers occupied Madura and Tinnevely as the representatives of Alam Khān (*Indostan*, I. 399) and not on behalf of Muhammad Ali. Orme's account, however, does not either refer to Khoob Khān's temporary occupation and to his being turned out, or to the restoration of the Hindu dynasty for a while. That seems to be the reason why the occupation of Miana and his two associates appears in his pages as a continuous one. It was apparently far otherwise; first, they occupied the country after Alam Khān's death; then evidently handed over possession of it to Khoob Sāhib; and again reasserted their authority after the old Hindu dynasty and its protagonists had turned out Khoob Sāhib. The period is undoubtedly a confused one, so much so that indeed Hill, in his *Yusuf Khan* (p. 30), is forced to remark that "it is difficult to obtain any exact information as to what happened in Madura for the next two or three years," i.e., from 1752 to 1755. The account in the text above is based on

to have paid any rent to Muhammad Ali, though the latter produced a document alleged to have been executed by them, on 29th November 1752, that they held the Madura and Tinnevely countries under him. Nothing more conclusive would seem to be necessary that the alleged document was a forged one and that they had, as Orme says, "acted for themselves," and not, as suggested by Muhammad Ali, in "obedience" to him. But Muhammad Ali persuaded the Madras Council into action evidently by suggesting that the conquest of Madura and Tinnevely countries would help to reimburse their empty coffers. The English too found, at about the time peace was concluded between them and the French in 1754-1755, that they should first endeavour to get back from Muhammad Ali the expenditure they had incurred in the war they had waged in his behalf. The English being his chief, if not the sole, creditors, were thus called upon to help him to secure possession of the territories that he claimed as his own, including among them the Madura and Tinnevely countries. Muhammad Ali accordingly requested, on 25th November 1754, that an expedition might be undertaken for the purpose against Miana and his associates.³³¹ His legal right to these territories was based on a *farman* alleged to have been received from Delhi on 24th March 1751,³³² appointing him

a consideration of all the different authorities. Hill's account (o.c., 30-31) omits to note the occupation of the country by Miana and his associates for a second time. Hill follows Orme and dates their occupation as having come about 29th November 1752, the date of the alleged written document in favor of Muhammad Ali, referred to above (see Orme, l.c. For the text of the document, see *Count. Corres.*, 1755, No. 32).

331. *Madras Fort St. George Records: Count. Corres.*, 1754, No. 422.

332. The alleged *farman* bore the date 29th January 1750. It will be found in *Count. Corres.*, 1751, where it is appended to document No. 28. The Madras Council were quick enough to note a peculiarity about the *farmans* produced by Muhammad Ali. "It has been more than once observed," they remarked in one of their consultations, "during the course of this war (the Karnatic War), that whenever anything

Nawāb of Arcot, and ruler over the dependent territories of Madura and Tinnevely, while the document alleged to have been executed in his favour by Miana and his associates was held to be a fair answer to the French complaint that the English were helping him in attacking their allies. Thus induced, the Madras Council determined on subduing the Madura and Tinnevely countries in the interests of Muhammad Ali.

The President and Council at Madras, accordingly, chose Lieut.-Col. Alexander Heron
1754-1755.
for this duty. He had arrived in India in September 1754 as Major of the Madras garrison and Third in Council, and he joined the forces at Trichinopoly, which were then cantoned at Uraiyyūr. Here he was joined by Yusuf Khān, who was then in high favour at Madras as his adviser³³³. He left Uraiyyūr about the beginning of February 1755 with 500 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys, the latter commanded by Yusuf Khān, besides 1,000 horse led by Mahfuz Khān, the elder brother of Nawāb Muhammad Ali,³³⁴ who also accompanied

material has been on the carpet, the Nawab (Muhammad Ali) has always received, or pretended to receive, such letters from Court (the Court at Delhi) as might divert us from our plan if disagreeable to him, or encourage us to pursue it if suited his purpose" (see *Mily. Cons.*, 29th April 1754).

333. Hill, *Yusuf Khan*, 21 and 32. Heron could not hit it off with Yusuf Khān and began soon enough to prefer complaints against him. See his letter to Orme, dated 10th January 1755 (*Orme Mss.*, 48, p. 34). Knowing the character of Heron, we have, as Hill suggests, to treat his observations *cum grano salis*.

334. Mahfuz Khān was the elder brother of Muhammad Ali, the Nawāb, but, being alleged to be the son of a woman of low origin, is said to have been passed over for the Nawābship of the Karnātic (Hill, *o.c.*, 26, f.n. 3). Hill, however, quotes no authority for his statement. Orme merely mentions the fact that Mahfuz was the "eldest son" of Anwar-ud-din (*Indostan*, I. 73). De La Tour, on the contrary, makes Muhammad Ali (and not Mahfuz Khān) the low born son of Anwar-ud-din. After stating that Anwar-ud-din had several sons, he remarks that "Maffous Khan, his eldest son, was designed for his successor; but his predilection was in favour of a son whom the law excluded from the succession, as being born out of the house, and by a Bayadere, or woman reputed common. He gave

the expedition during a part of its progress³³⁵. After reducing the Pālegār of Kumāravāḍi, two miles off the road to Diṇḍigal, he arrived at Madura on 5th March 1755. Miana fled in terror and Madura thus fell to Heron without a blow. He next marched on to Tinnevely, where Moodemiah and Nabi Khān, Miana's associates, were in power³³⁶. These joined Pulidēvar, chief of the western Pālegārs of Tinnevely, whose chief town was Nelkattam-sevval. Here he received overtures for peace from the Maravan chiefs, and Heron, without reference to the Nawāb or the Madras Council, concluded a treaty with them.³³⁷ Next he pushed on to Tinnevely, which he reached on the 25th March 1755. Here the Pālegārs would not yield. Heron took Nellicotah, identified with Natta Kottai,³³⁸ but failed to reduce Nelkattam-sevval. Meanwhile, details of his irregular conduct—both as to the atrocities committed by him and his troops and the corrupt practices indulged in by him—reached Madras, and the Madras Council determined to recall him³³⁹. The successes of Bussy in the Deccan also induced them towards this move, though the real

Trichinopoly, a strong place on the Caveri, with a considerable territory, to this son, who was named Mehemet Ali Khan" (De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, I. 14-15).

335. He left shortly after the submission of the Pālegār of Kumāravāḍi, see Hill, *o.c.*, 35.

336. Hill, *l.c.*

337. In justice to Heron, it must be stated that he was misled into making this treaty by Nawāb Muhammad Ali. Col. Heron, in explaining his conduct in this regard, produced a letter from the Nawāb, authorizing him to forgive the Maravans on their complete submission and payment of the alleged tribute due. But the letter was so dubiously worded that it left ample scope for the Nawāb to repudiate his permission if every condition laid down was not fulfilled to the letter! (see *Mily. Cons.*, 27th May 1755). This sort of trickery was in keeping with Muhammad Ali's character. See Col. Donald Campbell's *Letter* 26th May 1767 (*Orme Mss.*, 308, p. 27).

338. Caldwell, *Tinnevely*, 95.

339. Among the charges were that he received Rs. 20,000 from Mahfuz Khān while further sums were given to the other English officers and their *Dubashes* (agents). See *Mily. Cons.*, 17th Sept. 1755.

reason was that in illegally enriching himself, Heron had failed to make the expedition pay its own expenses. Among the chief charges against him were that he had paid more attention to the amount of the presents brought to him than to the collection of the amounts due; his taking a present from Mahfuz Khān, the Faujdār of Madura and Tinnevely, and making him renter as well of these countries without the requisite sanction³⁴⁰. Apart from the question whether he made a good or a bad bargain from the financial point of view, in thus leasing the countries to Mahfuz Khān,³⁴¹ there is hardly any doubt that the Madras Council and the Nawāb were extremely indignant at Heron's action. He started back from Madura on the 2nd May 1755. On his way, he was severely attacked at the Nattam Pass by the Kallars and narrowly escaping a serious disaster³⁴²,

340. Heron had no authority vested in him to appoint any one as the renter; he had to collect the alleged tributes due with another civil officer and a representative of the Nawāb.

341. Hill, after going into the question, arrives at the conclusion that it does not appear that "Heron made such a very bad bargain with Mahfuz Khan", when he allowed him to become renter on payment of an annual sum of Rs. 15 lakhs; moreover, it has to be noted that the lease was to be for three months only (see Hill, *o.c.*, 38-39). All the same, he had no authority whatever to rent and much less to take a present from Mahfuz Khān for the favor he was showing.

342. Heron makes light of the disaster in his official report, in which he declares that "the principal loss of the baggage was private property" and that the Company lost their old tents which were almost unserviceable, a few barrels of damaged ammunition and a few firelocks that had been delivered into the Quarter-Master's stores to be mended. These few men would not have suffered had they not been sick and unarmed and straggled out of the road. "We met with no other difficulty on our route" (Heron to Madras Council, 7th June 1755, *Mily. Cons.*, 19th June 1755). Capt. Joseph Smith, in his account of the expedition, gives a very different version of the affair (*Orme Mss.*, India, III. 608-612. It accompanies a letter dated 4th July 1763). Smith ends his account with these words: "The behaviour of our commanding officer and captains on that day deserved every punishment you can name. However they are at rest—We will let them remain so." Except Smith, all of the officers were dead at the time the letter was written (see Hill, *o.c.*, 40-43, for the text of the letter). Wilson, in his *History of the Madras Army*, I. 75, accepts Capt. Joseph Smith's version.

was tried by Court-Martial on various charges and dismissed the Company's service³⁴³. It does not appear he had a fair trial, but however that may be, he broke his arrest, and escaping to the Dutch at Sadras and thence to Pondicherry, got safely to Europe³⁴⁴.

Dissatisfied with his brother's administration, Muhammad Ali, in 1756, urged on the English at Madras to take decisive steps to subjugate the region³⁴⁵. Not being able to spare any European troops for the purpose³⁴⁶, they sent, in 1756, Muhammad Yusuf, the commandant of all their sepoy, with 1,400 men, with orders to combine them with the troops of Mahfuz Khān and Muhammad Ali and take command of the whole force, and with its aid to restore order. Muhammad Yusuf soon found that Mahfuz Khān was there for his own purposes and not to do anything to the bidding of either Muhammad Ali or the English. With his connivance, the Madras sepoy stationed at Madura were disarmed; Madura fort was occupied; and the surrounding Pālegārs openly began to assist Mahfuz in re-establishing himself in the place. Mahfuz had the greater reason to do all this in his own behalf, as the country had been re-assigned at the instance of his brother Muhammad Ali to another renter who had been granted plenary civil and criminal jurisdiction within the country on condition that he would maintain not less than 1,000 sepoy belonging to the English Company. Hearing of what had happened, Muhammad Yusuf marched at once on Madura, and encamped 4 miles off to its

343. The articles of the charges against him of which he was convicted were: (1) perverting the intention of his commission, and (2) breach of orders (see Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II. 476).

344. Wilson adds that he absconded to Pondicherry before the publication of the sentence (o.c., I. 70, f.m. 1).

345. Hill, o.c., 50-51; Wilson, o.c., I. 182-195; also Appendix B to that work.

346. Orme, o.c., I. 421.

southward with 1,500 sepoys and six field-pieces. Finding he could not storm the place, he sent word to Captain Calliaud at Trichinopoly. Calliaud marched towards Madura and opened negotiations with Mahfuz but he soon saw that the matter was beyond a peaceful settlement. In May 1757, he made a gallant attempt to carry Madura fortress by a night surprise, but was repulsed with loss³⁴⁷. In July following, he made another attempt but was again unsuccessful³⁴⁸. Eventually the place was given up to Calliaud on his paying a large sum to Mahfuz and his party. This, however, did not mean peace to the country or peaceful occupation to Muhammad Ali's party. Disturbances continued on all sides. The Kallars ravaged the country in every direction. Haidar, evidently in touch with Mahfuz³⁴⁹, and keen on making the most of his position at Dindigal, invaded, in

347. *Ibid*, I. 421-422; II. 210-212.

348. *Ibid*, II. 221-225.

349. Orme notes the fact that proposals had been made, according to Capt. Calliaud, in May 1757, to Haidar at Dindigal "for aid against the English and their adherents, the Pulitavar (one of the Pālegārs) offering to pay 600,000 rupees, and the Jemautdars of Maphuze Khan to give up the districts of Sholavanden (Solavandan) in which are comprised a strong pass, and the only road, between Madura and Dindigal" (Orme, *o.c.*, II. 209). This statement would seem to show that Haidar, acting as the agent of Nanjarāja at Dindigal, had come to an understanding with the Pālegārs of the Madura and Tinnevely countries, under which he was to get possession of Madura, Solavanden being, as it were, the key to it. Orme, however, adds that "nevertheless it was not intended that the (Madura) country when conquered should be given either to the Mysorean (*i.e.*, Nanjarāja) or Maphuze Khan; it was to be restored to a descendant of the ancient kings who lived in concealment in the country of the greater Moravar (Maravar); and Maphuze Khan was to have a suitable establishment in Mysore" (*Ibid*, 209). The arrangement would seem to have been that Madura was to be restored to the descendant of the old Naik family under the hegemony of Mysore and Mahfuz Khān was to be provided for in Mysore. The fact that the latter part of the arrangement was later carried out by Haidar and Mahfuz Khān settled down in Mysore and accompanied Haidar in his Malabar expedition shows that Calliaud's information was well founded. This news, according to Orme, increased "the necessity of attacking Madura as soon as possible" and induced Capt. Calliaud and Muhammad Yusuf to leave Tinnevely and move towards Madura (*Ibid*).

November 1757, the country round Madura and could only be beat off with difficulty³⁵⁰. He actually took Solavandan which offered no resistance and entered the district of Madura without opposition. He continued several days under the walls of the city, but, finding it much stronger than he expected, contented himself with plundering the country, sending off the cattle and other booty to Diṇḍigal. On the approach of Muhammad Yusuf, he took post with a part of his army near the issue of the Pass of Nattam, in order to intercept his march. Muhammad Yusuf, however, attacked him, and, with the advantage of superior discipline, and the execution of his filed-pieces, obliged the Mysore troops to decamp the ensuing night, Haidar himself returning with his detachments to Diṇḍigal.³⁵¹ Haidar, however, did not rest content here. He sent word to the French at Śrīrangam, who sent a detachment of Europeans and sepoy with artillery to Haidar, who, on their arrival, was, it is said, preparing to return against Madura³⁵². The news, though premature, was believed, and Muhammad Yusuf determined to be there before Haidar and the French detachment.³⁵³ Coming back from Tinnevely, he retook Solavandan and awaited Haidar's advance³⁵⁴. But Haidar, thus anticipated, abandoned his intentions and awaited developments.³⁵⁵ No revenue worth the name could be collected, just the very thing that both the English and Muhammad Ali most desired to secure.³⁵⁶ The English tried to get Muhammad Ali to recall Mahfuz Khān, his brother, but failed in their attempts to achieve this object.³⁵⁷ Worst of all, their needs elsewhere soon compelled them to withdraw Muhammad Yusuf from Madura.³⁵⁸ His departure meant

350. Orme, *o.c.*, II. 250.351-355. *Ibid.*, 252.356. *Ibid.*, 250-251.357. *Ibid.*, 252.358. *Ibid.*, 252-253. Towards the close of 1758, he was recalled on the fall of Fort St. David (*Ibid.*, 560), and did excellent service under Capt. Preston in cutting off the French convoys when on their way to Lally's camp at Madras (*Ibid.*, 383; Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 183).

undisputed power for Mahfuz Khān in the whole of the country. In this state of affairs, the English sent back Muhammad Yusuf, this time as the renter of Madura and Tinnevely countries. He arrived at Madura in the spring of 1759 and soon established himself as the chief authority in it.³⁵⁹ But though the English favoured him and even perhaps regarded him as a person suitable for their purposes at Madura, Muhammad Alī made no secret of his dislike for him.³⁶⁰ Muhammad Yusuf also, by his violent methods and his audacious acts—he made over the key of Travancore without the knowledge of his employers—alienated to some extent the support of the English even. However this may have been, in this state of affairs, his offer to lease the country he had so far helped to subdue, for a further period of four years, was refused by the English.

Enraged at this refusal, and finding himself in a position of undoubted strength, Yusuf determined to throw off his allegiance and began to collect troops³⁶¹. The time he chose was opportune. The English had suffered in their reputation in their attempt to take Vellore from Murtaza Alī in 1762. Murtaza Alī's defence, unaided by a single European, covered, as Col. Monson wrote, the English with derision and the Nawāb (Muhammad Alī) with debts. It is true Murtaza Alī was forced to surrender, after a siege of 2 months and 21 days, and was carried away prisoner to Arcot. But some of his dependents betook themselves to Yusuf Khān at Madura. A good part of the English forces had also been despatched, in August 1762, to attempt the conquest of Manilla, Capital of Philippine Islands. Travancore had been befriended by Yusuf Khān by the cession of the Kalakkadu district.

359. *Ibid.*, 467-468.

360. *Ibid.*, 468, 495-496, 560. Muhammad Yusuf arrived at Madras on 4th May 1759 (Orme, *o. c.*, II. 560; Wilson, *o. c.*, I. 184).

361. Wilson, *o. c.*, I. 185.

The French partisans—Marchaud and others—from Tanjore had joined him. The other European settlers, the Danes and the Dutch, were no doubt at peace with the English but they had, with the sanction of the English, opened a business connection for the sale of military weapons and stores, which Yusuf Khān knew he could buy in secret so long as he was able to pay the price that might be demanded. He had plenty of money with him and he knew he could spend it to better purpose on fighting Muhammad Ali than on seeking to appease him by paying it to him. Thus strengthened from every side, Yusuf Khān was ready to offer the stoutest resistance he was capable of. In 1763, accordingly, a strong force was sent against him by the English to Madras and he was in September of that year besieged in Madura.³⁶²

Most of his friends deserted him but he held out until October 1764 with great energy and skill, renovating and strengthening the fort at great cost and repelling the chief assault with a loss of 120 Europeans (including nine officers) killed and wounded. Nor did he, in his hour of trial, forget one other source of possible help at such a critical period of his position. Realizing the growing power and influence of Haidar, he opened up negotiations with a view to securing the help of one who could turn the scale in his favor.³⁶³ Muhammad Yusuf, accordingly, about the middle of 1763,³⁶⁴ commissioned Ali-zamān Khān, his agent at Mysore, to propose to Haidar that if he helped him to raise the siege of

362. *Ibid.*, 186-187.

363. *Haid. Nam.*, ff. 33-34.

364. The *Haid. Nam.* refers the incident to 1763-64: *Svabhānu-Tārāṇa*. This work refers to Muhammad Yusuf as *Sardār Yisū Muḥammad Kumandār*. It states that the siege had been on for thirty-seven months. This period must be taken to refer from October 1761 to October 1764, when Muhammad Yusuf was caught and hanged (15th October 1764).

Madura, he would cede to him the fort of Madura and also take service under him. Ali-zamān Khān was the brother-in-law of Badr-u-zamān Khān, one of Haidar's chief officers.³⁶⁵ The fact that Muhammad Yusuf had twice foiled the attempts of Haidar against Madura, did not deter Muhammad Yusuf from pressing for this aid at a time of trouble. Muhammad Yusuf knew how cordially Muhammad Ali was hated by Haidar, the more so because he had so disgracefully broken his promise to cede Trichinopoly to Mysore. He also knew that the English had earned Haidar's ill-will because they had supported Muhammad Ali and his cause against the just claims of Mysore. Haidar, however, was too deeply involved at the time with the Mahrattas and could not readily respond to the call. Nor could he have been easily induced to detach the necessary forces for relieving Muhammad Yusuf. There is reason for the belief that he had not only "objects of great necessity and importance on hand," but also he "did not consider it convenient or safe at that period to detach any part of his army."³⁶⁶ He accordingly prolonged the negotiations for some time on different

365. See Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 161. Kirmāṇi states Ali-zamān Khān was a Navāyet and had been married to a sister-in-law of Badr-u-zamān Khān. Kirmāṇi adds that Ali-zamān Khān "arrived at the presence" and made proposals on behalf of Muhammad Yusuf. Likewise, the *Haid. Nām.* states that Muhammad Yusuf sent word to Haidar through Ali-zamān Khān. From these statements, it would seem that Ali-zamān Khān, though agent for Mysore affairs for Muhammad Yusuf, was permanently stationed at Seringapatam. He had been evidently sent out on the mission and had gone over to Haidar on the mission with which he had been commissioned. Evidently Muhammad Yusuf had sent another emissary to Haidar, if we are to believe Muhammad Ali, Nawāb of Arcot. In a letter to the Madras Council, dated 12th February 1763 (see *Count. Corres.*, 1763), Muhammad Ali, writing of the machinations of Yusuf, states that he had "entered into a union with Haidar Naik and sent one Ghulam Hussain to him." This was evidently another emissary sent on a special mission to Haidar—quite other than the representative Ali-zamān Khān.

366. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 161.

pretexts, in fact until Yusuf's fall became almost a certainty.³⁶⁷ The fight at Madura thickened while the negotiations were being carried on. Though at first little progress was made against Muhammad Yusuf, except that the fort was more rigorously blockaded, eventually he was treacherously seized by Marchaud, the officer in charge of the French contingent, and handed over to Major Charles Campbell, who then commanded the English among the besiegers.³⁶⁸ He was hanged on

367. *Ibid.*, 162.

368. Wilson, *o.c.*, I. 188-196. The *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.) states that Sēshagiri Rao, Dewān of Muhammad Yusuf, proved treacherous and had Bakshi Bāvā Sāhib arrested and kept in confinement. Kirmāṇi states that Muhammad Yusuf was "taken through the treachery of Seonas (Śrinivāsa) Rao, a Brahman of Tanjore and other Jamadars" (*o.c.* 162). In Mons. Marchaud's *Precis Historique* (p. 41), we are told that "two Moor Chiefs, Srinivasa Rao and Baba Sahib, were leading authors of the conspiracy" against Yusuf. We are told that the latter had private causes of complaint against Khān Sāhib (*i.e.*, Muhammad Yusuf), by whom he had often been ill-treated and burned to revenge himself. To these motives of hatred were joined (those produced by) the reflections of every one upon the existing state of affairs and upon the course which ought to be followed. They felt that it would be very dangerous for them to be captured, arms in hand, defending this rebel, whilst to deliver Khān Sāhib to the Nawāb (*i.e.*, Muhammad Ali) would be a mode of making their peace, and they resolved to sacrifice him to their safety and vengeance. The Sēshagiri Rao and Bāvā Sāhib of the *Haid. Nām.* should perhaps be identified with the Śrinivāsa Rao and Bābā Sāhib of Marchaud—see Hill, *o.c.*, 219; App. III (b), 263; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 162. It is, however, difficult to reconcile the statements contained in the *Haid. Nām.* with those made in Marchaud's *Precis*. The *Haid. Nām.* would make us believe that two officials of Muhammad Yusuf, Sēshagiri Rao and Bāvā Sāhib, were opposed to each other in their attitude towards their master. While Sēshagiri Rao, his chief civil official, was against him, his military adviser (*Bakshi*) was in his favor. That was evidently the reason why Sēshagiri Rao had Bāvā Sāhib arrested, so that he may not be in a position to turn the army against Sēshagiri Rao and in favor of Muhammad Yusuf. According to the *Precis*, however, both the chief officials of Muhammad Yusuf proved inimical to him and joined in handing him over to Muhammad Ali. Whichever version is true, there is no question that the French officer Marchaud took a leading part in the treacherous act of betraying Yusuf and allowing Muhammad Ali to wreak his vengeance on him. All the records available show, as Hill remarks, that Marchaud was one of the leaders, if not the chief of the conspiracy, though he says in his *Precis* that the Khān was made prisoner by the Indian officers and that he was made prisoner himself and ran great risk of losing his life in his effort to defend Yusuf. His letter to

the 15th of October 1764 in the most ignominious manner, near the camp, about two miles to the west of Madura, and his body was buried at the spot.³⁶⁹ Haidar thus lost a chance to secure control over the Madura and Tinnevely countries and with it also the chance to wrest back Trichinopoly as well.

What, indeed, induced Haidar to adopt this dilatory attitude is not clear. Mons. Marchaud in his *Precis* suggests that Haidar either did not trust the offer to make

Haidar's dilatory
attitude towards him.

Col. Campbell, published by Hill, and copies of his letters in the Madras Record Office, however, tell a different tale. These prove definitely that he was the man who conceived the idea of betraying Yusuf, and the two Indian officers, being corrupted by him, helped him in his nefarious act. It is undoubted bribes were offered to him, but whether he betrayed Yusuf for obtaining money, as the Dutch account would suggest, or whether he was impelled to this act to save his own men, who, as deserters, ran the risk of death, if captured by the English, is open to question. Hill suggests the latter as the motive which prompted the betrayal but there is no evidence to support this view (Hill, *o.c.*, 237), especially as we know independently from contemporary records that attempts were systematically made to bribe him. Yusuf always suspected him and watched him closely, though Marchaud managed to communicate with the besiegers (*Ibid.*). Released in 1765, he is said to have died in 1778 at Rucil near Paris (*Ibid.*, 237-238). That Yusuf was in correspondence with Haidar and the kings of Travancore and Tanjore was abundantly proved from the papers found in Madura by the captors. An attempt was made by Muhammad Ali to take action against these, but the English at Madras held that Haidar and the king of Travancore had committed no overt act hostile to the English Company and that Muhammad Ali's treatment of the king of Tanjore was so bad as to completely explain the king's hostility (*Mily. Cons.*, 27th Oct. 1764). To complete the story of what became of Yusuf's Indian betrayers, it may be stated that Muhammad Ali, after instantly hanging Yusuf, put out the eyes of Śrīnivāsa Rao (*Tamil Ballad*), while his Muhammadan confederate was rewarded by the gift of a village (Hill, *o.c.*, 219, f. n. 4).

369. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 34; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 162; Wilson, I. 195, and App. E, 886, where a translation of a passage from the *Life of Wallajah* is set down, giving an account of Muhammad Yusuf and how he died only after the removal of a magic ball deposited in his thigh (Hill, *o.c.*, chs. VI to XV, 47-226). J. H. Nelson says that the magical ball of gold was imbedded in the "flesh of his right arm" and that this rendered him safe from bodily harm. (See *Madura Country*, Part III, 281). Kirmāṇi says he was impaled (*o.c.*, 162), but there is no authority for this statement. His body was, however, dismembered, according to the custom of the age.

common cause against the English or because he foresaw his speedy fall and "refused to take part in his quarrel or join him."³⁷⁰ Probably the latter cause proved the deciding factor. Haidar was not the person to risk his fortunes on a man doomed. It is possible he had evidence before him—probably from Alī-zamān himself—that Yusuf was bound to fail and that it would be wise for him not to antagonise the English at an inconvenient opportunity. Kirmāni suggests as a fact that Haidar wantonly "prolonged" the negotiations on different pretexts and that he did not consider it convenient or safe at that period to detach any part of his army. Apart from the Mahratta war then in progress, the determining cause should have been the utter hopelessness of Yusuf's situation at the hour he asked for aid. Haidar would not have missed, if he had thought well of it, an opportunity like the one that had offered itself to get hold of both Trichinopoly and the Madura and Tinnevely countries. The fact that he had encouraged the establishment at the Mysore court of an agency on behalf of Muhammad Yusuf shows that he—as a neighbour with an effective army and ample military stores at Dindigal—could have had no fear of Yusuf, either as a military adventurer or as a crafty politician. On the other hand, he should have thought it but right to keep a watchful eye on him and if possible use him to Mysore's advantage when an opportunity offered itself. As it turned out, Yusuf's rebellion came at an inconvenient opportunity for Haidar and he could hardly have jeopardised his own position in trying to help another, even with the view to make something of it for himself.

Mr. Hill, in discussing Yusuf's connection with Haidar, takes a nearly identical view, though he presents the case in a different way. It was not to the advantage, he

A critique of Mr. Hill's position.

370. Hill, *o.c.*, 262.

suggests, of the latter (*i.e.*, Haidar) to assist Yusuf Khān except so far as to damage the Nawāb (Muhammad Alī), and the English without creating a possible rival to himself. As regards the possibility of Yusuf becoming a "rival" to Haidar, there was no possibility of that, for their situations were different. Even if Yusuf had succeeded in his rebellion against the English and the Nawāb Muhammad Alī, he could not have had any opportunity to long maintain himself in his position at Madura in the face of Haidar himself at Diṇḍigal and the English and Muhammad Alī not farther away at Trichinopoly. And as for spreading himself beyond Madura--north-westwards to Mysore or north-eastwards to Madras—that would have been altogether impossible for him, having regard to the obstacles before him. Mr. Hill also suggests that Haidar might have learnt much from Yusuf's ways and methods and generally from his career. Haidar Alī must have watched, says Mr. Hill, Yusuf's career "with keen attention and learned much from it, especially in regard to the adaptation of European methods of warfare to Indian armies. The necessity of European discipline and European instructors, the preparation of his own military supplies, such as muskets, guns, cannon-balls and powder, the supply of his own horses to his cavalry, possibly the advantages of attacks by night, were all matters in which Haidar Alī followed if he did not actually imitate Yusuf Khan." Mr. Hill does not quote any authority, direct or indirect, in support of this suggestion. As stated at length in an earlier chapter of this work,³⁷¹ Haidar evolved his new technique in imitation of what the French and the English in their respective areas in South India had done. He adopted their systems of military discipline to his own purposes

371. See *Ante* Ch. XII, pp. 319-337 *et seq.*, where the authorities are set forth in detail.

to the extent necessary. He saw to it that the Indian soldier in his service was amenable to discipline of the kind introduced by the French and the English in Southern India. Further, Yusuf rebelled in 1764, by which time Haidar had already evolved his technique independently by himself as the result of his own personal observation in the warfare which he had himself engaged in. In regard to buying of horses, he followed, as we have seen,³⁷² the time-honoured system that had descended to him. As to preparation of supplies, there was a well-regulated system in vogue in Mysore, which he improved upon. Nor is there any reason to think that what befell Yusuf necessarily provided a lesson to Haidar in the matter of how far European officers should be trusted in higher command. We have shown above,³⁷³ that in this matter Haidar never yielded the command over his whole army into the hands of the European officers he employed. Nor did he, as we have seen, allow them to deal with troops that were not distinctively their own. Neither did he forget to see that the Topasses he entertained³⁷⁴ and his own regular armies were under his own personal control and that the number of European troops in his service bore some proportion to the strength of his Indian section taken as a whole. Thus, while his army in 1767, for instance, was about 200,000 strong including 25,000 cavalry, the number of Europeans was only 750, with 250 cannoners. While he was just to them, permitted them self-governance in their particular domain, helped them to maintain discipline according to their own views and systems, he never allowed the European officers and their portion of the army to domineer over the Indian sections or to dictate to him. He was strict to a degree and

372. *Ibid.*, XII. pp. 277-280.

373. *Ibid.*, pp. 367-361.

374. See De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 136, *n.*), who notes the fact that Topasses were regarded as his best troops, "and those he can most rely on."

when any one sought to do mischief, he was, as we have seen in the case of the Irish officer, Turner,³⁷⁵ not slow to condemn him to the prescribed punishment, including the last penalty, though he allowed him to be tried previously by Court-Martial by his own compeers. In actual warfare, Europeans in his army never knew the place assigned to them. Haidar, for instance, kept them ever in suspense, despite their impatience to know the post any of them would be assigned to in case of an attack. It was a rule with him never to make public his order of battle, and caused the guards of every place to be changed daily, though, according to the news, the enemy was on the point of arriving.³⁷⁶ One other point to note is that Haidar, friend and a firm friend too of the French, never entirely depended on them. His European section was a composite one, composing of representatives of all European nations. Though the French were larger in numbers, he did not treat them as superior to the rest. Indeed, his distrust of the French—from the other points of view—was so great that he never entered into a regular treaty of alliance with them at any time. Indeed, his policy in this respect was definitely made up early in his career and his son Tipū kept to it rigidly. Mr. Hill himself notes this fact, but fails, it is to be feared, to draw the right inference from it. Haidar was, in fact, carrying through the policy of Nanjarāja, his master, and Nanjarāja's predecessors, of extending the power and dominion of Mysore all through Southern India, and that policy did not admit of partners being taken except as paid colleagues, who did their duty for the salary paid to them. The French, too, fond of territory from early times, never showed themselves eager that Haidar should

375. *Ante* Ch. XII. pp. 345-346.

376. See De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 202.

confide fully in them. Law of Lawriston, for instance, tells us how impossible it was for Haidar to trust them.³⁷⁷ Haidar's confidence was shaken in them ultimately when they—even Mons. Hughel—refused to proceed to the conquest of fort Rama which would have led to Goa, when his army was ready for the march because it was Portuguese territory. De La Tour notes the fact that "this inconstancy of the French, and other similar events, gave Hyder to understand that he should not well support a war with any European power, and that he could not depend upon the Europeans in his service, excepting when they themselves were at war with his enemies."³⁷⁸ This conviction was borne in on Haidar fairly early in his relations with them—at least as early as 1763, if not from 1761, when Lally, who had till then not cared for an alliance with any Indian State, first bent low to make advances for an alliance with Haidar for the transfer of Tiaghur (Tyāga-durg) and Elavasinore to him, in return for aid in relieving Pondicherry, then closely besieged by the English.³⁷⁹ Haidar, accordingly, cannot be held to have been influenced to any extent by the career or conduct of Muhammad Yusuf or by the fate that overtook him owing to his having employed Europeans of the class then seeking service at Indian courts. Muhammad Yusuf shot up as a meteor and fell.

377. See *Et'at de l'Indeen* (1777), 81.

378. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 92-93. French policy in India was entirely dependent on the state of affairs in Europe. This could not have been understood by Haidar or any of the Indian powers, at any rate until they had had some experience of them.

379. It is interesting to note here the following passage from Orme, in which he describes Mons. Lally's attitude to the proposal received from the Portuguese monk Noronha, otherwise called the Bishop of Halicarnassus, who negotiated the treaty between Lally and Haidar:—"Mr. Lally, seeing no other means of procuring relief to the necessities which began to threaten Pondicherry, repressed the contempt with which he had hitherto regarded the military faculties of the princes of India, and sent two of his officers to conclude the treaty with Hyder Ally" (*Indostan* II. 637; see also, *Ante* Ch. XI. 229-231).

His career was all too brief and it was spent in too limited a sphere to influence that of Haidar who was infinitely his superior in talent, endeavour and action.

Though Haidar lost an opportunity to acquire a province for Mysore, he gained, besides a few recruits for the army,³⁸⁰ a friend for himself, who became a great figure in his immediate entourage for many years to come. This was Alī-zamān Khān. After the death of Muhammad Yusuf, Alī-zamān elected to remain, at Haidar's invitation, in Mysore. Haidar, "pleased with his manners, his mild disposition, and the charms of his conversation, made him," we are told, "his constant companion."³⁸¹ Sometimes, however, Haidar was offended with him, or even treated him with caprice. Being a very stout man, the Khān was not able to mount a horse, and therefore, when he went out, Haidar, evidently to secure his pleasant company, gave the loan of his own elephant.³⁸² Haidar evidently saw

Haidar's loss and gain from the Yusuf Khān episode.

380. Mr. Hill suggests that that it is not at all unlikely that many of Yusuf Khān's old soldiers went to Haidar, while Yusuf's own son was, since 1780, in Mysore (Hill, *o.c.*, 233). The following extract from a letter dated Palamcottā, 1st August 1780, from Capt. James Edington to the Madras Council, is interesting in this connection:—"It is said that Yusuf Khan's son at the head of 10,000 men is ready at Dindigal to enter Madura and Tinnevely districts, where he expects to meet many friends on his father's account" (*Mily. Cons.*, August 1780). Evidently Haidar held out hopes to Yusuf's son of office of some kind in Madura and Tinnevely as the result of his invasion of the Karnātic in July 1780. Yusuf's son could not have been older than 18 years at the time referred to, as he is said to have been born about 1762-63 (Hill, *o.c.*, 6). According to the *Tamil Ballad*, both he and his mother Maza escaped first to Travancore. Yusuf's son should have escaped from there to Mysore, from where he should have gone to Dindigal with a force to help Haidar.

381. Kirmāni, *l.c.* In another place, Kirmāni notes that Haidar was fond of sporting his wit, or of joking with his associates and companions, particularly with Alī-zamān Khān, see *o.c.*, 435.

382. *Ibid.* Alī-zamān Khān was one of Haidar's representatives when he made peace with the English in 1769 at the gates of Madras—Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 285. The other was Mehdi Ali Khān, who was also a Navāyet—*Ibid.* See also below. He was present at the fight at Raṭṭihalli and was wounded in it (Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 171). He was taken prisoner with

no objection to stoutness—in moderation—and indeed seems to have quite enjoyed the company of a stout person. But what made him feel attracted to and sometimes feel repelled by the presence of Ali-zamān was something in his character and his make up which made him no persuasive ambassador but a welcome friend and genial company. He was apparently like one of those stout men, so well described to us in an old and famous sonnet³⁸³ as being blessed by opposite qualities. He hoped, yet feared; he resolved, yet doubted; he was cold as ice, yet burnt as fire; he wot not what, yet much desired; and trembling too, was desperately stout. Ali-zamān lost a patron in Muhammad Yusuf, but secured another in Haidar, who, though he lost a province through lack of the quality of persuasion in Ali-zamān, still prized his presence so much as to make him his boon friend and companion.

Shortly after the Treaty of Bednūr had been signed and Mādhava Rao crossed the Tungabhadra, Haidar was free for a time to undertake his unexecuted plans. But before he could take up any of these, he had work cut out for him as the result of the last Mahratta invasion. The two woody and mountainous provinces of Balam and

Conquest of
Balam, 1765.

many other officers of Haidar at Chinkurli (*Ibid*, 196). He and others were released by Triambakrao Māma at the end of his campaign (*Ibid*, 229).

383. Sonnet by Stirling (William Alexander, Earl of? 1567-1640)—see *Aurora*, sonnet 68. Stirling was the author of some curious tragedies and an "Elegy on the Death of Prince Henry." He was held in high honour by James VI of Scotland, whom he followed to London. He was for some time Secretary of State for Scotland. He has been ranked as a poet with Drummond, of Hawthornden, who was his friend. Drummond was named the "Petrarch of Scotland." He was a born poet. His sonnets and madrigals have some of the grace of Sidney, and he rose at intervals into grave and noble verse as in his sonnet on John the Baptist. He was a devoted Royalist. His first poem was "Tears" on the death of Prince Henry, son of James I. The visit of Ben Johnson to him at Hawthornden is famous in literary history.

Coorg, which lay immediately to the south of Bednūr, had to be secured if he was not to be outwitted by a southern movement in case war broke out in the near or distant future.³⁸⁴ The province of Balam is represented now by the Bēlūr taluk and the country round about it.³⁸⁵ It represents the heart of the once mighty Hoysala kingdom, whose capital, Dōrasamudra, now represented by Halebid, is 11 miles to the north-east of Bēlūr. It appears to have extended from about Bēlūr in the north to Manjarabad in the south, up to where it met the northern boundary of Coorg. Since Vijayanagar times, it had been in the possession of a family of Pālegār chiefs, who had been subverted by Śivappa Nāyaka of Bednūr, about 1645, and made part and parcel of Bednūr for about thirty-seven years. Krishṇappa Nāyaka of the Pālegār family asserted his independence of Bednūr about 1682 and he and his descendants held on to their possessions until Haidar turned his attention to them in 1765. Venkaṭādri Nāyaka, a descendant of Krishṇappa, named above, was then the chief. He had attacked the dependencies of Seringapatam during the time Haidar was out of it and busy against the Mahrattas, and had carried off the goods and cattle of the

384. That this was a real fear and had considerable foundation in fact will be admitted by all who can recall the British movement of forces from the Bombay and Madras sides simultaneously against Tipū Sultān during the wars that ended in 1792 and 1799. Haidar had the prescience to note this fact and provide against it as early as 1765, when he undertook the subjugation of these provinces and making them part and parcel of Mysore. From the larger conquest contemplated by him—the whole of the South of India—these annexations would, of course, seem to be perfectly natural.

385. *Mys. Gaz.* (New and Revised Edn), V. 950. "Balam" is the "Bullum" of Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 64, 74, 711; II. 120, 122, 205, 279. As to the origin of the name "Balam", see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 950-951. Major Montgomery identifies Balam with the present Manjarabad. The fort at Manjarabad is an octagonal structure containing a pond, a few powder magazines and other adjuncts. There is a secret passage leading out of the fort (*Ibid.*, 1022). There was a fort here in those days and long after, as shown in Col. Mackenzie's Map of 1808,

peasants resident in them and owning allegiance to Mysore. He had built the tower of the Kēśava temple in 1736 and mounted a cupola on it.³⁸⁶ Haidar led an expedition against him. Being unable to stand the onslaughts of Haidar, Venkaṭādri abandoned his fort (probably Manjarabad) and fled with his property and family to the safety of the forest, and in confederacy with Chikka-Virappa, the Rāja of Coorg,³⁸⁷ prepared for war. Leaving a strong detachment at Balam (i.e., Manjarabad), he marched on towards Coorg. But at Arkalgūd, about 20 miles to the east of Manjarabad,³⁸⁸ Venkaṭādri made a fresh stand, and a well contested battle was fought. Venkaṭādri fought so fiercely that the forces of Haidar nearly gave way. Immediately Haidar observed this, he, with a few brave men, under the thick cover of the trees, advanced and attacked the rear of the enemy, with the result that their lines were broken and they were scattered. Venkaṭādri himself fled, while his dependents and women were attacked in the place where they had taken refuge by Tipū Sultān, then only about eighteen years of age, and taken captives. On this, Venkaṭādri made peace with Haidar by offering a large sum of money (fifty camel loads, it is said,) and elephant's teeth.³⁸⁹ But it does not seem that he drove him out of it. Matters were evidently settled in

386. See *E.C.*, V. Bl. 64; also *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 911.

387. Kirmāṇi does not mention the name of the Rāja of Coorg. He was probably Chikka-Virappa, son of Appājirāja, who ruled between 1736 and 1766 and was a contemporary of Venkaṭādri Nāyaka of Belūr. See Rev. G. Richter, *Manual of Coorg*, 239.

388. For Arkalgūd, see *Mys. Gaz.*, V. 939-940. It is 17 miles south of Hassan. This must be the place referred to by Kirmāṇi as the town of "Akruṇar", where he says the action referred to in the text was fought.

389. Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 163, 181, 183. Among contemporary writers, Peixoto makes a passing reference to Haidar's attack and conquest of Balam by mentioning it as the country of "Aigur" (see *Memoirs*, l.c.; also *M. A. R.* for 1937, p. 103, noticing this work). He roughly places the event subsequent to the Mahratta campaign of 1764-65.

an amicable spirit, as we see Venkaṭādri Nāyaka was succeeded in due course by his son Krishnappa Nāyaka, the last of the line to bear that name, in 1772.

Haidar next turned his attention to Chikka-Vīrappa, the Rāja of Coorg, whose country lay
 Attempt on Coorg, 1765. contiguously to the south of Balam.³⁹⁰

The conquest of Balam rendered easy this invasion of Coorg, with which Haidar desired direct communication both from Bēdnūr on the northern extremity of the Mysore territory and from Seringapatam, the capital. He pretended to be the liege-lord of Coorg, but the Coorg Rājas refused to recognise him as such. He, of course, intended a permanent conquest of the province. As an interjacent territory, its possession was of even greater value to Mysore. The invasion could not have been unknown to the Coorg ruler, as it was the direct result of the aid given by him to Venkaṭādri. The ostensible cause of the war, was the claim Haidar asserted over the *Ēḷu-sāvira-sīme* (the seven thousand country), which had been given up by the Mysore Rājas, besides the attempt made by him against the garrisons stationed in all the forts on his frontier with a view to their reduction and the part he

390. This attempt on Coorg is left unnoticed by Wilks, who makes Haidar's invasion of it in November 1773 his first invasion (o.c., I. 712). Neither De La Tour nor Robson has anything to record on the first attempt made by Haidar in 1765. Peixoto, the only contemporary writer who casually refers to the invasion of Coorg under Fuzzulullāh-Khān, places it subsequent to Mādhava Rao's campaign of 1764-65 (see *Memoirs*, l.c.). Kirmāni (o.c., 178-184), however, gives an account of it but post-dates it by referring it to 1767 (A.H. 1181). Probably the campaign dragged on to 1768, as the final treaty with Coorg was concluded in 1769. From the point of view of both the context and the light thrown by other independent sources, this invasion has to be assigned to 1765-1766. Stewart (o.c., 17) sets it down to 1764, which is impossible in view of the fact that Haidar's hands were full with Mādhava Rao's invasion. This fact is acknowledged in plain terms by Kirmāni (o.c., 179). Rev. G. Richter places the event correctly in 1765, in the reign of Chikka-Vīrappa of Coorg.

had played in Haidar's war against Balam.³⁹¹ Haidar left Bednūr immediately the Mahrattas left the country, and marched by land and sea towards Coorg. Having collected some 600 or 700 fishermen, he arranged with their boats for the supply of stores to be despatched by sea, the land route being difficult for transport, evidently on account of the wild, woody nature of the country.³⁹² He himself advanced with his regular and irregular infantry and artillery and fell on them unexpectedly,³⁹³ while Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān, who had accompanied Haidar in this campaign,³⁹⁴ marched on the north-eastern frontier of Coorg. Many battles were fought and Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān and his forces were put to rout and fled the country. Haidar, however, compromised by offering both "eternal peace" and the Uchchingi district, contiguous to the northern frontier of Coorg, for a payment of 300,000 pagodas. Chikka-Virappa acceded to the proposal. A portion of the amount was paid immediately and hostages given for the remainder. Before Haidar carried out his part of

391. Kirmāṇi includes the then Rāja of Coorg, a "Zamindar," and makes him a subordinate of the Suba of Sirā and of the Nizām of Hyderabad, and states that he had become "insubordinate" and "lifted" up his head to rebellion, plundered and murdered the garrisons of the Nawāb stationed in all the forts in his vicinity and reduced the whole country under his own authority (o.c., 179). There is evident exaggeration here, as there is no independent evidence of his having done all this.

392. Kirmāṇi calls Coorg a "wild desert," meaning that it was a wild, forest country difficult of approach and without facilities for the transportation of provisions, forage, camp equipage, etc. (o.c., 179-180).

393. In Kirmāṇi's expressive phrase, "like a sudden calamity" (o.c., 180).

394. Rev. G. Richter, *Manual of Coorg*, 243. Richter's account is based on the *Rājendra-nāme*, which has been translated into English. Kirmāṇi says that the Coorg Rāja, cowed down by the humbling of Venkaṭādri, yielded without a struggle and made peace with Haidar and became tributary, and paid a large sum of money, and likewise gave valuable presents of the rarities of the country." This version is not borne out either by the character of the Coorgs or by the actual facts as known from the Coorg side. See Richter, o. c., 243-244.

the engagement, Chikka-Virappa died (1766). His successors, Muddarāja and Muddaiya, joint rulers, called on Haidar to fulfil the terms of his engagement with their predecessor. After fruitless negotiations, they recommenced hostilities. Lingarāja, the younger brother of Muddarāja, attacked Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān near the *Ēlu-sāvira* district and defeated him. Fuzzul-ullāh attempted to retire towards Mangalore by the Bisaleghāt, but Lingarāja hotly pursued him, outmarched him, and faced him again and completely routed his army. The whole camp, treasure, guns and ammunition fell into the hands of Lingarāja and his victorious troops. The campaign dragged on to 1768, when Haidar once again proposed peace. In place of the Uchchingi country, he ceded the districts of Panje and Bellāre for the sum of Rs. 75,000 already paid to Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān and fixed the boundary between Mysore and Coorg at the river Sarve.³⁹⁵

While operations were going on in the north-west and west, in Balam and Coorg, Haidar had had to face various insurrections in the east and north-east, in the territories lately annexed by him. Among these were Sira, Hoskōṭe, Chikballāpur and Doḍballāpur, all still under Mahratta influence. The Mysore garrisons in all these places had been unable to quell the insurrections inspired by the local Pālegārs, during the year that Haidar was engaged with the Mahrattas. Similar trouble was experienced in the south and south-eastern part of Mysore. Immediately he was able to turn his attention to home affairs, Haidar detached a force under Mīr Alī

395. Rev. G. Richter, *o.c.*, 244. Kirmāpi, as might be expected, is all too brief in this part of his narrative. He says that Haidar placed a garrison of his troops in the fort of Mercara, though "he left the country in his (Coorg Rāja's) possession" (*o.c.*, 184). This is evidently an overstatement not confirmed from the Coorg side.

Razā, better known as Mīr Sāhib,³⁹⁶ to Sira, where he was enjoined to first re-establish Mysore authority. This accomplished, he was to join hands with the corps at Bangalore, Dēvanhalli and other places and put down the local insurrections. Haidar, with the caution that always marked his acts in matters of this nature, directed Mīr Sāhib to adopt a defensive plan of operations in winning the objectives aimed at. In a like manner, Fuzzul-ullāh-Khān was told off to reduce the incipient attempts at insurrections in the south and south-east and render possible the uninterrupted collection of revenue.³⁹⁷ This wary and prudent policy helped to put down without material difficulty the local disturbances that had raised their head and enabled Haidar to think of the more important affair of Malabar, whose permanent conquest he had been contemplating for some time.

With the conquest of Bednūr and the move against Balam and Coorg, Haidar thought he had prepared the way for the invasion of Malabar, for which he had had secret designs. This invasion was not only a continuation of the policy of the Mysore kings and their generals in the country to their west, but also in keeping with the ambitious policy of extension, embracing the whole of Southern India, which Haidar had planned. For the realization of such a policy, he looked upon the annexation of Malabar as a necessary first measure. Malabar, in those days, was not only contiguous with Mysore to its south but also to its south-west. Though its early history is still wrapped in obscurity, there is enough

Invasion of Malabar, 1765-66.

Early history of Malabar.

396. Mīr Alī Razā *alias* Mīr Sāhib was a brother-in-law of Haidar. He should be distinguished from Alī Razā Khān, son of Chandā Sāhib, who was helpful to Haidar in his Malabar campaign. See below.

397. See Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 524. Neither Robson nor Kirmāni has any reference to these events.

evidence to believe that it had an active trade connection with the Mediterranean cities through Arabia, on the other side of the sea, called after it the Arabian Sea. This connection dates back to pre-Islāmic days. The Phœnicians came by way of the Persian Gulf and afterwards by the Red Sea. Possibly the Jews made the same voyage in the reigns of David and Solomon. The Syrians under Seleucus, the Egyptians under the Ptolemies, the Romans under the Emperors, the Arabs after the conquest of Egypt and Persia, the Italians, more especially the Republics of Venice, Florence and Genoa, each in turn appears to have maintained a direct trade. This trade relationship brought into Malabar in due course of time successive waves of immigrants, who for one reason or another sought shelter on this hospitable coast of India. Here lay Musiris, identified with modern Cranganore, situated on the Alwaye river, where foreign ships touched in the centuries before the Christian era and from there carried on a brisk trade with Rome. Pliny (77 A. D.) and the *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea* (c. 70 A. D.) attest to this fact in vivid terms.³⁹⁸ The traditions of the Hindus and the Jews

398. *Musiris* identified with Muziricode, the ancient name of Krishnama-kōṭa, just opposite to Cranganore. It is the *Musiris primum emporium Indiae* of Pliny : Musiris, the first emporium of India. According to Pliny, there reigned here, in those days, Kelabothras, identified with Keralaputra. Pepper was conveyed, according to him, in boats formed from single logs from "Cottamara", identified with Cadatanād. The *Periplus* describes Muziris as "a city at the height of prosperity, frequented as it is by ships from Awake (Mahārāshṭra country) and Greek ships from Egypt. It is near a river at a distance from Tundis (Cadabundi) of 500 stadia." The Cochin Jewish copper-plate grant of Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman, dated in his 38th year, mentions Muzirikkōṭa as including the village of Ajuvannam, which was granted to them by the king. As Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman came to the throne in 978 A. D., his 38th year would be 1016 A. D. See *E. I.*, III. 66. King Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman referred to in this copper-plate is also mentioned in four lithic inscriptions in the temples of Tirakkadittānam, Travancore State (*T. A. S.*, II. 32-33, 34-35, 40-41, and 45), and in one inscription in the temple at Tirumulikkalam (*Ibid.*, II. 45-46). These are dated in the 14th, 15th, 26th and 48th years of his reign.

and Christians, who came to settle here, agree in making Cranganore, in the present Cochin State, the original capital of the Perumāls, who claimed sovereignty over the whole of the Chēra (Malayālam) country, and the first resort of western shipping. Descendants of fugitive Jews came to settle here about 378 A. D. after the final destruction of Jerusalem by Emperor Titus in 70 A. D. The local ruler granting them a settlement here about 490 A. D., more of their nation came over and lived here. The Christians came even earlier, their first advent going back to the 1st cent. A. D. One of the seven churches founded by St. Thomas, the Apostle, was, it is said, at this place. Whether this was so or not, there is no doubt that it was one of the first settlements of the Syrian Christians, who arrived here in 345 A. D., and flourished at it until they invoked the aid of the Portuguese in 1502 A.D., when their trouble began. Persecution evidently led them to leave it and settle at Cochin about 1509. Roman trade followed in the wake of the Arabian, Arabia being for long, even before the birth of Muhammad (6th cent. A. D.), the emporium from which Europe was principally supplied with Indian commodities by a tedious coasting navigation. In the post-Islāmic era, the Arabian connection with Malabar became even more firm, with the result that Islām got a foothold in Malabar quite early in its history. Those from Arabia already settled in it evidently embraced the new religion, and they and their descendants came to be known as Māpīllas (Moplahs), lit. those who traced their descent through the mother as distinguished from others of that religion, who, being of unmixed blood, traced their descent patri-lineally.

He is also mentioned in five other lithic inscriptions in the temple at Trikākarai, Travancore (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 2, 3, 4 of 1903, and *T.A.S.*, II. 46-48, 49-50). These are dated in the 23rd, 31st, 42nd, and 58th years of Bhāskara-Ravi-Varman's reign.

Among these was one Alī Rāja, who had in the progress of events, obtained possession of the fort of Cannanore with a small district on the coast, subject in a loose manner to the Rāja of Kolastri.³⁹⁹ It would take too much space here to unfold the circumstances that led to the conversion of this little Muslim chief from an opulent trader into a small territorial lord and merchant monopolist of Cannanore. Suffice it to say that it was this connection with Arabia on the one side and the European nations, who from about the end of the 15th century established themselves on the Malabar coast,

399. *Kolattiri*, also called *Chirakal*, from its capital, which is about 3½ miles south of Oranganore. The first figure that emerges from the mist of tradition, in the early history of Malabar, is Chēramān Perumāl, the last of the Chēra kings. He is said to have renounced the throne voluntarily, subdividing his kingdom and retiring to Mecca to adopt Islām. His date has been much discussed. Tradition assigns him to the 4th cent. A. D. His tomb is said to exist, however, at Sabhal on the Arabian coast, and it is said that the dates on it indicate that he reached it in A.H. 212 (or A.D. 799) and died there in A.H. 216 (or A.D. 803). His departure may, perhaps, be said to date from August 25, 825, the first day of the Kollam era in common use on the Malabar coast to this day. It is possible that his power was practically broken by the growing influence and turbulence of his feudatories and the encroachments of the Western Chālukyas, who rose to prominence about 973 A. D. The disappearance of a common ruler meant the division of Malabar among numerous small chieftains, of whom *Kolattiri* (or *Chirakkal*) in the north and the *Zāmorin* in the south were the most powerful. It was with these last two and with the *Cochin Rāja* that the early Portuguese adventurers entered into political and trade relations that eventually brought trouble on them.

Alī Rāja: The family of the Alī Rājas, or sea kings, of Cannanore dates from about the 12th and 13th centuries when Cannanore was an important emporium of trade (with Persia and Arabia) on the Malabar coast. The origin of the family is lost in obscurity. Tradition, however, assigns its foundation to a Nair minister of the *Kolattiri Rāja*, who embraced Islām at about the beginning of the 12th century. Towards the end of that century, the family appears to have obtained the port and town of what is at present known as old Cannanore as a grant from the *Kolattiri Rāja*. The Alī Rāja became his chief admiral and the head of the Cannanore *Māpīļas*. His authority gradually increased till by the beginning of the 18th century, he became practically independent of his suzerain and was able to put 25,000 men in the field. He had become so powerful at the time we are writing of—1765-66—that he was scheming with foreign aid to subvert his master and usurp all his territories,

not he other, that gave occasion to incessant revolutions in it. These revolutions arose partly from internal quarrels and partly from the wars of the Dutch, Portuguese and the English, and from invasions by the armies of Bednūr and Mysore. These perpetual feuds and quarrels prepared the way for further foreign interference. Indeed, about 1765, matters had come to such a crisis that it was for Haidar to intervene with ambitious designs of his own.⁴⁰⁰

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400. Vasco da gama reached Malabar in 1498 and his successors quickly established themselves at Cochin, Calicut and Cannanore (1501). In 1656, the Dutch began to compete in the Indian seas with the Portuguese for the trade of the country. They first took Cannanore in 1656, and erected a fort there, which they still held in the year of Haidar Ali's invasion (1765); in 1663, they captured the town and fort of Cochin and Tangasseri from the Portuguese. In 1717, they secured the cession of the island of Chetwai from the Zamorin of Calicut. The French first settled at Calicut in 1693. In 1726, they obtained a footing at Mahē, and in 1751 acquired Mount Dolly and a few outposts in the north, all of which were taken by the English in 1761, with the fall of Pondicherry. The English established themselves at Calicut in 1661, in 1663 at Tellicherry, and in 1684 at Anjengo, Chetwai and other commercial factories. Tellicherry was their chief entrepôt for the pepper trade. So rapid was the extension of their power that, in 1737, the English factories mediated a peace between the princes of Kanara and Kolattiri. They obtained the exclusive privilege of purchasing the valuable products of the country, *viz.*, pepper, cardamoms and sandalwood. For nearly a century (from about 1656 to 1766), the Mahratta pirates under Angria and other chiefs infested the coast and ravaged even inland towns by sailing up the Beypore, Ponnāni and other rivers, so much so that trade was largely interfered with. This, however, appears to have been but a continuation of the old piracy rampant on this coast as early as the first cent. A. D. Pliny feelingly refers to the pirates infesting the neighbourhood of Musiris (modern Cranganore) during his time. This piracy was destroyed by an English expedition sent out in 1756. Sōmasākhara Nāyaka II of Bednūr (1714-1739) is said to have invaded the country of Kolattiri Rāja in 1736, while his successor Basappa Nāyaka II (1739-1754) is credited with having again sent an army of conquest against it in 1751 and collected large sums of money from him. The Pālgāt Rāja, after its dismemberment by the Rājas of Calicut and Cochin, sought the friendship of Mysore, who stationed a subsidiary force in it to secure it against attacks (see *ante* P. 208). This connection afforded Haidar the opportunity to invade Malabar in defence of the Pālgāt Achchan. In 1758, he sent an army to Pālgāt and descended the ghāts through Coorg in person

What exactly was the objective of Ali Rāja of Cannanore in approaching Haidar is not clear. But it is fairly inferable that the conquest of Bednūr, Balam and the settlement with Coorg and their several dependencies had brought Mysore nearer to Cannanore, his own seat of power. This made him aim at a greater degree of power and possibly of independence as well and led him to seek the active aid of Haidar. The ties of religion united to those of mutual self-aggrandisement had made him the more eager to approach Haidar.⁴⁰¹ Ali Rāja was not, at any rate, slow to understand that if he was not to be subjugated by such a powerful neighbour as Haidar, he should seek his protection in time, and with his help, better his position, if he could.⁴⁰² Haidar, on his own side, desired to use him more as an instrument for securing a better access to the country which he desired to possess as the means for the reduction of the whole of the country as far as Cape Comorin. There is no doubt whatever that through him he was enabled to obtain a closer knowledge of the state of the northern portion of Malabar and to add a great deal more to the information he had gathered so far as to the position in its southern portion.⁴⁰³ One fact that emerged as the result of all that he came to know was that the whole country was divided into petty territorial areas presided over by chieftains, more or less independent of each other, with subordinate proprietors of land, generally drawn from the military caste, who were always at war with each other. This knowledge emboldened Haidar to draw the conclusion that the conquest of the country may not be attended with

(see *ante* P. 211). The invasion of 1765 followed and it was ostensibly to aid Ali Rāja and protect his people as against the chiefs of Malabar but really it was in prosecution of Haidar's own aims (see text above).

401. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 526.

402. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 96.

403. Wilks, *l. c.*

difficulty, especially if he prepared adequately for it and took into confidence one like Alī Rāja. Haidar did not realize at the time how much he had miscalculated the physical difficulties presented by the country, nor had he any adequate idea of the animosities that would be created by his invasion, especially at the instance of a man like Alī Rāja, and the effect it would have on the spirited inhabitants of the country.

Alī Rāja had first come into contact with Haidar immediately after the conquest of Bednūr. He had sent out a deputation to Haidar and that had been well received by Haidar. He not only loaded Alī's deputies with rich presents but also appointed him his Admiral. To maintain a fleet ready for service, not only to keep the coast clear of Mahratta and other pirates but also to use it in any warfare he might undertake later in this side of the country, he commissioned him to purchase or build vessels as may be found possible, and placed him in funds for the purpose. His brother, Shaikh Alī, was made intendant of the marine and put in charge of the ports and of the maritime trade of the newly conquered country of Bednūr and the coastal ports dependent on it.⁴⁰⁴ Alī Rāja, flushed with the means to make himself felt in his own land, soon formed a fleet manned by his Māpilla subjects, who are skilful navigators, and invaded the Maldivé Islands, in the Indian Ocean, under the pretence that some injustice had been done to them. Taking the Sultān of the Maldives a prisoner, he blinded him in the most barbarous manner and led him captive on his ship and presented him to Haidar, with evident glee, at Mangalore. Haidar was so irritated that he at once removed Alī Rāja from the command of the fleet and consoled

404. De La Tour o.c., I. 96-97.

the Sultān by offering him one of his own palatial residences and enough to make him feel as happy as he could in his unfortunate situation.⁴⁰⁵ Haidar, however, did not break off from 'Alī Rāja. He encouraged him and made him, indeed, proud of the protection offered to him. Alī Rāja, thus supported, made himself obnoxious to his neighbours, the Nair chieftains, while his subjects, the Māpillas, took the law into their own hands when their swollen claims were not met by the poor inhabitants, to whom they had lent at usurious rates of interest. Irritated beyond measure, the Nairs took counsel, under the presidency of the Zāmorin of Calicut, their leader, and resolved that on an appointed day there should be a general massacre of the Māpillas everywhere in the country. The conspiracy was carried into effect and nearly six thousand Māpillas were cruelly done to death. A great many, however, escaped with their lives by quickly taking to the sea; while a few, forewarned, assembled in sufficient numbers and resisted the attacks made on them. Those who took refuge at Cannanore managed to send deputies to Haidar and implored his aid in their hour of trouble.⁴⁰⁶ Haidar, improving on the situation, accepted the call, the more so as it served him as an ostensible cause for his long intended invasion of Malabar.

405. *Ibid.*, 98-99. The Maldives are a chain of several hundred tiny coral islands in the Indian Ocean, stretching 550 miles southward from a point 300 miles S.W. of Cape Comorin. Two hundred of these islands are inhabited. Male is the residence of the Sultān. Since 1645, he has been a tributary of the Governor of Ceylon, the Maldives being 400 miles to the S. W. of that island. The natives of the Maldives are akin to the Singhalese and are Muslims in religion; they occupy themselves in gathering cowries, cocoanuts and tortoise shell for exportation. Ibn Batuta visited these islands and lived in them in 1343-44.

406. *Ibid.*, 100-102. There is nothing inherently impossible in this story to make it incapable of belief, knowing as we do to-day the etiology of the disturbances that have marred social life in Malabar during the greater part of the century and three quarters that has elapsed since Haidar's invasion of 1765.

Before setting out on his expedition, Haidar made adequate arrangements for the protection of Bednūr, this being the more necessary as he had reason to believe of both treachery and rebellion during his absence from Bednūr. He left a corps of observation, consisting of 3,000 horse, 4,000 regular infantry and 10,000 peons at Basavāpaṭṇa, a stronghold, about 50 miles to the north-east of Bednūr; and with the rest of his disposal force, he made his descent into Kanara, about the close of the year 1765, with the definite object of achieving the conquest of Malabar.⁴⁰⁷ Haidar's plan was to attack both by land and sea. He, therefore, ordered his fleet, under the command of one Stanet, an Englishman, who had taken the place of Alī Rāja, to accompany him along the coast, he himself keeping close to it.⁴⁰⁸ The first stage of his route lay through the coastal area through which the railway now passes from Mangalore to Cannanore, covering about 80 miles. Having posted a garrison at Basavāpaṭṇa, he passed on to Bednūr, and from there, with an army consisting of 12,000 of his best troops, of which 4,000 were cavalry, while the rest were infantry, and 4 pieces of cannon, he reached Kundāpur.⁴⁰⁹ From Kundāpur, he passed southward to Mangalore, where he was joined by his ally and guide, Alī Rāja, by previous arrangement. From there, both pressed forward further south to Nilēśvar, which may be said to mark the southernmost limit of Kanara. From there, they moved forward to Cannanore, where Haidar encamped with his forces on the river called the Cannanore river, after

407. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 527.

408. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 103.

409. *Ibid.* Both Wilks and Kirmāṇi throw no light on the question of the strength of Haidar's forces. De La Tour errs in saying later that the artillery of Haidar consisted of 12 pieces of cannon (*o.c.*, I. 107). He states earlier (*o.c.*, I. 103) that they consisted only of four pieces.

the town near which it runs.⁴¹⁰ Here he found, ready to join him, 12,000 Māpillas under arms, ill-equipped but animated with a desire for vengeance against their enemies, the Nairs. Situated on a small bay, open to the south, but sheltered on the west by a bluff headland running north and south and surmounted by a fort, Cannanore possessed advantages which Haidar perceived at once. His fleet of ships sailed into the harbour and lay at anchor ready for action. Haidar was helped by the European officers on his staff, particularly the French, who later brought in a contingent of Hussars from Pondicherry.⁴¹¹ Second in command under him was Ali Razā Khān, the son of Chandā Sāhib, who directed, under Haidar's general authority, the subsequent operations.⁴¹²

His objective.

Before commencing operations, however, Haidar despatched an embassy to Māna-Vikrama-Rāja, the Zāmorin of Calicut, suggesting a peaceful settlement of the matters in dispute.⁴¹³ He demanded justice may be rendered to the Māpillas for the cruelties inflicted on them, and the punishment of the principal offenders, and suggested that he would not advance further with his army, if adequate reparation was done. If this were not done, he said he would be compelled to undertake the troublesome duty of rendering justice to every one.⁴¹⁴ Haidar also made a point of the contribution of Rs. 12 lakhs

410. This river, which is called the Cannanore river by De La Tour (*Ibid*), should be identified with the Vallarpatṭanam river, on the southern bank of which Cannanore is situated (see Map issued by the Surveyor-General of India, accompanying *Mysore Gaz.*, vol. V). Haidar was encamped on the northern bank of the river and the Nair chiefs prepared at first to prevent him from crossing it.

411. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 106, 107.

412. Wilks, *l. c.*

413. The deputation is said to have been composed of the most distinguished Brāhmins of the Mysore court (De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 103).

414. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 104.

levied by him in 1757, but not paid by the Zāmorin.⁴¹⁵ Haidar had not relinquished this claim so far and made it one of the ostensible causes of the present war.⁴¹⁶

The Nair chiefs had already taken counsel with one another and had agreed to support each other. When they heard that

The Nairs retaliate.
Haidar was advancing against them in aid of the Māpillās, they assembled an army, variously estimated from 100,000 to 120,000 men.⁴¹⁷ Māna-Vikrama-Rāja received the deputation, but in view of the consultations he had had with his brother chiefs and the decision arrived at, he said that the chiefs were astonished at the conduct of Haidar, with whom they had never had any connection or dependence so far; and that if his troops did anything more than drink the water of the Cannanore river—that if they even presumed to set their feet in it—they would be forthwith attacked and punished for their temerity. The ambassadors returned to Haidar's camp, while the Nair chiefs collected all their forces and marched out with the firm determination of preventing Haidar from crossing the river.⁴¹⁸

The Nair forces, though they were large in numbers and possessed of indomitable courage, Their tactics. and fired by a high spirit of independence and military honour, lacked discipline. Their efforts accordingly lacked sustained action; they were generally marked by uncertainty, caprice and desultoriness. They were ill-equipped too. Except for the broad blade, about the length of a Roman sword, they carried, and which was ever their inseparable companion,

415. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 582.

416. See *Ante*, P. 208; also Logan, *Malabar*, I. 405, where he says :—"The claim to this war subsidy was never relinquished and to recover it was one of Hyder Ali's avowed objects in invading Malabar."

417. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 104, 105.

418. *Ibid*, 105.

and the musket and the bow, they had no other weapon of offence or defence. They were, however, adepts in the use of these few weapons and they used them effectively too. Their concealed fire from the woods could neither be returned with effect, nor could those opposing them be induced to enter the thickets and act individually against them. In every movement through the forests, with which the country abounded, bands of Nairs would rush on the marching columns, and after making dreadful havoc, become invisible in a moment.⁴¹⁹ This kind of guerilla warfare, however, may impede and even delay the advancing enemy but not prevent him from ultimately attaining his aim. What was worse, the Nairs were wholly unaccustomed to cavalry warfare, on which Haidar founded his own expectations of success.⁴²⁰ Unaccustomed as they were to open warfare, they soon learnt what it was to attempt it on any scale. They determined to oppose Haidar's advance by preventing him from crossing the river at which he had arrived. They stood out in numbers to openly defend the passage of the river. Despite their numbers,

Haidar's progress
against them.

Haidar saw his opportunity. He ordered his fleet to enter the river.

His vessels sailed up as far as possible. Haidar now drew up his infantry in order of battle in a single line in face of the enemy, with his four pieces of cannon, and waited for the ebb of the water at a higher ford. When it was at its lowest, he entered it in full gallop, at the head of his cavalry, which till then

419. Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 527-529.

420. De La Tour, *o. c.*, I. 106. De La Tour says that cavalry "was a body of troops absolutely unknown to the Nayres (Nayars), no foreign army having penetrated as far as the Malabar coast, where no horses had ever been seen, except a few belonging to the European chiefs of the factory and purchased by them more for pleasure than for utility: for this country, intersected by rivulets, and covered with woods, besides being subject to continual rains for seven months in the year, is absolutely improper for the breeding and keeping of horses."

he had kept out of the sight of the Nair forces. Led by fifty of the French Hussars, he combined a charge on the flank of the Nairs, with a heavy discharge of grape in front. The dreadful carnage that followed may be better imagined than described.⁴²¹ The rapidity of the current being diminished by the vessels, the cavalry column traversed the river with ease at a place where it was a league in breadth, sometimes swimming and sometimes by wading through. It soon reached the lower reaches of the river,⁴²² where the Nairs had been attempting to oppose the infantry, who pretended to cross over at this spot. They were frightened at the sudden appearance of the cavalry and fled with the utmost precipitation and disorder, without offering any other defence but that of discharging a few cannon, which, owing to the confusion caused in their ranks, they were unable to point properly. At this moment, Haidar gave orders to pursue the fugitives at full speed, cutting down all they could overtake, without losing time either by taking prisoners or securing plunder. Haidar's direction that no quarter was to be given was kept up so rigorously that nothing was to be seen on the roads, for some four leagues round, but scattered limbs and mutilated bodies. The whole of the country of the Kolattiri Rāja was thrown into a general consternation, which was greatly increased by the cruelty of the Māpillas, who, following the cavalry, massacred all who had managed to escape, sparing neither women nor children. The army advancing under the guidance of this enraged and barbarous multitude, met with but little resistance.

421. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 529. Wilks, however, is extremely laconic in his description. De La Tour (*o.c.*, I. 107-108) gives a longer description.

422. De La Tour calls it the "other river" (*o.c.*, I. 107). He is evidently referring to a bend of the same river in its lower reaches. If we are to believe De La Tour and Wilks, there were two cavalry actions, one at the upper reach and another at the lower. Both these authorities cannot be referring to one and the same action when we remember that De La Tour's description refers to an action lower down the river.

Almost every place connected with human habitation—villages, fortresses, temples, houses—were found forsaken and deserted for miles to the southward. Indeed, it was not until they reached the environs of Tellicherry and Mahe—about fourteen and eighteen miles from Cannanore—that they found any signs of human life. Here, for the first time, they saw, under the walls of the English and French settlements, people taking refuge from the ravages of the Māpillas.⁴²³ Despite this general flight of the population, the army had not an easy march.⁴²⁴ Its progress was impeded at times by the Nair chieftains, who showed the stuff they were made of. Not only they lay in ambush, in woods and hills, and carried a kind of guerilla warfare,⁴²⁵ but also they actively opposed its advance. Quickly realizing the nature of the warfare that he had to reckon with, Haider, with a view to secure his communications, erected a series of block-houses—called at the time *Lakkaḍi Kōṭṭa*—and the Nairs, perceiving the object of these erections, impeded his progress by a courageous defence of their own small posts.⁴²⁶ One of these, which Wilks says was at a place called Tamelpelly,⁴²⁷ was

423. De La Tour *o.c.*, I. 107-108.

424. *Ibid.*, 108; Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 529-530.

425. *Ibid.*, 109, where he says: "The Nayres continued to conceal themselves in the woods and mountains, from whence they carried on a kind of concealed war with the Mapelets."

426. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 530, f. n. Wilks translates quite appositely *Lakkaḍi Kōṭṭa*, into *block-house*. A *block-house* is a house made of blocks of wood; originally one which *blocked* the way and impeded the advance. Generally speaking, a *block-house* indicates a strong building used for defence, and so called because constructed chiefly of hewn timber. Malabar has unlimited supplies of such timber. In the map accompanying Wilks' *History*, prepared by Col. Colin Mackenzie, there are two *Lakkaḍi Kōṭṭas* marked on it. One, called *Lakady Cotta*, is shown about midway between Heggadadēvan Kotta and Panamarti Kotta; and another, called *New Lakaree Cotta*, is marked between Panamarti Kotta and Tāmraçhēri, about 16 miles N. E. of Calicut.

427. *Tamelpelly* would seem to indicate the *New Lakaree Cotta* of Col. Colin Mackenzie's Map of 1808, *Tamelpelly* itself being identified with *Tāmraçhēri*, which is about 10 miles to the S.W. of *New Lakaree*

attacked by Haidar in a manner which was intended to prevent the escape of a single man. It consisted of, first, a line of regular infantry, and guns with an abbatis;⁴²⁸ second, a line of peons; third, of cavalry. This special kind of disposition was made to strike terror into the Nairs by making their destruction certain. But the Nairs, true to their reputation, defended themselves stubbornly, until they were tired of the confinement to which they had been compelled. They then leaped over the abbatis and cutting through the three lines with astounding rapidity, they gained the woods before the invading troops had recovered from their surprise. Such was the character of the warfare in which Haidar and Razā Alī Khān were daily engaged in the area of the five northern chiefs of Malabar, and, indeed, until they reached the confines of Calicut.⁴²⁹ Though thus impeded to a certain extent, the invading army was in want of nothing. It everywhere found cows, oxen, poultry, rice and other necessary provisions that it could have wished for, for the fugitives had abandoned everything without daring to load themselves with the least article that might abate the speed of their flight.⁴³⁰

Once Haidar reached Tellicherry, 42 miles to the north of Calicut, he tried to negotiate. He sent offers of peace on reasonable terms to Māna-Vikrama Rāja and the other chiefs. The Zāmorin, being fairly advanced in age, prepared to temporize. He remained

Seeks to negotiate
with the Zāmorin.

Cotta. See note 426 above. Tāmrachēri is a village on the ghāts, in the Kedavur Amsom, where is a palace of the Kottāyam Rāja. The Ghāt is one of Tipū's military roads and leads from Calicut through South Wynād to Mysore, and this was the line selected by Col. Arthur Wellesley later for the operations against Pychy Rāja. It has since been much used for the export of coffee.

428. *Abbatis* (*Abatis*) signifies a collection of felled trees with the smaller branches cut off, forming a fort-like obstruction to assailants.

429. See Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 531.

430. De La Tour, *l.c.*

quietly in his palace, and sent word that he waited for the conqueror and trusted to his discretion. He had heard, it is said, the favourable terms that the Pālegār of Rāyadurg had obtained by early submission⁴³¹ and wanted, if possible, to tone down Haidar's demands by a peaceful attitude. The friendly overtures of Haidar, the halt of the advancing army, the strict control that Haidar exercised over his forces,⁴³² and the quiet demeanour of the Zāmorin, induced the terror-stricken inhabitants to return to their abodes. This they did the more quickly because they saw that the Māpiḷlas confined their outrages, as the army advanced, only to

the persons or the property of the Nairs. Once, however, the Nairs of the Kolattiri Rāja united and made

a rush on the troops of Haidar and put to the sword a hundred of them. Haidar was enraged and took vengeance at once. He gave orders that all Nairs who could be captured should be put to death. A horrible massacre followed and they were so frightened that every one who could escape fled for his life, while others hid themselves as best they could. This determined but horrible action quelled all signs of unrest in the Kolattiri region.⁴³³ The people returned soon after to their homes once again. The Kolattiri Rāja escaped with his family to Travancore, the country being made over to Alī Rāja of Cannanore, who began to administer it from then.⁴³⁴ Alī Rāja agreed to such a heavy tribute that it was almost impossible to raise it and he fell consequently into arrears, despite the heavy taxes he raised from the people.⁴³⁵ The Kolattiri country being

Haidar advances against the Zāmorin's kingdom.

thus settled, Haidar advanced against the Zāmorin's kingdom. Arriving at Tellicherry, he encamped with his

431. Wilks, l.c.

434. *Ibid.*, 152.

432. Moens, o.c., 153.

435. *Ibid.*, 153.

433. *Ibid.*

forces on the river there, which separates the Zāmorin's country from that of the Kolattiri. Here he met with the first signs of opposition.⁴³⁶ The Zāmorin, willingly or unwillingly, and the frontier chiefs of the Kolattiri Rāja assembled their forces and pitched their camps on the southern banks of the Tellicherry river. They tried to prevent Haidar from crossing it. Though the odds were against him, Haidar successfully crossed the river with some loss, and marched straight on, fighting his way through the united forces of the Zāmorin and the Kolattiri frontier chiefs. The slaughter was so great that few of the Nair forces escaped, even the small number that tried to run away being pursued by the cavalry and put to the sword.⁴³⁷

Haidar marched further south towards Calicut, practically unopposed, except at a
 Invests Calicut. fortified hill pagoda, where Māna-Vikrama's nephew had taken refuge. This place was quickly invested. The young man made good his escape and the place surrendered.⁴³⁸ Reaching the confines of Calicut, Haidar took up his residence in the English factory, where his fleet had arrived before him.⁴³⁹ From

436. Both Wilks and De La Tour suggest in their narratives that Haidar had an easy walk over the territories of the Zāmorin. If Moens is to be believed, it was not so. While the Zāmorin made Haidar believe he was for peace, evidently he had agreed to or yielded to the frontier chiefs of the Kolattiri country and opposed or was compelled to oppose Haidar on the banks of the Tellicherry river, as mentioned in the text above (Moens, l.c.).

437. Moens, l.c.

438. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I, 109-110. Moens states that Haidar marched off southwards (into Malabar) "in the month of February 1766 and made himself master unexpectedly of the kingdom of Collastry". This would suggest that the first part of the campaign began in February 1766 and ended before 20th April 1766, when Haidar arrived at Calicut with his forces (Moens, *o.c.*, 152).

439. *Ibid.*, 110. Wilks refers to the "camp" of Haidar, but does not mention where it was located. De La Tour specifically states that Haidar encamped in the English factory house at Calicut, but suggests that Haidar and Māna-Vikrama settled the terms of peace in

here, he sent word to Māna-Vikrama Rāja of his arrival. If a safe conduct was assured to him, Māna-Vikrama agreed to meet Haidar in his camp to adjust the terms of peace. This proposal being acceded to, Māna-Vikrama proceeded to Haidar's camp on 11th April 1766, on a *coule*, at the head of 2,000 Nair troops. After the customary mutual exchange of presents, the terms of peace were settled.⁴⁴⁰ They were as follows: (1) Haidar

Proposes terms to the Zāmorin, April 1766.

was to restore to Māna-Vikrama his territories on condition of his paying a small tribute to Mysore; (2) Māna-Vikrama was to pay four lakhs of *Venetian sequins* as a military contribution;⁴⁴¹ (3) as a preliminary condition, the Nair chiefs were to lay down their arms; and (4) the grievances of the Māpīḷas were to be amicably adjusted.⁴⁴² The Zāmorin took leave of

the Zāmorin's "palace." But Wilks states they met and settled the terms in Haidar's "camp" to which the Zāmorin repaired in accordance with the safe conduct vouchsafed to him.

440. Māna-Vikrama's presents on the occasion consisted, it is said, of two small basins of gold (evidently offered by way of *Nasari*), one filled with precious stones, and the other with pieces of gold, and two small cannons of gold with cartridges of the same metal (De La Tour, o.c., I. 110-111.) Wilks says Haidar received the Zāmorin with "marks of particular distinction, and presented him with valuable jewels" (Wilks, l.c.). There is no mention of these in De La Tour's account. De La Tour says that when Haidar came forth to meet Māna-Vikrama, the latter "threw himself at his feet" and that Haidar "hastened to raise him." Robson says that De La Tour is here "most certainly mistaken." He suggests that as the representative of the Nairs, "the most haughty people on the face of the earth," he would sooner have preferred death to degrading himself before a Muslim, he and his people having "the utmost contempt for that tribe" (Robson, o.c., 35-36, f. n.).

441. *Sequin* is an old Venetian gold coin in value about 9s. 4d. sterling. cf. *Arabic Sikkah*, a stamp or die, from which the Hyderabad *sicca* or *sikka* is derived.

442. Wilks, l.c.; De La Tour, o.c., I. 111. These two writers differ in details. What is stated in the text may be held to represent the substance of what was probably mutually agreed to. There is one point on which Wilks is rather not clear. According to him, Haidar agreed to the "confirmation of the Rāja in his *actual possessions* as the tributary of Hyder." This would suggest a prior settlement of the part of the country traversed by Haidar, that is, the region between Nilēśvar and Calicut, including the Kolattiri (or Chirakal) territory.

Haidar and turned homeward, suspecting nothing.

Haidar's precaution.

But as he left, Haidar ordered the troops to move forward towards Calicut.

And even as he was receiving Māna-Vikrama in his camp and honoring him with presents in a friendly manner, he had given secret injunctions for a column to move on by a circuitous route and seize Calicut.⁴⁴³ When this column reached the post, the garrison not unreasonably concluded that their king had been taken prisoner, and considering that defence would not avail them, they evacuated the place the same night. This step was taken by Haidar because the Rāja had cunningly contrived to deprive him of the military contribution he had agreed to after the war of 1757.⁴⁴⁴ Whether such a step on

The Zāmorin tem-
porizes.

Haidar's part was right or wrong, it had an unfortunate effect on Māna-Vikrama. He apprehended from this virtual infraction of the agreement they had come to that Haidar meant further circumvention of it. What was worse, at the end of four or five days, Haidar began to press for the payment of the contribution and as was his wont, he applied rigorous methods to extract it. He stopped supplies so effectively that the Rāja, a pious man, who never dined without feeding a large number of people, was unable even to go through the daily routine of his life.⁴⁴⁵ This exasperated the Rāja a great deal. He

443. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 33) calls it the *Chikka Kille Kallikōṭe*, lit. the small fort of Calicut. It suggests that this step was taken by Haidar as a measure of precaution.

444. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 532. For the military contribution of 1757, see *ante* P. 208.

445. Robson narrates in piteous terms the trouble caused to Māna-Vikrama Rāja by Haidar on this occasion. The Rāja sent a Brāhman agent to enquire of Haidar as to his intentions in regard "to his request of the necessary provisions for the accustomed charity; soon after this intercourse, Haidar returned and directed that a sufficient quantity of grain for 500 men should be sent to the king who was forced to rest satisfied; the next day a considerable deduction was made out of

consulted with his ministers regarding the measures to be taken for realizing the amount and paying it to Haidar. Sanguine of collecting the amount, they seem to have at first given their word to soon make up the amount. But they soon found it impossible to collect the amount within the time allowed.⁴⁴⁶ At any rate, they failed to realize the amount and evidently pressed hard by the Rāja, they seem to have fallen out with him.⁴⁴⁷ Haidar had reached Calicut on the 20th April 1766,⁴⁴⁸ and the season was advancing and the breaking of the monsoon was not far off. Haidar, suspecting deception, placed Māna-Vikrama and his ministers under further restraint.⁴⁴⁹ Strict guard being placed over their

this allowance, and the third day the same; on the fourth an entire stop was put to this supply and Hyder having sent some principal Moormen (Maslms) to observe how matters went, they returned, telling him they apprehended some strange event from the gloomy aspect of the king's attendants; that the king himself had already fasted three days, and was then preparing for some particular ceremony. The king, being provoked at this cruel treatment, had assembled all his family, and after performing certain ceremonies with the chief Brahmins, ordered fire to be set to different parts of the building of his palace, which were of wood, and the whole, together with himself and family, were entirely consumed" (Robson, *o.c.*, 36-37). The cutting off of supplies, however, was not the sole reason for the calamitous step the Rāja took, though it proved evidently one of the chief factors which contributed to it. See text above.

446. Wilks, *l.c.* He writes that the Rāja's ministers "whether from inability or design, they appeared to make but little progress in its collection." There is no evidence whatever for "design" on their part; such "design" they knew would mean not only trouble to the Rāja but also to themselves, as they knew to their cost.
447. The *Haid. Nām.* (*l.c.*) says: *Rājage mātukottidda kaikelaginavarella tirugi biddu haṇa sallade hōddarinda*", which may be thus rendered: "the subordinates, who had agreed and given their word, turned back, and failed to bring the money."
448. Moens, *o.c.*, 153. He mentions the 20th April 1766 as the date of Haidar's arrival at Calicut, that is, after the virtual surrender of the Rāja. The date 11th April 1766 is given by Wilks as the date of the reception of the Rāja in Haidar's camp (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 531). The negotiation &c., took evidently eight days.
449. So states Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 532), but does not explain or even hint at what this further "restraint" consisted in. Moens' narrative suggests that Haidar had kept Māna-Vikrama a prisoner in his own palace and threatened to take his life and prevent the disposal of his corpse with

movements, the ministers were confined in their own houses, while Māna-Vikrama was "kept a prisoner in his own palace" and "mocked and threatened to flog as a common Malabari unless he pointed out his treasures." Haidar "would not see him" and, as we have seen, cut off supplies. The ministers were tortured into producing the cash they had—in his view—secretly hidden. Māna-Vikrama feared that Haidar would "take his life" and "that his corpse would not be burnt according to the customs" of his country and religion.⁴⁵⁰ He had been apprized of the cruelties and indignities that had been offered to his ministers and feared that his turn was fast approaching.⁴⁵¹ He accordingly determined to anticipate the possibility of a similar disgrace to himself.⁴⁵² As misfortune would have it, while Māna-Vikrama was in this difficult state of mind, he received letters from his nephews and from the kings of Cochin and Travancore, in which they bitterly reproached him—with execrations, we are told—as the betrayer of his country and an apostate to his religion, which, they said, he had abandoned to a Muslim. The Brāhman priest, who conveyed these letters to the Rāja, avowed to him, at the same time,

the customary Hindu rites. Evidently what was threatened in the case of the king had been already accomplished in the cases of his ministers (Moens, *o.c.*, 133, 153). They were evidently also flogged to death. (*Ibid*, 153).

450. Moens, *o.c.*, 133, 153. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 35-36) also testifies to the fact that they were placed under strict guard.

451. Wilks says that Haidar applied to the ministers "the customary Indian methods of extorting treasure" (*l.c.*). This is rather somewhat cryptic, but it might be presumed that Haidar inflicted "cruelties" and "indignities" on them, besides confining them in their own houses, flogging them and even, perhaps, threatening them with cruel deaths and a worse disposal of their bodies. At any rate, Moens' narrative shows these were the fears that Māna-Vikrama entertained and preferred self-destruction to the fate, he feared, that would overtake him at Haidar's hands. See Moens, *o.c.*, 133, 153.

452. Wilks, *l.c.*

it is said, that he had been degraded and excluded from his own caste and that all Brāhmans and Nairs had sworn never to have any communication with him.⁴⁵³ Māna-Vikrama, in a highly strung state of mind, gave way before these reproaches on the one side and the cruelties and indignities heaped on him and his ministers on the other, and fearing worse may befall him and his family, if he did not make it impossible for Haidar to go any further in his own way, barricaded the doors of the palace⁴⁵⁴ in which he was confined, and burns himself and all his people alive in the general conflagration that ensued. Several of his attendants, who had been accidentally excluded when he closed the doors, afterwards threw themselves into the flames and perished with their master rather than survive him.⁴⁵⁵ All attempts at

And burns himself to death.

453. This story is set out at length by De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 1, 111.-112. It is possible they misunderstood both the peaceful tactics and diplomacy of Māna-Vikrama in trying to win over Haidar. They seem to have preferred military fight to overtures for peace. But they did not know Haidar and how he had completely overcome all the opposition that had been offered by them so far.

454. "Palace" is the word used by Robson, *o.c.*, 37; the same word is used by De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 111. Moens, however, describes it as "the room in which he was imprisoned" (*o.c.*, 185), though he, twenty pages later, at p. 153, describes it as "his own palace". Wilks refers to it as "the house in which he was confined" (*l.c.*). The *Haid-Nām.*, however, speaks of it as "the sanctuary (*guḍī*) in which he had taken refuge" (ff. 35-36). If this was so, it must be presumed, he had taken his final refuge in the sanctuary in his palace, to which access, he should have thought, was impossible to any one.

455. There can be no doubt that this ghastly event occurred as a matter of fact. Wilks states that he inquired and made sure of its actual occurrence. "In the remembrance after a lapse of years of so extraordinary a scene as that which has been related, and even in the confusion of such a moment, a spectator may have misconceived what he said; but I have been assured," writes Wilks, "by more than one eye-witness, that several of the Raja's personal attendants, who were accidentally excluded when he closed the door, afterwards threw themselves into the flames and perished with their master" (*o.c.*, I. 532-533). Wilks quotes, in support of the "credibility" of the story, other "instances of similar desperation on the part of other military classes of the Hindoos." One is the well known case of Ranga Rao of Bobbili

extinguishing the fire proved futile, Haidar's commands

related by Orme, and the other the more recent occurrence of the capture of Gawilgarh, where the assailants were commanded by General Arthur Wellesly (see Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 532, f. n.; see also Orme, *Indostan*, II. 254-260, for a thrilling account of the tragic circumstances in which Ranga Rao of Bobbili killed himself after heroically defending himself in his fort at Bobbili in January 1757). The incident referred to by Wilks as having occurred at Gawilgarh, a strong fortress between the sources of the Tapti and the Purna, about 15 miles north-west of Ellichpur in Berar, is not recorded by W. J. Wilson, in his *History of the Madras Army*, III. 118-124, where a full account of the siege and capture of Gawilgarh is given by him. The fact, however, is that after the battle of Argaum, General Arthur Wellesley proceeded to besiege and storm Gawilgarh (14th December 1803). The Rāja of Berar was hardly ready either to resist or oppose him. But the commander of the fort refused to surrender and died in its defence. Edward Thornton, however, in his *History of the British Empire*, III. 353-354, gives the following account of the incident referred to by Wilks. "The garrison was numerous and well armed. Vast numbers of them were killed...The killedar was a Rajpoot of eminent bravery...He was aided by another Rajpoot, Beni Singh, bold and intrepid as himself; but the bravery of the leaders does not seem to have been shared by those whom they commanded. Little of their spirit was displayed by the garrison. The two Rajpoot commanders appear to have considered the fall of the place as inevitable, and to have resolved not to survive the event. Their bodies were found among a heap of slain; a more fearful evidence of the determined spirit in which they had acted was afforded by the discovery, that, in conformity with the feeling of their country, they had doomed their wives and daughters to become sharers in the fate which they scorned to evade for themselves. But the task had been imperfectly performed. A few of the women only were dead. The rest, some of whom had received several wounds, survived to afford exercise to the humane feelings of the conquerors. It is scarcely necessary to add that General Wellesley directed all attention and respect to be shown them." The discovery of these females is related in the *Journal* of Sir Jasper Nicolls, K. C. B., quoted in the *Wellington Despatches*. Nicolls was present at both Argaum and Gawilgarh and ended his career as C-in-C. in India, 1839-1843. Both Bussy, who figured in the Bobbili affair, and Wellesley, in the Gawilgarh issue, were, as Wilks remarks, "as eminently distinguished by their humanity as by the most brilliant military talents"; still they were unable to prevent the occurrence of an event too horrible to contemplate or describe. The taking of such a terrible step should be described as the last attempt of a desperate soul, determined on saving what he considered his honour, which he regarded as inviolate and inviolable under any circumstances. There seems, therefore, no doubt that Māna-Vikrama burnt himself to death with his family and people. Logan records an account of it, said to have been obtained in 1798 from the then Zāmorin by Mr. Jonathan Duncan, President of the first Malabar Commission and later Governor of Bombay (1794-1811). See Logan's

notwithstanding.⁴⁵⁶ Though there is reason to believe that Haidar was affected to some extent by the tragic end of the Zāmorin and his people, it did not operate to the advantage of the fallen man's family, his ministers, or his people. If anything, the conduct of the Zāmorin only further exasperated him. He doubled his demand on the

Haidar's exactions
from the Zāmorin's
ministers.

Zāmorin's ministers⁴⁵⁷ and tortured them without the least intermission. They could not, however, produce

Malabar, I, 411. For other sources referring to Haidar's campaigns in Malabar, see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 35-36.; *Tell. Fact. Rec., Letters Received* 1765-66, p. 19; *Diaries*, XXIX. 188, 257, 260, 293, & c., Kirmāpi, however, gives an entirely different account. He is wholly at variance with the other sources when he says that the Zāmorin, on finding that all the country had been conquered by Haidar, that affairs were going against him, that he was not able to oppose the conqueror any further in open fight, and that he had no means of escaping from him, and, finding himself resourceless, sent ambassadors with presents and provisions for the army and the "tribute money," etc., (the arrears due) and asked for forgiveness for his offence. Haidar, from convenience and policy, called the envoys to his presence, and having severely reproved them, he honoured the Zāmorin with a *Cowl-nāma* (letter of security) and sent for him. After they met, Haidar, it is added by Kirmāpi, "gave him his life and property and forgave his offences, but took the country out of his hands, and instead of it gave him a monthly pension, and thus freed himself from all further trouble with him" (*Kirmāpi*, o. c., 185). This story has to be rejected as incredible in the light of the contemporary and other sources, of which the *Haid. Nām.*, is the earliest, being referable to 1784. The story narrated in this work is, moreover, materially corroborated and supported by the other sources cited above. Kirmāpi's account being based on other sources referred to but not specifically named by him, we have been unable to trace the particular one from which he derived his version. He also postdates the conquest of Malabar to 1767 (A. H. 1181), which is also not supported by other sources (o. c., 173). On the other hand, Stewart antedates the event and sets it down to 1764 (o. c., 17).

456. Wilks, l. c. There can be no doubt that Haidar issued such a command, whether from merciful motives or from the sole motive of saving as much as he could, of what might otherwise be lost in the fire. De La Tour says that "the tragical end of the Samorin affected Haidar extremely" and he adds that "he was so irritated against the nephews of that prince, that he publicly swore he would never restore their dominions (o. c., I. 114). Wilks, however, takes the opposite view that "even a scene of this nature was not calculated to operate on the impenetrable nerves of Hyder" (o. c., I. 533).

457. *Haid. Nām.*, l. c.

anything like the amount demanded of them, what they did bring in falling far short of the sum stipulated by Haidar.⁴⁵⁸

Haidar's arrangements for holding the conquered country were made with characteristic zeal, while the contributions levied were being collected by his agents. The Rāja of Kolattiri having fled,⁴⁵⁹

his territories were taken over by Haidar. The Rāja of Kolattiri, however, had several "sons",⁴⁶⁰ one of whom was seized by Haidar, made a prisoner and "adopted" by him, being converted to the Muslim faith and given the name of Ayāz Khān.⁴⁶¹ The Kolattiri country was handed over to Alī Rāja, who agreed to pay a tribute for it, which he found it impossible to raise. While the taxes he imposed on the people proved heavy, he himself was always in arrears in the payment of his tribute to Mysore.⁴⁶² The Zāmorin's territories were annexed to Mysore, Calicut being garrisoned.⁴⁶³ The small fort there was improved and enlarged,⁴⁶⁴ and additional posts were erected in different parts of the country, and, with a

458. Wilks, l. c.

459. Kirmāṇi says that he was "slain" but no other source confirms this statement. Probably he fled and sought shelter in Travancore (o.c., 185).

460. So says Kirmāṇi; probably he means "nephews," as the succession was in the female line (l.c.).

461. "Iyas Khān" of Kirmāṇi (l.c.). Wilks partially confirms this story in his *History* (o.c., I, 741), though he says that he was one of those prisoners "carried off in the first inhuman emigration from Malabar." He describes him "as a young Nair, from Cherul," i.e., Chirakkal, or the Kolattiri kingdom, and adds that he "had been received as a slave of the palace, and to whom, on his forced conversion to Islam, they had given the name of Sheik Ayaz" (*Ibid*). He became Governor of Bednūr on Tipū's coming to power. The English writers called him *Hyat-Sahab* (corruption of *Ayaz Sahab*). When offered the Governorship of Chitaldrug by Haidar, he declined it, but was, as will be narrated later, persuaded to accept it (see Wilks, o.c., 742-743, for an anecdote in this connection).

462. Moens, o.c., 153.

463. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; Wilks, o.c., I, 533; and De La Tour, o.c., I, 113.

464. *Ibid*; Wilks, l.c.

view to eventualities, stored with ammunition and provisions for the use of their ample garrisons. A disposable column of 3,000 regular infantry, aided by Ali Rāja's Māpilla troops, was stationed at Calicut.⁴⁶⁵ The civil government of the place was committed to one Mādanna, son of one Terakanāmbi Śankara-Gauḍa, who had been Governor of Coimbatore, a position in which he had proved himself capable and trustworthy.⁴⁶⁶ He was chosen for the post for the reason that he was successfully governing the adjoining country, and being a Hindu, it was expected that he would be welcome to the Nairs, whose manners and customs he understood.⁴⁶⁷

All this took nearly a month from the day Māna-Vikrama put himself to death in such an extraordinary fashion. Haidar then moved further south-west, with the view of reducing the country as far as Travancore, thus completing his design of the conquest of the whole of the Western Coast from Goa onwards.⁴⁶⁸ He had the more reason to do this now, as he suspected that the sons of the Nair chiefs of Malabar—including those belonging to the Kolattiri and Zāmorin families—had taken counsel with the kings of Travancore and Cochin, and had collected a large army at Ponnāni, about 36 miles to the south of Calicut.⁴⁶⁹ Their forces assembled on the banks of the river of the same name, and were

465. Wilks, l.c.

466. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; De La Tour, l.c. De La Tour describes Mādanna, whose name he does not mention, as the "Raja of Coimbatore", which is not strictly correct; nor is his reference to him as a "Brahman" equally accurate. Mādanna, according to *Haid. Nām.*, was a non-Brahman Hindu, being a *Vokkaliga*, his father's name being Śankara-Gauḍa, as stated above.

467. De La Tour, l.c. See also and compare, on the subject of Haidar's invasion of Malabar, Peixoto, *Memoirs (l.c.)*, whose account, though brief, agrees in the main with the other sources drawn upon here.

468. The conquest of Bednūr was the prelude to the conquest of the Portuguese territories; as regards Travancore, see text below.

469. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I 112.

assisted by a few European gunners ⁴⁷⁰ and Portuguese artisans. These, however, precipitately withdrew, immediately Haidar made his appearance. He pursued them as far as Cochin, some fifty miles further to the

Reduction of
Cochin and other
chiefs.

southward, where, by the mediation of the Dutch, the king of Cochin made peace with him by agreeing to pay tribute to Mysore.⁴⁷¹ Ponnāni possessed

a strong fort and it was garrisoned by Haidar immediately the Nairs retired before him. The example of Cochin was followed by the submission of the rest of the chiefs, including the Rāja of Pālghat,⁴⁷² who all agreed to pay tribute and settle the alleged claims of the Māpīḷas.⁴⁷³ On these terms, their territories were restored to them, except that the nephews of the Zāmorin were kept out of possession of Calicut and the territory subordinate to it.⁴⁷⁴ From Cochin, after a dreary and difficult march, in which many horses and cattle were lost, Haidar passed through the woods of Annamalais, receiving on the way tribute from the

Return to Coimba-
tore.

Rājas of Pālghāt and Cochin,⁴⁷⁵ and reached Coimbatore, towards the close of April 1766, where he cantoned. Before doing so, he posted Alī Razā-Khān with 3,000

470. The Europeans referred to were probably Dutchmen.

471. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 112-113; Wilks, *l.c.*; and Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 186.

472. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 534.

473. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 113.

474. *Ibid.*

475. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 533-534; Kirmāṇi, *o.c.*, 186; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 36. Wilks says Haidar exacted "tribute" from both these Rājas. The chief of Malabar referred to by Kirmāṇi may be identified with the Rāja of Pālghāt. He is said to have sent 23 elephants and Rs. 7 lakhs as a present. According to him, Haidar levied contributions also from the inhabitants of Cochin. De La Tour does not mention these conquests. According to *Haid. Nām.*, however, a lack of rupees was exacted from the Chief of Pālghāt, while the Chief of Cochin was made to pay an annual tribute (*khaṇḍāne*) of 40,000 *varahas*.

infantry at Mannārkāt,⁴⁷⁶ a large town and fortress on the frontier, about 18 miles west by south of Coimbatore and midway between Ponnāni and Pālgāt.

Mādanna at Coimbatore, however, did not fulfil expectations. His exactions, and his lack of knowledge of the character of the people he had to deal with proved inimical to the success of his administration. Nor would the Nairs easily yield to foreign subjugation as Haidar seems to have thought. Their fiery zeal for independence and the imprudent measures of Mādanna drove them into open rebellion.⁴⁷⁷ The secret help that the king of Travancore rendered them and the nephews of the Zāmorin also evidently inclined them in the same direction.⁴⁷⁸ Alī Rāja and his brother Shaik Rāja had added their own quota. If they and Mādanna had been more temperate in their exactions, the rebellion would perhaps have been less general.⁴⁷⁹ Within two or three months of Haidar's arrival at Coimbatore, he received news of a general rebellion of the Nairs throughout the invaded country. The monsoon had broken out and every rivulet had swollen into a river. The weather helping them, the Nairs attacked the block-houses, which the swelling of the rivers had cut off from all reinforcement, either from each other, or from the movable column stationed at Calicut.⁴⁸⁰

476. De La Tour calls this place "Madigheri" and says it was 6 leagues from Coimbatore (*o.c.*, I. 114). If that be so, it should be "Mannarkat" of the Survey Map of India; and "Mungary Cota" of Mackenzie's Map of 1808.

477. Wilks *o.c.*, I. 534.

478. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 115.

479. *Ibid.*

480. Wilks says "three months" (*l.c.*); Robson says that the rebellion occurred "within two months" after Haidar's departure (*o.c.*, 37). The rebellion was begun by the brother of the late Zāmorin of Calicut, if not led by him. He collected an army of 20,000 men and invested Calicut. From intelligence gained from within, he forced the place, and put the whole garrison to the sword, except about 300 men, who fled to a neighbouring temple for safety (Robson, *l.c.*).

The Nairs began by massacring a small garrison of about 200 men stationed at Puḍiyangāḍi.⁴⁸¹ Here they cut off five French soldiers, who were proceeding from Mahe to join Haidar at Coimbatore.⁴⁸² Their object was to take Calicut before Haidar or Alī Razā Khān came back to prevent their endeavours. Both Ponnāni and Calicut were soon invested by them.⁴⁸³ News of this reaching Alī Razā at Mannārkāt, he made a precipitate march, which duly impressed the Nairs. But seeing that he had no cavalry with him, they succeeded in drawing him into a place, situated at the junction of the two rivers near Puḍiyangāḍi, where he found himself shut up, without being able to pass on either side, by reason of the depth and rapidity of the water. He also saw he had been cut off from returning by the defiles he had passed, which were everywhere rendered difficult to pass by the felling of trees and by the lying in wait of Nairs in ambuscade, ready to fire.⁴⁸⁴ Haidar, securing reinforcements from Mysore, after the rains abated a little, marched at the head of 3,000 horse, 10,000 foot and 12 light pieces of cannon,⁴⁸⁵ and by forced marches through a mountainous country, under a blazing sun, alternating with rain followed with thunder and lightning, soon reached Manjēri,⁴⁸⁶ which he made his head-quarters. From here he sent detachments in various directions. One of these, consisting of 5000 foot and 1000 horse,

481. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 114; De La Tour calls this place Pandicharry, which has to be identified with Pondiagerry of Mackenzie's Map of 1808 and Puḍiyangāḍi of the modern Survey Map.

482. *Ibid.*, 115.

483. *Ibid.*, 115-116.

484. *Ibid.*, 117-118.

485. *Ibid.*, 118-119. Wilks, however, says that Haidar moved with only "a light equipment of eight days' provisions" (*o.c.*, I. 535), and he is confirmed by *Haid. Nām.* also (*l.c.*).

486. Manjēri, called "Munjera" by Wilks (*l.c.*), lies nearly midway between Periangāḍi and Nilambūr, and just 10 miles north of Malapuram. There is a graphic description of the difficulties encountered by Hajdar during this march in De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 119-120.

was under one Asof Khān, who had strict orders to retake Calicut. On his approach, the rebel leader marched out valiantly and gave battle. Worst of in two attacks, and not choosing to be invested, he left the place towards night-fall, retreating with his army. The inhabitants fled to the neighbouring hills, thus facilitating the occupation of the country by Asof Khān. But the rebel leader's retreat was nothing more than a ruse. Three months elapsed and he reappeared on the scene. Haidar's party, lulled into a state of security, fell an easy prey to a sudden attack. Asof Khān's head was cut off and Calicut was retaken with ease.⁴⁸⁷ The rebel leader, however, was not kept long in possession of the place. Haidar, hearing of the disaster, detached a force under Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao, one of his Brāhman officers, with orders to retake it. On his advance, the rebel leader attacked him, but being worsted once again, retired to the woods. Śrīnivāsa Rao re-occupied Calicut thereafter and garrisoned it.⁴⁸⁸ Hearing of this unexpected arrival of Haidar, the Nair chiefs collected their forces and prepared to offer opposition to him at Puḍiyangāḍi. They had strongly entrenched themselves here, at this place, which, on its left wing, had a fortified village with a ditch and parapet planted with pallisades, well furnished with artillery. Haidar, seeing the resolute opposition offered him by men who preferred death to surrender, determined to attack this camp. He detached his right wing, consisting of 4000 of his best sepoys, and charged them to attack it. Commanded by a Portuguese officer, they attacked the camp by marching to the edge of the ditch, but being badly exposed, the troops were destroyed to a man by the Nairs, who fired with impunity from pentholes or from behind

487. Robson, *o.c.*, 37-38.

488. *Ibid.*, 38. The "Sevagee Row," a Mahratta Brāhman, referred to by Robson, should be identified with "Śrīnivāsa Rao", *i.e.*, Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao of the text above.

the hedges. Haidar's anger knew no bounds at the improper manoeuvre of the Portuguese officer, who soon earned his dismissal at his hands. The French officer, who served in support of the main body of the troops, under the direct command of Haidar, now advanced forward and put himself at the head of the remnant of the sepoys with his reserve corps. Supported by his own men, Haidar and his troops jumped into the ditch, and hastily ascending the entrenchments, tore up the pallisades, and were instantly in the face of the Nair chiefs. They gave no quarter; the Nair forces, taken unawares and all too suddenly, suffered themselves to be butchered without even an opportunity for offering any resistance. The flames of the village on fire, and the direction of the cannon now pointed on the unhappy Nair chiefs, showed that the village had been carried. Haidar now moved with his whole army and attacked the entrenchment, with the result that the Nairs deserted it and fled precipitately in utter disorder. The inhabitants all round deserted their homes and had the anguish to behold, from their hiding, houses in flames, their fruit-trees cut down, their cattle destroyed and their temples burned.⁴⁸⁹ Their further march uninterrupted, Haidar's troops slew isolated bodies of Nairs, while the prisoners taken in the first attacks were either beheaded or hanged. As their numbers increased, Haidar conceived the plan of transplanting them to uninhabited areas in Mysore. This cure for rebellion in one province and for defective population in another proved, as might be expected, wholly futile. Unaccustomed to the new climate, and the new conditions of life demanded by it, added to the hunger and the mental anxiety resulting from the sudden transfer from their accustomed environment, not two hundred

489. De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 120-125. Wilks omits all mention of this attack (*l.c.*).

survived of the 15,000 thus transported.⁴⁹⁰ These rigorous measures, however, had little effect in restoring confidence in the people. The Māpiḷlas and Alī Rāja saw that in the ruin of the Nairs their own future was involved. They prevailed on Haidar to return to Coimbatore in the hope that his absence might induce the people to return to their homes. Haidar, however, thought it best to proclaim an amnesty to such of the remaining inhabitants as should immediately submit. Many returned but they bore no love for Haidar or for his troops who had proved so cruel towards them.⁴⁹¹ Before returning to Coimbatore, Haidar took the precaution of providing for the protection of the new conquests he had made. As he had exacted the allegiance of the Rāja of Pālghāt, he directed the erection of a fort at Pālghāt, a position judiciously chosen as an advanced post and Depot, securing for all time an easy communication between the new conquests and the old province of Coimbatore, from whose capital it was only thirty miles distant.⁴⁹² Haidar appointed Sardār Khān, described as an officer of great courage, as Subādār of the newly occupied country and left with him military force sufficient to guard it and aid him in its administration.⁴⁹³

490. Wilks compares these transplantations to the numerous instances that occur in Jewish history, and adversely remarks on "the barbarous nature of the design" underlying such transplantation of the population of one area to another (l.c.). Here is something of a warning to those—European or Indian—who suggest transfer of populations from one area to another, for whatever reasons.

491. Wilks *o.c.*, I. 535-536. De La Tour says that Haidar issued an order which made the Nairs forfeit all their privileges, subjecting them "to salute the Pariahs and others of the lowest castes" and that he also issued another edict by which he established in all their rights and privileges such Nairs "as should embrace the Muhammadan religion" (*o.c.*, I. 126-127). These statements should be taken with reservation, though he says that "many of the nobles took the turban on this occasion" (*o.c.*, I. 127). As a matter of fact, many remained, as he admits later, "dispersed and chose rather to take refuge in the kingdom of Travancore than submit to this last ordinance" (*Ibid.*).

492. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 536.

493. Kirmāṇī, *o.c.*, 186-187. On the topics included in this section, see also *Haid. Nām.* (l.c.), which contains a running summary of the whole affair.

In 1766, the last year of the reign of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar II, the territorial limits of Mysore had extended far beyond what they had been in 1704, the last year of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar's reign. Its northern frontier had extended to Bednūr and far beyond it, while the southern frontier had extended to Diṇḍigal in the south and Cochin in the south-west. The tendency to reach down to the sea in the south and south-west and advance northwards to the banks of the Krishṇa had become more pronounced since 1750, with the coming into power of the Dalavāi brothers. This territorial expansion was the direct outcome of the strenuous work which Haidar Alī continued from the period he came to be at the head of affairs in Mysore, thus fulfilling the policy of his masters and the predecessors, the early rulers of Mysore.

CHAPTER XIV.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(contd.)

Krishnaraja's Rule : General features—Religion—Gifts, grants and other records, 1734-1766—(a) of Krishnaraja Wodeyar : (1) 1734-1750—(2) 1758-1760—(3) 1761-1766—(b) of the Dalavais : (1) 1735-1757—(2) 1741-1763—The spirit of the times—Condition of the people—Trade and Commerce—Taxation.

INSCRPTIONS and literary works bear out in an ample measure the rule of Krishnarāja Wodeyar over Krishnarāja's Rule: Mysore "seated on the jewelled throne in Seringapatam" during 1734-1766 General features. (*ratna-simhāsanārūḍharāgi*). They point to the actual conduct of the government by the Dalavāis (particularly by Dalavāi Dēvarājaiya) in his name throughout the greater part of the reign. Inscriptions, however, reveal prominently the personality of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, and his active influence on the administration, from about 1758 onwards. The administrative institutions of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar had stood the test of time and were maintained with considerable regularity and vigour. The system of conducting local government through agents (*Kārya-karta*) and headmen (*Gurikār*) with the aid of the militia (*Kandāchāra*) appears to have become stereotyped as a permanent feature.

There are indications that Krishnarāja Wodeyar was, like his predecessors, a pious Vaishnava.¹ Religion. Of the Dalavāis, Dēvarājaiya was, we learn,² a devout worshipper of Śrī-Rāmachandra, with his

1. See, for instance, records cited below, referring to his grants particularly on *Gōkulāṣṭami* and *Dvādasi* days in keeping with the Vaishnava tradition.

2. E.C., III (8) TN. 68 (1749), ll. 72-73: *Yasya Śrī-Rāmachandrō hṛdaya sarasiṣṭe bhājayā rājamānō buddhim saddharmakṛtyē nṛutam* . . . See also his gifts in the name of Śrī-Rāma and Sita, referred to below.

mind intent on works of merit. His younger brother Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya was, however, an ardent Śaivite of the Śuddha-Śaiva school (*Śivapūjādhurandhara*),³ being, as he tells us,⁴ a disciple of Sundarēśvarāchārya and a devotee of Śrī-Nanjundēśvara of Nanjangūḍ (*Garaḷapura*). Of him we glean a picture as a person wearing the sacred ashes and the rosaries, adoring the *linga* and prostrating to the Śaiva saints.⁵ Toleration was a cardinal feature of the religion, alike of Krishnarāja Wodeyar and the Daḷavāis.

Numerous were the gifts, grants, acts of piety, etc., by the king and Daḷavāis during the reign. Gifts, grants and other records, 1734-1766. Some of the earlier documents of the period—relating to these—issued independently by Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, close with a seal inscribed in Kannaḍa as *Mahisūra Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya*,⁶ while most of the later ones fully bear the impress of the king's personality and invariably end with his signature in Kannaḍa or Nāgari characters thus, *Śrī-Krishnarāja, Śrī-Krishṇa*.⁷ The records of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, however, it is interesting to find, bear two seals inscribed in Kannaḍa, one at the top and one at the bottom, the former containing the words *Śivaśambhō-Mahādēva* and the latter the expression *Śrī-Nanjundā*, which probably stands for his name.⁸

3. See his *Śivabhakta-Vi. Dar.*, col.; also I, 14. For Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya's attainments in Śaiva lore, etc., and an account of his works cited in this Ch., see under *Literary activity* in Ch. XV below.

4. *Ibid.*: I, 13; *Śiva-Gite*, I, 13-14.

5. *Ibid.*: *Bhasita Śiva-māleḡaḷa dharisi, lingārchane . . . māḡutta, Śiva-saraṇaraḡidāvareḡe poramaḡuta*. See also *Mbh. Ādi.*, ff. 1, where Nanjarājaiya refers to himself as worshipping Śiva according to *Śaivā-gamas (Śiva-pūjā-grhaḡalli Śaivāgamōkta vidhānadinda Śivārchaneyam māḡi)*. The *Śiva-saraṇaru* referred to are the traditional sixty-three saints of Śaiva hagiology celebrated in the Tamil *Periyapurāṇam*, whose contents are not unknown in Kannaḍa versions.

6. *Vide* references cited in f.n. 48, 49 and 50 *infra*.

7. *Vide* references cited in f.n. 19, 23, 27, 28, 33, 40, etc., *infra*. The only available earlier record, however, containing the king's signature, is that of 1738, cited in f.n. 10 *infra*.

8. See *E.C.*, IV (2) Ch. 56 (1758), cited in f.n. 41 *infra*; also references cited in f.n. 61 and 64 *infra*.

Among the extant records of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, a copper-plate charter, dated in 1734,⁹ registers a gift of lands by him to the temple at Tiruchangōḍu. A lithic record, dated March 25, 1738,¹⁰ relates to grant of the village of Taggihalli, in Maddagiri taluk, to one Krishnāvadhāni of Kaunḍinya-gōtra and Āpastambha-sūtra. A *nirūpa* of Krishnarāja, dated August 20, 1739,¹¹ directs the officials of Channapaṭṇa to invest Lakshmīdhara-Tīrtha with the entire management of the local *maṭh* and its landed property, formerly administered by Raghunātha-Tīrtha of the Vyāsarāya Maṭh. A copper-plate inscription, dated August 22, 1741,¹² records his grant, on the occasion of *Gōkulāṣṭami*, of Kannambādi (*Kaṇṇavapuri*) as an *agrahāra* (of 120 shares) to Brāhmins, giving it the name of *Nanjarāja-samudra* after Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya. Another, dated April 15, 1744,¹³ refers to the formation by him, at the suggestion of Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya,

9. *I.M.P.*, II. 1226, Sa. 202: Ś. 1656. *Tiruchangōḍu* referred to in this inscription should be identified with Tiruchengode, in the present Salem District, 26 miles south-west of Salem. The town derives its name (*Tiru-shem-kōḍu*) from the red-peaked hill, at the northern foot of which it stands. The rock is about 1,200 ft. above the plain. The *durg* is a bare square-looking mass with some red stains on its sides, like the red streaks on the wall of a pagoda. It is from this that the name is derived, the Sanskrit name of *Nāgāchalapura* (Snake-hill town) being derived from the snaky look of the streak on the hill-sides. The temple of Śiva on the hill here, dedicated to Ardhanārīśvara, is of great repute and contains numerous inscriptions recording grants made during the times of Pāṇḍyan, Chōla, Vijayanagar, and Nāyak kings. One of these, dated in the 27th year of the Chōla king Parāntaka, refers to the entrustment by a private person of gold for the maintenance of a perpetual lamp in the temple to the "village assembly" of Tiruchengode, while the people of the "eighteen districts" were to protect the grant. (No. 186 of *I. M. P.*, being 640 of 1905 of the Madras Epigraphist's Collection). The place is still much frequented by pilgrims, especially on new-moon days and during the car festival held annually here.

10. *E.C.*, XII Mi. 56: Ś. 1600, *Kaṭayukti*, *Chaitra Śu.* 15, Saturday. Ś. 1600 here is an error for Ś. 1660.

11. *M.A.R.*, 1925, p. 18, No. 3: *Siddhārthi*, *Śrāvaṇa ba.* 12.

12. *E.C.*, IV (2) Yd. 58: *Durmati*, *Śrāvaṇa ba.* 8 (*Gōkulāṣṭami*), Saturday.

13. *M.A.R.*, 1923, pp. 66-70, No. 58: Ś. 1666, *Raktākṣi*, *Vaiśākha śu.* 15, Sunday. The grant is signed by Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya as *Venkaṭēśvara*.

of an *agrahāra* at Hampāpura and the bestowal of it upon twelve Brāhmans, under the name of *Ven-katurāma-samudra*. Two lithic records, dated in 1749,¹⁴ relate to his gift of the village of Jālige (in Dēvanahallī taluk) to Goddess Chāmunḍēśvari together with the revenues of jōḍi Kāmēnahallī. A third, dated August 22, 1750,¹⁵ registers his grant to God Nanjunḍēśvara of Nanjangūd of three villages in Dyāvāṇḍahallī-sthala (Dēvanahallī) belonging to Channapaṭṇa. Two *nirūpas* of his, dated in 1750,¹⁶ and addressed to Rāmaiya, Superintendent of the *Paṭṭana-Hōbali-Sīme*, refer to his grant, at the instance of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, of two villages of the revenue value of 100 *varahas* each in Chikkadēvarājagiri-sīme and Dyāvāṇḍahallī-sīme, respectively, to the Lakshmikāntasvāmi temple at Kaḷale. Of about the same time is an inscription on a pair of golden feet of the shrine of Śrī-Nārāyaṇasvāmi in the Mēlkōṭe temple recording it as a gift of Krishṇarāja.¹⁷

A lithic record of about 1758 refers to a gift of lands by Krishṇarāja Wodeyar to the temple
 (2) 1758-1760. at Perunḍalaiyūr.¹⁸ Reference has already been made in an earlier chapter to the conclusion of the *Bhāshā-patra* (deed of promise) by Krishṇarāja on October 24, 1758, in favour of his father-in-law Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya. This was supplemented at the same time by the issue by him of the *Nambuge-nirūpa* (order of assurance) also, allowing Nanjarājaiya and other members of the Kaḷale family complete freedom in respect of their domestic affairs (such as marital relations, management of family estates, etc.).¹⁹ We have a series of lithic inscriptions, dated

14. *Ibid.*, 1913-1914, p. 50, para 108.

15. *E.C.*, IX Dv. 69: Ś. 1673 [1672], *Pramōdāta*, *Bhādrapada* śu. 2.

16. *M.A.R.*, 1910-1911, pp. 55-56, para 134.

17. *E.C.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Sr. 288.

18. *I.M.P.*, I. 550, Cb. 299.

19. *E.C.*, IV (2) Nj. 268: *Bahudhānya*, *Āsvīja* ba. 8. For a detailed notice of the *Bhāshā-patra* (*Ibid.*, Nj. 267), *vide* text of l.n. 77 in *Ante* Ch. IX.

May 23, 1759,²⁰ recording respectively the grant by Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, as rent-free, of the villages of Mogehalli (in Channapaṭṇa-sthala of the revenue value of 600 *varahas*) and Bingipura (in Bengalūr-sthala, yielding 200 *varahas*) to Akal Shāh and Aṭavala Shāh for the *Fakīr-Dharma*, and the village of Chaṭṭamagere (yielding 219 *varahas*) to the tomb of Sālār Masūd Khādri at Toṇṇūr for feeding the poor at the tomb. A *nirūpa* of Krishṇarāja, dated in 1759,²¹ and addressed to Chikkaiya, Superintendent of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbali-Sīme*, intimates the appointment by him of Bhagavānu Śāstri, in place of Śankara Dīkshita, as a *sthānika* in the temple at Nanjangūd, with all the privileges pertaining to that office. Another *nirūpa* of his, of the same date,²² is addressed to Abhinava-Sachchidānanda-Bhārati-Svāmi of Śringēri, in which he expresses his pleasure at the proposed visit of His Holiness to Seringapatam and Nanjangūd on his way to Rāmēśvaram (*Sētu*) and at the opportunity thus afforded him of paying homage to the gods Chandra-maṇḍisvara and Ratna Vēṇugōpāla (*ratnamaya Vēṇugōpālasvāmi*), and informs him that though the country had for the past eight or ten years suffered from the raids of the Muhammadans and the Mahrattas (*Yavana Mahārāṣṭrara upasarga unṭāgi dēśa-kōśagaḷu arūpavāgi iddāgyū*), orders had been issued to the officers concerned to receive him with due honours and furnish him, as usual, with supplies and contributions (*ulupe muntāgi*)

20. *Ibid.*, IX Cp. 32; An. 90; and IV (2) Kr. 18, 19 and 20: Ś. 1682 [1681], *Pramāthi*, *Vaiśākha* ba. 12. The revenue value of the villages granted, according to the records, had been previously paid into the treasury by Haidar. Significantly enough, these documents point to the active influence Haidar was wielding over the administration of Mysore already about April-May 1759.

21. *M.A.R.*, 1918, p. 59, para 131.

22. *Ibid.*, 1916, p. 72, para 131. [For the text of the document, see *Selections from the records of the Sringeri Mutt*, Vol. I. pp. 46-47, No. 33: *Pramāthi*; also pp. 47-48, 54-55, Nos. 34 and 38: *Pramāthi* and *Vikrama*, (1759-1760)].

in their respective jurisdictions. A copper-plate grant, dated September 29, 1760,²³ records the gift by Krishnarāja Wodeyar of the village of Belāvādi (with twelve minor villages of the revenue value of 1,200 *varahas*), in Bēlūr-sthala, under the jurisdiction of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbali*, to His Holiness, during the latter's halt in Seringapatam (on his way to Rāmēśvaram), to provide for the offerings, etc., to the deities Śārada and Chandramaulīśvara. A *nirūpa*, dated October 4, 1760,²⁴ relates to a further grant by him of the village of Koḍalipura, in Arkalgūḍ-sthala, as a *sarvamānya* to the *maṭh*. Another, also dated in 1760,²⁵ and addressed to Lakshmikāntaiya, Superintendent of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbali-Sīme*, refers to a former grant of the village of Taṇḍeya for the maintenance of Kaḷale Chikkaiya's temple, *satra* and *maṭha*, and to a further grant of land (yielding 28 *varahas*) made by the king. Among other documents of the year, are copper-plate charters recording respectively a grant to the Śiva temple in Satyamangalam and gift of lands in Puttūr, Kāṇiyūr and Kuntūr villages.²⁶

23. *Ibid.*, 1923, pp. 41-44, No. 6: Ś. 1682, *Vikrama*, *Bhādrapada* ba. 5. (For the text of the grant, see *Selections*, pp. 48-52, No. 35). A *nirūpa* of Krishnarāja, of the same date and addressed to Lakshmikāntaiya, Superintendent of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbali-Sīme*, not only confirms the above grant but also directs him to make over the village, with its hamlets, to the Śringēri Maṭh (*M.A.R.*, 1916, p. 72, para 180. For the text, see *Selections*, pp. 52, 53, No. 36). In 1762, information was received that the local officer at Bēlūr was mismanaging the revenues from Bejavādi. A second *nirūpa* was accordingly issued by Krishnarāja Wodeyar on September 15, desiring Haider Ali to see that the village was made over to the *maṭh* and that the money collected was also remitted to it (*M.A.R.*, 1916, l.c. For the text, see *Selections*, pp. 55-56, No. 40: *Chitrabhānu*, *Bhādrapada* ba. 12). This record is of some interest as it points to the "outward show" of power retained by the king even after Haider's usurpation.

24. *Ibid.*, 1916, p. 72, para 131. (For the text, see *Selections*, pp. 53-54, No. 37: *Vikrama*, *Bhādrapada* ba. 10).

25. *Ibid.*, 1918, p. 59, para 131.

26. *I.M.P.*, I, 551, 553, 562, Ch. 307, 323 and 397: Ś. 1682, *Vikrama*.

A copper-plate inscription from Hanasōge, dated August 24, 1761,²⁷ registers the grant by Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, on the occasion of *Gōkulāṣṭami*, of the village of Baragūr (together with twelve hamlets) as an *agrahāra* (named *Krishṇarāja-samudra*) to Brāhmins. Another, from the same place, dated September 11, 1761,²⁸ relates to the formation by him of an *agrahāra* (named *Dēvāmbā-samudra* after his mother) in Mēlkōṭe, Nanjangūd, Yedatore and Rāma-sāgara, and his grant of the same to Brāhmins, divided into 225 shares (*vritti*). This record speaks also of Krishṇarāja's gifts in such holy places as Prayāga, Gaya, Rāmasētu (Rāmēśvaram), Kānchi, Venkaṭādri (Tirupati) and Śrīrangam.²⁹ A third, dated December 3, 1761,³⁰ records the gift by Gurikār Mādaiya, agent of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar at Coimbatore, of 50 *vallam* of land in the village of Kaṭṭampatti for the daily offerings of the God Ponmalai Vēlayudhasvāmi at Kiṇaṭṭakkaḍavūr. A *nirūpa* of Krishṇarāja, dated August 11, 1762,³¹ refers to an additional grant of the village of Gūliharavi as a *sarvamānya* to the Śringēri Maṭh. Another, dated in 1763,³² directs Nanjarājaiya, Superintendent of the *Putṭanada-Hōbali-Sīme*, to set apart for several charities certain lands purchased by Kaḷale Chikkaiya. A copper-plate inscription, dated January 4, 1764,³³ records the grant by Krishṇarāja of

27. *E.C.*, IV (2) Yd. 17: *Vishu, Śrāvāṇa ba. 8 (Gōkulāṣṭami)*, Monday.

28. *Ibid.*, Yd. 18: *Vishu, Bhādrapāda su. 12*, Friday. See also *M.A.R.*, 1914-1915, pp. 64-65, para 110.

29. *Ibid.*, II. 89-98.

30. *M.E.R.*, 1925, App. A, p. 10, No. 17: *Ś. 1683, Vishu, Kārtigai 22*, Thurs. day.

31. *M.A.R.*, 1916, p. 72, para 131. (For the text of the document, see *Selections*, p. 55, No. 39: *Chitrabhānu, Śrāvāṇa ba. 6*).

32. *Ibid.*, 1918, p. 59, para 131.

33. *E.C.*, IX Nl. 8: *Ś. 1683, Svabhānu, Pushya su. 1*. Rice places this record in 1761, accepting the *Śaka* date 1683. The cyclic year *Svabhānu, Pushya su. 1*, however, corresponds to January 4, 1764, the exact date of the document. Apparently *Ś. 1683* is a scribal error for *Ś. 1685, Svabhānu*

two rent-free villages (of the revenue value of 27 *varahas*) to the mosque built by the Pēsh Imām Ahmad Shāh Saidu in Sonḍekoppa of the Nelamangala-sthala. On the 11th of the same month (*i.e.*, on the occasion of *Makara-sankramaṇam*), he also, we learn,³⁴ made gifts of a pair of silver pots, a silver plate and a silver chowrie to Gangādharaśvara and Svarṇāmbikā at Śivaganga. A copper-plate charter from Pollāchi (Coimbatore district), dated March 4, 1764,³⁵ refers to the establishment by Mādaiya, agent of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, of an *agrahāra* called *Mādhavapura* to the west of Ānemale (Ānamalai Hill), allotting shares to Brāhmins; and to his gift of lands to the local Śiva temple. Another, dated April 6, 1764,³⁶ records the grant by Krishṇarāja of the village of Sonḍekoppa, in Huliūrḍurga-sthala, to Aṇṇaiya Śāstri. A *nirūpa* of his, dated December 30, 1765³⁷ and addressed to Kāntaiya of the *Paṭṭanaḍa-Hōbali-Sime-Vichāra*,

(see *Ind. Eph.*, VI. 330). Another record, a lithic one (*E. C.*, IX Cp. 146), referring to a grant by Haidar Ali of the village of Majūr to Saidu Muhammad Akal Shāh Khādrī for *Fakir-Dharma*, is dated Ś. 1686 [1685], *Svabhānu*, *Pushya* *su.* 2. This, again, actually corresponds to January 5, 1764 (see *Ind. Eph.*, l.c.), though Rice places it in 1763. Haidar is further styled in this epigraph as "*Rājādhirāja-Rāja-paramēśvara mahā-pratāpa Nawāb Haidar Ali Bahadūr* ruling the empire of the world." We have also other records of the same date (*i.e.*, 1764), in which he is referred to as agent (*Kārya-karta*) to king Krishṇarāja II (see, for instance, *M. A. R.*, 1924, pp. 55-57, 57-58, Nos. 61 and 62). Evidently, by 1764, Haidar had reached the height of his power as the *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore, although his theoretical designation of "agent" to the reigning king continued to be formally retained in the public documents of the time. The ascription of supreme titles to Haidar is to be understood only on this footing. Even Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, Haidar's predecessor in the office of *Sarvādhikāri* in Mysore, was looked upon as the supreme authority in Mysore during 1748-1751 when he was at the plenitude of his power and glory (see under *Literary activity* in Ch. XV below). And Haidar followed in his wake.

34. *E. C.*, *Bangalore Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, NI. 92-95: *Svabhānu*, *Pushya* *su.* 8, Wednesday.

35. *M. E. R.*, 1928, App. A, p. 6, No. 7: Ś. 1685, *Svabhānu*, *Phalguṇa* *su.* 2, Sunday. See also and compare *I. M. P.*, I. 560, Ch. 375 and 376.

36. *E. C.*, XII Kg. 36: Ś. 1686, *Tāraṇa*, *Chaitra* *su.* 5.

37. *M. A. R.*, 1925, p. 17, No. 2: *Parābhava*, *Pushya* *ba.* 3. Here for *Parābhava* read *Pārthiva*,

directs him to pay 360 *Kaṇṭhīrāya varahas* annually to the Guru Lakshmīdhara-Tīrtha at Channapaṭṇa. Another, dated in 1765³⁸ and addressed to Krishṇaiya of the *Āyakattu* department, desires him to make over as *sarvamānya* one-half of the village of Kaḍattūr, in Śālya-sthala (Salem), to Venkaṭanarasimhāchār, great grandson of Kōṭikanyādānam Immaḍi-Lakshmīkumāra-Tirumalai-Tātāchārya. Perhaps the last of the available records of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar is a copper-plate charter, dated April 19, 1766,³⁹ registering the grant of two villages in Piriyaṭṇa-sthala as *Śrōtriya-mānya* to the Guru of the Śrīpādarāya Maṭh, Lakshmīnidhi-Tīrtha-Śrīpāda, disciple of Śrī-Vallabha-Tīrtha (who was disciple of Śrīkaṇṭha-Tīrtha.) These villages, according to the charter, had fallen into decay and were overgrown with jungle, infested by elephants and tigers. The object of the grant was the restoration of the villages to their former condition by clearing the jungle and making the ground fit for cultivation at the expense of the *maṭh*, suitable remissions being made in the rental (to be paid for the villages during the first five years) for the construction of tanks, etc. We have also numerous documents of the reign, relating to sale of villages and lands, gifts, etc., by the king (1760-1763),⁴⁰

38. *Ib. d.*, 1912, p. 58, para 130. Krishṇaiya of this record is perhaps identical with Bakshi Krishṇaiya of the *Mily. Cons. and Mily. Count. Corres.*, cited in *Ante* Ch. XI.

39. *Ibid.*, 1925, pp. 70-71, No. 77: Ś. 1689, *Vyaya, Chaitra su.* 10. Here for Ś. 1689 read Ś. 1683. Accepting the Śaka date, the *Report* places the grant in 1767, which, however, does not tally with the cyclic year. *Vyaya* actually corresponds to Ś. 1688 (see. *Ind. Eph.*, VI. 334). There was an intercalary *Chaitra* in that year (*Ibid.*) and the grant must, in keeping with the Vaishṇava tradition, be held to have been made on *Nija-Chaitra su.* 10 (April 19, 1766), *i.e.*, six days before the death of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar.

40. *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 58, para 180; 1933, pp. 261-263, No. 56; 1928, pp. 52-53, No. 45; 1908, p. 24, para 78 (*E. C., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 299 and 300) (1760-1762); *I. M. P.*, I. 551, Cb. 303, 304 and 305 (1760-1762); *E. C.*, III (1) Nj. 15; IV (2) Ch. 81; Ng. 7; Yl. 63; V (1) and (2) Hn. 118 and 132 IX Nl. 51, and XII Tp. 112; Ck. 45, etc. (1761-1763). The Royal sale deeds, cited here, point to the low state of finances in the treasury which

private parties (1737-1760)⁴¹ and officials (1761-1766).⁴²

The records of the Daḷavāi family, during the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, range from (b) Of the Daḷavāis: 1735 to 1763. Although the Daḷavāi (1) 1735-1757. régime in Mysore was practically at an end in 1759, Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya continued to make grants, etc., in his own name even during his retirement in Koṇanūr. A lithic inscription, which can be dated in July 1735,⁴³ registers a grant by Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya (cousin brother of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya) to the *maṭha* of Maruḷadēva in Honnāpura (Māgaḍi taluk). From a copper-plate charter dated August 22, 1741,⁴⁴ we learn that the Sarvādhikāri, with the Daḷavāi's consent, made all the sixteen great gifts to Brāhmins, and, just before his death in 1739, had obtained the formal permission of Krishnarāja Wodeyar for the formation and grant of an *agrahāra* (of 120 shares) to them in his own name (*Nanjarāja-samudra*) in Kannambāḍi (*Kaṇvapuri*). About 1735, Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, we note, got built "a strong bridge of twenty-three very substantial arches" over the Kapinī river at Mallanamūle.⁴⁵ An inscription

had been continuously drained during troubled times (1751-1761). To restore the equilibrium, the practice of disposing of villages and landed property appears to have come into increasing vogue in Mysore from about 1760 onwards.

41. *Ibid.*, 1916, pp. 71-72, para 130 (1737); 1935, pp. 100-103, No. 28 (1751); 1912, p. 53, para 130 (*E. C., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, TN. 254) (1753); 1924, pp. 54-55, No. 60 (1755); 1914-1915, p. 64, para 110 (*E. C., Bangalore Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Mā. 86) (1757); 1916, p. 72, para 131 (1760); *E. C.*, IV (2) Ch. 55 (1750), 56 (1758), 101 (1759), and III (1) Nj. 32 (1759), etc.

42. *Ibid.*, 1933, pp. 200-206, No. 31 (1737); 1908, p. 24, para 78 (*E. C., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Nj. 298) (1761); 1925, pp. 68-69, No. 75; 1926, pp. 93-94, No. 110 (1763); 1924, pp. 55-57, 57-58, Nos. 61 and 62 (1764); *E. C.*, IX Cp. 166 (1761), 146 (1764); An. 91 (1765); III (1) Nj. 94 (1766), etc.

43. *Ibid.*, 1914-1915, p. 64, para 110 (*E. C., Bangalore Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Mā. 122: *Rakshasa, Śrāvana* *śu?*). The characters in the record are considerably defaced.

44. *E. C.*, IV (2) Yd. 58 (cited in f.n. 12 *supra*): ll. 31-35.

45. See account of Rev. Schwartz's Embassy to Seringapatam (1779), quoted in *Wilks*, I. 846 (with f.n.), App. VIII. From the context, "Madene muley" of the text is to be identified with Mallanamūle, near Nanjangūd.

from the *Mackenzie Collection*, dated April 6, 1747,⁴⁶ refers to the erection by him of a two-storeyed *Rangamantapa*, named *Sītā-vilāsa*, in the temple of Ranganātha at Seringapatam. Dēvarājaiya is also, about this time, credited with the construction of a water-course by name *Sītā-sarōvara*, near the capital.⁴⁷ The *Daḷavāi Agrahāram Plates* II, dated April 18, 1749,⁴⁸ record the grant to Brāhmans by him (Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya), with the formal permission of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar, of an *agrahāra* of 120 shares, named *Rāmachandrapura* (south of T. Narasipur), formed out of fourteen villages acquired by him. A *nirṇāya* of Dēvarājaiya, dated in 1750⁴⁹ and addressed to Tammaiya, *Pārupatyagār* of Krishṇarajanagara-sthala, directs him to see that a village of the revenue value of 100 *varahas* in that place was made over to the Lakshmīkāntasvāmi temple at Kaḷale as per orders of the king. An inscription of about 1750 on a silver platter (for burning camphor) in the Nārāyaṇasvāmi temple at Mēlkōṭe, refers to it as a votive offering of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya of Mysore (*Mahiśūra Daḷavāyi Dēvarājaiyana sēve*).⁵⁰ A letter of the Daḷavāi, dated in 1751⁵¹ and addressed to Ummāji-Paṇḍit of Kōlār, is of some interest. According to it, Ummāji-Paṇḍit had sent word to Dēvarājaiya through Sābāji Nāyaka that in case assurance was given in regard to the maintenance of the rights and privileges of the *Dēśmukhi*, *Dēśpāṇḍe*, *Nāḍu-Gauḍa* and others as heretofore, as also with regard to the expenses of his establishment, the salary of the 400

46. Ms. No. 18-15-20, p. 65: *Prabhava, Chaitra śu. 7*.

47. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 99; see also and compare *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 44.

48. *E. C.*, III (1) TN. 63: *Ś. 1670, Śukla, Vaiśākha śu. 12*, Tuesday. Here for *Ś. 1670* read *Ś. 1671*. Rice places this document in 1748, relying mainly on the *Śaka* date. But the cyclic year *Śukla* actually corresponds to *Ś. 1671* (see *Ind. Eph.*, VI. 300), and the date of the grant falls on April 18, 1749, as above.

49. *M. A. R.*, 1914-1915, p. 64, para 110.

50. *Ibid.*, 1908, p. 24, para 78 (*E. C.*, *Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Sr. 290).

51. *Ibid.*, 1909-1910, p. 42, para 105.

Īlekārs of Sōmaiya and the villages to be granted to himself, he would arrange for the transfer of Kōlār to the Mysore Government and send his own younger brother to Seringapatam. Thereupon Dēvarājaiya wrote to him in reply that he need not feel the least anxiety about any of the matters mentioned above in case the place was loyally transferred to the Mysore Government; and asked him to effect the transfer, looking upon the assurance given by Gōpālarājaiya (Katti Gōpālarāja Urs) and Sābāji Nāyaka as assurance given by himself. A *nirūpa* of Dēvarājaiya, dated January 6, 1754⁵² and addressed to Virarāju, Superintendent of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hōbaḷi-Sīme*, directs him to afford all facilities to the representatives of the Śringēri Svāmi in their enquiries into the conduct of the disciples of the *maṭh* and in the collection of the usual contributions from them, and to put down with a severe hand mischievous men causing obstruction to those representatives. A lithic record of about 1756 from Bhavāni-Kūḍal, registers the erection by Dēvarājaiya of a *maṇṭapa* in the local Īśvara temple.⁵³ Another, dated in 1756,⁵⁴ relates to the execution of repairs to the various parts of the temple of Avanāśīśvara at Avanāśī, and the setting up of a *linga* called Śankarēśvara in the south-east corner thereof, by Gurikār Śankaraiya, an official under Dēvarājaiya at Coimbatore. A copper-plate inscription from Kāramaḍai, dated in 1757,⁵⁵ records the grant by Dēvarājaiya of the village of Bhūsuraḷḷam (? Bhūsuraḷḷyam) to Brāhmins.

The earliest of Daḷavāi Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya's records is a lithic one dated March 10, 1741,⁵⁶ referring to a grant of wet land (of the sowing capacity of ten *koḷugas*)

52. *Ibid.*, 1916, p. 72, para 131. (For the text, see *Selections*, p. 45, No. 32: *Śrīmukha, Pushya su.* 12).

53. *I. M. P.*, I. 526, Ch. 68.

54. *Ibid.*, I. 523, Ch. 32: *S.* 1678, *Dhatu.*

55. *Ibid.*, Ch. 36: *Ś.* 1479, *Īśvara*. Here for *Ś.* 1479 read *Ś.* 1679.

56. *M. A. R.*, 1925, p. 64, No. 67: *Ś.* 1663, *Durmatī, Chaitra su.* 5.

to the local god of Kaṇimbale by his agent Rāmappa. Next we have inscriptions of about 1746 on the pedestals of God Tāṇḍavēśvara and Goddess Chaṇḍikāmbikā in the temple of Mallikārjuna on the hill of Beṭṭadapura, which speaks of them (*i.e.*, pedestals) as his gifts.⁵⁷ We have also inscriptions of about 1750 on the pedestals of the metallic images of Dakṣiṇāmūrti (in the temple of Gangādhareśvara at Seringapatam), Mānōnmani-Amma (processional image of Sarvamangalā-Kāmākshi-Amma in the temple of Agastyēśvara at Tirumakūḍlu), Tāṇḍavēśvara and Chaṇḍikāmbikā (in the temple of Vaidyēśvara at Talakāḍ), and Tāṇḍavēśvara and Mānōnmani (in the Divyalingēśvara temple at Haradanahalli, Chāmarājanagar taluk)—referring to these gifts as the service of Nanjarājaiya.⁵⁸ An inscription on the northern wall of the *mahādvāra* of the Trinayanēśvara temple at Mysore, datable in November 1752,⁵⁹ records the completion of the tower (*gōpura*) of the temple, caused to be erected by the Daḷavāi. A lithic record, dated November 1, 1756,⁶⁰ speaks of Viraiya, domestic agent (*manevārte Gurikār*) of Nanjarājaiya, as having got built the tank at Channapatṇa and made a rent-free gift of land thereunder (*kaṭṭu-koḍige*) to gods and Brāhmins. A *nirūpa* of Nanjarājaiya, dated in 1759⁶¹ and addressed to Basetṭi, *Pārupatyagār* of Mysore (*Mahisūru-nagara*), communicates to him the king's grant of the village of Taṇḍeya (of the revenue value of 120 *varahas*, in the Mysūru-Nagara-sthaḷa under the jurisdiction of the *Mysūru-*

57. *Ibid.*, 1912-1913, p. 49, para 114 (*E. O., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Hs. 154). The donor Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya is referred to thus: Nanjarāja Waḍeyaraiya, son of Virarāja Waḍeyaraiya of Kaḷale and grandson of Mahisūr Daḷavāi Doḍḍaiya of Bhāradvāja-gōtra, Āśvalāyana-sūtra and Rik-śākhā.

58. *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 58, para 130 (*E. O., Mys. Dist. Suppl. Vol.*, Sr. 174, TN. 149 and 194).

59. *Ibid.*, 1909, p. 27, para 102 (*Ibid.*, My. 107 : Ś. 1675, *Āṅgīrasa, Kārtika ba?*, where for Ś. 1675 read Ś. 1674).

60. *E. C.*, IX Cp. 34 : Ś. 1678, *Dhātu, Kārtika su.* 10.

61. *M. A. R.*, 1918, p. 59, para 131.

Nagarada-Hōbaḷi-Vichāra-Chāvaḍi) to provide for offerings of rice and lamps in the Prasanna-Nanjunḍēśvara temple—built at his own expense by Kaḷale Chikkaiya, on the northern bank of the Kapilā near Nanjangūḍ—and for the upkeep of the *satra* there and of the *jaṅgama-maṭha* in the Pēṭe of Mysore, also founded by Chikkaiya; and directs him to carry out the king's orders. Among other records of Nanjarājaiya, assignable to the period c. 1756-1760, are inscriptions referring to his setting up of images of sixty-three Śaiva saints—with their respective names inscribed thereon—in the Śrīkanṭhēśvara temple at Nanjangūḍ, and his gifts of two silver chowries (*chāmara*) and a silver cup to the Lakshmīkāntasvāmi temple at Kaḷale and of the image of Tāṇḍavēśvara to the Rāmēśvara temple at Rāmanāthpur.⁶² A lithic record from Mādanūr, dated February 11, 1761,⁶³ registers a grant of villages for services to god Annadāni-Rāmēśvara of Bangārahallī-Rāmanāthpur. Three *nirūpas* of his, all dated in 1763,⁶⁴ relate in the main to a car festival that was to take place at the Lakshmīkāntasvāmi temple at Kaḷale on the 6th lunar day of the dark fortnight of Śrāvana annually under the name *Nanjarāja-Tirunālū*⁶⁵ during the asterism of *Kṛttikā*. One of these *nirūpas*, addressed to Nāgaiya, *Pārūpatyagār* of Piriypaṭṇa, intimateś to him the grant by Nanjarājaiya of the village of Karatālū (of the revenue value of 220 *varahas*) in Rudrapaṭṇa hōbḷi, to provide for the function;⁶⁶ and orders him to treat the village as a tax-free endowment. Another, addressed to Venkaṭēśaiya, directs him to supply the

62. *E. C.*, IV (2) Nj. 200-265; *M. A. R.*, 1918, l.c.; 1917, p. 59, para 144; 1909, l.c.

63. *Ibid.*, V (1) and (2) Ag. 84: *Vikrama, Māgha sū.* 7. See also *Ibid.*, Ag. 60 (February 14, 1761), a grant by Virarājaiya, son of Nanjarājaiya, more fully noticed under *Domestic life* in Ch. XV below.

64. *M. A. R.*, 1914-1915, p. 65, para 110.

65. A festival organized and endowed by Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya. See Appx. v-(2).

66. This grant is also referred to in *E. C.*, IV (2) Yd. 32 (1767), a lithic record.

temple at Kalale with 50 milch cows and see that they are properly tended, and to collect the revenue of the village Karatālu and carry on the car festival from the next year.

The grants show that in keeping with the spirit of toleration characterising Hindu kings, Krishnarāja did not differentiate between classes of his subjects. Hindus and Mussalmans received equal treatment. The Śringēri *maṭh* received special attention, having regard to its importance and the influence it wielded. Institutions and individuals of other sections of the people also thrived under the unstinted support of the king. So deeprooted were the traditions of the early rulers and the Daḷavāis in this regard that, as we shall see, Haidar, during his regime as *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore (1761-1782), could not but cherish them and make them the foundation of his political policy.

The state of the times is to some extent reflected generally in the records above referred to as well as in the literary productions noticed in the next chapter.⁶⁷ The maintenance of the ideal of *Varṇāśrama-dharma* and crystallisation of society into recognised castes helped to preserve society against political cataclysms outside the country and revolutions within. The even tenor of the daily life of the various classes seems to have been hardly disturbed by the one or the other. The displacement of chiefs and rulers, of ministers and agents was not felt by the general body of the people. Neither the quiet of the Brāhmanical settlements (*agrahāras*), nor the even pursuit of religious and literary avocations and of institutions (like *maṭhs* and temples) was disturbed. The feasts and festivals were observed as of old. The temple festivals (*Gōkulāṣṭami*, *Vasantōtsavam* and the others

67. See also, on this and the following sections, article entitled *Two Centuries of Wodeyar Rule in Mysore* by N. Subba Rao in the *Q. J. M. S.*, XXIII. 453-473.

usually termed *Tirunāls*) were celebrated with the usual eclat. The management of the temples continued in the hands of the *sthānikas*, who had been, if anything, more assertive than ever in the exercise of their authority.

Trade and Commerce went along traditional lines, the State maintaining a monopoly of Sandal-wood, which attracted the attention of the European traders in India.⁶⁸ The *hana* and *varaha* continued to be the prevailing currency of the period. From the references in certain inscriptions to the tax levied on looms (*magga terige*) and on cotton (*hatti pommū*), it would seem that weaving as an industry was next only to agriculture. Evidently the handloom industry was showing a tendency to expansion and afforded scope for taxation. The military and civil professions derived their income from salaries (*suvarṇādāya*) and in exceptional cases from lands also (*davasūdāya*) granted to them by the ruler. Gifts were the commonest mode of acquisition of landed property by certain classes of people. Assignment of lands for military purposes (*i.e.*, to meet military expenditure) was a feature of the time. Deeds relating to the conveyance of villages by the king to private parties during the latter part of the reign throw light on the low state of the State's finances. The treasury was evidently getting depleted more and more during 1751-1761. It is said that as regards some of these sales "the price received in each case was nearly ten times the annual rental value of the same."

During the reign of Krishnarāja II, the old financial system—modified by Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar—was being continually adapted to the requirements of a

68. See, on this point, *Records of St. George: Tellis. Cons.* (1748-49), 209, 222; (1750-51), 103, 115, where the imposition by the King of Mysore of an "impediment" on Sandal-wood "exported out of his country" is frequently referred to.

polity dominated by the civil and military elements. The main sources of State income were, as of old, land revenue, excise, income-tax, tolls and customs, and local and communal taxes. An examination of these items shows that both as regards levy and incidence, there was a constant tendency at adaptation. While there were some departures in the matter of levy, in other cases there were improvements effected and thus the earlier system was sought to be improved from the point of view of yield. Thus, under land revenue, besides the existing items, there were included the tax on building sites of Brāhmanas and Śūdras (*brāhmaṇa nivēśana*, *śūdra nivēśana*) in villages and the major towns (*halli*, *hiriyūr*); a moiety of the income derived from rent-free lands granted to menials (*ūḷiga mānyada arevāsi*); the quit-rent from *jōḍi* lands granted rent-free (*mānyada jōḍi*); the fee levied for assessment rolls (*paṭṭē kāṇike*); the tax on plots of land where greens were grown (*soppina tōṭa*); the tax on minor crops raised (*chiluvāna pairu*, *jājari pairu*); the additional revenue raised from dependent villages (*upagrāmagāḷa hechchu huṭṭuwaḷi*); the surplus revenue derived from the lands under the tanks, i.e., rates levied on crops raised under the tanks and in garden lands (*kere keḷagaṇa hechchu huṭṭuwaḷi*, *kere pairu*, *tōṭada pairu*); the fixed cash assessments levied (*sisṭu nagadu kandāya*), the tax on dung hills (*tippe halla*); and on the iron sugarcane mills installed in place of the wooden ones (*kabbiṇada kabbiṇa gāṇa*). Under income-tax were included the tax on profits in business (*lābhādāya*), and the tax on income derived from exports (*horādāya*). Tolls and customs formed a major source of revenue and under this head were included octroi duties (*sunkada pommū*) on cloth (*javaḷi*), cotton (*hatti pommū*), and road tolls (*mārga sunka*). Under local taxes, it is worthy of note that while the earlier levies were maintained, most of the taxes introduced

by Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar, as an exceptional measure, appear to have fallen into desuetude, only some being current (such as *Dēvarāya vatta*, *kuri terige* and *mane terige*). An interesting addition under this head, during this period, as elsewhere indicated, was the tax known as *bāla terige*, a fee levied on tailed animals. Another addition was the item known as *dēvata arevāsi*, a moiety of the income set apart for divine service. A rather unique tax, throwing light on the political conditions of the times, was the *daṇḍina kāṇike*, military cess, which later developed into the *nazarāna* under Haidar. A similar item was the one known as *sēnāya*, which was a cess levied on military officers. These taxes appear to have been introduced in the latter half of Krishnarāja's reign. These indicate the character of the times as much as the expedients adopted to cast the taxation net wider so as to cover even the military. Among communal taxes, inscriptions prominently mention only *jātikūṭa*, *samayāchāra* and *puravarga* (evidently a variety of profession tax levied on certain sections of people living in the cities as differentiated from the major towns), which would indicate that the government had still its hold on caste associations and meetings in particular localities. Under miscellaneous sources, we find included the items known as additional presents or benevolences (*hechchu bēḍige* or *kāṇike*) and the fee for putting the *ṭikā* on the forehead (*nāmagāṇike*). Notwithstanding these additional levies, the records bear out in an ample measure the general contentment of the people during the period, despite the violent character of the changes that were taking place both in and outside of Mysore.

CHAPTER XV.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(contd.)

Social life: 1734-1751—Vedic learning and culture—Literary activity: Karachuri Nanjarajaiya—His works: (a) The *Sivabhakta-Vilasa-Darpanam* and other *Saiva-Puranas* and *Mahatmyas*, c. 1734-1742—(b) The *Mahabharata*, the *Kakudyiri-Mahatmya*, the *Sangita-Gangadhara*, etc., c. 1742-1751—(c) The *Garalapuri-Mahimadarsa* (*Garalapuri-Mahatmya*), c. 1763-1765—The proteges of the Dalavais: Nuronda: The *Saundara-Kavya*, c. 1740—Krishna Dikshita: The *Dalavai Agraharam Plates* II, 1749—Kasipati-Pandita: Commentary on the *Sangita-Gangadhara*, c. 1748—Narasimha-Kavi: The *Nanjaraja-Yasobhushanam* (including the *Chandrakala-Kalyana*), c. 1748-1750; The *Sivadaya-Sahasram*—Nilakantha-Kavi: The *Nanjarajayasassamollasa-Champuh*, c. 1748-1750—Venkatesa: The *Halasya-Mahatmya*, c. 1763-1765—Other writers, c. 1740-1750: Gopalaraja: The *Kamalachala-Mahatmya*, c. 1740; Channarajappa: The *Venkatesvara-Sataka*, c. 1750; Padmaraja-Pandit: The *Vijayakumarana-Kathe*, c. 1750—Domestic life: Queens and children of Krishnaraja—Other members of the Royal Family—The Dalavais—Death of Krishnaraja Wodeyar, April 25, 1766—The character of his rule and the conduct of his ministers—Evil effects of wrong ministerial behaviour: loss of power and displacement by Haidar Ali—Nanjaraja's faults of character and the penalty he paid for them—Why he failed in his attempt to take Trichinopoly—Redeeming features in his character: His memorable stand for the political liberty of Southern India—Nanjaraja, the symbol of the independence of the South—His fatal mistake: lack of planning and preparation for war—The man and his idea: a justification—Nanjaraja and Bolingbroke: a comparison and a contrast—The Dalavai brothers: an estimate of their work—The

credit due to them—Results of the disaster at Trichinopoly:
End of the Dalavai regime and the emergence of Haider
Ali—Krishnaraja Wodeyar II as he might have been.

INVOLVED as the kingdom was in intricate foreign politics and internal troubles continuously during 1751-1761, the social side of the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar is perhaps best seen to advantage in the period 1734-1751, an epoch marked by the ascendancy of the Dalavāis on the one hand and on the other by peace and security in the State, despite the occasional inroads of the Mahrattas and the Mughals. Of Seringapatam, during this period, we glean a picture as a flourishing city with a large resident population as busy and active as a hundred years ago. We read of it as still shining as a mediæval Hindu city ruled by a king who maintained the traditions of a revered past. With its impregnable and extensive fort (*kōṭe*) adorned by the moat, ramparts, spikes and bastions; its richly plastered mansions (*bhavana*, *saudha*); its magnificent Palace (*aramane*) brilliant with its many exquisitely carved halls with self-expressive names *Saundarya-Vilāsa*, *Chitra-śāle*, *Chandra-śāle*, *Hajāra-chāvaḍi*, *Navaranga-maṇṭapa* and *Bhadra-bhavana*; and its jewelled throne (*ratna-simhāsana*),¹ Seringapatam was as ever before an object of beauty and admiration. Among the attractive features of life in the capital city were the king's Durbar (*ōlaga*) in the gorgeously decorated court-hall (*Ōlaga-śāle*, *Hajāra-chāvaḍi*) of the Palace and the grand *Mahānavami* or *Navarātri* festival, conducted in the impressive old style.² Indeed the Dasara, with its elaborate programme of wrestling by jeṭṭis (*malla-yuddha*, *muṣṭi-yuddha*) and

1. *Saund. Kāv.*, chs. I, IV, IX-XII; also *Nanjarājayaśas. Cham.*, II. ff. 6. For an account of these and other works cited in this Chapter, see under *Literary activity* below.

2. *Ibid.*, chs. I, IV, IX and XII.

the procession-in-state on the tenth day (*Pauju*), had attained considerable popularity.³ One of Krishnarāja Woḍeyar's Durbars held about 1740 was, it is interesting to find,⁴ attended by the following among other feudatories of his, namely, Doḍḍaiya of Sāmbaḷḷi, Chaluvaia of Anantagiri, Kāntaiya of Haradanahaḷḷi, Krishnaiya of Maddūr, Kemparājaiya of Beḷḷūr [the conqueror of Baiche Gaṇḍa of (Chik) Baḷḷāpur], Alangada Narasaiya of Māgaḍi, Vīrarājaiya of Nuggehaḷḷi, Chikkaia of Kaḍūr, Narasarājaiya of Kaḍaba, Chaluvarājaiya of Hebbūr, Muddarājaiya of Chiknāyakanahaḷḷi and Dēvarājaiya of Śūlagiri; the chiefs of Salem (*Śālya*), Deṇkanikōṭe, Hosūr, Nāmakal, Satyamangalam, Coimbatore (*Coyamuttūr*), Mysore, Gaurāmbudhi, Yelandūr, Piriyaṇṇa, Hoḷe-Narasipur (*Narasimhapura*), Arkalgūd, Kandikere, Turuvēkere (*Turugere*), Dēvarāya-durga, Tumkūr, Maddagiri, Kuṇigal, Huliya-durga and Channapaṇṇa; and the headmen (*Gurikār*) of Kikkēri, Bēlūr, Hāranahaḷḷi, Honnavāḷḷi and (?) Diṇḍigal. The festival had grown with the ages and the feudatories seemed to delight in its celebration even more than their liege-lord. Its social aspects were as much appreciated by about this time as their political.

Vedic learning and culture continued to be preserved intact during the period. We have reference to the capital city of Seringapatam with its Brāhmanical tenements (*bhūsura-nikara-nivēśana*) always resplendent with the fragrant odour of the flame of sacrificial fire, whose inhabitants, leading good domestic lives, were reputed for their proficiency in Vēdic lore and disputation.⁵ Among the Vēdic scholars of the time, Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya

3. *Ibid.*, ch. XII.

4. *Ibid.*, I, 39-82.

5. *Nanjarājayāsas*. *Cham.*, II. ff. 5-7: *nirantara dēdīpyamāna hōmadhūma gāndha sugandhi vāta*; *Vēdēshu vādēshucha atyantam chaturāṣṭ chaturshvapi*.

was, it is interesting to note,⁶ well known for his attainments in the *Purāṇas*: he was descended from a learned family, his father Timmappārya being referred to as one who could recite the whole of the *Yajur-Vēda* and the *Āpastambha-Sūtra*.

The court of Krishṇaraja Wodeyar was the symbol of the culture and tastes of the times. Literary activity. Literature—sacred and secular—and the arts flourished as usual under royal patronage. Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya—referred to as Nanjarāja in literary works—was himself, we learn,⁷ the foremost among the scholars of Krishṇarāja's court. An accomplished person that he was, he had mastered, and was known to have had at his fingers' ends, all arts.⁸ Gifted with a nice sense of discrimination,⁹ he used to take delight in the company of the learned.¹⁰ He had been initiated into the tenets of Śaivism,¹¹ and had

6. See *M. A. R.*, 1923, pp. 66-70, No. 58 (1744), cited in Ch. XIV, f.n. 18. The genealogy of Venkaṭapataiya, according to this record, was as follows:

Gōvinda Daṇḍāyaka of Kannambādi (*Kaṇṇavapuri*)

Gōpālārya	} Vēdic scholars
Krishṇārya	
Timmappārya	

Venkaṭapati m. Kāvā.

7. *Saṅgī. Gaṅgā.*, ff. 1: *Śrīmat-Krishṇa mahibhujō narapatēr vidvat pradhānāgraniḥ Śrī-Nanja-kṣhītipālaka*.
 8. *Ibid*; also *Nanjarājayaśō.*, I. p. 5: *sakala kalānidhi; sarvāḥ kalāḥ śirasi kṛta hastānjali pūṭaḥ*.
 9. *Nanjarājayaśas. Chām.*, I. ff. 3: *sārāsāra vivēchanāti chaturāḥ*.
 10. *Śiva-Gī.*, I, 18; *Śivabhakta-Vi. Dar.*, I, 12; also *Mbh. Adī.*, ff. 1, and *Saḍhā.*, ff. 118, and *Bhadrāgiri-Mahāt.*, col.: *budhajanaroḍane gōṣṭhiyānesagi; budhajana ranjane*.
 11. *Ibid*, I, 15; *Ibid*, I, 14: *Pāsupata sāstrārtha tatvava . . . tīṭidu*. Here the word *Pāsupata* has to be understood as meaning "of or relating to Śiva," and not the Pāsupata school of Śaivism. Nanjarāja was a Śuddha-Śaiva. During his time, the Pāsupata school as such had nearly, if not wholly, gone out of existence. Broadly the passage may be rendered thus: "He having learnt the fundamental doctrines pertaining to the religion of Śiva."

drunk deep in the fountain of the *Śaivāgamas* and *Nigamas*, including the *Śaiva-Panchākshara*.¹² Proficient in composing poems in Sanskrit, Telugu, Kannaḍa and other languages,¹³ he could study independently a gloss or commentary on a treatise or text,¹⁴ and was held in high esteem by his contemporaries as a new Bhōja in the matter of appreciation and encouragement of literary merit (*Śrī-Nanjarājō nava-Bhōjarājaḥ*; *nūtana-Bhōjarājaḥ*).¹⁵

Most of the earlier literary productions of Nanjarāja

His works :

(a) The *Śivabhakta-Vilāsa-Darpanam* and other *Śaiva-Purāṇas* and *Mahātmyas*, c. 1734-1742.

extant are adaptations in Kannaḍa prose (*vachana-kāvya*; *ṭiku*), assignable to the period c. 1734-1742.¹⁶ They generally belong to a series entitled *Nanjarāja-Vāṇī-Vilāsa* and deal with *Śaiva-Purāṇas*, ritualism and philosophy. They are written in intelligible

modern Kannaḍa (*achcha Kannaḍa*) for popular edification (*akhilararivante*), and begin with invocations, among others, to Śiva, Gaṇeśa, Nilakanṭha-Bhāshyakāra (Śrikanṭhāchārya), Haradattāchārya and Sundarēśvarāchārya, some of the works¹⁷ being preceded also by a short poetical account of the pedigree of Nanjarāja (*i.e.*, of the Kaḷale Family). Thus he rendered from Sanskrit the *Śivabhakta-Vilāsa-Darpanam* (in 90 chapters),¹⁸

12. *Ibid.*, I, 13-14; *Ibid.*, I, 12-13: *vara Śivāgama nigamadārtthavānariḍu*.

13. *Mbh. Sabhā.*, l.c.; also *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa*, col.; *Śivabhakta-Vi. Dar.*, col.; and *Bhadrāgiri-Mahāt.*, l.c.: *Gīrvāṇānāhira Karmāṭakāḍi nānā bhāṣhā viśēsha kāvya rachanā chāturi dhuriṇa*.

14. *Nanjarājajayāṣō.*, I. p. 4: *svayam vyākhyā pīṭhmadhivāsati*.

15. *Ibid.*, VI. p. 89.

16. Nanjarāja, as he tells us, began the *Ādi-Parva* of his *Mahābhārata* in 1742 (*Ś. 1664, Dundubhi*), just at a time when he had finished his major works on *Śaiva-Purāṇas*, such as *Hālāsya-Mahātmya*, *Śivabhakta-Vilāsa-Darpanam*, *Bhadrāgiri-Mahātmya*, etc. (see *Mbh. Ādi.*, ff. 1). This enables us to assign these earlier works of his to c. 1734-1742. See also and compare *Kar. Ka. Oha.*, III, 40-47.

17. See, for instance, the *Śiva-G.* and the *Śivabhakta-Vi. Dar.*

18. *Mss. Nos. A. 136 and 229—P.*; *Mys. Or. Lib.*; also No. 18-18-9—*P. L.*; *Mad. Or. Lib.* We have also, in palm leaf, a Telugu version of this

dealing with the *Śivabhakta-Māhātmya* of the *Skāndōpa-Purāṇa* of Vyāsa; *Śivadharmōttara-Vachana* or *Purāṇa* (in 50 chapters),¹⁹ and the *Sētumahimādarśa* (in 52 chapters)²⁰ of the *Skānda-Purāṇa*; *Śiva-Gīte* (in 16 chapters)²¹ of the *Padma-Purāṇa*; *Linga-Purāṇa* (in two parts of 108 and 50 chapters respectively);²² *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa* (*Tātparya-dīpikā*);²³ *Bhadrāgiri-Māhātmya* (in 16 chapters),²⁴ dealing with the legendary history of Bhadrāgiri as told in the *Brahmāṇḍa-Purāṇa*; *Hālāsya-Māhātmya* (in 71 chapters),²⁵ depicting the sixty-four sports of Sundarēśvara of Madura, as narrated in the *Agastya-Samhitā* of the *Skānda-Purāṇa*; *Haradattāchārya-Māhātmya* (in 10 chapters),²⁶ describing the life-history of Haradattāchārya, the Śaiva preceptor, according to the *Bhaviṣhyōttara-Purāṇa*; and the *Vighnēśvara-Vrata-Kalpa* (in three parts, namely, *Syamantakōpākhyāna*, *Sankaṣṭahara-Chaturthī-Vrata* and *Dhruvā-Vināyaka-Charitre*),²⁷ dealing with the worship of Gaṇeśa as prescribed in the *Bhaviṣhyōttara-Purāṇa* and the *Kāśimahimārtha-Darpaṇam* of the *Skānda-Purāṇa*.

work—known as *Śivabhakta-Vilāsa*—ascribed to Nanjarāja. This has been brought to our notice by Mr. M. Venkata Reddi, Nosam, Kurnool district.

19. Ms. No. 18-20-16—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*

20. See *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 46.

21. Ms. No. 18-4-19—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*; also Ms. No. A. 128—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*

22. Ms. No. 19-2-37—P.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*; also No. 19-13-25—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*

23. Ms. No. K. 46—P. L.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*

24. Ms. No. 18-18-14—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.* Bhadrāgiri: a hill to the south-west of the confluence of rivers Pinākini and Vahni.

25. Ms. No. 19-3-55—P.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*; also No. A. 199—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.* There are three Mss. of this work in the *Mad. Or. Lib.* and four in the *Mys. Or. Lib.* Nanjarāja is known to have written a Telugu version also of the *Hālāsya-Māhātmya*.

26. Ms. No. 185—P. L.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*

27. Ms. No. B. 259—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.* See also *Des. Cat. Kan. Mss.* of the *Mad. Or. Lib.*, II, item Nos. 249, 251 and 278,

Between 1742-1751 Nanjarāja seems to have been engaged in the preparation of a modern Kannaḍa prose version of the *Mahābhārata* (*Mahābhārata-tātparyā-ṭīku*),²⁸ also under the series *Nanjarāja-Vāṇī-Vilāsa*, of which the following portions are extant: the *Ādi-Parva* (in 199 chapters),²⁹ *Sabhā-Parva* (in 132 chapters),³⁰ *Ānuśāsanika-Parva*, *Drōṇa-Parva*, *Śalya-Parva* and *Sauptika-Parva*,³¹ and the *Hari-Vamśa* (in 101 chapters).³² About 1748-1749 Nanjarāja appears to have rendered into Kannaḍa the *Kakudgiri-Māhātmya*,³³ a prose work (in 20 chapters) treating of the sanctity of Śivaganga according to the *Tirtha-Khaṇḍa* of the *Skānda-Purāṇa*. The version is otherwise known as *Sajjana-Karṇa-rasāyana* (*Sajjana-Karṇa-rasāyanamembī ṭīku*), meaning literally, pleasing to the ears of the good (i.e., devotees of Śiva). It begins, like his earlier works, with the introductory chapter—dealing with his pedigree—referring also to his expedition to Dhārānagar (c. 1746) and siege of Dēvanahalli (1746-1747).³⁴ Nanjarāja is further credited with having written the *Sangīta-Gangādhara* and numerous other works in Sanskrit. Only the *Sangīta-Gangādhara*

28. In view of what has been stated in f.n. 16 *supra*, the entire series of Nanjarāja's prose version of the *Mahābhārata* has to be fixed in the period c. 1742-1751. Some of his later works, noticed above, are also assignable to this period, since he was during 1751-1761 engrossed in public affairs which should have kept him away from steady literary pursuits.

29. Ms. No. 18-21-13—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*

30. Ms. No. 18-16-12—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.*

31. Mss. Nos. 18-16-17 and 18-20-11—P. L.; *Mad. Or. Lib.* See also *Des. Cat. Kan. Mss. of the Mad. Or. Lib.*, I, item Nos. 103 and 107.

32. Ms. No. 104 (P. L.) in the Maharaja's Sanskrit College Library, Mysore.

33. Ms. No. 156—P. L.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*; also No. B. 286—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*

34. See *Nanjarājajayānti*, VI p. 89: *tatkavi samakṣhamēva kṛti-nāyakaṇa Kalulē kula chirantana sukrta paripākēna svakapōla kalpita Sangīta-Gangādharaḍyānēka prabandhābhīnaya ḍarsanajanita kautukēna . . . Nanjarājēna*.

(c. 1745-1748), however, has so far come down to us.³⁵ It is an epic poem in six cantos, modelled in the main on Jayadēva's *Gīta-Gōvinda*. The work begins as usual with invocations to Śiva and an account of the genealogy, etc., of the author, and centres round the sports of Śiva with the wives of the hermits of Dārūkavana, the resulting estrangement from Pārvatī, the separation and sufferings of the couple, the intercession of the maid, the reconciliation, the re-union and the joys of Śiva and Pārvatī. Alike in point of subject-matter and method of treatment, the poem is to be reckoned a contribution of unique interest to the devotional literature in Śaivism.

Between 1751 and 1761, Nanjarāja does not seem to have produced any literary works, fully engrossed as he was in political and military affairs. Perhaps the latest available production of Nanjarāja is the *Garalapuri-Mahimādarśa* (*Garalapuri-Māhātmya*) (c. 1763-1765),³⁶

(c) The *Garalapuri-Mahimādarśa* (Garalapuri - Māhātmya), c. 1763-1765. a Kannada prose work (*ṭiku*) in twelve chapters, treating of the sanctity of Nanjangūd as dealt with in the *Skānda-Purāṇa*. The occasion for the writing of this work was the inauguration by Nanjarāja of the *Nanjarāja-Tirunāḷu* about 1763.³⁷ When completed, it was, we are told,³⁸ dedicated by him to Śrī-Nanjuṇḍēśvara of Nanjangūd.

35. Ms. No. 4422 (with text and commentary in *Telugu* characters)—*P. L.*; *Mys. Or. Lib.* See ff. 1, where the commentator refers to the author and his work thus : *Śrī-Nanja-kṣhitipalakēna rachitam Sangita-Gangā-dharam; Śrī-Nanjarāja nāmā mahākaviḥ . . . Sangita-Gangā-dharābhīdhānam mahā-kāvyaṁ ārabhamāṇaḥ*. The text of the poem has lately been edited and published by Mr. M. R. Sakhare, Belgaum. The commentary is separately noticed above.

36. Ms. Nos. K. 405 (*P. L.*) and A. 20 (*P.*) in the *Mys. Or. Lib.*; see also *Des. Cat. Kan. Mss. of the Mad. Or. Lib.*, II, item No. 253.

37. *Vide* col. to item No. 253 in *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid*

Under the direct patronage of the Daḷavāis, Nūronḍa wrote the *Saundara-Kāvya* (c. 1740),³⁹ a Kannāḍa poem in thirteen chapters (*sandhi*). The poet seems to have been a resident of Seringapatam, since he shows a close acquaintance with that place⁴⁰ and constantly refers to the local gods thereof (*i.e.*, Gangāḍharēśvara and Ranganātha).⁴¹ He appears too as a devout Vīra-Śaiva with a tolerant outlook on life. He mentions Tōṇṭada-Siddēśvara of Yeḍeyūr (a deified Vīra-Śaiva saint and poet, c. 1470),⁴² and begins each chapter generally with invocation to Śaiva deities (as, for instance, Triṇēśa, Nanjunḍēśvara, Gangāḍharēśvara, Pārvati, Chāmunḍi, etc.), occasionally praising Viṣṇu as well (for instance, in the manifestations of Śankara-Nārāyaṇa, Ranganātha, Vēṇugōpāla-Krishṇa, etc.).⁴³ The poem is written in the colloquial *Sāṅgatya* metre. Curiously enough, it is conspicuous by the absence of any Śaivite topic as its theme but deals for the most part with the exploits of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya during the invasion of Mysore by the Nawāb of Arcot (1737).⁴⁴ The poet not infrequently eulogises the Daḷavāis,⁴⁵ and exhibits an intimate knowledge of the court of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar and of life in Seringapatam.⁴⁶ The

39. Ms. No. B. 285—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.* In ch. XIII, v. 162, we are told that the *Saundara-Kāvya* was begun on *Kārtika śu. 10* and completed on *Āsviṇa śu. 10*, the cyclic year, however, not being mentioned. But at the very end of the Ms. is a passage referring to its completion on *Dhātu, Mārgaśīra ba. 10*, which corresponds to December 17, 1756. Probably a copy of the work was made by the scribe in 1756. In any case the *Saundara-Kāvya* appears to have been written not earlier than 1740 and not later than 1756. See also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 47-50.

40. See ch. I.

41. See chs. I, II, V, VIII-XI, and XIII.

42. See ch. XIII, v. 95.

43. *Vide* chs. IV-VII, IX, XI and XII.

44. *Vide* chs. V-X. For details, *vide* Ch. IV, pp. 74-77, of this vol.

45. See chs. II, IV-X.

46. See chs. I-IV, IX-XII.

Saundara-Kāvya bears, on the whole, ample testimony to the ascendancy of the Daḷavāis in Mysore during the early years of Krishṇarāja's reign and is of considerable value for the social, and no less political, history of the times.

Krishṇa Dikshita of Kāśyapa-gōtra and Sāma-sākhā, a scholar of the court of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, composed the *Daḷavāi Agrahāram Plates* II (1749) issued by Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya.⁴⁷ This inscription, in sixteen plates, is in a mixture of Sanskrit and Kannaḍa, the Sanskrit portion, dealing with the pedigree, etc., of the Mysore rulers and the Daḷavāis, being written in the usual *Kāvya* style. Krishṇa Dikshita composed also the *Hampāpur Plate* (1744), another record in Sanskrit.⁴⁸

Among the protégés of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, in particular, Kāśīpati-Paṇḍita, son of Umāpati-Paṇḍita of Kauṇḍinya-gōtra, wrote a commentary in Sanskrit, entitled *Śravaṇa-Nandinī* (c. 1748),⁴⁹ on the *Sangīta-Gangādhara* of Nanjarāja. His commentary is, as it were, a treatise on poetics and he refers in it to a *Bhāṇa* by name *Mukundānanda*, and to *Bhāva-Prakāśikā* and *Kāvyaḍarśa* among earlier works on poetics.⁵⁰ Kāśīpati-Paṇḍita is most unstinted in his admiration of the poetical talents of his patron.⁵¹ And he is himself highly spoken of by his own contemporaries as a versatile scholar and poet.⁵²

47. *E.C.*, III (1) TN. 63, ll. 1388-1389.

48. *Vide* f.n. 6 *supra*.

49. See ff. 1 of the Ms. of *Sangīta-Gangādhara*, cited in f.n. 35 *supra*; also col. at the end of each canto.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*, where Kāśīpati-Paṇḍita speaks of Nanjarāja as *Mahākaviḥ sakala kalānidhīḥ*, etc.

52. *Nanjarājayaśa*, VI. p. 89: *sakalakalā kuśalamatinā sarasa-kavi-chakra-vartinā Kāśīpati sūdhimaninā*.

Narasimha-Kavi, of Sanagara-Kula and son of a scholar by name Śivarāma,⁵³ wrote the

Narasimha-Kavi :

The *Nanjarāja-
Yaśōbhūshaṇam*
(including the *Chan-
drakālā-Kalyāṇa*), c.
1748-1750.

Nanjarāja-Yaśōbhūshaṇam (c. 1748-1750).⁵⁴ The poet was the disciple of a religious preceptor by name Yōgānanda-Yatīndra,⁵⁵ and was, we learn,⁵⁶ one of those who followed the estab-

lished standards of good literary composition, having mastered the *Śāstras* and literature,⁵⁷ probably under his own father.⁵⁸ He had a friend and colleague in one Tirumala-Kavi of Ālūr, styled Nava-Bhavabhūti.⁵⁹ Narasimha-Kavi had attained considerable popularity as Nava-Kālidāsa (*nava-Kālidāsaḥ*; *navina Kālidāsaḥ*),⁶⁰ highly esteemed by his contemporaries⁶¹ and honoured by his patron Nanjarāja himself, the Nava-Bhōjarāja.⁶² The *Nanjarāja-Yaśōbhūshaṇam* is a treatise in Sanskrit on the science of poetics (*alankāra-śāstra*). It begins with invocations to Sarasvati, Śambhu and Yōgānanda-Yatīndra-Guru, and extends to seven chapters (*vilāsa*) dealing respectively with the exposition of the characteristics of the poetic hero (*nāyaka nirūpaṇam*), nature of poetical composition (*kāvya svarūpa nirūpaṇam*), implied meanings of expressions (*dhvani nirūpaṇam*), sentiments (*rasa nirūpaṇam*), merits and defects of rhetorical writing (*dōsha-guṇa nirūpaṇam*), dramaturgy (*nāṭaka prakaraṇam*) and figures (*alankāra prakaraṇam*).

53. *Ibid*; also I. p. 1, v. 4; and col. to ch.

54. Pub. Gaskell's *Oriental Series*, No. XLVII; see also and compare Mss. Nos. 467, 3904, 4019 and 4381—P. L.; Mys. Or. Lib. The citations are from the published work.

55. I. p. 1, v. 3.

56. See col. : *sarasa sāhitya sampradāya pravartaka*.

57. VI. p. 89 : *sūtra sāhityayōrapi nītānta niṣṇāta*.

58. See col., where he says: *Śrī-paramaśivavatāra Śivarāmadēśika charaṇāravinādanusandhāna mahimā samāsādita*.

59. VII. p. 223 : *Ālūra Tirumala-Kavērabhinava-Bhavabhūti nāma birudasya suhrdā*.

60. VI. p. 89; VII. l.c.

61. *Ibid* : *sarasakavīnām puratō gaṇanīyasyāsya*.

62. *Ibid* : *nātana-Bhōjarājēna Nanjarājēna sabahumānāhūtaḥ*.

The subject-matter of each chapter is suitably illustrated by the poet's own verses eulogistic of his patron Nanjarāja, whence the name of the work. The chapter on dramaturgy is of especial interest to us, as it embodies, by way of illustration, a play in five acts, named *Chandrakalā-Kalyāṇa*,⁶³ intended to be enacted before a learned audience—including perhaps Nanjarāja also—assembled on the occasion of *Vasantōtsava* of Śrī-Nanjunḍēśvara of Nanjangūd.⁶⁴ In respect of treatment of the science of poetics in general, Narasimha-Kavi follows closely the *Pratāparudra-Yaśōbhūṣaṇam* of Vidyānātha, though at times he differs from, and is more elaborate than, the latter.⁶⁵ He shows also intimate acquaintance with such earlier works on the subject as *Daśarūpaka*, *Kāvya-prakāśa*, *Śringāratilaka* and *Nānārtharatnamālā*;⁶⁶ quotes from Jayadēva and Kaiśiki;⁶⁷ and makes mention of the *Raghuvamśa*, *Kādambari*, *Harsha-Charita*, *Sūrya-Śatāka*, *Mahāvira-Charita* and *Uttararāma-Charita*.⁶⁸ The *Nanjarāja-Yaśōbhūṣaṇam* is decidedly later than the *Sangīta-Gangādhara*, *Śivabhakta-Vilāsa-Darpaṇam* and other works of Nānjarāja, to all which it refers.⁶⁹ It undoubtedly is an index of the greatness of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya during 1748-1751 when he was at the height of his power and glory in the kingdom of Mysore. Narasimha-Kavi has also written the *Śivadayā - Sahasram*,⁷⁰ another work in Sanskrit, in ten chapters (*aṁśa*).

The *Śivadayā-Sahasram*.

63. See VI. pp. 87-154.

64. See VI. p. 88: *Garalanagarābharanāyamaṇasya bhagavato Garalapuriśvarasya vasantōtsavē sasantōshamaśēsha digantōpasēdusha-mamishām rasika vidushāmaḥbhilashita sampādana ēva*.

65. As, for instance, in respect of *Dhvani*.

66. See pp. 32, 37, 38, 64, 87, 154 and 159.

67. See pp. 2, 16 and 18.

68. See pp. 36 and 84.

69. See VI. p. 89: *Karṇāṭaka bhāṣā virachita Hālāsyā-Charita Śivabhakta-Vilāsādī bahuvīdha prabandha samudāyēna . . . Nanjarājēna*.

70. Ms. No. B. 72—P.; Mys. Or. Lib.

Almost contemporaneously with the *Nanjarāja-Nilakaṇṭha-Kavi* : *Yasōbhūṣaṇam*, Nilakaṇṭha-Kavi wrote the *Nanjarājayaśassamōllāsa-Champūh* (c. 1748-1750),⁷¹ an epic poem, also in Sanskrit, in three cantos (*ullāsa*), eulogising Nanjarāja. The latest event referred to in the work is Nanjarāja's acquisition of Dhārānagar (c. 1746), and he is himself mentioned as the virtual ruler of the kingdom of Mysore with Seringapatam as its capital.⁷² The poem begins with invocations to Lakshmi-Narasimha, Śiva, Gaṇēśa and Ranganātha. Throughout, the poet shows an intimate acquaintance with his patron Nanjarāja, the capital city of Seringapatam and the court of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar.

Venkaṭēśa of Paurukutsa-gōtra and Āpastambha-sūtra, a resident of Gummaḷāpura, wrote the *Hālāsya-Māhātmya* (c. 1763-1765),⁷³ a *champu* in Kannaḍa. The poet appears to have composed this work at the desire of Nanjarāja, just at a time when the latter had completed his pious services in the Nanjunḍēśvara temple at Nanjangūd (i.e., construction of the tower, enclosure and miniature temples, setting up of images of Śaiva saints and the writing of their history, c. 1756-1763).

Among other writers of the period, Gōpālarāja (Katti Gōpālarāja Urs of Beṭṭadakōṭe, father-in-law of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar) wrote the *Kamalāchala-Māhātmya* (c. 1740),⁷⁴

71. Ms. No. B. 999—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.*

72. See ff. 16: *Śrīrangarājadhānī rājyapālakah . . . Śrīmān Nanja-Bhūpālakah*. As in the *Śrīngārājatīlaka-Bhāṇah* (Ante Ch. III), the capital city of Seringapatam is also referred to in this work by the name of *Karivaradārāja-pura* after the presiding deity Ranganātha or Karivarada of the place (*Karīḍapuravarābhīdhānā rājadhānī*) (see ff. 6, 7).

73. See *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 50-53. This work fixes the author in or about 1740 but from the internal evidence above referred to, the *Hālāsya-Māhātmya* of Venkaṭēśa appears to have been written not earlier than c. 1763.

74. Ms. No. 279—P. L.; *Mys. Or. Lib.* See also and compare *Kar. Ka. Cha.*, III. 53-54.

a Kannaḍa prose version of the legendary history of Kamalāchala (Gōpālāsavāmi hill) as told in the *Bhaviṣhyōttara-Purāṇa*. The work is in ten chapters and is also known as *Śrī-Gōpāla-Bhūpālōkti-Vilāsa*.⁷⁵ Channarājappa of the Ānegondī family in Mysore composed the *Venkaṭēśvara-Śataka* (c. 1750),⁷⁶ a religio-philosophical poem in Kannaḍa in 103 stanzas. Lastly, Padmarāja-Paṇḍit of Mysore, son of Śānta-Paṇḍit and disciple of Akalanka-Muni, a celebrated Jain teacher and disputant (*Guru; Vāda-vādīśvara; Vādi-Pitāmahā*), wrote the *Vijaya-kumārana-Kathe* (c. 1750),⁷⁷ a Kannaḍa poetical work in the *Yakṣhaḡāna* metre.

Dēvājamma of Kaḷale, daughter of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya by his first wife, was the principal queen of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, to whom he was wedded in 1746 (*Akṣaya*).⁷⁸ He had also two junior queens, namely, Dēvājamma of Biḷuguli and Lakshmammā (afterwards celebrated as Mahārāṇī Lakshmammānṇiyavarū), a daughter of Katti Gōpālārāja Urs of Beṭṭadakōṭe, both of whom were married to him in or about February 1760 (*Pramāthi, Māgha*).⁷⁹ An inscription on a silver plate in the Lakshmīkāntasavāmi

75. See col. to ch.

76. Ms. No. B. 168—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.* See also and compare *Ibid.*, 93-94.

77. Ms. No. B. 257—P.; *Mys. Or. Lib.* See also and compare *Ibid.*, 100.

78. *Annals*, I. 173. Cf. *Mys. Raj. Cha.* (42) which seems ambiguously to place this event in 1744 (*Raktākṣhī*).

79. *Ibid.*; also *Raj. Kath.*, XII. 490 (compared). A *nirūpa* of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, dated in 1760 and addressed to Chikkaiya, Superintendent of the *Mysūru-Nagarada-Hobālī-Sime*, speaks of the grant of an *umbālī* of the revenue value of 60 *varahas* in the said *sime* to one Channa for having prepared the ornamented seat (*hase-jagālī*) on the occasion of the king's marriage (see *M. A. E.*, 1918, p. 59, para 131). The reference here is obviously to the wedding of 1760, mentioned above.

temple at Kaḷale refers to it as a pious gift of Lakshmmamma to that temple.⁸⁰ By his principal queen, Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar had two sons (Nanjarāja Woḍeyar and Beṭṭada Chāmarāja Woḍeyar) and two daughters (Dēpājamma and Dēvājamma); by the second he had a son (Dēvarāja Woḍeyar) who is said to have died in his infancy; and by the last queen Lakshmmamma a daughter (Chāmamma).⁸¹

Among other members of the Royal Family during the period was Dēvājamma of Kaḷale—
 Other members of the Royal Family. well-known as Doḍḍamma—the senior dowager queen of Doḍḍa-Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar and adoptive mother of (Chikka) Krishṇarāja. She appears to have lived till about 1767, if not still later. On September 11, 1761, Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar got an *agrahāra* formed in her name (*Dēvāmbāsamudra*) and bestowed it on Brāhmins.⁸²

Among the members of the Daḷavāi family, Sarvādhikāri Nanjarājaiya, cousin brother of
 The Daḷavāis. Dēvarājaiya and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, had, according to one source,⁸³ four wives, the principal of whom was Chandāyamma. He, however, had no issue. Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya had two consorts,⁸⁴ the second of whom Chalvājamāmbā (Chaluvājamma, daughter of Dēvarāja Urs of Śādamangala) is depicted in the *Daḷavāi Agrahāram Plates* II (1749) as an ideal lady, beautiful, generous, kind-hearted, and ever devoted to her husband.⁸⁵ By her Dēvarājaiya had sons who, however, it is said,⁸⁶ died

80. *M. A. R.*, 1917, p. 59, para 144.

81. *Annals*, l.c.

82. *E. C.*, IV (2) Yd. 18 (cited in Ch. XIV, f.n. 28), ll. 99-101: *Śrī-Dēvāmbāsamudrābhīṣham . . . svamīturmāmnā chaivāgrahāram pramūḍita hṛdayaḥ kārayamāsa*. See also *Ante* Ch. XIII, f. n. 4.

83. *K. A. V.*, ff. 19.

84. *Ibid.*, ff. 19-20.

85. *E. C.*, III (1) TN. 63, ll. 69-72.

86. *K. A. V.*, ff. 20.

in their infancy. His brother Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya had four wives,⁸⁷ by the first of whom Channājamma (daughter of Dodḍaiya Urs of Denkanikōṭe) he had a daughter (Puṭṭamma *alias* Dēvājamma, wedded to Krishnarāja Wodeyar as already mentioned),⁸⁸ and by the second Dēvājamma (daughter of Virarāja Urs of Nilasōge) a son by name Puṭṭa-Virarāja Urs,⁸⁹ identical with Virarājaiya or Virarāya Wodeyar of Mysore, mentioned in a lithic record dated February 14, 1761.⁹⁰ The record relates to his (Virarājaiya's) having set up the image of Rāmēśvara in the enclosure of the local temple at Rāmanāthpur and to his having made a grant in Siridanūr to provide for the offerings, etc., to the God.

Krishnarāja Wodeyar passed away on April 25, 1766, in his thirty-eighth year, his queens not observing *sati*.⁹¹

Death of Krishnarāja Wodeyar, April 25, 1766.

The life of Immaḍi-Krishnarāja Wodeyar was cast in difficult times. His reign aptly illustrates the dangers of infant rule during critical periods in the history of a country. Installed on the throne in his sixth year, it was his particular misfortune to remain under the perpetual tutelage and the all-powerful sway of the Daḷavāis for over two decades (1734-1755). So complete was their domination over the affairs of Mysore during the period that even after Krishnarāja attained the age of discretion in 1746, he had hardly any scope allowed him for the assertion of his own will in State

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid.*

90. *E.C.*, V (1) and (2) Ag. 60: Ś. 1683, *Vikrama, Magha su* (?) 10. The *Haid. Nām.* (ff. 72) also mentions Daḷavāi Virarājaiya, son of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya. According to the *K. A. V.* (ff. 84), Virarājaiya was nominated to the post of Daḷavāi under H. H. Śrī-Krishnarāja Wodeyar III, and held office during 1818-1826. Evidently he lived for over half a century after his father's death (in or about 1773).

91. *Annals*, I. 202: *Vyaya, Nija-Chaitra ba.* 1. See also *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, 44.

matters. The selection of an infant to succeed Chāmarāja was a *coup de maître* on their part. It placed regal power in their hands and enabled them to exercise sovereign rights much as they liked. So real was the exercise of these rights that they came to displace the sovereign himself in the public eye. It never seems to have struck them that they were setting a bad example. And not until each of them fell from power, did they seem to realize the enormity of their crime towards their king and country. The idea of servant and master, of duty and obedience, never appealed to them. If they had thought of the king and of their responsibility to him, they would have recognised the existence of a restraint on themselves. They failed to mind the majesty of the sovereign above them. They did not, indeed, take a pride in the greatness of their own master. They forgot the Purāṇic injunction that ministers should not only protect the country but also the king.⁹² They failed in their duty, and those who came after them proved worse. Whatever may be said of Dēvarājaiya, Nanjārājaiya, who knew well the religious texts and the injunctions—for he had not only read them but also commented on some of them—had no excuse to transgress the bounds set to ministers in their relations towards their Sovereign. And his unpopularity was so great that at the time he fell in 1759 there was none to sympathise with him, none even to shed a tear over his departure from Seringapatam where he had been in supreme control for years. Such is the over-mastering effect of power on a person in authority that he forgets himself and becomes wholly unable to distinguish between right and wrong. Nanjarāja's attitude

92. The *Agni-Purāṇa* thus sets down the duties of ministers :—"Deliberating upon the measures of the State, taking steps for the success of undertakings, preparing for all future contingencies, supervising the Royal Exchequer, drafting civil and criminal laws for the realm, checking encroachments by any foreign power, taking steps for arresting the progress of disturbances, and protecting the king and the country" (*Agni-Purāṇa*, CCXLI, Śls. 16-17).

towards his sovereign was not only morally wrong but also a political crime against him and his own country.

Haidar was successively the servant, the pupil, the enemy and the deceiver of Nanjarāja. At the age of thirty-three (or thirty-eight) years, and in obedience to his patron's summons, he assumed control of Dinḍigal (1755). But as Nanjarāja had advanced in age and become weakened in authority, Haidar repented of the rash promises of his youth. He neither respected his engagements nor the loyalty he owed his old master and protector. He no longer entertained the same reverence for Nanjarāja. His ambition was to supplant him and he succeeded in doing so. If Haidar displaced him, it was Nanjarāja's fault, nay, the result of his political shortsightedness. His blindness to his own faults was phenomenal. It would not have been so pitiable had it not been so wicked. The country suffered as much from the treachery of the one as from the treason of the other.

Where Nanjarāja showed the way, Haidar only followed; where Nanjarāja was a failure, Haidar saw clearly the way to success. If Nanjarāja had only been faithful and loyal towards his sovereign, if only he had conserved and not frittered his energies, if only he had concentrated on his objective and not wasted his time over vain endeavours to get from diplomacy what he should have obtained by the use of the sword, and if only he had kept his counsel and not betrayed himself into the hands of Murāri Rao, he would have won his way through at Trichinopoly. But he was not destined to fly the Mysore flag over that great fortress—just because of his tortuous diplomacy and more tortuous methods of buying aid from pepole who were determined on not extending their aid to him. Instead of

Evil effects of wrong ministerial behaviour: loss of power and displacement by Haidar Ali.

Nanjarāja's faults of character and the penalty he paid for them.

a quiet occupation, he found a siege ; his soldiers panted and died on the burning sands of the river-bed at Trichinopoly ; his own country was overrun by the Mahrattas ; and his retreat proved the signal for the final extinguishment of all claims over the city, on whose conquest he had set his heart and wasted his men and money.

A more spirited man, a man in whom action dominated more than ambition, would have acted differently. He would have proved himself a very Julian in the prosecution of his objective.⁹³ When, on the death of Chandā Sāhib, he saw that his moderate and respectful demand for the treaty, far from being fulfilled, served only to harden the heart of Muhammad Alī, his implacable adversary, he should have boldly resolved to commit his life and fortune to the arbitrament of immediate war. He yielded foolishly to the delays and deceptions practised on him by Muhammad Alī and this led him in turn to try deception on others. He failed to note that Salābat Jang's forces were far away ; that the country round about was feebly guarded but for the handful of the English ; and that he could occupy, if he willed it, the fortress of Trichinopoly by a decisive attempt on it. He should have assembled his troops, being in possession of the country round about ; divided his army ; and struck a blow for himself. He could have divided one body against the defenders ; another to guard the passes open to his own capital ; and a third to keep up communications between himself and his capital. He

93. Julian Augustus, commonly styled the Apostate, for he renounced Christianity : Roman Emperor for eighteen months, 361-363 A.D. A capable soldier, a vigorous administrator and a wise ruler. Though painted in blackest colours by the Christian Fathers, he was a lover of truth, chaste, abstinent, just and affectionate, if somewhat vain and superstitious. Such is the estimate of Gibbon, who describes him as an "extraordinary man," as great in philosophy as in the field of Mars. Gibbon's description of the manner in which he prepared for war against Constantius is a masterpiece in word-picture which can hardly be surpassed.

neither lacked men nor money. And he could have ordered more levies, for he had ample resources. He had, besides, Murāri Rao's troops. He could have used them to purpose. He should have directed Murāri to scour the country in two directions and join him under the walls of Trichinopoly. Instead he allowed him to do nothing but try to secure the fortress for himself by playing false to his paymaster. What is most extraordinary, he himself did nothing. He reserved no task for himself, except that of tortuous diplomacy or unskilful attempts at bribery. On the other hand, he should have resolved to keep to himself the most dangerous part of the whole business. He should have selected the bravest of the brave among his troops, a sufficiency of men, intrepid and active, and ready to lay down their lives for him, and, like himself, prepared to cast behind them all hope of turning back. At the head of such a faithful band, he should have fearlessly plunged in an attack on the fortress, choosing his own time for it. The secrecy of his plan, the suddenness of his attack, the surprise he would have created for the besieged, his discipline and vigour, would have surmounted all obstacles. The labour of his men would have done the rest. And he would have won his objective before his enemies had had time to recover from the shock of the attack or even received news of it. The inhabitants round about would have opened their gates to him; and the possession of the strongest, the most sacred, the most famous and the most populous of the cities of the South would have been followed by the submission of all the neighbouring districts down to Cape Comorin. The object of the treaty would have been realised. Not only that. The intelligence of such rapid action would have been speedily transmitted to his enemies—Salābat Jang, the Mahrattas and the French—and they would have been confounded by the celerity displayed

by their rival. But Nanjarāja was not the man for such quickness, decision, or promptitude. Nor was he capable of soldierly action or blessed with the prescience of a fighting general. Indeed, he failed to watch events that were happening round about him with the eye of a general. He chose to fight Muhammad Ali and his confreres not with the arms and ammunition he had so plenteously provided himself with but with the weapon of political machination, in which he was no match for them. He was a poor judge of men and a poorer judge of his own capacity. His character was a compound of ambition and cruelty, of pride and weakness, of vacillation and intrigues, of double-dealing and corruption. He lacked the essential qualities of a leader of men and possessed not the genius of a conqueror. His long abuse of power, no doubt, had won for him a spurious reputation among his contemporaries as the virtual ruler of a great kingdom, but, as personal merit can alone deserve the respect of posterity, Nanjarāja, it must be confessed, inherited a great office without the ability to make good in it.

But there were certain redeeming features in the character of Nanjarāja. He was hard working, unsparing, dogged and single-minded. He held fast, for instance, to the idea of Chikkadēvarāja that Southern India was politically doomed if there was no leadership at all in it—and there had been none in it since the death of Śrī-Ranga VI in or about 1681—but only continued rivalry and aimless conflict. The ceaseless fights between the former feudatories of Vijayanagar had weakened the country and had opened the way to the inroads of the Northern States. The lesson that Vijayanagar had taught during a course of over four centuries had been forgotten: Gingee had fallen; Madura had been tottering; and Tanjore had

Redeeming features in his character: His memorable stand for the political liberty of South India.

been overrun. The Mughal forces had followed in the wake of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa. These in their turn had fallen and the Mahrattas under Śivāji had seized hold of the opportunity to obtain control in the South. The fight between Mysore, the one organized State which had inherited the Vijayanagar tradition and which had succeeded in part in its mission to continue it in a manner suited to the altered conditions, and the rest of the old feudatories or their successors, the Mughal and the Mahratta, continued much to the detriment and well-being of the country. During this continued period of turmoil and strife, there should have been not a few who should have observed and reflected that these ceaseless fights between the people of the South—who had been for generations accustomed to the peaceful life of Vijayanagar times—meant no more than civil war. They should have realized the evils of such war and their own impotence before the invading hosts from the North. If Chikkadēva was the first to discern these evils and the first to take decisive steps to avert them by a southward movement, with the definite aim of the unification of the whole of the South on the Vijayanagar model, Nanjarāja was the next and must be reckoned the last to follow it up with a persistency that reflected the greatest credit on him. He saw in the forces contending for supremacy in the South that if he missed the opportunity that had offered itself to him—the secret treaty with Muhammad Ali is the true index of the spirit that animated him—the continued civil strife that had stifled life and destroyed the peace of the country would continue longer and end in making the invading Mughal or his representative the arbiter of destiny to the people of Southern India. That was the very thing that Chikkadēva had originally tried to prevent, and it was the identical thing that Nanjarāja had with singular tenacity stuck to. But there was this

difference between the two : Chikkadēva knew the limits to which he could go, while Nanjarāja, in his eagerness to win through, set no bounds to his action. There is, however, something to be said in defence of Nanjarāja. The position had worsened during the period of sixty years that had elapsed since the death of Chikkadēva. Muslim control of the South had been tightened by the creation of two Nawābships—Sīra and Arcot—in place of one. The Mahrattas had established themselves as a power at Tanjore. The Nizām had become independent and claimed control over the South. Foreign nations like the English and French had shown no disinclination to take sides between the contending parties. All things thus pointed to the continuance of the prevailing conflict. Nanjarāja saw that there was no hope for the South so long as these conditions lasted. He accordingly was daily being confirmed in his conviction that a final attempt at the capture of Trichinopoly, the key to the southern supremacy, was a dire necessity. He saw that there was no other way to avoid the subjection of the South to the foreigner. That would be both a scandal and a misery. There must have been many in the land who should have still remembered the splendid glories of Vijayanagar and recalled how it had proved a bulwark against the aggressions of the North. The representative of that great Empire was still in the land, though he bore but an attenuated rule in it. The early terrors inspired by the Muslim name had died ages ago. The Muslim had been fought repeatedly and defeated. Those who remembered these things came to believe not only in the justice of their cause but also in the possibility of the success of a well-organized campaign against those who were eager to wrest the power from its rightful owners. In any case, it seemed out of the question that South India could be subjected to foreign supremacy while there was yet a chance to secure its independence.

The idea was thus deepening that it would be intolerable to see South India surrendered to the foreigner while an opportunity was yet available to keep him out of it. Nanjarāja was the symbol of that idea. He embraced it openly and stood out for it actively. He was emboldened in his venture by the signal defeat that his brother Dēvarājaiya had inflicted on the combined forces of the Nawābs of Sīra and Arcot only about fifteen years ago (1737). Nor could he have forgotten the success of Chikkadēvarāja against Madura and the occupation of the country up to Trichinopoly. Since Chikkadēva's time, it was the one ambition of the rulers of Mysore to seize Trichinopoly and control the whole country to the south of it, as far as Cape Comorin, as one kingdom in the interests of the people inhabiting it, free from outside interference, free from external control, and free to develop their own culture and civilization. The idea was by no means either a new one or an impossible one to attain. The Hoysaḷas and the Vijayanagar monarchs had done it before and Chikkadēva had all but succeeded in it. And people who remembered the state of the country for three quarters of a century backward to 1673 could not but have welcomed a project of the kind that Nanjarāja had in view. It was not so much a war of conquest that he contemplated as a war to retain the liberty of self-growth that had been sanctified by centuries of exercise by past rulers in the south of India. And if they had succeeded and wielded undisputed supremacy for ages, why should he (Nanjarāja) not do the same? The time seemed propitious and he had the sinews of war. Nanjarāja saw that with the death of Aurangzīb, the one obstacle in the way to the realization of Mysore's objective had disappeared. The terror of the Mughal name was dead long ago. He did not think

much of the Mahratta opposition. It could be put off; or it could be even bought off. Bijāpur, Gōlkonḍa and the rest of them had gone for good. Their pretended successors, the Nizāms and the Nawābs, were fighting among themselves. Nor did he reckon the opposition of the Nizāms or the Nawābs of Arcot and Sīra as anything serious. They had still to earn their reputation. He had a large army and he had enough money. Chikkadēva's treasure would seem to have been gathered for this special purpose. And he thought that diplomacy would do the rest. He thus saw that his duty to his country could be discharged, if at all, just at the time he inaugurated his campaign (1751). Only recent events had made him feel uneasy, as they should have made many others like him, if they could have any idea as to what foreign domination once again would mean in the South. The extinction of the Nāyak Dynasty of Madura in 1736 had been followed by the occupation of Trichinopoly, Diṇḍigal, Madura and Tinnevely by the forces of Chandā Sāhib and even Tanjore had been subjugated. The Mahratta success of 1740-1743 had proved only an interlude and no more. The defeat of Chandā Sāhib and the reoccupation of Trichinopoly and the appointment of Murāri Rao to it did not prove of permanent value to the Hindu cause. Murāri Rao vacated his office in 1743 and the Nizām's nominee Anwar-ud-dīn occupied the country and claimed to rule over the whole of the South through his sons Mahfūz Khān and Muhammad Alī. Rival Muhammadan parties claimed to rule. Madura, the ancient Hindu capital, had been occupied by one Ālam Khān, a supporter of Chandā Sāhib, and had withstood a siege in 1751. Nanjarāja was a close witness to all these misfortunes that the ancient Hindu capital underwent. Anarchy prevailed in the country round about it, and those who recalled the glories of its past, could not but have wished for a day

of the old Hindu régime. Nor would they have wished for a continuance of the foreign rule which meant so much misery to the people accustomed to their temples, festivals and religious observances. If he only acted with vigour and nerve, Nanjarāja felt—like many others of the time—that he could drive the intruders out as Kampanna Wodeyar, the Vijayanagar Prince, had done before him four centuries ago. If he failed to strike a blow then—about 1751—he would have failed in his duty and, what is worse, would have lost his only opportunity. All eyes in the South should have turned to him as the only man who could undertake so great a task. His reputation stood high; he commanded universal respect in the South; he had the necessary equipment; and, what is more, he commanded in an ample measure the required resources. If he declined to try, he would have not only lagged behind in carrying out the ambitions of Chikkadēva but also have failed to do his duty towards his country and his people. His name and fame were at stake and he had to act, whether he liked it or no. The only other alternatives were subjection to the outsider, and negotiations to win over some of those whom he had perforce to fight if he was to attain his objective. The first, according to Nanjarāja, was out of the question. He had inherited a life-long passion for the freedom of the South, and he could not well sacrifice it. As to winning over the Mahrattas—they being competitors against him in the pursuit of supremacy over the South—it was plainly equally out of the question. The Mahrattas failed to recognise that Mysore was better situated to control the South and that a friendly Mysore was preferable to a fighting Mysore. The Mahrattas since Shāhji's time had both a personal and an imperial attitude which prevented them from leaving the South to Mysore and thus making common cause against the foreigner. That is where

Mahratta politics went wrong from the days of Śivāji. In these circumstances, what was the peculiar mission of Mysore that it could not be left to itself because of the hostility of the Mahrattas? What could not have been achieved by leadership by Mysore aided by the Mahrattas in the South? But if the Mahrattas stood out for themselves, was Mysore to hold back at the critical hour? That was the question that evidently troubled Nanjarāja. And he stood out for the cause of his country and his religion—of which he was an ardent interpreter and a zealous follower—and decided upon action in the full belief he would succeed. It was not mere personal ambition that carried Nanjarāja to the course of action on which he staked his name, fame, and all. He profoundly believed in the greatness of the cause he had made his own; in the greatness of his country as the guardian of Hindu culture, religion and civilisation; and in the greatness of the idea that had impelled action on the part of Chikkadēva. Both his writings and his actions show that he was a lover of his country, its religion and its culture, and that he stood for them all. Indeed, as we shall see, he had so far infused enthusiasm in the justice of his cause in Haidar that, despite the fact that he was a Muhammadan himself, Haidar, when he came to occupy Nanjarāja's place, tried to prosecute the latter's policy and objective with all the vigour and singleness of purpose he was capable of. In fact Haidar stepped into a rich national heritage and proved the greatest opponent of the greatest outside power in the land.

If Nanjarāja can be justified in his idea of a war against those who kept him out of
 His fatal mistake : lack of planning and preparation for war. Trichinopoly, he can hardly be com-
 mended for the manner in which he prosecuted his claims. As we have seen, he did not plan beforehand his campaign with a view to success;

he did not realise the importance of initiative in war. He showed no foresight whatever in the conduct of the war; he waited till something had happened and then tried to circumvent it. That was not the way to win a war. No wonder, then, the cause he stood for suffered from his lack of common military prudence. The idea of an independent South headed by Mysore in face of the expanding power of the foreigner thus ended in humiliation, he himself in the end paying the last price of resistance.

There is something truly tragic in the end that overtook Nanjarāja. But the man was nothing; the idea he stood for was great in itself and deserved to succeed.

The man and his idea: a justification.

His *modus operandi* may have gone wrong but his policy was right and in keeping with the spirit of the times. The man who staked his all on it cannot but deserve a meed of praise from posterity. For, after the disaster of Trichinopoly, there was no more political liberty in the south of India. The issue between Nanjarāja and Muhammad Alī was really a conflict between a free Southern India and a fettered Southern India; a Southern India with its own culture and civilization, and a Southern India under the control of foreigners. Nanjarāja in his efforts to save the South exhausted himself and Mysore of its resources. It would be idle to speculate on "what might have been" had he succeeded in his attempt. How long would such success have been kept up by him or by those who followed him? How far would it have changed the current of history? Who can venture to answer questions of this nature? It would be as profitable to ask what would have happened if Demosthenes had succeeded and Philip had lost Chæronea. But it is impossible, despite all his faults and deficiencies, to withhold from Nanjarāja our admiration for striking a final blow for the

political independence of the South. While the attempt lasted, he was the hero of the South. All eyes had turned to him for driving the foreigner out of the land. There can be no question that popular goodwill was on his side in this attempt. He had not only persuaded himself of the need for such a venture but had also persuaded Murāri Rao for the moment to join him, though the latter proved a traitor later, and all the country from Mysore to Trichinopoly had joined him. That is an achievement that, despite the failure that overtook him, stands to his credit and to the credit of the people of South India. Nanjarāja's defeat at Trichinopoly has to be deplored, because it opened the way to the South passing under the sway of the foreigner, who eventually had himself to make way for another stronger than himself. What the success of Muhammad Ali meant was not seen in 1755 when Nanjarāja turned his back from Trichinopoly but in 1756 when the English won at Plassey and laid the foundation for their rule not only in Bengal but all over India. From every point of view—from that of the victor and the vanquished—the success of Muhammad Ali at Trichinopoly has to be characterised as a "dishonest victory." There is enough in contemporary records to prove that if it was not obtained exactly by open fraud and violence to truth, it was made possible by recourse to prevarication, unjust putting off and rank dissimulation which deceived nobody except those who indulged in it. So far as Nanjarāja is concerned, it must be frankly confessed that even if the ultimate issue of his fight for Trichinopoly was known to him beforehand, if all the South had known what it must be, even then, it has to be admitted that Mysore could not have turned from the course she followed. She was to take account of her then position in the South; of her name and fame; of what Chikkadēva had done; of what Vijayanagar,

her predecessor, had done for ages; and of what the future had in store for her and others in the South. It is not possible to adjudge that Nanjarāja was wrong in choosing to risk his country, his wealth, his name, his fame, his all for the freedom and safety of all in the South of India. That that should be the final verdict of history on him there can be no doubt whatever.

In some respects, Nanjarāja resembled his elder contemporary Bolingbroke, the great Tory hero.⁹⁴ Both favoured separate and secret negotiations for what they considered the good of their countries; both were fond of carrying on underhand conspiracies—secret talks with the enemy rather than open conferences with the allies; both brought discredit on their countries by their indecision, cross intrigues and doubtful diplomacies; both proved unfaithful to their respective sovereigns; both endeavoured by dubious means to gain supreme power and to keep it by any means, and by any

Nanjarāja and Bolingbroke: a comparison and a contrast.

94. Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount (1678-1751). Tory Prime Minister of Queen Anne, after the dismissal of the Whigs. Much has been written on him since his own times. Besides contemporary accounts of his life, the following modern biographies may be noted: Leslie Stephen, *Dict. of Nat. Biog.*, 1897; C. de Remusat in *L'Angleterre au 18^{me} siècle*, I, 1856; T. Macknight, 1863; J. Churton Collins, 1886; A. Hassal, 1889; Walter Sichel, 1901-1902; P. C. Yorke, *Enc. Brit.*, 11th Edn., 1910-1911; and Sir Charles Petrie (Collins), 1937. Alexander Pope wrote his first famous work, "*Essay on Man*", at Bolingbroke's suggestion, and devoted it to an exposition of that virtuoso's philosophy. The tone and temper of this philosophy is best expressed in this *Essay* with its twin assertions that "whatever is is right" and that

"For forms of Government, let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administered is best."

As Mr. G. D. H. Cole has remarked, not only the early 18th century was really indifferent about forms of Government, but also it regarded political authority as too securely settled in the hands of the aristocracy for its nature to be worth much argument.

Nanjarāja was in power between 1739-1759. Bolingbroke entered Parliament in 1701; became Secretary for War, 1704; Secretary of State, 1710; Prime Minister, on the dismissal of the Earl of Oxford, 1714; dismissed from office on the accession of George I; fled to Paris, March 28, 1715; returned to London, 1723; retired to France, June 1735; returned to England and settled at Batterssea, 1744; died, December 12, 1751.

act that the circumstances demanded ; both had literary inclinations and produced works which still count for something, though they make a far weaker impression upon posterity than they evidently made on contemporaries ; and the political wisdom of both was *ex post facto* and often in direct contrast to their actions. There were, however, some points of difference as well between Nanjarāja and Bolingbroke. Throughout his career, Bolingbroke desired to be considered the Petronius or the Alcibiades of his age and to mix licentious orgies with the highest political responsibilities. Nanjarāja was far too religious and far too puritanical in his outlook to become so accomplished a voluptuary as these old world worthies were. Nor did he, like Bolingbroke, patronise Providence, though, proud as Lucifer, he did seem at times to assume the superior air and appear condescending indeed. It is uncertain if Nanjarāja had the brilliant gift of eloquence that Bolingbroke was blessed with ; nor Bolingbroke's wit, good looks and social qualities, which made firm friendships with men of the most opposite character. Nanjarāja had, however, some saving features in his character, while Bolingbroke's public life presents none of those acts of devotion and self-sacrifice which so often help to redeem a career characterized by errors, follies and even crimes.

Thus, with all their greed, insensate ambition and love of power, it is indeed to the credit of the Daḷavāi brothers that they were able to divert their attention from the immediate preoccupations of the hour and devote themselves whole-heartedly to the solution of broader questions of policy. During the early years of the reign (1734-1751), they not only kept a steady eye on the westward and southward expansion of Mysore (up to Malabar and Trichinopoly) but also took a keen interest

The Daḷavāi
brothers : an esti-
mate of their work.

in the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence of the kingdom as against the pretensions to supremacy⁹⁵ and inroads of the Mughals and the Mahrattas on the one side and the assertions of some of the local potentates on the other. In the latter direction, they achieved, on the whole, a fair measure of success, enhancing the reputation and prestige of the State and attaining to the plenitude of their power and glory (1748-1751).

The acquisition of Trichinopoly for conserving the political solidarity of the South was the main objective of the foreign policy of the Dalavāis—particularly of Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya—during 1751-1755, a period of uncommon stress and turmoil in the Karnāṭak and Southern India. They had inherited it from Chikka-dēva's time. They had to fight for it; they had to die for it, if the South was to be at all free politically. They staked everything for their idea and they lost their all over it. Around this issue was centred the tenacious and protracted Mysorean struggle they carried on during a period of four long years (1752-1755). Notwithstanding his best efforts over this enterprise, Nanjarājaiya met with little success. His failure was, as we have seen, due as much to lack of initiative in war on his part as to the flagrant breach of faith and shifting policy of Muhammad Ali, the uncertain movements and changing allegiance of Murāri Rao of Gooty, the persistent opposition and hostility of Pratāp Singh of Tanjore, the ultimate combination of the English and the French against him (during 1754-1755), and the pressure of the Nizām and the Mahrattas on Seringapatam demanding his immediate presence at the capital. There is reason to fear that his brother Dēvarājaiya, who looked after

95. For a fuller notice of the nature of sovereignty of the Indian powers of the 18th century over the South, see Ch. XVI below; also Appendix V—(3) to this Vol.

the home affairs during this period of warfare, failed in his duty and allowed the enemy to march on the capital while the war was still on at Trichinopoly. There were also serious defects in the character of Nanjarājaiya—over-confidence in the justice of his cause, unjustified reliance on French support, and vacillation, indecision and intrigue in the prosecution of his scheme—and these contributed directly to the collapse of what was otherwise a well-conceived project of political expansion.⁹⁶

The disaster that overtook the foreign policy of the Dalavāis, accompanied by the exactions of the Nizām and the Mahrattas from the kingdom of Mysore, had the immediate effect of draining the resources of the State and reacting adversely on the court of Seringapatam (1755). It

Results of the disaster at Trichinopoly.

End of the Dalavāi Rège and the emergence of Haidar Ali.

was too late when Krishnarāja Wodeyar, realising the gravity of the situation, sought to assert himself (1755-1757) and adjust his relations with the Dalavāis on a new footing (1758). The attempt, though purely a temporary palliative, proved eventually a failure. It led to the end of the Dalavāi rège and paved the way for the rise to prominence of a more powerful usurper in the person of Haidar Ali from the lower ranks of the military (1759). Indeed, it was an irony of fate that almost at a time when Krishnarāja Wodeyar was about to inaugurate his independent rule, Haidar had become a power in Mysore (1759-1760). In vain did Krishnarāja with the Royalists exert himself to the utmost to hold his own against Haidar during 1760-1761. Haidar's usurpation was complete in July 1761—the net result of the action and reaction of a long course of affairs, external and internal (1750-1761).

96. In this connection, it is significant to note that Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya had maintained a regular journal of his transactions ever since he set out from Mysore [see *Count. Corres.* (1758), p. 30: *Letter No. 49*, dated February 27, 1758—Dalavāi to Capt. Dalton]. Unfortunately, however, this record has not come to light so far.

Krishnarāja Wodeyar, as he appears from the materials available to us, was a pious and promising ruler. Under other circumstances, he should have fared differently.

Krishnarāja Wodeyar II as he might have been.

The Dalavāis too were noted for their piety and for their patronage of learning and promotion of literary activity, Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya being himself an accomplished scholar of the age. Had they but behaved loyally towards their sovereign, allowed him a legitimate share in the management of State affairs, planned carefully, worked vigorously, exacted what was due from their allies and acted generally with greater discretion during 1746-1755, the course of the history of Mysore, nay of South India, would have run along different lines.

CHAPTER XVI.

KRISHNARĀJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*)

The rights and wrongs of Trichinopoly: the significance of the Mysorean struggle for it—Circumstances leading to the struggle—The position in 1751—The role of Muhammad Ali—The position of the English and Nanjarāja—The deception on Nanjarāja and its results—The course of the struggle—The Truce of 1754 and the conduct of the French—The conquest of the South, a problem to the Indian Powers—The relative validity of the Nawāb's claims—The English attitude—The conduct of Pratāp Singh of Tanjore—Haidar's reaction to it—Murāri Rao's duplicity—His mockery of a mediation—His real object—His improper conduct—What it cost him eventually—A contemporary view of the Trichinopoly issue: Robert Orme—Orme and the negotiations—Saunders' proposed settlement—Wilks' review of the position—The conduct of the French, further noticed.

ENOUGH has been said¹ to show what the struggle for Trichinopoly really meant. It was, in fact, the last effort put forward by the Hindu kingdom of Mysore—as the true representative of imperial Vijayanagar—for the political independence of the South. With the defeat of Nanjarāja and his departure to Mysore, that attempt may be taken to have received its practical death-blow. Though Haidar Ali, as we have seen, adopted the policy of expansion in the South initiated by Nanjarāja and his

The rights and wrongs of Trichinopoly: the significance of the Mysorean struggle for it.

1. See *ante* Chapters VII & VIII.

predecessors, and though he prosecuted their aims and objectives, he may, perhaps, be taken to have been moved by other impulses as well. He might even have prosecuted the old aims and objectives purely from the point of view of an adventurer or even for the sole purpose of maintaining his own personal supremacy undisputed. Whatever the motives, that he did prosecute the aims and objectives of Nanjarāja is, as we have shown, to the credit of Nanjarāja and the impress that the latter's policy had left on Haidar. There are reasons to believe that the objectives of Nanjarāja and those of Haidar, in their initial stages at least, have been misunderstood by writers on the history of the period we are treating of. It is, therefore, necessary to pause a little here and clear the tangled web they have woven around themselves in this connection and show how they have deceived themselves into the comforting belief that the fight for Trichinopoly was a fight between the two rival Nawābs of the Karnātic and their protagonists, the English and the French on either side, in which Mysore came in as a secondary factor. That this is not so will have been evident from what has been set down in the preceding pages. Mysore had an inviolable claim to Trichinopoly, a claim which could not be set aside. Up to 1736, when the rule over the South was undisputably Hindu in character,² Trichinopoly formed part of the Nāyak

2. The alleged supremacy of the Mughal since 1693 over the Nāyak kingdom of Madura was only nominal. Chandā Sāhib's occupation of Trichinopoly in 1736 was the result of the attempt made in 1734 on behalf of the Nawāb of Arcot by his son Saḍdar Ali Khān and his nephew and confidential adviser Chandā Sāhib. Queen Minākshi's quarrel with Bangāru Tirumala, the father of her adopted son, gave the latter an opportunity to interfere. While Bangāru Tirumala ruled over Madura and Tinnevely, Chandā Sāhib occupied Trichinopoly fort unmolested. But his occupation of the dependent country was so far ineffective that renewed attempts had to be made to get possession of it. The revolt of Muhammad Yusuf in 1763 and what preceded is the best proof of the non-conquest of those areas till then on the part of the Nawāb of Arcot.

kingdom of Madura. It was the chief stronghold of that kingdom in Tirumala Nāyaka's time (1623-1659) and it was in its hands until the death of Queen Minākshi, in whose reign it was first occupied on her behalf by Chandā Sāhib in 1734 and finally on his own in 1736.

Aurangzīb died in 1707. The Nizām claimed overlordship over the South as the Mughal's agent in or about 1713, when Kumr-ud-dīn Chin-Kilich-Khān was nominated Nizām-ul-mulk with a nominal control over the Mughal possessions in Southern India. His deputies at Arcot claimed through his alleged right; while the Mughal's direct representative claimed through his alleged right of overlordship. But the fact was the South was never conquered either by the Mughal or the Nizām. In 1748, when the so-called disputed succession to the Nawābship of Arcot arose, the fight was as between the rival claimants and their objective was the establishment of the right to possession of the country which they could not so much as claim by virtue of any conquest or effectively occupy in a military sense and collect its revenue.³ The English

Circumstances
leading to the
struggle.

3. The following is a succinct summary of the history pertaining to Trichinopoly and the country dependent on it :—

- 1559: Viśvanātha Nāyaka takes Trichinopoly.
- 1609-1623: Virappa Nāyaka first attaches Trichinopoly to Madura, the Tanjore king having exchanged it for Vullam.
- 1623-1659: Fortress of Trichinopoly becomes the chief stronghold of the Nāyak kingdom during Tirumala Nāyaka's time.
- 1734: Minākshi invites intervention of Dōst Ali, Nawāb of Arcot, in her dispute with Bangāru-Tirumala, father of her adopted son.
- 1736: Chandā Sāhib finally occupies the fort of Trichinopoly.
- 1741: Chandā Sāhib attacked by the Mahrattas; Chandā Sāhib taken prisoner; and Murāri occupies Trichinopoly till 1744.
- 1743-1744: Nizām-ul-mulk invades Trichinopoly; the Mahrattas vacate it; and Anwar-ud-dīn becomes Nawāb of Arcot.
- 1748-1749: The French ransom Chandā Sāhib and with Muzaaffar Jang attack Anwar-ud-dīn and kill him at Āmbūr. Anwar-ud-dīn's son Muhammad Ali flees and occupies Trichinopoly.
- 1749-1751: Chandā Sāhib declared Nawāb of Arcot by the French

and the French, who had till then been but traders and had not put forth any pretensions to territory and had no military forces worth the name, saw an opportunity to better their own position—incidentally making money in their individual and personal interests, for private trade was allowed and illicit gains not discountenanced by the morals of the time—and began to interfere in the affairs of the local powers. They were probably influenced by the example of those who had endeavoured—before their very eyes—to carve out kingdoms for themselves. Śivāji was one of these. They had also seen how Chikkadēvarāja had built up a vast kingdom for himself and how he had extended his conquests to the extreme south as far as Madura. They saw too that trade and warfare were incompatible but that interference on one side or other was a primal necessity, if they were to exist at all. To exist or not to exist—that was the question for them. They openly acknowledged they were not principals in the war;

Before Chandā could invest Trichinopoly, Nāsir Jang enters the Karnātīc with a powerful army. Muhammad Ali joins him but the French defeat them at Gingee in 1750, at which battle Nāsir Jang was killed, and Muzaffar proclaimed Nizām by the French. But he was killed and succeeded by Salābat Jang, his brother, in 1751. Muhammad Ali again occupies Trichinopoly.

1752: Chandā Sāhib delivered by the French to the Tanjoreans and put to death.

1752-1764: Subjugation of Madura and Tinnevely by the English on behalf of Muhammad Ali, Nawāb of Arcot. Yusuf Khān's revolt suppressed in October 1764.

1781: First appointment of their own collector by the English to the area. It came about in this way: The *Treaty of Paris* in 1763 having put an end to French interference in the affairs of the Nawāb of Arcot, his Karnātīc districts were left in the hands of renters, the Pālegārs of the South still continuing to yield but a very imperfect allegiance. In 1781, soon after the second war with Haidar Ali had commenced, it was arranged with Muhammad Ali, the Nawāb, who was quite unable to perform his engagements, to assign his revenues to the Company for a period of five years, one-sixth of the proceeds being reserved for his own expenses. The English Government at Madras accordingly appointed its own Collectors.

their replies to Nanjarāja demonstrate this to a fault. They frankly pleaded that they had no right to interfere in the disposal of territory, as they were prohibited by the Mughal from doing that. The position was acknowledged that they were traders and no more; and that their interference in behalf of their protegee was in the capacity of friends and well-wishers, not as principals in the warfare—with a right to settle matters on the footing of their being principals—but as subsidiaries who had no right to interfere in the arbitrament of territorial affairs. Of course, the position assumed was a camouflage but it was a necessary step in the then position of affairs. This attitude showed that it was possible for the English and the French to maintain a pretended neutrality even while they were waging war as subsidiaries of the country powers.

It was in these circumstances and with these views that the war of the Karnātic was waged. The position in 1751 was briefly this: There was peace in Europe between England and France. But the English and the French, having espoused opposite sides, were at war in South India. Muhammad Ali was supported by the English as the rightful Nawāb, while Chandā Sāhib's candidature was put forward by the French. Muhammad Ali laid claim to all the country between the river Krishṇa and the Cape Comorin, the area originally under the sway of Vijayanagar. Actually he had really no territory under his control. He had thrown himself into Trichinopoly—with a view to eventualities. The whole of the *Subāh* of Arcot, including the Capital, was in Chandā Sāhib's hands and was dominated by the French. Tanjore, which had been taken by the Mahrattas in 1675, was independent, and Pratāp Singh, its ruler, was, as might be expected, against

Nanjarāja. Madura was in the hands of Ālam Khān, an adherent of Chandā Sāhib. Muhammad Ali's position at Trichinopoly was a precarious one. He was besieged by Chandā and the French force under Jacques Law.

Landless, friendless, and destitute of men and money, Muhammed Ali looked to Nanjarāja in Mysore and the English at Madras for effective help. Nanjarāja's help was sought because he was the one man who had both men and money; he was at the head of the best organized State of the time in the South; that State had the prestige of an old hereditary monarchy still attached to it; and he was, besides, well-known for his ambitious expansionist aims in the South, the key to which was Trichinopoly. His forbears had fought for it and much money and many lives had been already sacrificed for it since the days of Chikkadēva. It cannot be that Muhammad Ali, cunning and astute as he was, did not count on the inordinate desire for power on the part of Nanjarāja and his brother Dēvarāja. He was in a desperate state. He had no more territory than Trichinopoly town at the time and even there he was probably not desired. And he made up his mind to offer Nanjarāja his own terms. When he did so, he was determined to cheat Nanjarāja of his dues when it came to fulfilment. He knew the English at Madras would not agree to his doing this, but he desired to take no risks with them. He kept the clause in the Treaty relating to the surrender of Trichinopoly and its dependencies a secret from them for the time being. The one feature of the character of Muhammad Ali, on which all who had anything to do with him agreed, was that he was always deliberate in his deception. He was so far deceptive in his character that he deceived friends and foes alike in the same determined manner. Nanjarāja took care to guard his position. He won over Murāri Rao, and

The role of Muhammad Ali.

attached him to himself at great cost. Murāri was thus detached from the main Mahratta power and prevented from making common cause with Pratāp Singh of Tanjore, who, in this matter, was inimical to Nanjarāja's aims in the South. But he too proved treacherous in the end. True to his word, Nanjarāja kept the clause a profound secret. Even Murāri knew nothing of it. There is no reason to believe, as suggested by Orme,⁴ that he "made the agreement by his (Murāri Rao's) advice." Murāri's aid was sought by Nanjarāja as the result of his agreement with Muhammad Alī; he was not the inspirer of the agreement. Nanjarāja required no one to offer any suggestion to him in this regard. It is possible, however, he found it impossible to conceal it from the sagacity of his subsidiary, especially in the later stages of the war. When Murāri came to know of it, he made up his mind to turn it to his own advantage at the proper time.⁵ The English at Madras realised the enormity of the offence committed by Muhammad Alī only after the fall of Trichinopoly. The capture and death of Chandā Sāhib was the signal for Nanjarāja's demand for a fulfilment of Muhammad Alī's treaty with Mysore. The English at Madras knew nothing of the secret clause in the Treaty until the time came for its fulfilment. On the death of Chandā Sāhib, Major Lawrence sent 400 of the French prisoners of war to Fort St. David, brought up the rest with the military stores and artillery at Jambukēśvaram into Trichinopoly and completed all his other dispositions; and proposed to Muhammad Alī that he should move forthwith at the head of the confederate army into the Karnātic, where the news of his successes at Trichinopoly would help to reduce the other fortresses under the control of Chandā Sāhib and facilitate the

4. Orme, *Indostan*, I, 243.

5. *Ibid.*

establishment of his government over the province and help to raise the revenue due from it. Muhammad Ali pretended to acquiesce in this advice, but showed, what Orme calls, an "unaccountable backwardness" as often as he was pressed to put it into execution. The inconsistency in his conduct perplexed all but the select few who were acquainted with the clause. The English, indeed, had no conception of the difficulties which held him back, when, to their great astonishment, Nanjarāja explained the mystery by refusing to march until the city of Trichinopoly with all its dependencies was delivered up to him, for, that, he said, was the price that he had stipulated with Muhammad Ali for his assistance. Dissimulation being no longer of any service, Muhammad Ali confessed the truth when Major Lawrence demanded an explanation of it. He protested that his extreme distress alone had extorted a promise from him, which Nanjarāja himself, as he might very well have known, he said, was totally out of his power to perform! Trichinopoly, he pleaded, was the great Mughal's, and himself only a Viceroy, appointed to govern it during the pleasure of that prince; that the resigning of such an important place to the government of an Indian king would involve, he added, both himself and the English in continual wars with the whole Mughal Empire! Firmly resolved on not parting with the place, he, in a word, proposed to amuse Nanjarāja with a further promise of delivering it up within two months! By this time, he hoped, by collecting the so-called arrears of revenue due from the province of Arcot, to repay the expenses which Nanjarāja had incurred* by assisting him. As immediate reparation—"a palliative", in the words of Orme⁶—"he proposed to give up the

6. *Ibid.*, 244.

fort of Madura with its dependencies, which included a very large district." These terms, he suggested to Major Lawrence, were, in his view, a full and ample recompense for all that Nanjarāja had done for him, more especially, he with consummate adroitness added, as the reduction of Chandā Sāhib's power had proved an essential advantage to the interests of Mysore as well as to his own! Major Lawrence was as surprized at this statement as anybody else in Trichinopoly.⁷ His powers, however, being confined to the operations in the field, he reported matters to the Governor and Council at Madras and waited for instructions. Meanwhile, the Governor and Council at Madras had received simultaneously applications from both the parties, each setting forth, as might be expected, the subject in his own way.⁸

Dupleix had been foiled but Muhammad Alī could not be saved from the results of his own duplicity. The difficulties of the English were mainly due to the character of their protege. When they came to know that Trichinopoly was the price for Mysore's assistance, about the middle of 1752,⁹ they did not know what to say of it. They prudently determined not to interfere in the dispute, unless violence should be used against Muhammad Alī. Professing great friendship for Nanjarāja, they strenuously recommended to both parties an amicable adjustment of their differences. This suggestion failed to carry conviction to Nanjarāja's mind. He, with justice on his side, demanded fulfilment of the Treaty and very rightly refused all prevarication in the matter. He would not countenance

7. *Ibid.* Orme writes that "great therefore was the general surprise and anxiety when it (the secret clause in the Treaty) was made public" (*Ibid.*).

8. *Ibid.*

9. See *ante* p. 133, f. n. 2.

the plea that Muhammad Alī was but the agent of the Mughal and as such had no right to dispose of the Mughal's territory. The English, his allies, were really aghast at his conduct, though they, as wise people, did not make public their views in the matter. They characterized it, in their solemn proceedings, as "a knavish and weak action: the former because he [Muhammad Alī] knew he had no right to do it; the latter because he must know that, though he procrastinated difficulties, yet he must, in the end, as it but too plainly appears, make a powerful enemy instead of a friend."¹⁰ Of course, the English tried their utmost to reconcile the differences between Muhammad Alī and Nanjarāja in this matter. But they knew what a bad case they had to defend and what an impossible compromise to effect, when they pleaded that Nanjarāja would be committing a breach of faith if he deserted Muhammad Alī. Nanjarāja's taunt was effective to a degree: "The bad scent of the Nawab's behaviour," said he,¹¹ "is spread over the world to such a degree that you cannot discern the odour of our faith." Nanjarāja's attitude is understandable in the light of the bad faith of Muhammad Alī. The injustice committed by the English in supporting their untruthful ally could not be forgiven. Haidar, as we shall see, never forgot it.

The whole of Nanjarāja's subsequent conduct confirms the belief that he simply refused to be deceived. He determined to conquer Trichinopoly by means, fair or foul. The steps he took with this end in view were such that Lawrence, the English General, was compelled to place an English garrison in Trichinopoly for its

The deception on Nanjarāja and its results.

10. *Fort St. George Records, Milly. Cons.* (1753), Consultation dated 3rd January 1753.

11. *Ibid., Count. Corres.* (1753), Letter No. 48.

protection. At the same time the troops from Tanjore and Pudukotah left for their homes, with the result that the English position at Trichinopoly was still further weakened. Dupleix saw his opportunity in all these happenings, and, despite the sad fate that had overtaken his ally Chandā Sahib, won over Nanjarāja and Murāri Rao, the Mahratta chief, to his own side. This done, he played a waiting game, for he had no military commander whom he could put forth against the veteran Lawrence. In any case, he thought he could starve out the garrison in the Trichinopoly fortress by preventing supplies of provisions and military stores to it. Lawrence, as we know, depended, for the existence of his army, entirely upon the safe arrival of his convoys, and this Dupleix planned, with the aid of Nanjarāja and Murāri Rao, to prevent in no uncertain manner. In this attempt, however, his arrangement miscarried, though Nanjarāja and his army did not lack in their endeavours.

On the English side, the chief duty of bringing in the convoys safe fell to Muhammad Yusuf, who rendered splendid service to the English in this respect. Of him, Lawrence wrote in the highest terms of praise. "He never spares himself," he wrote once,¹² "but is out on all parties, and by his good intelligence brought in provisions to keep us in a moderate plenty we wanted, much to prolong the time till Mafuze Khan could join us." Orme, indeed, remarks that the lack of provisions was such that, on one occasion—12th May 1754—had not the convoy come through, Lawrence must next day have left the town to its fate, and withdrawn to Tanjore.¹³ This would have meant nothing less than the defeat of the English arms and the success of Nanjarāja. It was

12. *Orme Mss.*, p. 78, No. 13.

13. Orme, *Indostan*, I. 357. See also *Mily. Cons.* (1754), *Consultation* dated 20th May 1754: *Letter from Capt. Calliaud to Palk*, dated May 12, 1754.

accordingly resolved upon to prevent Muhammad Yusuf being used by the English for this purpose. For accomplishing this end, it was decided upon to utilise the services of one Punniyappan, the interpreter in the English camp. The English being in difficulties for supplies, he suggested to Major Lawrence that if he were allowed to visit Nanjarāja, he might be able to bring about a suitable understanding with him. There being no reason to doubt his good faith, he was granted permission. Punniyappan went on his chosen errand. He saw Nanjarāja and suggested that the English would be forced to accept any terms he might offer if their supplies were effectually cut off by putting Yusuf Khān out of the way. Towards this end, he suggested that either Yusuf Khān should be waylaid and killed while on one of his expeditions or steps should be taken to induce the English to believe that he was a treacherous man and unworthy of their goodwill and trust. As the former course seemed impracticable, the latter seemed feasible of a trial. Punniyappan, the *Dubāsh* of Lawrence, arranged to carry out the nefarious project. He resolved upon dropping in the English camp—in such a manner that it can of certainty be discovered—a letter addressed to Yusuf Khān and one of his brother officers, suggesting that they were, in return for certain rewards, to betray Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans. The letter was written and dropped by an adherent of Punniyappan and was, by pre-arrangement, discovered by another in the English camp, and placed before Captain Calliaud. Captain Calliaud, on seeing it, placed Yusuf Khān and his brother officer in immediate arrest. An enquiry was ordered and it turned out that Yusuf Khān and his brother officer were absolutely innocent in the matter and that the letter had never come from the Mysorean camp. The *Dubāsh* was duly blown off from the muzzle of a cannon for his treachery and Yusuf Khān and his comrade set at liberty.

It should be said to the credit of Nanjarāja that he had nothing to do with this treacherous act of the *Dubāsh*. It was evidently a case of personal vengeance on the part of the *Dubāsh*, though he endeavoured, in its prosecution, to make a business of it by inducing Nanjarāja to become a party to it, evidently on false pretences.¹⁴

Not long after—on August 2, 1754—Dupleix's supersession by M. Godeheu came off and negotiations for a treaty of peace between the English and French Companies followed. A suspension of arms was proclaimed on the 11th October 1754 and a conditional treaty was agreed to in January 1755. The departure of Saunders and Dupleix finally put an end to the war, while the arrival of M. Duval De Leyrit in succession to Dupleix at Pondicherry meant the annihilation of the hopes that Nanjarāja had built on French aid. The advance of the Nizām and the Mahrattas on Mysore added to the troubles of Nanjarāja and he had to hark back to his own country, his ambitions unrealised and his money and men wasted. What was often within his reach, the Fates had denied him. That was because he had denied to himself the active duty of prosecuting his aims in a manner that would have proved decisive to him and to his country. He lacked as much decision as character. No wonder he failed. The French cannot, however, be exculpated. They did not keep to their promise; they, in fact, were loth to take any action disadvantageous to their own aims and aspirations. As the sequel showed, they made their so-called help the cause for extortionate demands on Nanjarāja. Those demands were both unjust and immoral, especially in

14. For Calliaud's enquiry, see *Orme Mss.*, pp. 115-181, No. 13. The Madras Council refused to excuse such treachery: Council to Lawrence, 26th March 1754. See also Orme, *o.c.*, I. 348-350.

the light of the utter lack of sympathy they showed to Nanjarāja in the active prosecution of his thwarted claims. If Trichinopoly sealed the fate of Nanjarāja, it also sealed the fate of Dupleix and the French nation in India.

The conquest of the South was never complete—
 either at the hands of Bijāpur and
 Gōlkoṇḍa or at the hands of the
 Indian Powers. The last hope of Mughal
 domination disappeared with the death of Aurangzīb in
 1707. The death-blow he gave to the Southern Muham-
 madan States destroyed their ambitions as well. The
 Mahrattas first through Shāhji and then through
 Śivāji made repeated attempts but failed. Even earlier,
 Mysore also tried to establish its suzerainty and had
 nearly succeeded in the days of Chikkadēva. In the
 reign of Krishnarāja II, the attempt was renewed by
 Nanjarāja at what seemed an opportune moment. The
 claims of the respective parties seemed to have been
 well understood at the time. Thus, as regards the
 claims of the rival Nawābs, it was that neither of them
 had any real claim to the South, not only because
 their own alleged master, the great Mughal, had not
 conquered it by his sword nor ruled it by virtue of
 the exercise of even nominal suzerainty over it, beyond
 touching the fringes of the South, but the South had
 never accepted such a suzerainty. Śivāji on the one
 side and Mysore on the other had disputed such ex-
 ercise, time and again. The actual position thus was
 that in the prosecution of their independent aims, the
 Mahrattas and the Mysoreans were conscious of the
 fact that they were disputing the attempts of the
 Mughal in the South.

When Aurangzīb died, the rival Nawābs put forward
 claims they could not really substan-
 tiate. Muhammad Ali's claim to the
 Nawābship was, as a matter of fact,
 The relative vali-
 dity of the Nawābs'
 claims.

not acknowledged by the French until the *Treaty of Paris* in 1763. Both Muhammad Ali and Chandā Sāhib claimed to have received *firmans* conferring the Nawābship of Arcot from the great Mughal. But such *firmans* were easily forged and no importance seems ever to have been attached to the assertion of either of their claims during the very time they were being so vigorously put forward. Muhammad Ali's claim was based on a *firman* alleged to have been received from Delhi on the 24th March 1751, appointing him Nawāb of Arcot with power to rule over the South including the countries of Madura and Tinnevely. The English at Madras were, however, quick to perceive a peculiarity about the *firmans* produced by Muhammad Ali. "It has been more than once observed", they recorded once in their minutes of consultation in 1754,¹⁵ "during the course of this war, that whenever anything material has been on the carpet, the Nawab has always received, or pretended to receive, such letters from Court as might either divert us from our plan if disagreeable to him, or encourage us to pursue it, if it suited his purpose." Similarly, the claims of the Nizām as the representative

15. *Milij. Cons.* (1754), *Consultation* dated April 29, 1754. The alleged *firman* referred to in the text is dated 29th January 1750 and is appended to No. 26 of *Count. Corres.* (1751). The interested reader on this subject of patents will find a most illuminating account of a dispute between the English and the French deputies as to their origin and validity at the conference held at Sadras on 3rd January 1754 (Orme, *Indostan*, I. 337-341). The conference lasted for eleven days, when it broke up, leaving both parties more exasperated than ever. As the discussion between the English and the French in this connection throws interesting sidelights not only upon the *forged* character of both the originals and copies of these so-called patents of title for possession of vast tracts of territory in the South, but also on the manner in which these two foreign nations tried to secure possession of these areas to themselves, prejudicing the rights of third parties like Mysore, while pretending to help the local powers to settle their own differences, it will be found further dealt with at some length in Appendix V—(3) below.

(or agent) of the Mughal were of the most nebulous kind. The very fact that they were disputed shows that they were not recognised. What made them loom large was what made them make history. And that was the reason why they were at the time either supported or combated by the local representatives of foreign nations, the English and the French. These had settled in the South of India as traders and were at the time shedding off their trading habits and entering slowly and steadily, though unconsciously, into territorial matters, being dragged into the local quarrels; and later—fairly consciously and with well understood political aims—into territorial conquests with a view to consolidate their respective positions. Their individual national policies coloured their aims here. Whatever made for the success of one of these and the defeat of the other—their command of the sea, their home support and their steadiness in prosecuting their aims, contributed not a little towards the final result—there can be no question that it was their presence at the time in the country that helped Muhammad Alī to thwart Nanjarāja and cheat him of his lawful prize. But the English at Madras were still to learn of the true nature and character of their ally Muhammad Alī. They could not have had any idea of the extent either of his treachery or his ambition. It was to cost them many sanguinary wars and a few Governorships as well.

If the English at Madras had insisted on Muhammad

The English attitude.

Alī fulfilling his treaty conditions, it would have been a different matter.

But while they appreciated Nanjarāja's claim, they were loth to lose either their hold on Muhammad Alī in whose immediate vicinity—if not country—they not only lived but also traded, or the large sums of money they had lent him. They no doubt felt

that the Mysore King may make a good and virtuous ruler and under his rule, trade would flourish, while their accumulated debts would be guaranteed to them by his Daḷavāi Nanjarāja. Though such thoughts came to them now and again and though they even put them down in their debates and resolutions, still, they always preferred to play a waiting game. They went so far as to answer effectively Major Lawrence's objections to their view. But, as we have said, they would not make up their mind for a definitive Treaty with the King of Mysore. They knew such a treaty would prove something better than "the treaty on foot in Europe", which they characterized as one "not to be depended on."¹⁶ An accommodation with the Daḷavāi, they realized, even if it did not end the war, would put it in their power "to wage it with advantage."¹⁷ But the change of policy that followed Godeheu's arrival and the advantages it seemed to offer, made them change their views. The Truce was advantageous to Muhammad Ali also.¹⁸ Muhammad Ali's debts had accumulated and the English were sure, with the Truce, to recover them. And unless Muhammad Ali was supported, in the changed circumstances, they could not hope to realize the huge amount involved. He could be treated as the *defacto* and the titular Nawāb of Arcot and used as a puppet to wage war in their own interests, if war was renewed. The Company could not, in any case, lose its money. That was the fundamental point with the English. Hence, despite the indefensible conduct of their ally, they had to stick to him. Moral considerations weigh but lightly in matters where money is the prime factor in arriving at a decision. The English as a nation of traders desired to protect themselves first before trying to

16. See *ante* Ch. VIII, pp. 171-172.

17. *Ibid.*, 172.

18. *Ibid.*, 175-176.

protect others, however just or equitable their cause. The mutual relations of the English and Muhammad Ali could only end, in the circumstances, in one way. And that was destined to be the supplanting of the one by the other. What Nanjarāja lost, the English gained. Trichinopoly, if it proved the grave of the French and the final extinguishment of Mysore's legitimate ambitions in the South, became the first milestone in the ultimate success of the English as a nation in India. Trichinopoly, even before Plassey, thus paved the way for the establishment of British power in India. And it was the discernment of Nanjarāja that attracted him to it, and however wrongly he might have prosecuted his aims, there can be no question that he showed the way to the English at Madras to recognize the fact that the captor of Trichinopoly would prove the ultimate victor of the South. Nanjarāja led the way in the struggle and bore the brunt of it in men and money and the English reaped the benefit.

The rights and wrongs of the Trichinopoly affair do not, however, end with this. The parts played by Murāri Rao and Pratāp Singh of Tanjore remain yet to be considered. Pratāp Singh forgot the help that Mysore in 1739 had given to Saiyāji in connection with the embassy to Satāra for obtaining aid to maintain the Hindu cause in the South against the advancing Muhammadans. He had forgotten the invasion that followed, in 1740, the death of Nawāb Dōst Ali at Dāmālcheruvu, the taking of Trichinopoly and the capture of Chandā Sāhib as a prisoner of war in the following year. Whatever his differences with Chandā Sāhib may have been, his attitude towards Mysore was neither straight nor honourable to him. He proved himself a weakling and an opportunist throughout. He did not join the English readily or

The conduct of
Pratāp Singh of
Tanjore.

help them with alacrity in the struggle at Trichinopoly. He but rendered moderate assistance in 1753. Towards the end of that year, when disappointed with the English, Nanjarāja sought French aid, and Murāri Rao had declared himself an ally of the French, Pratāp Singh had almost signed a treaty of alliance, when the news of the disastrous failure of the French attempt to storm Trichinopoly fort (November 1753) induced him to hesitate again. The French, tired of his procrastination, directed a Mahratta detachment to ravage his country. This was followed by another under the French, which attacked the eastern side of his kingdom. He had eventually to seek the aid of the English, who sent General Lawrence to his relief. Despite this, Murāri Rao had to be bought off by Pratāp Singh. Pratāp Singh, however, was not left unmolested for long. In 1758, when the renewal of hostilities began, he was besieged by the French, who demanded the payment of Rs. 46 lakhs alleged to be due on a bond executed by him in favour of Chandā Sāhib in 1749. Pratāp Singh, aided by the English, resisted the claim, and Lally, who had been sent to lay siege to Tanjore, raised it on the appearance of the English forces at Tanjore and the English fleet off Kāraikkal. But when, shortly after, Madras itself was besieged by the French, the most urgent English requests for help were left unheeded by him. He did not actually refuse help but steadily evaded giving it. And when the trouble was over, he was among the first to send felicitations to the English at Fort St. George on the escape they had had! He proved himself equally lax in rendering aid during the remainder of the war, though he professed friendship to the utmost. These instances of his opportunism are enough to show the true character of Pratāp Singh. He was neither sincere nor steadfast as an ally, and as a man of action, entirely weak.

Bent on his own personal safety, he took the best from both sides. The appeal of joint action, of co-operation for attaining an objective which might have meant good to the whole of Southern India, could not produce any impression on him. He failed to note what Muhammad Ali's friendship for him meant. He did not understand why Nanjarāja and the English parted company over the cession of Trichinopoly. Nor did he realize why Nanjarāja exhausted all his powers of persuasion in inducing him to join Mysore. As Orme, the contemporary historian, puts it, the Mysorean argument was that "if Trichinopoly should once be provided with a stock of provisions, it was not to be doubted but that the English and the Nabob would immediately turn their arms into the Carnatic".¹⁹ The Mysorean was prophetic, indeed, in his argument. The possession of Trichinopoly meant the possession of the Karnātic. The whole course of subsequent history tended to confirm this view. After the occupation, the English embarked, at the instance of Muhammad Ali, on a policy of conquests in the Karnātic, often not counting the cost it meant even to themselves. But they knew, as financiers of Muhammad Ali and as traders, how to get back what they had invested on Muhammad Ali and his so-called interests. And they got it, as the events showed, with compound interest. But Pratāp Singh had reckoned without his host. Palk, the ambassador sent to Pratāp Singh to counteract Nanjarāja's endeavours and Dupleix's manouvres, understood how to bring him round. Sakkōji, his finance minister, who had stood out for neutrality, was dismissed and Mānakji, his rival, who had been out of favour for sometime, succeeded him, with the result that English influence once again became predominant at Tanjore. Thus Tanjore was induced into an alliance—

19. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 285.

after nearly a year of procrastination—with the English and Muhammad Ali, with results which can only be described as disastrous to itself. The immediate penalty it had to pay was an attack by its own kinsmen headed by Murāri Rao, which, as described above, shows the light in which the new alliance was viewed by him. The attack, though warded off by Mānakji, was in the nature of a remembrancer, but it failed to produce any impression on Pratāp Singh. The French also did not overlook the new combination and Chandā Sāhib's bond afforded them, as narrated above, the opportunity to attack Tanjore. They, no doubt, had eventually to withdraw but the moral of these attacks was not grasped by Pratāp Singh. Pratāp never could understand the mind of Muhammad Ali. Nor did he remember that the claim of "tribute" made by Muhammad Ali would mean the eventual extinction of his State. That claim was not long in the coming. First raised in 1762 and settled amicably by the mediation of the English, it cropped up in one form or another again and again. Though Pratāp Singh died in the meantime (in 1768), his successor reaped the full benefit of it. In 1771, in the reign of Tulsāji (1768-1787), the English attacked Tanjore and reduced it. The reasons adduced were non-payment of the "tribute" for two years; his unwillingness to help the allies against Haidar's invasion in 1769, during which Tanjore was exempted, in return for a bribe of Rs. 4 lakhs, from the general depredation effected; his friendly correspondence with Haidar and his own kinsmen, the Mahrattas; and finally, his invading (in 1771) the Marava country which was alleged to be under the protection of Muhammad Ali. Tanjore, instead of getting a reimbursement of its own expenses in the late war, thus got embroiled in the meshes of its own doubtful diplomacy. The English at Madras not only thought they were bound to act on

behalf of Muhammad Ali but also saw that an independent Tanjore, ready to co-operate with Haidar, would mean danger to themselves! Tanjore was taken and given to Muhammad Ali in 1773, the alleged requests for help from Haidar and the Mahrattas having proved vain. There was really no ground for the belief that Tulsāji was in league either with Haidar or the Mahrattas. Mill, in fact, suggests that the alleged correspondence with the Mahrattas was forged by Muhammad Ali's agents, and as for requests to Haidar for help, it was never proved, for it could not well be. Haidar had entered into a commercial treaty with the English at Bombay in 1770, and in 1772, after being defeated by the Mahrattas, had sought in vain the help of the English and the opportunity for wreaking his vengeance did not come to him till 1778. The English acted on suspicion and thus wronged a State that had been dragged into their friendship even against its own interests. The Court of Directors intervened, disapproved of the action of the Madras authorities both in 1771 and 1773, and ordered the restoration of Tanjore to its ruler. These orders were carried out, in 1776, much to the chagrin of Muhammad Ali, who had meanwhile fleeced the country to its bones. A fresh settlement was also arrived at, under which Tanjore passed under English protection. This made the Rāja the direct ally of the E. I. Company, while, not long after, the "tribute" payable to the Nawāb was also assigned to the English. Tulsāji died in 1787. His brother, Amar Singh, who succeeded him, and his nephew Sarabhōji, who later took his place, were both men deficient in character. Two new treaties were concluded with Tanjore, one with Amar Singh in 1787 and another with Sarabhōji in 1799. Under the latter, Tanjore passed to the English, Sarabhōji being provided with a pension. That was the sad fate that awaited it from the day Pratāp Singh mounted

the throne. Unlike Venkōji (Ēkōji) and his immediate successors, Pratāp Singh possessed no strength of character. His political weakness was to some extent due to the fact that he depended on popular suffrage—he having been placed on the throne “by the general concurrence of the principal men of the kingdom”,²⁰ and, in endeavouring to conciliate his supporters, he lost greatly his own regal powers. He lacked both political insight and political courage. He was ever between two stools. The English treated him in the same manner they had treated Nanjarāja. In the guise of mediators, they helped to maintain Muhammad Ali at his cost. Tanjore had never actually been incorporated with the Karnātic treaties nor was it ever included in the so-called patents of the Mughal or the Nizām. The “tribute” claimed had really no legal basis to stand on. Yet, the English made Pratāp Singh believe in it; they even went to the extent of explaining to him the necessity and even the reasonableness of his contributing towards the repayment of the large expenditure incurred by Muhammad Ali, they themselves being the persons to be benefited by such reimbursement. Pratāp Singh could not see the utter illegality of the claim, he himself having kept at his own cost a large army in the field in aid of Muhammad Ali and his supporters the English, and he himself having met the cost of provisions supplied to the English camp at Trichinopoly. Without the aid of Tanjore, Trichinopoly could not by any means have been held in the interests of Muhammad Ali.²¹

20. *Report of Tanjore Commission* (1798) (Tanjore Collector's Press): The Report is dated 6th March 1799.

21. See, as to Tanjore's constitutional position *vis à vis* the Karnātic treaties, Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds*, V. 257, who holds it had not been incorporated with them. As to the temporary and casual character of Tanjore's dependence on the Nawāb of Arcot, see Mill, *History of British India*, II. 227; and as to the restoration of Tanjore by Lord Pigot, see Thornton, *History of the British Empire*

Nor did Haidar forget or forgive the remissness and unfriendliness of Pratāp Singh. He remembered how he had refused to join Nanjarāja in 1753 in the retaking of Trichinopoly; how he had, at the last moment, refused to sign the treaty of 1753; and how Mysore had lost Trichinopoly by want of co-operation on his part. In 1769, Tanjore had accordingly to purchase immunity from attack at the hands of Haidar by a payment of Rs. 4 lakhs. In the war which began in 1780—when Tanjore had become a protected state and a direct ally of the English—Haidar inflicted the worst horrors on Tanjore. Perhaps no part of South India then suffered as badly as Tanjore. The whole country was overrun by Haidar's troops, most of the important places being devastated beyond description. Neither a village, temple, nor a paddy field escaped the eyes of Haidar's hordes. Almost every structure of any note in the Tanjore country bears silent testimony to this day to the cruel hands laid on it. The English garrisons at Pattukottai and Tirukāṭṭupalli, about 10 miles north-west of Tanjore, were captured. Tanjore held out but Col. Braithwaite's force was, in 1782, annihilated to a man on the banks of the Coleroon.²² Such was the vengeance that Haidar breathed against Pratāp Singh and his kingdom for the treachery he had played against Mysore at the hour of its need, that he treated the latter with the utmost cruelty. It cannot be said that Pratāp Singh did not deserve punishment for the trick he had played on Nanjarāja in 1753, but it is deplorable that he himself being dead, his fair country should have been chosen for

in India, II. 199-204. Thornton is justly critical of Warren Hastings' inaction in connection with the revolution that ended in Governor Pigot's illegal arrest and death.

22. The details of this action on the Coleroon will be found described below in the proper place.

vicarious satisfaction by Haidar. The devastation of the country was so complete, indeed, that the outturn of paddy in this area for 1781-82 and 1782-83 went down to less than a tenth of the normal. Vengeance, indeed, knew no bounds with Haidar, when he was in the mood to wreak it. The famine of 1781 from which Tanjore suffered is, perhaps, the worst one that that prosperous land has ever known. The picture drawn of its effects by the missionary Schwartz is a heart-rending one. "As the famine was so great and of so long continuance," he wrote,²³ "those who have been affected by it seemed beyond its reach. A vigorous and strong man is scarcely to be met with. In outward appearance, men are like wandering skeletons. . . . When it is considered that Haidar carried off so many thousands of people and that many thousands have died of want, it is not at all surprising to find desolated villages. . . . Such distress I never before witnessed and God grant, I never may again." Schwartz wrote these words in September 1783. Haidar's devastation occurred in May 1781. We can, therefore, imagine how terrible should have been the drain on the resources of the country which had such lasting effects—effects which are summed up to this day locally in the terrible and telling phrase "*Haidar Kalāpam*."²⁴

The part that Murāri Rao played in this affair cannot but be regarded as the darkest imaginable. Judging him even from the standpoint of the morals of his own time, he must be held to have been both ungrateful and treacherous to a degree. He was engaged by Nanjarāja with 6,000 of his troops to assist him in the cause he had, at Muhammad Ali's request,

Murāri Rao's duplicity.

23. Pearson, *Life of Schwartz*, I. 392-393.

24. Lit. Haidar's devastation; somewhat akin to the Kannada phrase *Haidarana havalī*, which means the same thing.

made his own. Murāri Rao brought in 4,000 men, when Nanjarāja first assembled his forces at Karūr, while 2,000 more joined him under Basin Rao, when the conjoint forces reached Trichinopoly. He and his chiefs, Basin Rao, Innis Khān and Hari Singh, co-operated actively in the war. Dupleix, indeed, went so far as to ascribe to Murāri Rao and his men the successes the English had gained at Śrīrangam during 1751-1752.²⁵ But how much of that remark was based

25. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 247. The identity of Basin Rao (the "Basin-row" of Orme) is difficult to make out. He has been described as a "nephew" of Murāri Rao by Orme. According to the genealogy of the Ghōrpaḍe family, Murāi Rao had two nephews, sons of his half-brother Daulat Rao. These were Bahirji Rao and Śantāji Rao *alias* Subhanji Rao. Bahirji Rao succeeded to Gajēndragad and died in 1803, while Śantāji Rao *alias* Subhanji Rao died without issue, the date of his death being unknown. As Basin Rao died in April 1753, he could not have been the former. It is a question if he can be identified with Subhanji Rao *alias* Śantāji Rao. However this may be, Basin Rao, as noted in the text above, assisted Clive while besieged in Arcot, November 1751, and subsequently took part in the battle of Ārpi with him, quitted him later and arrived with his troops at Trichinopoly, in accordance with the orders of his uncle, in December 1751. He was killed on April 1, 1753, while vigorously charging the English line (under Major Lawrence's command) near Trivaḍi (Tiruvīḍi)—Orme, *o.c.*, I. 196, 197, 198, 205, 206, 279. As regards Innis Khān, he was the principal officer of Murāri Rao. He was a brave and active man. He arrived at Trichinopoly in 1751 with 500 Mahrattas and beat up 200 of Chandā Sāhib's cavalry. He cut off the French dragoons at Trichinopoly (1751) by a ruse, the action being over "in an instant." He accompanied Clive in April 1752 to Samiavaram and killed or took prisoners of war all the 700 French sepoys who came to attack it. He was, in August 1752, sent by Nanjarāja to join the French, but being too late to join in the battle of Bahur, he pretended to join Muhammad Ali and the English, with the hope of "getting money" from the former. In 1753, he was detached by Murāri Rao to reinforce the army at Śrīrangam with 3,000 Mahrattas. In February 1754, he took part, with his chief, in routing the English convoy and grenadiers, without waiting for the arrival of the French troops. A graphic account of this rout will be found in Orme (*o.c.*, I. 345), who describes it as "by far the severest blow which the English troops had suffered during the course of the war" (see Orme, *o.c.*, I. 204, 221, 261, 263, 269 and 344-345). Finally, as to Hari Singh ("Harrasing" of Orme), he was a Rajput soldier. He commanded the Mahrattas in the action of the 10th May 1753 at Śrīrangam. With his cavalry, sword in hand, he valiantly broke through the English line under Major Lawrence, but was repulsed. For a description of this action, in which the French troops

on a genuine appreciation of the "valour and activity" of Murāri Rao and his men, is doubtful. For Dupleix, as a farseeing man, had kept an eye on Murāri Rao during the whole course of the fight at Trichinopoly. Indeed, he had been in a way cultivating him. He had continually addressed letters to him and forwarded presents, both from himself and from his wife. In these letters, the English had been represented as "a plodding mercantile people, unacquainted with the art of war, and not fit to appear in the field, opposed to a nation of so martial a genius as the French."²⁶ But Murāri Rao was an astute man. He knew his interests and sided any side that promised to yield him pecuniary benefit. His opinion of the English was something very different from what Dupleix had tried to impose on him. When he first joined Nanjarāja in 1751, Clive, then being besieged by Razā Sāhib at Arcot, sent a messenger to inform Murāri Rao of his situation, and requested him to relieve him. The messenger, it is said, returned safely to the fort of Arcot, bringing a letter from Murāri Rao, in which he said that "he would not delay a moment to send a detachment of his troops to the assistance of such brave men as the defenders of Arcot, whose behaviour had now first convinced him that the English could fight."²⁷

Indeed, both Murāri Rao and Nanjarāja had been deeply impressed by Clive and they agreed to detach a part of their troops for co-operating with him.

His mockery of a mediation.

under M. Astruc took part later, see Orme, *o.c.*, I. 283-285. The French were so well commanded that Lawrence, convinced that he could not dislodge the Mysore troops under Virappa, the Mysore general, marched his troops into the plain and encamped at the Fakir's Tope, which Virappa had lately abandoned. Virappa, the Mysore general, mentioned by Orme (*Ibid.*, 285), may be identified with *Virappanarāj*, referred to at p. 125 *ante* as the officer who commanded the Mysore troops in the fight for Trichinopoly.

26. *Ibid.*, 280.

27. *Ibid.*, 192.

Though their first attempts to get into Arcot town were foiled, Basin Rao with a thousand men joined Clive and marched with him and took part in the fight at Ārṇi and then proceeded to Trichinopoly. Not only that, when, in 1752, Lawrence agreed to the suggestion of dividing his forces, so that both the countries to the north of the Coleroon and to the south of the Cauvery may be protected adequately, he was told by Nanjarāja and Murāri Rao that “they would not take any detachment of their troops if they were to be commanded by any other person” but Clive,²⁸ an opinion which Lawrence had himself independently arrived at. Though Murāri Rao co-operated with Nanjarāja in the war and rendered valuable service during the course of the war—at Elimiserum, Samiavaram, Pichandar Kovil, etc.—when it at last came to meeting the demand of Nanjarāja, he behaved in a manner utterly treacherous to him. Having pretended to be impartial as between Muhammad Ali and Nanjarāja, and having been chosen, with equal confidence on both sides, to be the mediator between them, he came one evening into the city in great state, at the hour fixed, accompanied by two commissaries deputed by Nanjarāja. They all proceeded to Muhammad Ali's residence, where Captain Dalton, as commander of the English garrison, was present. He painted in vivid colours the distressful state of Muhammad Ali's affairs when Nanjarāja undertook his cause, at which time, though he claimed lordship over a country extending from the Pennār to Cape Comorin, he possessed no more of this vast territory than the ground enclosed by the walls of Trichinopoly, where he had been closely besieged by a much superior and implacable enemy. Having said thus much, he appealed

28. *Ibid.*, 220.

to Muhammad Ali for the truth of what he asserted, and wound up by a formal demand for the delivery of the city and territory of Trichinopoly, agreeably to the solemn treaty he had made with Nanjarāja, which he—dramatically enough—produced, signed and sealed! Muhammad Ali, who had expected such a harangue, acknowledged openly the favors he had received, and said that he was resolved upon fulfilling his engagements; but, he added, that, being at the moment in possession of no other considerable fortified town, it was impossible to remove his family, which was very large. He, therefore, urged for time—until he could, he said, by reducing the Arcot province, get a proper place for the reception of his family. He ended by desiring a respite of two months, at the expiration of which he promised to send orders to his brother-in-law to deliver up the city. Murāri Rao highly commended this resolution; and after some other vague discourse, he signified his inclination to speak to Muhammad Ali in private, and desired, on that score, the commissaries to withdraw. As soon as they and the rest of the audience, with the sole exception of Captain Dalton, retired, Murāri Rao, changing his countenance from the solemnity of a negotiator to the smile of a courtier, told Muhammad Ali that he believed him endowed with too much sense to mind what he had said before those two stupid fellows, meaning the commissaries, whose retirement he had desired! “You must likewise,” said he, “think that I too much discern merit to believe you have any intention of fulfilling the promise you have now made. How could you answer to the Great Mogul the giving up so considerable a part of his dominion to such insignificant people? It would be the highest absurdity to think of it. These, you may be assured, are my real sentiments, whatever my private interest may induce

me to say to the contrary in public."²⁹ Muhammad Ali was not a little delighted to find Murāri Rao in this disposition, for it was his resentment more than Nanjarāja's that he dreaded. And, as might be expected, he immediately made him a present of a draft on his treasury for Rs. 50,000, promising much more if he would reconcile matters, and get Nanjarāja not to insist on the letter of the Treaty. Murāri Rao readily assured Muhammad Ali that he would do this, though nothing was farther from his intention.

As Robert Orme, the historian, has justly remarked,³⁰

Murāri Rao was in reality the most
His real object. improper person that could have been
chosen to adjust the difference that had
arisen between Muhammad Ali and Nanjarāja. His
objects were, first, by ingratiating himself with Muhammad Ali, to persuade him to admit a large body of his own troops into Trichinopoly city as the best means of deceiving Nanjarāja into the belief that he really intended to give it up according to his promise. Once this was agreed to by Muhammad Ali, he would have instructed his men to seize on any opportunity that might offer of seducing or overpowering the rest of the garrison. And if this iniquitous scheme succeeded, he intended to keep possession of the city, which, as we know, he had formerly governed for a time himself!³¹ If, perchance, there should be no chance for the realization of his plan, he determined to protract the dispute as long as possible by negotiations, during which period he was sure of being kept in pay by Nanjarāja, while he did not doubt, at the same time, that he possessed the address to get considerable presents from Muhammad Ali. If this double-dealing should be exhausted, he purposed to make Nanjarāja declare war, feeling sure that he had too great

29. *Ibid.*, 246-247.

30. *Ibid.*, 246.

31. In 1741. See *ante* p. 62.

an opinion of the Mahrattas to carry it on without continuing them in his service. The result showed that Muhammad Ali, cunning man that he was, understood the game of Murāri Rao. He would rather place his trust in Nanjarāja than in Murāri. As we have seen, Muhammad Ali realized that he could not even move out of the city—to join his English allies—for Nanjarāja had threatened to attack him if he showed any inclination to do so before settling the dispute that had arisen between them. He, therefore, made over to Nanjarāja the revenues of the island of Śrīrangam and several other adjoining districts, empowering him to collect them himself. He also promised to deliver up Trichinopoly at the end of two months, and in the meantime, he agreed to receive 700 men (200 according to one source) into the city, provided that they were his own men and not Mahrattas. That shows the inner convictions of Muhammad Ali. That he placed no reliance in Murāri Rao but tried to ward off a blow from him is clear from the terms he finally agreed to with Nanjarāja. But he was as much false to Nanjarāja as Murāri Rao had promised himself to be. Nanjarāja was not deceived by the promises of Muhammad Ali. He wanted to gain time as much as Muhammad Ali. Muhammad Ali thought that an immediate declaration of war would come in the way of the progress of the war in the Karnātic from which he expected some signal advantage, whilst Nanjarāja delayed to commence hostilities against him. Nanjarāja, on the other hand, wished for nothing so much as the departure of Muhammad Ali and the English battalion, that he might carry on his schemes to surprise Trichinopoly, which, he realised, their presence would render impossible. The excuses Nanjarāja offered when he was asked to move were understood as showing his intentions. To frustrate them, 200 Europeans with 1,500 sepoy were placed in garrison

in the city, under the command of Captain Dalton, who was instructed to oppose any surprise against it.

Murāri Rao's attempt to make as much as possible for himself at the expense of Nanjarāja was wholly wrong. His stipulations with Muhammad Ali showed clearly that he desired to get possession of Trichinopoly for himself, thus cheating Nanjarāja, who had employed him, of what was due to him. The fact that Mubammad Ali evaded him testifies to his intelligence and sagacity in seeing through the wily trick that was sought to be played on him. But that cannot excuse Murāri Rao from the blame attaching to him in this affair. His duty was plain. He was to have stood by Nanjarāja and asked for the carrying out of the Treaty. If Muhammad Ali failed to agree, he should have been made to know something of the consequences that would follow. But Murāri Rao's love for money and desire for a continuance of hostilities which brought him funds was so great that he had little regard for his own word or for the just interests of others. Nanjarāja's bargain for his help proved a bad one. Nor was Murāri Rao's conduct towards the close of the war any better. Here, again, he was found bargaining with both Nanjarāja and Muhammad Ali and making the most of the situation for himself. During the course of the war, Muhammad Ali had repeatedly induced Murāri Rao to return to his own country. But exorbitant demands on the one side and the scarcity for money on the other, had rendered it impossible for him to carry through the idea. In 1754, however, the position of Nanjarāja in regard to money was, perhaps, no better. Murāri Rao's demands being incessant, they could not be met. Murāri Rao began to tire of a war which brought him no money, and tried to seek a plausible pretext to break with Nanjarāja. He demanded the payment of his arrears, which, by the

His improper
conduct.

account he made out, amounted to Rupees ten lakhs. Nanjarāja, having never refused to advance him money whenever he wanted it, suggested he had already overpaid him. Sharp altercations followed and Murāri Rao pretended to withdraw his troops, and retired to the north bank of the Coleroon, declaring not to return until his claims were met. Muhammad Ali, having heard of this, tried to get rid of Murāri Rao without any expense to himself. In this state of affairs, the march of Gaude Rao to Tirukkāṭṭupalli occurred. This march instantly suggested to Murāri Rao that if he could administer a severe blow to Gaude Rao's troops, it would surely induce the king of Tanjore, already terrified by the incursions of the Mysoreans and the French, to furnish money necessary to purchase his retreat. If disappointed in this expectation, Murāri Rao thought that he at least would have the satisfaction of taking vengeance for the severe blow he had sustained from Mānakji (Mānāji) earlier in the early part of 1754. The double motive of interest and revenge induced him to immediately cross the rivers of Coleroon and Cauvery in the night with 3,000 of his best troops. At day-break, he fell upon Gaude Rao's party so furiously that only 300 with their general escaped. The rest were either killed or taken prisoners. Immediately he wrote to Muhammad Ali, then just arrived at Tanjore, that if he would give him security for Rupees three lakhs, he would return to his own country and never more be an enemy either to him, the English, or the king of Tanjore. Muhammad Ali, having as usual no funds, applied, as Murāri Rao had foreseen, to the king of Tanjore. After many meetings, the king of Tanjore consented to meet the demand. The articles of a treaty were drawn up and signed, according to which Rs. 50,000 were to be paid to Murāri Rao as soon as he reached Valikondapuram,

to which place he had previously retired from Trichinopoly, a lakh more immediately he reached the pass of the western mountains, and the balance of Rs. 1½ lakhs when he reached his own country. While he was pushing through this faithless transaction with the enemies of Nanjarāja, whom he was pledged to support, he acquainted Nanjarāja of what he was doing. This he did, not because he wanted to behave as a truthful employee, but because he desired to get as much as he could from Nanjarāja before he finally left the scene. He suggested that if Nanjarāja would pay him his so-called arrears, he would return to his assistance. Only to be duped once again, Nanjarāja sent him Rs. 50,000, which was what he could spare at the moment. Immediately he received the sum, Murāri Rao, the wily man that he was, marched away with all his troops to Valikondapuram, and from there, shortly thereafter, to his own country.

It is difficult to find words of the right kind to characterize Murāri Rao's conduct in deserting his employer, an employer whom he had systematically deceived at every stage. To say that he behaved throughout treacherously would not be doing violence to truth. Not only did he foil the attempt of Nanjarāja to get justice but he also actively interfered and induced Mahammad Ali to break the treaty. This was the more reprehensible, when he had been chosen to act fairly as an arbitrator between the two parties. He betrayed Nanjarāja's cause, while all the time he was adding to his coffers through the liberality of his employer. The final act in the treacherous drama he enacted—his quitting the scene of war—after getting a fresh sum from Nanjarāja, all the while promising him to stay on in his employ, was in keeping with the rest of his character. Necessity may know no law;

What it cost him eventually.

nor religion, nor even common good faith. Murāri Rao in need was Murāri Rao at variance with truth. But there are no acts of treachery more strongly to be reprobated than those which lie hid under the pretence of duty even to oneself or under some profession of necessity. He forgot that forests have ears and fields have eyes, and men have memories, and that often treachery comes back roosting to him who practises it. Haidar, the servant and apt pupil of Nanjarāja, who took part in this war, including its last stages, remembered the part played by Murāri Rao in it and meted out punishment to him which finally ended both his career and life.³²

How a contemporary viewed the attempt of Nanjarāja for the possession of Trichinopoly will be clear from the remarks offered by Robert Orme, the historian of the Karnātic War, who was then a Member of the Madras Council. Orme, indeed, thinks that it was a mistake on Nanjarāja's part to have tried to obtain possession of that great fortress-town. "It is difficult to find an example of a prince," he says, "conducting himself with more weakness than the Mysorean (Nanjarāja) in the course of this war : the Nabob (Muhammad Ali) procured his assistance by a promise which he never intended to perform." It is strange that Orme has not a word to say of the strange conduct of the English Council at Fort St. George. From what we have said above, it will have been clear that the Council did not seek to defend the immoral conduct of Muhammad Ali. Orme's further suggestion that the possession of Trichinopoly would have meant danger to Mysore is too transparently absurd to deserve any consideration. "Indeed," he says, "had the Mysorean been endowed with common sagacity, he might have foreseen that the

32. See below.



Robert Orme.



possession of Trichinopoly, the object of all his endeavours, would have been the greatest misfortune that could have happened to him, since it would certainly sooner or later have involved him in a war with the Mughal government, which probably would have ended in reducing the kingdom of Mysore itself, like the Carnatic, to be a province of the Empire." The fact that the trouble actually came from the Mahrattas and the Nizām in alliance with the French general Bussy and not from the Mughal shows how wide of the mark this criticism was, while the army of the Nizām at the time was such that Mysore by itself would have made short work of it. Orme did not realize the objective of Nanjarāja any more than he could appreciate the nature of the fraud practised on him by Muhammad Ali. The fact that it was deliberate made no impression on him. He was no doubt a dupe to the promises of Muhammad Ali as much as Duplex, and of Murāri Rao also. But public morality as private morality had sunk so low at the time that the practice of such base frauds was felt to be a matter of no consequence. Here was the head of a friendly State which had treated solemnly the engagement it had entered into and had wasted three years of warfare in the interests of another at great pecuniary cost and had engaged an army of 20,000 men in his cause, and had rendered services to him that had given him a fresh start in his life, obliged to return to his country without receiving the country he had stipulated for, or even the least compensation for the enormous expenses—not to speak of losses in men and money—he had incurred, nor even any the smallest security for their reimbursement, for, as Orme himself was discerning enough to remark, what reliance he might place on the conditional treaty was little better than chimerical, since many unfortunate events might render that convention abortive.³³

33. Orme, *o.c.*, I. 339. It is unnecessary to add that Orme was venal to a

It is not a little remarkable that Orme should have expressed the view he did, especially when we remember that he had acted as the negotiator with Nanjarāja in arriving at a satisfactory solution of the differences between the Council at Fort St. George and Nanjarāja. The Council at Fort St. George at first thought that it would be best to negotiate through Major Lawrence. But the plain military officer he was, he excused himself on the plea of ill-health. He uniformly expressed his regret that the attempt had been made to keep Trichinopoly after promising to cede it, a position to which he would not accede. In February 1756, the Directors in England ordered the Council at Fort St. George to renew the negotiations on the basis of certain terms which might help to obtain an accommodation with Nanjarāja and help the Company to reimburse its coffers. They directed that Mr. Orme should be employed to conduct the negotiations. These proposals had been communicated to Muhammed Alī in 1754 and the belief that such communication had led to their failure, had suggested to the Directors an injunction of secrecy when they desired to renew the attempt. Indeed, the Council at Fort St. George went so far as to suggest, in their reply to the Court of Directors, that they deemed it imprudent to make any public advances to the Rāja of Mysore, because of the alarm it might unavoidably give to Muhammad Alī and the Rāja of Tanjore! Thus, to get over one difficult situation, they were ready to create another. To rectify the immorality of one transaction, they were not afraid of perpetrating another. They invested, in this view, Mr. Orme with the needed authority and thus armed with the prescribed authority, he began his negotiations with Berki (Barakki) Venkaṭa

degree in his transactions with Nawāb Muhammad Alī (see Love, *Vestiges*, II. 513-519).


Rao, the agent of Nanjarāja. The negotiations went on secretly for a long time, the results being reported confidentially from time to time to the Council at Fort St. George until October 1758, when evidently the negotiations broke off.³⁴


Orme knew more of the inequity of the position than he cared to acknowledge. The fact of the position was that the war had ruined the commercial prosperity of the Company. The war had been conducted at the expense of the English; it had meant an expenditure of 35 lakhs of pagodas for securing possession of Trichinopoly. Mr. Saunders, the Governor, saw that reimbursement of this sum was a paramount necessity. After considerable cogitation, he suggested to Nanjarāja an accomodation which was mainly intended to secure the recovery of this vast sum. If Muhammad Ali could not find this sum for the Company, he could be used to obtain it. He could be used as a pawn in the game. For that, his recognition as Nawāb was needed, for on him the Madras Council had staked their all. Accordingly, Saunders proposed to Nanjarāja that the Rāja of Mysore should renounce the French alliance and aid in the recognition of Muhammad Ali; he should prevail on Murāri Rao to do the same, and until such recognition was brought about, Nanjarāja was also to defray the expenses of his own and Murāri's army. He was also to give *sāhukār* security for the total amount expended by the Company in the war of Trichinopoly, that sum to be paid on the actual delivery of that place to Nanjarāja. Nanjarāja was to pay for that possession the *usual tribute*

34. See *General Letters from Fort St. George*, dated 20th November 1756; 28th February and 10th November 1757; 18th March and 10th October 1758. References are made in these *Letters* to proceedings of what are called "Private Committees," of which there is no trace either at the India Office or at Fort St. George. Of course, there is no reference to them, either direct or indirect, in Orme's *Indostan*, which goes up to 1761.

to the Nawāb of the Karnātic, whatever that phrase may mean. He was also to pay ten lakhs to Muhammad Ali, and to put him in possession of a fort and a district in Mysore yielding two lakhs a year. It is not clear whether this sum was to be paid in addition to or in extinction of the ten lakhs advanced to Muhammad Ali already by Nanjarāja. The English at Fort St. George were to be allowed the right of exclusive trade with Mysore, while they were to aid Nanjarāja in the *conquest* of Madura, Tinnevely and other countries as far as Cape Comorin, so that Mysore's undisputed supremacy up to the extreme South of India may be established.⁹⁵ Mr. Saunders' aim was not only to get Nanjarāja to a settlement but also get the Rāja of Tanjore to accede to the terms agreed to between himself and Nanjarāja and thus to obtain a reciprocal guarantee of the Rājas of Mysore and Tanjore, of Muhammad Ali and of the English at Madras to an arrangement which might insure peace in the South and allow trade an uninterrupted course. But Mr. Saunders did not realize that both the time and circumstances of the hour were against him. The Court of Directors desired secrecy in the matter. They would not desire Muhammad Ali to know anything of it. Their fears as to that person's incapacity to either keep a secret or to appreciate its value were not by any means lacking in substance. But there can be no question that the morality of the proposal to carry on any negotiations with Nanjarāja behind the backs of Muhammad Ali or the Rāja of Tanjore was too much even to the contemporaries of the period. Apart from Saunders, who suggested the bringing in of these parties into the transaction and obtaining their approval to it,

95. Wilks remarks that this was "an obligation which would have involved them (the English) in a long, unprofitable and sanguinary warfare" (o.c., I. 178). But he overlooks the fact that domination of the South was the very objective of Nanjarāja's warfare in the South, of which the occupation of Trichinopoly was to be but the prelude.





Col. Mark Wilks.

there were evidently others in the Madras Council who took a similar line.³⁶

Wilks, reviewing the position as it developed towards the close of 1758, passes severe strictures on the indefensible attitude adopted by the Company in this affair.

Wilks' review of the position.

Viewing the general objects of the proposals put forward by Mr. Saunders to Nanjarāja, he says that "if they had been made and enforced at the period when the shameful fraud practised on Nunjeraj (Nanjarāja) was first discovered, the act would have claimed our admiration as the indignant resolve of a generous people, who acknowledged 'justice' alone 'as the standing policy of nations,' and spurned at association with dishonor. But after carrying on a long and sanguinary war ostensibly as auxiliaries in defence of that breach of treaty, to make these propositions as principals without the concurrence or the knowledge of Mohammed Ali (as proposed by the Court of Directors), materially changes the colour of the transaction; the slender praise of tardy conviction is not even claimed upon the record, and the whole is referred to that commanding plea of necessity and self-preservation, which so often overrules whatever of morals is mixed with political discussion."³⁷ That may sound severe as a castigation but it cannot be gainsaid that it was well merited. If the Governor and Council at Fort St. George tried to do some tardy justice to themselves, the Directors, who seemed to appreciate better the difficulty of dealing with a person like Muhammad Ali, seem to have prohibited them from doing it, not because they were actuated by a better standard of public morality but because they felt themselves drawn into a political position from which there was no possible extrication for themselves except by going down still

36. See *ante* Chs. VII & VIII.

37. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 380-381.

further the Gadarene slopes. To go forward, they found, was as difficult as to go backward. And they found, like Macbeth, that going forward was better than going backward. With them, expediency was a virtue in itself.³⁸ While Wilks was thus justly critical of the wrong attitude taken by the Directors of the Company in defrauding Nanjarāja of Trichinopoly, it is not to be mistaken that he was not strong in his animadversions on Nanjarāja himself and his conduct of the war and of the stupid acts he perpetrated to gain possession of that city. There is hardly any doubt that he only covered himself with ridicule and disgrace by the mistaken steps he adopted to effect his objective. But that is not the same as saying that his objective itself was wrong or his help had not been useful or timely both to the English and to Muhammad Ali. That is where both these parties failed; Muhammad Ali grossly failed in making good his word and the English in making him keep his plighted word. Neither the pompous declarations of Nanjarāja nor his blundering operations, nor even the wrongful attempts he made to secure his objective could excuse the wilful "fraud," which, in the opinion of Major Lawrence, had been practised on him.

As to the conduct of the French, the less said the better. Even before the date on which the terms of the truce were published—11th January 1755—it was clear to Nanjarāja that the French were not

The conduct of the French, further noticed.

38. In the negotiations at Madras, Nanjarāja's representative was Berki (Barakki) Venkaṭa Rao (see *ante* Ch. VIII. pp. 136, 144-145, 152, 161-180, etc.). According to Wilks (*o.c.*, I. 377, *f.n.*), he was in touch with an English officer named "Klees" in the *Pāṇṇaiya Mss.* His identity is not ascertained. Wilks suggests it cannot be Clive, for he was away in England at the time. He may be identified with Mr. Cooke, who was appointed on a commission to negotiate (see *ante* p. 162). Wilks denies that Venkaṭa Rao was "forcibly detained" by the English as suggested by the French and Nanjarāja,

ready to carry out their obligations. He naturally treated them just as he had treated Muhammad Ali. If they desired to retire, they could, he said, do so and go back to Pondicherry. They could not, he said, bind him to the terms of their treaty. They had no right, he openly declared, to make any treaty with the English on his behalf. As a matter of fact, Nanjarāja had discovered, even before the truce was concluded between the French and the English, that the French were determined to keep Trichinopoly for themselves if they should succeed in taking it. Nanjarāja said that the French were as much for deceiving him of the fruits of his victory as the English had been. What is worse is that this statement applied as much to the conduct of Dupleix as to that of Bussy, who continued to fight the battles of Salābat Jang against the country powers. The truce, while it stipulated for the cessation of hostilities in the Karnātic, did not interfere with his status or the authority of his position in the Northern Circars, where he continued to wield the full power of the Nizām against everyone against whom he could turn his hand, to maintain his own position or to secure the pecuniary contribution which alone can help to sustain him in it. In the whole history of the career of that able French diplomat and general, there is no greater blot than the active aid he rendered in the spoliation of Mysore, immediately after the conclusion of the truce of 1755. But for the invasion of Mysore by Salābat Jang aided by Bussy to exact the so-called arrears of tribute due by it, a tribute that was immoral in its levy, illegal in its exaction, and inequitable in its incidence,⁸⁹ Nanjarāja


and adds that "it was a simple *invention* of Nunjeraj to justify his disavowing the acts of his agent" (l.c.). This is far from the actual fact (see *ante* p. 145, f.n. 76; 164, f.n. 25; and 174, f.n. 65). Venkajā Rao's detention is also referred to in *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, Letter No. 96, cited in *ante* p. 145, f.n. 76 *supra*.

89. See Appendix V—(3), regarding "Tribute."

would not have been called off to Mysore. What he would have done at Trichinopoly by continuing there after the truce need not detain us for any length of time. For, as it was, he had to leave the island of Śrīrangam, the revenues of which had been formally given up to him by Muhammad Alī, to the French, though they had unjustly included him in the truce they had concluded with the English, without notice to him, and, as it seemed, against his will, and undoubtedly in open violation of the terms of the treaty concluded with him, and certainly against his country's interests. He had repudiated openly their right to do so and had declared he would carry on the war. And Bussy's act was openly disruptive of the Treaty the French had concluded with Mysore. They were, indeed, in strict alliance with Mysore, while they were also bound by treaty with Salābat Jang as well. But it is not clear that Bussy was bound to break the treaty with Mysore to fulfil the treaty with Salābat Jang, treating Mysore as his country's enemy for the purpose.⁴⁰ Bussy, indeed, felt consi-

40. Wilks contends, indeed, that he was so bound; a point on which even Bussy did not, as pointed out in the text above, feel personally clear, though he compromised with his conscience later (see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 384-385). Orme says that Salābat Jang's claim for tribute was a "pretended" affair and that Bussy was in a "perplexity" inasmuch as Nanjarāja "well deserved" the services of the French for what he had done "in return for the expenses he had incurred in assisting them during the war of Trichinopoly," "while the French troops with M. Bussy were obliged to assist Salābat Jang against any powers whom he might think proper to treat as enemies, for it was on that condition, without any exception for the Mysoreans, that he had given the northern maritime provinces to the French Company" (Orme, *o.c.*, I. 404). Orme thus not only exculpates his own nation but also the French Commander. But his own previous narration of events from 1745 onwards up to 1755, marking the departure of Nanjarāja from Trichinopoly, suppresses material facts relating to the war, especially all that one had the right to know about the cession of Trichinopoly to Mysore under the secret clause of the Treaty. And yet Orme devotes the greater portion of his first volume (Madras Edition, pages 167 to 405) to the Epic of the Mysorean conquest of Trichinopoly. If the claim to the tribute was a "pretention" on the part of Salābat Jang, Bussy's duty seems to have been clear: to resist Salābat Jang's importunity. But it suited him to compromise with his conscience for

derably embarrassed in the matter and tried in the first instance to get the money from Mysore without declaring war. But when he found Dēvarāja, the brother of Nanjarāja, unyielding, he declared war and exacted the vast sum of Rs. 55 lakhs from him, ruining the country and those who stood security for Dēvarāja as well. If the conduct of the English was immoral to a degree, the conduct of the French was worse; it was venal and contemptible in the extreme.



APPENDIX I.

(1) ON THE SUCCESSION OF THE DALAVAIS OF KANTHIRAVA II.

In view of the variations among the authorities as regards the succession of the Dalavāis of Kanṭhīrava II, it is necessary to go into the subject in some detail. According to the *Annals* (I. 156), Dāsarājaiya of Dēvarāyadurga, last of the Dalavāis of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar, was succeeded by Kāntaiya. Kāntaiya was slain during the siege of Chikballāpur and succeeded by his son Nanjarājaiya. Nanjarājaiya was followed by his son Basavarājaiya, who in turn was succeeded by a Nanjarājaiya and by Vīrarājaiya, son of Doḍḍaiya of Kaḷale. According to *Wilks* (I. 241), however, there were only two Dalavāis during Kanṭhīrava's reign, namely, "Canty Raj" (Kāntaiya) and his son "Busoo Raj" (Basavarāja), the former of whom lost his life during the reduction of Chikballāpur and the latter carried it on to success, extending his conquests as far as Doḍballāpur and Miḍagēsi. The *Mys. Rāj. Cha.* of Venkaṭaramanaiya (p. 32) refers only to Nanjarājaiya as the Dalavāi of Kanṭhīrava, to whom it accredits the successful siege of Chikballāpur, the subjugation of the Pālegārs of both the Ballāpurs (Chikballāpur and Doḍballāpur) and Miḍagēsi and the extension of his operations as far as Sīra. According to the *Mys. Dho. Pūr.* (I. 70), an earlier source (c. 1710-1714), Dāsarājaiya of Dēvarāyadurga, last of the Dalavāis of Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar, remained in office under Kanṭhīrava till March 12, 1705 (*Tāraṇa, Phālguna ba.* 13) when he was succeeded by Basavarājaiya (grandson of Kāntaiya of Kaḷale and second son of Nanjarājaiya I) who continued till November 4, 1708 (*Sarvadhāri, Mārgasīra śu.* 3).

Unfortunately, however, the characters in the original manuscript of this work are thoroughly defaced on p.71, rendering it impossible to make out the names of the successors of Basavarājaiya. The chronological and genealogical position of both the *Annals* and *Wilks* in regard to the Daḷavāis of Kanṭhīrava is rather vague, loose and contradictory. We have no information in these authorities as to the exact period of office of each of the Daḷavāis and their actual relationships. In particular, Kāntaiya, commonly mentioned by them as the first Daḷavāi of Kanṭhīrava, actually belonged to the Kaḷale family as we know from other sources, though he is referred to in the *Annals* (l. c.) as Kāntaiya of Kalla-haḷli, apparently after the place of residence of this branch of the Kaḷale House, situated in the same taluk as Kaḷale (*vide* Ch. I, f.n. 13). Further, he is identical with Muppina-Kāntaiya of Kaḷale, grandfather of Basavarājaya, a position supported by the *Annals* and by the *Mys. Dho. Pūr.* and the *K.A.V.* (*vide* Table XIII). The siege of Chikballāpur took place in November-December 1710, according to both the *Mys. Dho. Pūr.* (II. 50) and the *Annals* (I. 156). There is no evidence,¹ and it is improbable, that Muppina-Kāntaiya, a very old man as his name itself indicates, was the Daḷavāi of Kanṭhīrava during 1705-1711 and that he took part and was slain in that action as both the *Annals* and *Wilks* would have us believe. Hence it is not safe to rely on them. Neither can we accept the order of succession of the other Daḷavāis of Kanṭhīrava confusedly mentioned in the *Annals*, unless it is supported by more acceptable data. On the other hand, the statements of the earliest available contemporary chronicle (*i.e.*, *Mys. Dho. Pūr.*) that Daḷavāi Dāsarājaiya of Dēvarāyadurga was in office under Kanṭhīrava till March 1705 and that he

1. Cf. *Ancient India*, P. 305, where Dr. S. K. Aiyangar follows the *Annals*, without, as it seems to us, adequate evidence in support of his position.

was succeeded by Basavarājaiya, grandson of Muppina-Kāntaiya of Kaḷale, during 1705-1708, are more specific and creditworthy. Nanjarājaiya was the successor of Basavarājaiya and this is supported by the *Mys. Rāj. Cha.*, a manuscript next in point of time to the *Mys. Dho. Pūr.*, according to which he (Nanjarājaiya) was the Daḷavāi of Mysore during a major portion of the latter part of Kanṭhīrava's reign, actively figuring in the siege of Chikballāpur and other events (1710-1711). He is, perhaps, identical with Nanjarājaiya of Maddagiri, a nephew of Basavarājaiya of Kaḷale (see *K.A.V.*, ff. 18); also Table XIII). We would not, therefore, be far wrong in fixing his period of office between 1708-1714. Since the *Annals* (I. 159) is, however, positive only in regard to the period of office (*i.e.*, 1714-1724) of Daḷavāi Virarājaiya (another grandson of Muppina-Kāntaiya and son of Doḍḍaiya of Kaḷale) under both Kanṭhīrava II and Krishnarāja I, we have to place his (Virarājaiya's) succession about February 1714.

(2) ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE MYSURU
DHOREGALA PURVABHYUDAYA VIVARA.

This work has generally come to be known as Nagara Puṭṭaiya's *History of Mysore*. Wilson was the first to ascribe its authorship to Nagara Puṭṭaiya (*Des. Cat. Mack. Mss.*, pp. 329-330) and this position is followed in the *Kar. Ka. Cha.* (III. 4) and the *Mys. Gaz.* (II. iv. 2631). According to a Persian manuscript history of the early rulers of Mysore, referred to by Wilks, however, Nagara Puṭṭaiya was a contemporary of Tipū Sultān, who, in 1798, at the command of the latter, assisted Asad Anwar and Gulām Husain to translate into Persian "two books in the Canara (Kannada) language". In 1799, after the fall of Tipū, Col. W. Kirkpatrick, one of the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, handed over to Major, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel, Colin Mackenzie

two *Kaḍatams*² along with a book in the Kannaḍa language entitled "*The Succession of the Kings of Mysoor, from ancient Times as it is in the Canara Cuddutums, now written into a Book by Command by Nuggur Pootia Pundit.*" These manuscripts were "among the plunder of everything useful or apparently valuable, carried off to the stores of the Sultaun" on the death of Chāmarāja Wodeyar VIII in 1796. They accidentally escaped destruction by fire, shortly after, "by the pious artifice of a bramin" and eventually fell into the hands of a British officer in the confusion of the 4th of May 1799," along with "a large portion of the contents" of an apartment of the Seringapatam Palace in which they had been lodged. It was from the book of Nagara Puṭṭaiya Paṇḍit, above referred to, that the Persian translation was made by Tipū Sultān in 1798 and subsequently an English translation also prepared, under Major Mackenzie's direction, for Wilks' use. The two *Kaḍatams*, however, proved, on examination by Wilks, "to be the actual originals" from which the Paṇḍit's copy was made, being, as he (Wilks) says, "probably the two books mentioned in the Persian translation" (*Mysoor*, I. Preface, pp. xxi-xxiv; II. 605). There appears little doubt that the original *Kaḍatam* entitled *Mysūru-Dhoregaḷa-Pūrvābhyudaya-Vivara*,

2. Wilks gives an accurate description of a *Kaḍatam* or *Kaḍitam* thus: Cudduttum, Curruttum, or Currut, a long slip of cotton cloth, from eight inches to a foot wide and from twelve to eighteen feet long, skilfully covered on each side with a compost of paste and powdered charcoal. When perfectly dry, it is neatly folded up without cutting, in leaves of equal dimensions; to the two end folds are fixed ornamented plates of wood, painted and varnished, resembling the sides of a book and the whole is put into a case of silk or cotton or tied with a tape or ribbon; those in use with the lower classes are destitute of these ornaments and are tied up by a common string; the book, of course, opens at either side, and, if unfolded and drawn out, is still a long slip of the original length of the cloth. The writing is similar to that on a slate, and may be in like manner rubbed out and renewed. It is performed by a pencil of the *balapam*, or *tapis ollaris*....." (*Mysoor*, I. Preface, P. XXII, f. n.).

now in the Madras Oriental Mss. Library and used in the present work, is one of the two *Kaḍatams* above adverted to by Wilks and relied upon by Nagara Puṭṭaiya also. This *Kaḍatam* is a work of anonymous authorship and belongs to the period c. 1710-1714, as a detailed examination of it goes to show (*vide* text of Ch. I of this Vol.) The similarity in the title of both this original manuscript and its copy by Nagara Puṭṭaiya Paṇḍit perhaps largely accounts for the position that the latter himself was its actual author, which can no longer be accepted.

(3) Manucci on Mysore, 1705-1706.

In his *Storia Do Mogor* (Part IV, written 1701-1706)³, Signor Niccolao Manucci, the well-known Venetian traveller in India, dealing with the last years of the reign of Aurangzib, writes thus incidentally of Mysore under Kanṭhīrava-Narasarāja Wodeyar II:—

[1705]

" (P. 98).....Daud Khan, after making an agreement with the Mahrattahs, withdrew, and took up his abode in Arkāt, leaving the enemy present in the direction of Adoni and Sira.....Without troubling himself about the increasing ruin to his empire due to the Mahrattahs, this King [Aurangzib] now plans the renewal of war against Maisur [Mysore] or Saranpattan (Śrirangapaṭṭanam). His ambition is to capture the great treasure possessed by this Prince. This territory lies near the region of Malabar and the Prince possesses one hundred thousand matchlock men and ten thousand cavalry. His revenue, after paying expenses, is every year (P. 99) eleven *Carois* (Krores) of rupees—that is thirty-five millions.⁴

3. W. Irvine roughly fixes 1701-1705 as the chronological limits of Part IV of the *Storia* (see *Introduction* to the work, Part I. P. LXXIV). In the light of internal evidence, however, we have to place it between 1701-1706.

4. " Apparently 35,000,000 of some coin not named, worth 3 1/7 rupees each—probably the pagoda. Eleven *krores* of rupees equals about

He is lord over a large territory defended by over one hundred fortresses and many forests.

"This Prince has a Brahman as his Chief Counsellor named Duduhaja Daluahia (Duduhāja Dalwae),⁵ a man of sound judgment. The reigning prince is a nephew⁶ of the late ruler, and is deaf. For this reason King Aurangzeb protests that this Prince is not a legitimate successor, and claims the right to take possession. Thus he is making ready for a campaign, and has sent out orders to the Princes of Tanjor, the Princes of Trichinopoly, and other neighbouring rulers who are his feudatories. They must be prepared to invade Maisur, and should they refuse compliance, they will, he says, be chastised.

"The King of Gulkandah, Shah Abdullah Qutb Shah [1611-1672] several times made war against this monarch [*i.e.*, of Maisur], hoping to obtain his treasures and territory. But he had no success, the said Prince defending himself valiantly; and the punishment he inflicted on his adversaries was to release them after cutting off their noses.

"They say that the inhabitants of this country (Maisur) are so active that when horsemen are passing through their forests, they come out rapidly, and, placing their hands on the horse's quarters, spring up behind,

£ 11,000,000. The figures must be grossly exaggerated" (Irvine's note No. 1 on pp. 99 of the *Storia*, Part IV). Nevertheless, Manucci is to be understood to be testifying here, as an impartial observer, to the vitality and financial soundness of the kingdom of Mysore.

5. The person referred to here seems identical with Daḷavāi Dāsarājaiya of Dēvarāyadurga, a member of the Arasu family (see Chs. XI and XII of Vol. I, and Ch. I of this [Vol.]). Manucci was evidently misinformed on the point. Cf. Irvine's note No. 2, *i.e.*, referring to Duduhaja as "an epithet or nickname."

6. The reference here is to Kaṇṭhirava-Narasarāja Wodeyar II, son of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar of Mysore (*vide* references cited in Vol. I, Ch. XVI, fn 10). Manucci and no less Aurangzib was misinformed on this point also. Cf. the order of succession and dates of Mysore rulers, given by Irvine in note No. 2 *supra*, relying on Wilks and L. B. Bowring.

and cut off the rider's nose with a sort of half-moon in iron that they carry. By this feat so much (P. 100) fear was established in the (Mogul) army that no one was so bold as to advance until the musketeers had fired. No one can enter or leave the Maisur ruler's territories without a passport....."

Again, after referring to Bijapur and other affairs, Manucci resumes :

"(P. 238) Meanwhile he [Aurangzib] sent men to reconnoitre the route along which, as he pretended, his army would make its advance on its way to attack the Prince of Massur (Maisur). The same was done in regard to Tanniaur (Tanjor) and Triginapali (Trichinopoly) ; it was meant only as a means of intimidation and the extraction of money from them. With the same object he gave a fresh order for Daud Khan to return to the Karnatak. The Khan, assuming pleasant ways, feigned himself the friend of those princes, and advised them to offer handsome tribute to the Mogul if they wished to be liberated from imperial interference.

"These Princes are so ignorant that they paid what was demanded of them, without foreseeing the destruction which would overcome them therefrom The said Daud Khan amassed all the money that he could from them and from the Europeans.....

"Daud Khan left the Court and came back to the Karnatik, and when he reached it all the European nations sent him their presents, which he accepted.....

"(P. 239) The Prince of Maisur was aware that, as soon as the rainy season was over, King Aurangzeb would make war upon him. He therefore made ready to resist him with a force of fifteen thousand horsemen of different tribes—Pathans, Rajputs and Moguls, etc. The whole of these men came out of the Mogul empire ; not finding employment at that Court, they went and took service with this Prince. I do not believe that

these men will be faithful to him ; on the contrary, I know that Aurangzeb, following his custom, will be sure to invite them to desert his standard by an offer of higher pay, if he has not done this already (p. 240), as he has practised in the kingdoms of Bijapur and Gulkanda, and in other principalities. The said Prince suspected, however, that this tampering had taken place, and called a council of his principal officers. He asked them, in case such a desertion happened, what would be the remedy for the evil. They replied to him that he should place no reliance on those horsemen ; in time of need his Highness had forty thousand captains, not to speak of the soldiers who fought under their standards, making a total of three hundred thousand men, all of them ready to defend his Highness.

“ Within their own country this tribe consider themselves valiant soldiers, and are very tender on the point of honour. If by chance in going out from or coming into any place, their clothes are touched unintentionally, or when passing each other they cough or spit, they hold that there has been an affront, and they forthwith challenge each other to a duel. This sort of duel happens customarily two or more times in a day. They are fought in the presence of the Prince, who allows them because he cannot prevent them. These officers and soldiers are highly paid, and live very well ; they are rather skilled in the use of weapons, and are accustomed to wear on their arms small armlets of gold or silver. In a few months from this time, if Aurangzeb lives, we shall see what sort of valour these soldiers have, and I shall not fail to give a clear report.

“ Although this prince might easily lead this great army against the Mogul, he is an enemy of war, and it pleases him better to live in peace and amity. He offered to his Majesty fifteen millions of rupees and five elephants, promising, in addition, to double his

annual tribute, on condition that he was not interfered with. Aurangzeb accepted the proposal, and at once sent off a thousand horsemen to convey the money to his camp (p. 241). The Shivā Jis (the Mahrattahs) had information, and pursued the convoy, with twenty thousand horse, hoping to relieve them of the cash but the pursuers were not in time. The escort had retired with the utmost promptitude into a fortress, and up to this moment the money is locked up there.

"In the month of September of the said year [1705] King Aurangzeb fell ill, and for twelve days, he did not appear at the public audiences. The news caused a great commotion in the royal camp, since the greater number believed he was dead; the fact being that he unexpectedly fell into a swoon, and for three hours on end he was unable to speak a word.....

"(P. 242) when the King could move about, having recovered from his indisposition, the rainy season had ended. He sent men to measure the quantity of water in the rivers, preparatory to an attack on the Prince of Maisur, to whom he forwarded violent threats. At this time news was received by his Majesty that the villagers in the Province of Agrah had risen and plundered the suburbs of the City, and closed the roads in those parts. Very shortly afterwards other reports were received that some Pathan Chiefs, who ruled between the Province of Kabul and the Indus river, had risen in rebellion, and killed several soldiers of Prince Shah Alam, his son.

"From the coming of these reports the design of fighting the Prince of Maisur was frustrated; and the King withdrew his army to the neighbourhood of Aurangabad [read Ahmadnagar], having continually at his heels the Mahrattahs, who follow him everywhere.....

"(P. 243) His Majesty's retreat towards Aurangabad was against his will, his desire being to make war against the Prince of Maisur; but he had to postpone that

campaign in order to attend to the above rising. The king was greatly exercised in mind by these uprisings, the more so when he recollected that his undertakings had not been very successful and the common people had begun to speak disparagingly (P. 244) of his continual and fruitless marches. He issued a proclamation that, if any one spoke abusively about the royal marchings, his tongue would be pulled out the next morning early [1706].

“(P. 245) The large sum of money sent by the Prince of Maisur as a present to his Majesty had been taken to a fortress called Sirpi,⁷ situated in the vicinity of that Prince's territory. This money was recovered by the Prince of Maisur, and the fortress taken,⁸ in the following manner. When this Prince saw that the King had retreated, and that his affairs were in a bad state, he made use of the opportunity, and bribed the soldiers who garrisoned the place. This was done very easily, since they were dying of hunger and had received no pay. They delivered up the fortress on April 18 [?1706]
.....”

7. Irvine identifies this with Supa in North Canara (*Storia*, IV. 245, f.n. 2).

But Sirpi, with reference to the context, is identical with Sira in the Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Bālagḥāṭ. Sira, in the Tumkūr district, was a Mughal *subāh* since Khāsim Khān's time (1687-1695).

8. The reference to the taking of the fort of Sira by Mysore appears to rest on the basis of a rumour current when Manucci wrote. The fort remained in the hands of the Mughals for a considerably long time, though it would seem that Kanṭhirava, as narrated above, succeeded in taking back possession of the amount preserved therein for safety.

APPENDIX II.

(1) BOARD'S LETTER TO STRINGER LAWRENCE AND ROBERT PALK, MAY 11, 1753.¹

"Major Lawrence having advised us that the King of Tanjour has offered to act as a mediator to reconcile the difference between the Nabob and Mysore King and as we are of opinion such a reconciliation is absolutely necessary to our own as well as the Nabob's affairs, we desire you will endeavour to cultivate it, hereby giving you full power and authority to do the same and desiring you would do it upon the best terms you can. The following if to be got would be the most advantageous.

It is evident that the Mysore King's demand will be Trichinopoly, if it should be so, that if it be agreed to be delivered, it be on a limited time on conditions :

That the Morattas be drawn off the French.

That the Mysore King and Moratta shall endeavour to settle the Nabob in the Province.

That the Mysore King pay such a sum of money to the Nabob and if possible that the debt to us which is large, be secured.

That the King of Tanjore be included in this Treaty and the Mysore King not to molest him or his country.

That we do not appear as Principal in this affair, our troops may evacuate the place and at the time appointed.

That you endeavour to prevent the Nabob's entering into engagements prejudicial to us"

(2) BOARD'S LETTER TO THOMAS COOKE, SEPTEMBER 12, 1753.²

"Being determined by all possible means to promote a reconciliation between th Nabob and Dalloway though

1. *Fort St. George Records : Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 77.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 149-150.

Messrs. Lawrence and Palk advised us they found it impossible to effect anything, yet we are come to a resolution to make a further trial and have fixed on you for this Commission, you will therefore proceed to camp with expedition visiting the King of Tanjore on your way

We give you full powers to confer with the Nabob concerning the necessary steps to be taken to conclude a peace and to do the same with the Daloway ... We think it necessary to tell you what has already passed and our sentiment thereon.

The Daloway has seemed averse to treat in camp, possibly intimidated by the French or thinking their knowledge of it might be of disservice to him, but on conversing with his Vakeel here, he expressed a strong desire for it and has since acquainted the President that he had the Daloway's orders to propose either being paid the money he advanced or being put in possession of Trichenopoly and if the latter, he would draw off the Moratta from the French, who with himself were to join the Nabob, settle him in the Arcot province, enter into a strict alliance with him and further would pay him a considerable sum of money and that he would also enter into a friendly alliance with the King of Tanjour.

The Nabob, though the situation of his affairs has been frequently laid before him and [on account of] our inability to support the expense, evades as much as possible coming to the point and wrote the President that he gave him a power to settle affairs with the Daloway and offer the districts belonging to Trichinopoly but not the Fort till the money be paid. We are of opinion these are terms the other will not accept but that with Trichinopoly he would be satisfied and in return grant the Nabob several advantages, though nothing ought to be left to his generosity.

If contrary to expectation the Daloway could be brought to accept a mortgage of the districts belonging to Trichinopoly as a security for the payment of a certain sum to be settled and agreed on in full satisfaction of all his demands on the Nabob and thereupon consent and engage to draw off the Moratta from the French and return to their respective countries, we recommend to you the perfecting such an accommodation, but if he is to be satisfied with anything less than Trichinopoly, the terms on which the cession of that place may be consented to, are these :

(i) that he renounce his agreement with the French and enter into an alliance with the Nabob to settle him in his government,

(ii) that he draw off the Moratta from the French and engage him to enter into an alliance with the Nabob to settle him in his government,

(iii) that he defray at his own proper expense the whole charge of the Mysore and Moratta troops,

(iv) that the payment of the Nabob's debt to the Company be secured and that such a further sum as the parties may agree on, be paid by the Daloway to the Nabob.

(v) that the English, King of Tanjour and Tondaman be included in this alliance and act as guarantees for the performance of the treaty which must be signed by the contracting parties and if either of them shall at any time infringe it, he is to be deemed an enemy by all the rest,

(vi) that all the parties do jointly use their influence to promote a peace with the French,

(vii) that if either of the parties be attacked, the rest shall support him, the party attacked defraying all charges,

(viii) that until the Daloway shall have fulfilled whatever is hereinbefore stipulated to be done by him,

the Fort of Trichinopoly shall be garrisoned by English troops, but so soon as the Nabob shall be peaceably settled in the Arcot government and the Daloway shall have accomplished what is before stipulated on his part to be performed, the English troops shall then evacuate the said fort and put the troops of the Mysore King in full and quiet possession of the same."

(3) SUMMARY OF THE NAWAB'S LETTER TO THE
GOVERNOR OF MADRAS, OCTOBER 20, 1753.³

"The letter from the Nabob empowers the President to make peace with the Daloway on either of the following terms, *viz* :—

(i) That the Mysoreans be allowed what money they advanced the Nabob, Moraree and Tondaman until the death of Chunda, together with five lakhs of Rupees for the Dalloway's charges to that time and that Tinnevely and Madura countries may be mortgaged as a security for the payment.

(ii) Should the Mysoreans demand the whole sum they have hitherto expended, it may be objected that they have put the *circar* to a very great expense and ruined the country, notwithstanding which the said Tinnevely and Madura countries may be made over as aforesaid.

(iii) If this should be rejected, the whole Trichinopoly country except the Fort, may be mortgaged to him till their money be paid, provided they expell Morarow and enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with him, the Nabob, and assist him in settling the Arcot country.

(iv) In case a peace cannot be effected on these terms and the Mysoreans insist on the *Fort*, he (the Nabob) is obliged to agree to it, in which case they

3. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), p. 182. For details of the letter, see *Count. Corres.* (1753), pp. 180-181, No. 242.

formerly promised him a sum of money and a good fort and fruitful country producing two lakhs of Chakrams in any part of the country he might choose, to enter into an alliance and act with him in punishing the French and to expel Moraree and settle the Arcot province, these terms must therefore be demanded and in regard to the sum of money to be paid by the Mysoreans, the whole amount of what has been advanced by the Company besides 15 lakhs of Rupees must be insisted on."

- (4) A REPRESENTATION OF VENKATA RAO (MYSORE VAKIL), TO THE PRESIDENT *re* HIS PROPOSALS FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NAWAB, c. MARCH 1754.⁴

"In regard to the money the whole expense we have been at in paying our army, Moraree's troops and the Nabob together with what has been paid to Tondaman, Torayore, etc., Pallegars, including the sum laid out to draw off or disband the people in Chenda's army as also what has been paid to the French at Pondicherry and likewise the sum laid out to entertain forces and to pay the batta and to give presents, etc., should be accounted from the time we began to assist on the arrival of the Nabob's letter to this day and the payment to be ordered in ready specie upon the Savacars. Unless it is complete with this, they, meaning his masters, will never agree to receive the money upon the mortgage of the country, but on the contrary they will agree to receive the Fort and the country and to order the payment of the Company's money which had been advanced to this day on account of the affair of Trichinopoly as may appear reasonable on their declaring it with an oath to be paid them after the delivery of the

4. *Fort St. George Records: Count. Corres.* (1754), pp. 65-66, No. 109.

Fort and the country as per the limited time, together with ten lakhs of rupees to the Nabob according to the agreement as also two lakhs worth of the country including a fort. Should every one act against our government, you should send a force to assist us. We shall on our part send our forces to assist in your affairs and those of the Nabob, with sincerity. We shall not harbour a friendship with the French and your adversaries. You should observe the same with respect to our own. We shall be sincere to you in every respect. You should do the same on your part. We shall carry on or send our traffic and merchandize only to the English ports but they shall not be sent into any other hatman's ports nor shall we permit any other hatmen to settle any factory or trade in the country. Agreeable to the foregoing, an agreement shall be drawn out and sealed with the King's seal with an oath prescribed by our religion and it shall also be signed by the Dallaway. The Merchants' mediation shall likewise be inserted in it as well as the witnesses. You should on your part be mindful of the fort to be delivered according to the agreement or limited time and the money to be received of the sowcars. Should any of the Mogul's subadars (or officers) make an attempt, oppose or plead any hindrance in the performance of the above agreement, you should . . . and deliver the fort according to the limited time and receive the money through the means of the merchants according to the agreement. At present you should assist us with a force to settle Madura, etc., countries on that side. Till the time limited be expired, you should leave only the English guard in the Fort and withdraw the Nabob's people who have no business there. You should give us dividend out of the guns, firelocks, ammunition, elephants, etc., which were seized in Chanda's army. In case of traffic from our government, you should not suffer any hindrance but on the contrary you should use us

respectfully. We shall never fail in this agreement. You should on your part give a writing or agreement with an oath prescribed in your religion under the Company's seal and the Counsellor's sign and you should insert the mediation as well as the Merchants' attestation."

(5) COUNCIL'S LETTER TO STRINGER LAWRENCE,
MARCH 25, 1754.⁵

"Terms proposed by the Council to Mysore through the Vakeels of the Mysore King :

(1) That the King of Mysore shall renounce his alliance with the French and enter into an alliance with the Nabob Anaverde Khan to settle him in his government of the Carnateck.

(2) That he draw off Morarow from the French and engage him to enter into an alliance with the Nabob to settle him in his government.

(3) That until this be effected, the King of Mysore shall defray at his own expense the whole charge of the Mysore and Moratta troops.

(4) That the King of Mysore shall secure to the Company the whole debt due to them by Nabob Anaverde Khan to be paid by the Savacars in Madrass on delivery of the Fort of Trichenopoly at the time hereinafter stipulated.

(5) That on delivery of the said fort to the King of Mysore, he shall also pay to the Nabob ten lakhs of Rupees and assign him such a district of the Mysore country with a fort in the same as shall produce annually two lakhs of Rupees.

(6) That the King of Mysore shall grant the English the sole and exclusive privilege of trading in his country and no other Europeans whatever shall be permitted to partake of it.

5. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1754), pp. 77-78.

(7) In consideration of all which Articles to be done and performed by the King of Mysore, the Fort of Trichenopoly shall be delivered over to him within 12 months from the conclusion of this agreement and that on signing the same all the forces and effects of the Nabob Anaverde Khan (provision not included, which is to remain there for the benefit of the King of Mysore) shall be withdrawn and the said fort shall be and remain garrisoned by English troops only until the time stipulated for the delivery thereof.

(8) That a due proportion according to former agreement, of all the cannon and warlike stores taken at Seringham shall be delivered to the King of Mysore at the same time as the Fort.

(9) That the English will guarantee to the King of Mysore the peaceable possession of the said Fort.

(10) That the King of Tanjore if he chooses it, shall be admitted into this alliance and the peaceable possession of his dominions shall be guaranteed to him by all the parties.

(11) That this treaty may be more beneficial to all the parties, *viz.* the English, the Nabob, King of Mysore and King of Tanjore, they do mutually agree to defend each other's possessions against the attacks and attempts of an enemy who may invade the same.

It is possible objections may be started to several particulars in the foregoing Articles but that the treaty may not on that account be protracted for want of sufficient instructions, we shall now give you our thoughts on such as seem the most liable to difficulties :

(i) It is probable the Dalloway may object to the 3rd Article. In that case, as the Nabob's circumstances will not admit of his defraying the charge of the Mysore troops, we see no other way of settling the Article than by stipulating that when the King of Mysore shall be in possession of the Trichenopoly country, he shall retain

the tribute due from that country to the Arcot subah-ship until the debt is paid.

(ii) The payment of the Nabob's whole debt to the Company will, we are afraid, occasion some difficulties as Vencatrow proposes only to pay what has been expended on account of the affairs of Trichinopoly. Indeed last year he offered to pay the whole but then it did not amount to above 25 lakhs; and by the time this treaty may be concluded it will be full 35; this is so material an object to us that it must be insisted on and rather than break off the Treaty, some equivalent may be thought of. Perhaps if the two lakhs' worth of country proposed to be assigned the Nabob were given up, it might conciliate the difference.

(iii) The limited term of one year for the surrender of the Fort, we believe, will be admitted. Vencatrow has intimated as much to the President though he has not inserted it in his memorial. If it should be very strenuously objected to, perhaps the agreeing to admit a small party of Mysoreans into the Fort may obviate the difficulty and we think we cannot be of any prejudice.

These, Sir, are the points that occur to us at present. Others may arise, but if they should not be very essential, such we mean as may effect the general plan, we desire you will not wait for particular orders but conclude on your own judgment. We hereby empower you to do so and when all the Articles are fully agreed on, the Treaty must be ratified by us under the Company's seal, and by the Nabob, King of Mysore and King of Tanjore under their respective chips....."

(6) THE REVISED PROPOSALS OF VENKATA RAO *re* AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NAWAB, MAY 13, 1754.⁶

"Proposals made by Venkat Rao, the King of Mysore's Vakeel, to the Hon. Thomas Saunders, Esq.,

President and Governor of Fort St. George, acting as mediator between the said King of Mysore and Nabob Anaverdy Khan Bahadur.

(1) The King of Mayasore (Mysore) proposes to draw off all his forces and return to his own country and not molest the Nabob on condition that he be paid the whole expence he has been at in paying his army, Morari Row's troops and on account of the Nabob together with what has been paid to Tondaman, Torayore and Polligars including the sum laid out to draw off or disband the people in Chunda's army as also what has been paid to the French at Pondicherry and likewise the sum laid out to entertain forces and for *Batta* and presents to be accounted from the time the King first began to assist the Nabob on the receipt of his letter to the day of concluding this agreement, the said sum to be paid in ready specie or secured by the *savacars* but the mortgage of the country will not on any account be accepted [Note the similarity of this part of the document with the earlier portion of Appendix II-(4)]. If this proposal should not be accepted, in that case, the King of Mayasore proposes the following terms:—

(2) The King of Mayasore will consent to renounce his alliance with the French and enter into an alliance with Nabob Anaverdy Khan Bahadur to settle him in the Arcot Government.

(3) The King of Mayasore promises that he will draw off Morari Row from the French and send him away to his country and that he shall not join the French and act against the Nabob.

(4) The King of Mayasore promises to defray at his own cost and charges, the expences of his troops that shall be employed in the Nabob's service.

(5) If the King of Tanjore will accede to the Treaty, the King of Mayasore in that case promises to enter into

a defensive alliance with him, that is to say, if the King of Tanjore will guarantee unto the King of Mayasore the peaceable possession of Trichinopoly Fort and the country. The King of Mayasore will on his part engage to assist the King of Tanjore to the utmost of his power in defending his dominions against all his enemies and will upon no account molest his country.

(6) The King of Mayasore promises that on the delivery of the said Fort to him or his officers, he will pay unto the Nabob Anaverde Khan 10 lakhs of Rupees and assign to him in possession of such a district in the Mayasore country with a fort in the same as shall produce annually 2 lakhs of Gopal Chakrams.

(7) The King of Mayasore agrees to pay the English East India Company, the debt due to them by the Nabob on account of the expenses defrayed from the time they began to assist in the affairs of Trichinopoly to the time of making this treaty, as may appear reasonable by an oath or cause the same to be secured by the *Savacars* in Madars, to be paid on the delivery of the Fort of Trichinopoly at the time and manner hereafter stipulated.

(8) The King of Mayasore promises to grant to the English the sole and exclusive privilege of trading in his country and no other Europeans whatsoever shall be permitted to partake of it.

(9) In consideration whereof the King of Mayasore demands that the Fort of Trichinopoly be delivered in his possession within 12 months to be reckoned from the day this treaty shall be concluded, he paying the usual tribute to the Arcot Subahship from the time of the delivery of the Fort but in the interim, if he collects any part of the rents of Trichinopoly country, he is to pay the said tribute in proportion.

(10) From the day of the conclusion of this treaty until the expiration of the said 12 months (unless all the

parties should consent to deliver up the Fort sooner), the King of Mayasore will agree that the said Fort be garrisoned by the English troops only and all the Nabob's people, except one killedar and attendants, shall immediately evacuate the said Fort and the King of Mayasore requires that he shall be at liberty to have an officer in the said Fort in token of his right to the same.

(11) All provisions, cannon, mortars, etc., relating to the Fort at the expiration of the said 12 months shall belong to the King of Mayasore, but not the warlike stores, cannon, mortars, etc., which may belong to the field or the English.

(12) The King of Mayasore demands that a due proportion of all the cannon and warlike stores, etc., taken at Srirangam shall be delivered to him at the same time as the Fort, but in case all the said cannon, warlike stores, etc., should not be then in being, in such a case a due proportion of what shall be in being shall be delivered him and a just equivalent in money for what shall have been expended.

(13) The King of Mayasore demands that the peaceable possession of the said Fort and country shall be guaranteed to him by the English against all persons who shall invade or molest the same and that the English as mediators shall not refuse the delivering of the said Fort on pretence of orders from court, he paying the usual tribute.

(14) The king of Mayasore also requires that as he assists Nabob Anaverdy Khan in settling him in the Arcot Government, the English shall assist in settling the King in the peaceable possession of Madura and Tinnevely countries, he paying the expence of the English troops which may be sent upon that business, together with the cost of the Ammunition, etc., as also all other charges as may be necessary and likewise he is to defray the charges of the English garrison (which may

be left in the Fort) during their stay there, together with the cost of the Ammunition, etc, as may be necessary for their use.

(15) That the King of Mayasore shall not molest Tondamon, the said Tondamon paying to him as customary under Anaverdy Khan Bahadur and will on no account demand more or molest him.

(16) The agreement shall be signed, sealed and guaranteed by the contracting parties and whosoever shall infringe this treaty, shall be deemed as an enemy by the rest who agree to assist the injured party in giving him a just satisfaction. The Nabob, the King of Mayasore, the King of Tanjore and the English mutually agree to yield their assistance to each other in case of an attack by the enemy.

Memorandum.—In regard to the 3rd Article, Venkat Rao says that the Dalloway will consent so far as to send away Morari Row to his country, but if the French endeavour afterwards to send for him from his country to join them, he doubts whether the Dalloway will consent to prevent him from so doing; he is, however, of opinion that if he once returns to his country the French will not easily get him back again. In regard to the 7th Article, which mentions the Company's debt, Venkat Rao is of opinion that the Dallaway will ask the amount of the Company's debt, but it being explained to him that it is impossible to say exactly how much it is, as the disbursements and charges at Fort St. David, Devecotah and camp for a considerable time past have not been brought to account, here, he then desired it might be guessed at within 2 or 3 lakhs more or less, upon which he was told it might amount to between 30 and 35 lakhs, which he said he believed the Dalloway would consent to pay. In regard to the months, Venkata Row says that that Dalloway will desire a shorter term but being told this was the very basis of the treaty and could not be

dispensed with and that the Dalloway might look on the promise of the English to deliver it then as most sacred, he said he did not doubt but he could prevail on the Dalloway to consent to it.

Agreed that a copy of the foregoing proposals be sent to Major Lawrence and that he be desired to communicate the same to the Dalloway as soon as possible, as it is of great consequence that this affair should not remain in suspense and thereby prevent the pursuit of some other plan but be brought to a conclusion or dropt without delay."

(7) A NOTE ON M. BUSSY, 1720-1785.


Mons. Counte de Bussy, who took part in Salābat Jang's expedition to Mysore (1755), was a distinguished French diplomat of the 18th century. The story of his life and work has been told recently by Prof. Alfred Martineau in his work "Bussy et l' Inde Francaise," Bussy and French India, published in French at Paris (1935). "Nurtured in the traditions of Dupleix, besides being a friend and contemporary of both Dupleix and Lally, though at variance with both of them," he was, we note, "destined to see the beginning of the end of French domination over India, an end signified by his own recall." The following note relating to the details of his career in general and his connection with the politics of Mysore (1755) in particular would be found interesting.⁷

Charles Joseph Patissier, known later as the Marquis of Bussy and Castelnau, was born at Ancienville, in the

7. Based mainly on *Bussy in the Deccan*.—Being extracts from "Bussy and French India," in French, by Prof. A. Martineau. Translated by Dr. Miss A. Cammiade (Pondicherry, 1941), pp. ii & 306. Also works of Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 451, 454-5, 460, 462-3, 477, 485-9, 494-500, 502; Orme, *Indostan*, II. Bk. IX. 845; Malleton, *Dupleix* (Rulers of India Series), 87, 93-96, 140, 162-3, 180-3; Hill, *Yusuf Khan*, 89, 83-84, 125-126, etc. See also *f. n.* 17 just at page 711.



Mons. De Bussy.



province of Aisne, in France, February 8, 1720.⁸ Born of a small lord who possessed no other wealth than his sword and of a mother who belonged to a still lower rank, he held a lieutenancy under his father (1733), on whose death in 1735, he resided in the Islands of France and Bourbon, down to 1740. He arrived in India in 1741 and took part in La Bourdanna's siege of Madras, 1746. In 1748, he was among the garrison which defended Pondicherry against Boscawen's attack. He distinguished himself at Āmbūr (1749) and took part in the siege of Tanjore under Goupil, his first daring exploit being the capture by night of the invincible rock-fortress of Gingee in 1750, with D' Auteuil as his second in command. Orme gives a graphic account of the capture which helped to establish the reputation of French arms in South India, which stood Dupleix in good stead in his long struggle with the English. When, in 1751, Muzaffar Jang became Nizām on the death of Nāsir Jang, Bussy, accompanied by his Dewan Abdul Rahiman, better known by the title of Haidar Jang, escorted him (Muzaffar) to Aurangabad, then the capital of the Deccan. On Muzaffar's death, the same year, Bussy with a French corps helped Salābat Jang in his advance towards Hyderabad and made him Nizām entirely through his influence.

At this juncture, Pēshwa Bālāji Rao from Poona proceeded from Aurangabad, on a projected invasion of the Deccan, and levied contributions wherever Salābat Jang's authority was acknowledged. Bussy, who was principal adviser in directing Salābat Jang's army at the head of a battalion of 500 Europeans and a body of 5,000 disciplined sepoys, recommended, as the best means of repelling these aggressions, that the war should be

8. This corrects Vincent Smith's statement that in 1751 Bussy was thirty-five years of age, implying his date of birth in 1716 (see *Oxford History of India*, p. 476, f.n. 2).

carried into the Mahratta country. When Salābat and Bussy advanced on Ahmadnagar, the Pēshwa attacked him at the head of 40,000 horse (by surrounding them). The French artillery of eight or ten field-pieces galled him severely. Thus helped, Salābat advanced towards Poona, totally destroying every village on the route. The Pēshwa opened up negotiations with Salābat and at the same time tried to create dissensions among his (Salābat's) officers in regard to the views of the French. Bussy, as the best means of counteracting such schemes and securing his own influence, exerted himself with judgment and energy. On the 22nd November (1751) he planned an attack of the Mahratta camp, while the Mahratta army fled before him and valuable booty was obtained. The surprise was incomplete, but the Mahrattas sustained very little loss, only one man being wounded. But the attack made a great impression and had the effect of raising his reputation among the Mahrattas. Undaunted, the Mahrattas attacked Salābat Jang and nothing but the French artillery prevented a total defeat. Salābat Jang returned to Ahmadnagar to replenish, constanly harassed by the Mahrattas. Salābat's short-lived ardour abated on hearing of Raghujī Bhonsle's movements to the eastward. His difficulties on the road; the clamour of the troops for arrears of pay; and discontent among his officers made him to accept Bussy's advice to close up with the Pēshwa's overtures. An armistice was concluded and Salābat Jang returned to Hyderabad. But disaffection among his troops was so great that Raghunath Dass, the Dewan, was assassinated on 7th April 1752, in a tumult created by the soldiery for arrears of pay.⁹

Bussy now became the chief adviser and guide of the newly created Nizām and through him secured French

9. *Vide*, On the Nizām-Pēshwa Relations (1751), Grant-Duff, *o.c.*, I. 454-456.

ascendency at Hyderabad. As the virtual master of the Deccan, he got confirmed all the grants made by Muzaffar Jang and brought under French control all the territory lying between the Krishna and Cape Comorin. In 1753 he obtained the assignment of the revenue of the Northern Circars (represented by the present districts of Guntūr, Gōdāvari, Kistna, Vizagapatam and Ganjām of the Madras Presidency) for meeting the cost of maintaining French troops in the Deccan.¹⁰ Bussy not only supported his troops from the revenue he collected but also supplied funds to Dupleix for the prosecution of his ambitious schemes. To the Nizām he was faithful; he took part in Salābat Jang's fiscal expedition to Mysore (1755) and fought for him and defeated in his interest the Nawāb of Savanūr, 1756. Through the jealousy and intrigues of his enemies, he was ordered, in 1756, to leave the Nizām's territory and proceeded to the east coast. He, however, soon regained his supremacy and reduced Bobbili after a memorable attack. His fame and prowess spread far and wide. Suraja-daula, the Nawāb Nāzim of Murshidabad, applied to him for help in 1757, but he refused it. He seized Vizagapatam and other fortresses besides Daulatabad for his master, the Nizām. In May 1758, he returned to the Deccan just in time to be suspected of complicity in the murder of Shah Nawāz Khān, minister of Salābat Jang, in retaliation for that of Haidar Jang, Bussy's Dewan.¹¹ On July 18 of the same year, at the end of

10. Wilks (o. c., I. 375) styles it in "absolute cession," which seems not quite correct. See Roberts' *History of India to the End of the E. I. Co.*, in *Historical Geography of the British Dependencies*, p. 111. There does not appear to have been any unconditional grant of the territory, its revenue being assigned for the maintenance of Bussy's troops "so long as they were in the service of the Subadar." As Vincent Smith points out, while Bussy retained power, the practical result was the same (see Smith, o. c., 477, f. n. 1).

11. Grant-Duff adversely remarks that "Bussy, if he found it inconvenient to replace him (Shah Nawāz Khān) in the ministry, had not even the

the seventh year of his office at Hyderabad, when he was at the zenith of his power, Bussy was recalled by Lally, the French Governor-General at Pondicherry, and the ascendancy he had built up by his great skill for his nation, was lost for ever.

Bussy acted as second brigadier during the siege of Madras and took part in the battle of Wandiwash, in which Sir Eyre Coote defeated Lally and took Bussy prisoner, January 22, 1760. Bussy was despatched to England but the ship which carried him being captured by a French man-o'-war, landed at Brest, March 9, 1761. In May, he married a cousin of Choiseul, the French minister; and soon exculpated himself of all the charges of venality and corruption brought against him by Lally. In 1765, he married Marie Charlotte Justine de Messey, his first wife having died on 5th March 1764. Retiring to his estates of Castelnau, he was, in 1777, invited to express his ideas about French intervention in India during the war of the North American Independence. He gave his opinion in a memorandum entitled "Reflections on Indian Affairs." Appointed to the conduct of military and diplomatic relations against the English in India, he left Paris, November 18, 1781, and was landed with French troops by Admiral Suffrein, to reinforce Cuddalore (then besieged by the English), on 16th March 1783, three months after Haidar Ali's death. Peace between France and England having been declared about this time, hostilities ceased in India and Bussy withdrew the French troops from the support of Tipū. He expressed

excuse of necessity for stooping to duplicity" and that "his conduct became entangled in the tricks and intrigue which true wisdom despises," thus tacitly hinting at Bussy's complicity in the murder (Grant-Duff, *o. c.*, I. 498). Malleon hardly touches on the subject; Prof. Martineau glosses over Bussy's conduct by merely adding that Shah Nawāz Khān "being accused of having instigated the murder of Haidar Jang, was massacred along with his son, before Bussy had time to reach him" (Martineau, *o. c.*, 281).

his thoughts on the future of the French in India, in a letter written to the minister Mons. de Castries, September 28, 1783, and in another dated 4th August 1784. Like many others of his time, he is said to have made a large fortune for himself; so fast, indeed, was the process in his case that he is said "in the course of a year to have passed from poverty to opulence." He died at Pondicherry, on January 7, 1785, in his sixty-fifth year, from an attack of gout. He had no issue by either of his wives.¹²

Bussy had greater political prescience than even Dupleix. When the "vague and magnificent" title of suzerain of Southern India from the Krishna to Cape Comorin was bestowed on Dupleix, that ambitious man was elated. He even contemplated assuming the title of Nawāb on the death of Chandā Sāhib. Bussy dissuaded him from doing so, for he saw that it would offend the English and make them wholly irreconcilable. Dupleix saw the absurdity of the idea and quickly yielded to the sound advice of Bussy. Bussy's success in the Deccan alarmed the Madras Council and they recalled Col. Heron from his expedition to Madura and Tinnevely in February 1755. While in the Deccan, Bussy took into his service that extraordinary person M. Marchand, who figures so prominently in the siege of Madura. On the recommendation of M. Dupleix and others, Bussy gave

12. For a brief but vivid account of Bussy in his days of decline at Pondicherry, see *Le Vieux Pondicherry* by Miss V. Labernadie, 368-374. This picture of the distinguished general as an effete, old man immured in his own tent, seeking the pleasures of the table and the harem as an Oriental Nawāb would, instead of answering the clang of the arms, seems, however, distinctly overdrawn to his disadvantage. In any case, it is one that requires more tangible evidence than is furnished by the learned authoress. He was only 65 years of age in 1785. Death claiming him as her own at the moment he was arranging to take over his dear old capital city and he, so victorious in building up France's dominion in India at one time, failing to see the *fleur de lise* flow over any French town in India when he was called away, is a theme for a portrait painter to depict.

Marchand the command of his own body-guard of hussars, an appointment which excited some jealousy, which Bussy never minded.¹³

Bussy was a careful officer. He weighed things before he came to a decision. He warned Lally against his rashness in proceeding in person against Muhammad Yusuf, during the siege of Madras (1758). Yusuf Khān and Capt. Preston had been urged by Lord Pigot to force their way into Madras. Preston, though he was against this apparently useless movement, prepared to obey on the 2nd February. He started at the head of 60 to 80 Europeans, 2,500 sepoy and 1,500 Indian cavalry and four guns. He proposed to cut his way through the enemy at Vepery (now part of Madras City) and thence on to St. Thome. Lally, whose cavalry had been constantly on the alert to meet the raiding parties of Yusuf Khān and Preston, hearing of the intended march, determined to deal with them in person. "In spite of my representations," wrote Bussy to De Leyrit on 14th February 1759, Lally himself marched against them. He then adds: He had nearly 600 Europeans, the *élite* of his army, more than 3,000 sepoy and 2,000 black horse. He was beaten and returned, accusing, according to his custom, his officers of cowardice."¹⁴

Bussy trained many Indian soldiers in the art of modern European warfare. One of these was Ibrahim Khān Garde, who was at the head of ten thousand artillery and infantry on the side of Sadāśiva Bhao, the commandar of the Mahratta forces at the battle of Panipat, 1761. Elphinstone wrote of Bussy as "the most distinguished of the officers of his nation that ever appeared in India."¹⁵

13. See Bussy's letter to De Leyrit, dated 25th February 1756. *Bibliothèque Nationale*, N. A. F. 9860, cited in Hill, *o.c.*, 125, f.n. 2.

14. Note to Lally's letter to de Leyrit, 14th February 1759. See *Letters to Bussy*, p. 86, note 2, appended to *Memoire pour le sieur de Bussy*, Paris, 1764, cited in Hill, *o.c.*, 83, f.n. 6.

15. Elphinstone, *History of India*, Ed. Cowel, 1894, p. 720.

Bussy was truly a great man of French colonial history and ranks not so much as a military genius but as a diplomat, who definitely held "that the departure of French (from India) would be followed by the arrival of the English, who would build their greatness on the ruins of the French;" and that "either you must dominate the Asiatic or you must be dominated by him." "He was certainly not superior to Duplex for his daringness of his plans; but Bussy transcends Duplex by his judiciousness and by his discernment... If Duplex was haughty, domineering absolutely in his ideas and obstinate in their realizations, Bussy was a greater master with a more supple mind, knowing better how to adapt himself to circumstances and drawing his inspiration from them."¹⁶

With this sketch of the career and character of Mons. de Bussy in the background, we may quote *in extenso* his connection with the politics of Mysore (1755):—

"After settling all things as well as he could," writes Prof. Martineau,¹⁷ "Bussy had gone back to Hyderabad at the beginning of January (1755) in order to make the necessary arrangements regarding an expedition to Mysore which had been agreed upon long before. According to an old custom, the ruler of Mysore paid his rent to his sovereign lord only after military pressure. Nothing had been paid since the death of Nizam-ul-Mulk, that is to say, since 1748, and the arrears amounted to about 50 lakhs, the annual tribute being about five lakhs.

THE FISCAL EXPEDITION OF MYSORE.

"Both Bussy and Godeheu were not very favourable to the expedition to Mysore. At the time of the

16. Martineau, *Bussy in the Deccan*, Miss Cammiade's translation, 156, 223, 297, 303.

17. *Ibid*, 209-220. We have also had the benefit of translation of this and other portions of Prof. Martineau's book by Rev. Father C. Browne, and Mrs. Adelina de Guiraldes, wife of the famous Argentine poet and novelist Ricardo Guiraldes, now of the Ramakrishna Mutt,—both of Bangalore, to whom our acknowledgments are due.

surrender of Law at Srirangam in 1752, the French had made an agreement with Mysore to conquer Trichinopoly. The armies of both the nations were even then at Srirangam waiting for a favourable opportunity to restart or to push on hostilities. Would it be wise of the French to join in an enterprise which, though not strictly speaking a military one, yet might alienate Mysore and cause it to join their enemies just at a moment when the French were about to encounter great difficulties perhaps with the English? Bussy was too refined a diplomat not to foresee the danger and backed by Godeheu, he at first tried, with all the diplomacy of which he possessed the secret, to dissuade Salabat Jang from this project. But his diplomacy failed for the first time. The Suba was in need of money and necessity caused him to utter words which were not intended to bring joy to Bussy. The prince had a very bad impression of the downfall of Dupleix and as the English took delight in giving out the report that this downfall had been brought about by them, this was a first blow to the French prestige. Later on, towards the end of January, it became known that a conditional agreement, the exact terms of which were not yet revealed, had been concluded whereby Muhammad Ali was recognised as the Nawab of the Carnatic, leaving aside the eminent rights of the Suba. The French discretion regarding the Mysore campaign led to the belief that either they had lost all authority or that they were traitors to the welfare of the Deccan. The Suba had an explanation with Bussy.

“ ‘This attitude,’ said he, ‘must be dictated by your own interests. Is this the return I get for the innumerable benefits with which I have overwhelmed the French? Should I not, on the contrary, expect their greatest eagerness for the welfare of my affairs? How else am I to re-establish my affairs but with this

expedition on which I am resolved? Do you think I have not waited long enough? I have been desprived of my revenues, from the province of Arcot, for the past four years. Owing to my complacency and your arrangements, I do not even know from whom I am to claim my dues. Must I push my complacency still further and abandon the only opportunity I might have of going to Mysore to claim my rights? Oh! this time it is too exacting of me! It seems to me that in this occasion you should strive for my welfare with as much zeal as I have myself taken care of yours.'

"This torrent of words, made more vivid by its tone and by gesture, annihilated Bussy. He had only feeble reasons to oppose these just reproaches. He was resolved to back out and he said that he would have given anything in the world to be exempted from playing such an unpleasant role. He dreaded that if he went too far, he might blast the reputation of uprightness which he had and in which laid all his strength. He would have been exceedingly happy if the matter ended with this first reproach. But the next day the Suba renewed his complaints in full durbar. The whole court shared his feeling of indignation which animated the Suba and looked upon the French nation as a most ungrateful monster. The rumour became general, fear alone kept the word traitor from being uttered. It does not appear as though Bussy had been present at this meeting, but that very day he received the following letter from the Suba :

" 'I have understood and pondered over all that you have said and represented to me about our Mysore's expedition. Till now I have relied on the friendship of the French, convinced that they were keen about my interests and as for you, I have considered you as my brother. But all that you say in favour of the Zemindar of Mysore and the round-about way in which you are

trying to dissuade me from going to exact the tribute due to me, lead me to think that I have been mistaken. Every notable man in my army is astonished that you should seem more zealous for the welfare of that Zemindar than for mine. I appeal to your sense of justice. You are fully aware that since five years, out of consideration for your nation, I did not claim the tribute due from the Carnatic. This rich province has now fallen into the hands of my enemies who have deprived me of more than one crore of rupees. The Marathas have despoiled me of one half of my kingdom of Aurengabad and of the greater part of Candesh and Berar. I admit that if it had not been for you, I might have lost the whole of those provinces. Chicacole, Rajamundry, Ellore and Moustafanagar, which the Hyderabad ruler considers as the apple of his eye, have been given for the maintenance of your army, so that you might easily obtain what you need for their upkeep while you were expected to do in return all in your power for my welfare. You know how stranded I am to provide for the sustenance of my army, you have been a witness to the various cabals and revolts which resulted from this. This tribute, due to me by my vassals, is the sole source of revenue left to me. I was not able to raise this tribute during the five years it has taken me to bring order, with your help, throughout the Deccan. The perfidious Zemindars pay in their tribute only when compelled to do so; the Mysore Zemindar has paid nothing for the past six years. When my father and my brother appeared with their armies within his territory, he gave them something like 30 to 40 lakhs. I always intended going to Mysore myself; the opportunity occurred only this year and I find that you are opposed to it. This is what leads me to believe that you are not interested in my welfare. As I get no tribute from the ruler of the Carnatic nor from the Zemindar of Mysore, to what avail is

the French alliance to me? There is nothing else left for me to do but to become a fakir. If you persist in opposing this expedition, give me back Mazulipatam, Divy, Devaracottah, Condavir and the other territories which were given to your nation purely as gifts and also Chicacole, Rajamundry, Ellore and Moustafanagar which were given for the upkeep of your troops; then I will set to work according to my own views and bring back order in this country with whatever help I shall be able to obtain.

“‘This comparison which would be made of the French and the English would allow me to fix my choice. The English have helped the meanest of my servants, Muhammad Ali, and have raised him to his present position. If you, who are the allies of the lawful master, allow his affairs to deteriorate, where does your honour stand? You are an intelligent man, think of all that I have said. You have done so much for me, you seemed so attached to all that concerned me that I consider you as a brother’ (A. C. C. 286, P. 88-93).

“The whole of this letter was so full of logic that Bussy realized that his situation became daily more and more embarrassing and difficult. He asked instructions from Pondicherry, but Godeheu had just left hurriedly for France (16th February) and the Council of three administrators in charge of the Government, while awaiting the arrival of his successor, Mr. de Leyrit, declared that they did not think they had been empowered to give any orders in the matter. They considered this matter was too delicate for them alone to take a decisive step. Mr. de Leyrit would have to decide it (letter of 21st March).

THE MYSORE EXPEDITION.

“Salabat Jang called out so insistently that his voice dominated everything else. As early as the 2nd March,

Bussy notified to the Council at Pondicherry that the matter could no longer be postponed; the French had to go along to Mysore with Salabat Jang unless they were resolved to lose all they had: the very terms of the agreement, whereby the Circars were ceded to them, obliged them to do so.

"They started a few days later and as it was not strictly speaking a military expedition, they met with no hindrance. The inhabitants were aware that it was the usual way of collecting the taxes, so they withheld from any resistance, lest their own taxes be increased. On the other hand, the troops too refrained from provoking the people or from being hostile to them. Only one tiny fort, along the path, refused victuals and had some shots fired on our troops; within an hour's time, the fort had been silenced and the tributes doubled.

"At first Salabat Jang did not intend to proceed beyond the boundaries of Mysore and resolved to wait there for the tribute to be brought to him, but he was told that Balaji Rao was about to attack Mysore from the north-west in order to get his share of booty. But Bussy, who had secret relations with the Prime Minister of Mysore, made him understand that there was a way to avoid the attack. Since Mysore would have to pay out, whether he wished it or not, it would be better if Salabat Jang himself came up to the walls of Seringapatam where he would appear to the Marathas as the liberator of the country. The question of equitable contribution could then be settled. Things were carried out accordingly and the army set out marching.

"Salabat Jang would have wished to use this opportunity to force the Raja to restitute all the lands and fortresses which he had seized since the death of the Nizam. He wished also the Raja should come in

person to pay his homage as an outward acknowledgment of his subordination. On Bussy's insistence, Salabat Jang agreed to give up these two claims. In the meantime a daughter was born to the Raja; so Salabat Jang, on Bussy's suggestion, was pleased to confer, on that child, the fortress of Ascola and its dependencies, as a Jagir; this represented a gift of two lakhs of rupees. Bussy sent his confidential man, Haidar Jang, to be present at the investiture; the child was placed on the knees of Haidar Jang, while a pearl necklace worth six to seven thousand rupees was put on its neck, in Bussy's name.

"Thus Bussy had attained his double aim, *viz.*, the entente between the French and Mysore had not been broken up and the Marathas had stayed back in their country. There only remained the accounts to be settled between Salabat Jang and the Raja. This was quite easy. The Raja acknowledged being a vassal of the Mogol Emperor whose lieutenant in Southern India the Suba was. The Raja likewise agreed to pay 50 lakhs, of which 12 lakhs were to be paid down cash immediately, and 8 more lakhs within three months; 11 lakhs were to be given in jewels and the balance of 19 lakhs either in assignments or in letters of credit. This arrangement proved satisfactory to all and more especially to the Suba himself, who owed 70 lakhs to his troops. The Mysore contribution was an appreciable amount to him, so that Salabat Jang no longer hesitated to proclaim Bussy's fame with greater vehemence than he had used three months previously to doubt Bussy's fidelity. He wrote on the 21st March to Mr. de Leyrit:

"All that Mr. de Bussy did during the past five years that he has been beside me is as nothing when compared to what he has done during this last campaign which has been most glorious not only to the French name but also the security and support of my government. I find

no words to express all the praise due to him for all the trouble he has taken and for the careful way in which he reached his ends. I am render obligation to him for the money which has come into my treasury . . . All I have, I owe to his bravery while all my happiness is due to the French under his command. Were he ever to leave me, I swear that I will then and there hand over my government to any man who wants to take charge of it and I will retire into some unknown corner. I think of him only as a brother with whom I wish to share the honours of the subadary' (A. C. C. 2, 86 P. 98-101).

" Even the Raja of Mysore aknowledged and sang the praises of Bussy. Towards the end of May he wrote to Bussy that he thanked at Almighty 'for having come with your troops and those of the Mogul, your ally, to settle, through your mediation, all my affairs. So that, although I had incurred some losses previously, I was in a position to satisfy the Moguls. I even swear by God that it is through your help that my life, my country, my honour and even my creed itself have been preserved. I have no friends among Europeans except Frenchmen; my one hope for the future is that you should always continue extending to me the same favour and protection as by the past' (A.C. 3. 86. p. 101-103).

" Mr. de Leyrit had reached Pondicherry in the meantime. Bussy might have thought that he had seen the end of all future worry, if the daily invasion of the Carnatic by the English had not given him cause to think and fear that some day the Deccan too might be undermined by better organised and more powerful cabals than those which had caused him a great deal of anxiety the preceding February.

" *The re-echo of the Mysore affair on the English policy* : The more fortunate than truly glorious Mysore expedition gave the biggest impetus to the policy which the English were to carry out thereafter, in the Carnatic,

though it may not have actually caused it. The conditional treaty drawn up by Saunders and Godehen on the 11th January stated among other terms that both the Companies would not intervene in the quarrels which might occur among the Indian princes and that each one would remain in its respective positions till such time as the two interested nations in Europe had come to some conclusion. But this treaty did not specify Muhammad Ali or any other prince, nor did it fix the positions held by the English or the French troops nor did it give their enumeration. No boundaries were fixed. Therefore there was matter for controversy, but when dealing with adversaries who are more keen on their interests than on truth, every controversy easily turns acrimonious and carries a risk of war.

"When Bussy was marching back light-heartedly with his troops from Seringapatam, little did he think that the English were going to make use of his intervention to claim similar rights in other parts of India. In fact it was the argument which Pigot, the Governor of Madras, put forward shortly after, when the French reproached him for having interfered in the affairs of Madura and Vellore and their excessive entry into those of the Carnatic. Leyrit explained that the two cases were not alike; the reply was that although it might be true that the French had received no payment from Mysore, yet they were being indirectly paid by the Circars. Why should the English not enjoy similar rights to receive subsidies from their allies and lend them a helping hand when necessary? The whole of the Franco-English conflict rests on this ambiguity which took its source at Seringapatam.

"We give below a letter from Pigot, taken at random from among many similar ones, which explains, though it does not justify, the whole of the English policy.

This letter was sent to Leyrit and is dated 1st February 1756 :—

‘ Please think, Sir, of your various enterprises since the conclusion of the treaty, all of which I have carefully noted. Please think of the amount of money exacted by Mr. de Bussy at the head of a body of French troops, from the Raja of Mysore who certainly was never a vassal of your nation. Please note that you have had troops marched through the territory of Taureour (a little to the north of Trichinopoly) and that you drove away the one who commanded at the time of the truce solely because he had not paid the customary tribute.

‘ Please remember the various marches undertaken by Mr. de Bussy in the Northern provinces, through territories of princes who undoubtedly were not dependent on him, the contributions he raised on all sides and the unlimited authority he established.

‘ After thinking seriously on all that I have stated above, please be kind enough to compare the conduct, which we have held since the truce, with that of your nation which had no right whatsoever except that of possessing a day during which you were left free to govern a part of the province in which rights, if any, belonged to the Nawab. We only accompanied the latter when he went to collect the tribute due to him in such parts of the province which were subject to him at the time the peace was concluded ’ (A. C. C. 2. 91. P. 229).

“ The distance between Seringapatam and Hyderabad, as the crow flies, is 550 kilometers. The return journey had no incident. On reaching the Krishna they found the river was rising every minute owing to heavy rains in the highlands. The troops did not dare to ford it. Bussy and Salabat Jang sat on the same elephant while the army taking advantage of a slight fall in the river, followed two days later. Hyderabad was reached on the 13th or 14th July.”

Comment seems needless. The above passage speaks for itself. The injustice of the expedition, the acknowledgement of its inglorious character, Bussy's personal dislike of it, his hesitation, the false reasoning adopted by Salābat Jang, the fallacious grounds on which the claim was preferred, the handle it gave the English at Madras, all throw a lurid light on the corrupt politics of the period. With Bussy, as with the rest of the politicians and diplomats of the time, the end always justified the means. The embarrassment felt by Bussy vanished when Salābat's pressure became heavy. He, without further trouble of conscience, proceeded to nullify his nation's engagement with Mysore, and to execute the treaty which he himself had concluded with Salābat. The French were by treaty in strict alliance with Mysore; and they found themselves they were also bound by treaty to fight all the battles of Salābat Jang, and consequently to treat as enemies their allies of Mysore. This dilemma was perceived by Bussy, and while credit is due to him for trying to prevent hostility, blame attaches to him for yielding eventually to a course of action which was essentially immoral. He did what he, a man of honor and probity, should not have done. Such are the meshes of diplomacy in which a diplomat may find himself at times when morality is given the go-by. Wilks' defence of Bussy that he felt the embarrassment but that he could not prevent hostilities, sounds like special pleading in the case of a person who should have known what he was about (see Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 385). It would be tantamount to the confession that necessity knows no law. The fact is that Bussy saw he had to use force and he scrupled not to use it. Dēvarājaiya, the Daḷavāi, being, at the time, unable to resist, had to yield and yielded to it, though not without resisting it as much as he could. That is a redeeming feature in his character. He would

not surrender, even if he had to in his exhausted state, without striking a blow for his country.

(8) THE TRICHINOPOLY QUESTION, 1755—1761.

The question of the surrender of Trichinopoly to Mysore with a view to recovering the debt due by Nawāb Muhammad Ali Wālājah to the English East India Company, continued to engage the attention of the Court of Directors in London and their Agent and Governor at Fort St. George, Madras, since 1755.

On October 14, 1755 the *Secret Committee* of the Court of Directors, London, thus advised the *Select Committee* of the Governor's Council, Fort St. George, Madras¹⁸:

"Have received with great pleasure the provisional treaty concluded between Saunders and Godeheu, as it may lead to a definitive treaty; but the present political situation has prevented further negotiations. Meanwhile the Council should try to maintain peace on the Coromandel Coast..... Peace is essential for the recovery of the Nawab's debt. As Trichinopoly is the best security for that debt, it must be secured against either open attack or surprise. Suggest that the negotiations begun between Saunders and the Mysore Vakil for its surrender might lead to an advantageous conclusion, if this could be done without any breach of faith towards the Nawab, the King of Tanjore or any other Indian ally of the Company: "

Again, on February 13, 1756 they directed: ¹⁹

"In view of the strong desire of the King of Mysore to obtain Trichinopoly, we think that its delivery to him to be highly advantageous if thereby his alliance can be secured without injuring the King of Tanjore who has acted as a good friend and ally, and if the Nawab's interests be 'attended to so far as circumstances will admit'

18. *Mad. Des.* (1754-1765), p. 53.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

and his whole debt can be thus recovered. The proposals of Venkata Rao, the Mysore Vakil, to Saunders, recorded in Military Consultations, May 13, 1754, seem to offer a good basis for a treaty equally beneficial to the Company, the Nawab and Tanjore. Negotiations should be entered with Mysore on these lines, preferably by Robert Orme, or, if his health will not permit, by some other capable person. But the Commissary is to conclude nothing finally, and his proposals are to be laid before the whole Council for their approval. The utmost secrecy must be observed. Trichinopoly must not be given up without receiving the whole of the Nawab's debt or fully equivalent security. Difficulties may perhaps arise with the Nawab, but every effort must be made to conciliate him, but, if that is impossible, the recovery of his debt and an alliance with Mysore are prime objects, especially when the French may renew war on the Coast..."

On November 20, 1756, the *Select Committee* at Fort St. George, reported to the *Secret Committee*:²⁰

"Are attempting to negotiate a treaty with the King of Mysore for the recovery of the Company's debt [*Vide* Military Consultations, May 13, 1754, and October 25, 1756] but have made no public advances for fear of alarming the Nawab and the King of Tanjore. Do not expect that the King of Mysore will consent to the treaty. From what Lawrence and Palk reported in 1754, it is doubtful whether Venkata Rao's proposal was ever approved by the King of Tanjore. The Dalaway might perhaps have consented to pay 30 or 35 lakhs, which was then the amount of the Nawab's debt, but is unlikely to be willing to engage for the amount it has now risen to. But even if he were willing, it is doubtful whether so large a sum could be found owing to the contributions levied twice by the Marathas and once by Salabat Jang and as the civil wars which have raged there still continue.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

Have not heard anything from Venkata Rao since he left Madras. The Committee are endeavouring to ascertain the attitude of the Mysore Darbar and if there is the least chance of a treaty, will start negotiations without delay. Orme has agreed to undertake the management of the business and is at present in correspondence with Venkata Rao..."

Again, on February 28, 1757, they submitted: ²¹

"Orme's secret negotiations [with Mysore] have not produced any result worth mentioning..."

On November 11, 1757, the *Secret Committee* observed. ²²

"Recognize the difficulty of the Mysore negotiations, but it will be of great service if they can ever be brought to success..."

On October 5, 1758, the *Select Committee* reported: ²³

"Orme has received no answer to his letter to Venkata Rao, approved in Private Committee of February 1..."

On January 23, 1759, however, the *Secret Committee* recorded and instructed: ²⁴

"Have read the minutes of the Private Committee, February 1, 1758, [missing] in which Orme reports receiving a letter from Venkata Rao of Mysore offering 30 lakhs of Rupees for the surrender of Trichinopoly, and stating that this is the utmost that the King of Mysore will give, and that a Vakil is being sent to Madras. Agree with the Madras Committee that this offer was not sincere and expect that little further progress has been made. However as the Nawab's debt is an object of the highest concern, no opportunity should be lost of getting as large a satisfaction for it as circumstances will permit. The orders of February 13, 1756, recognise that the Company's honour and interest are

21. *Ibid*, p. 91.

22. *Ibid*, p. 153.

23. *Ibid*, p. 169.

24. *Ibid*, pp. 191-192.

closely connected with the Nawab's credit and advantage. But if his affairs should be in such distress that our future support will rather increase than decrease his debt, he must consent to such terms as are most conducive to our interest, 'for although we are willing to aid and assist this our faithful but unfortunate ally, we must not sacrifice ourselves.' But no steps may be taken that will dishonour the English name. The Nawab should be convinced that the proposed measures are fair and reasonable; and the Committee are then at liberty to execute their own determinations in case he will not be reasonable. Trichinopoly 'being a stake of the last importance,' it should not be delivered up, except for a sum nearly adequate to the Nawab's debt; nor should the Committee engage to guarantee its possession to any one; nor again should it pass to the French or their allies. Under such conditions, 30 lakhs may be deemed a fair equivalent for it. Before any definite action is taken, the scheme must be approved by the Governor and Council....."

But, on March 13, 1761, they communicated to the President and the rest of the *Select Committee* at Fort St. George, thus: ²⁵

"We observe with pleasure your application and care to reduce the Nabob's immense debt; we much approve of what you have done in securing the revenues of Arcot. The Nabob ought to be sensible of the great distresses we are plunged into rather than sacrifice his interest and submit to bear his share of the inconveniences. The treaty formerly directed to be negotiated with the King of Mysore and Venkata Row we by no means approve and absolutely revoke all power heretofore given you of compounding for Trichinopoly.

25. *Mily. Desp. from Court*, II. 25, Paras 10 and 11. See also *Mad. Desp.*, p. 257 (Summary).

"The Nabob's account should not be loaded with partial charges but a war with France does not, in our judgment, make any material difference. It enables us, with great assistance from government, to give him powerful and secure protection, and in peace we have been under the necessity of doing the same to the extent [of] our abilities; however this and many other points must be determined when we come to a final adjustment, and we certainly shall expect an equitable equivalent for interest on the vast sums of money for many years advanced and owing."

(9) COPY OF AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BY BAKSHI KRISHNAIYA OF MYSORE WITH NAWAB MUHAMMAD ALI WALAJAH, JUNE 1761.²⁶

"I, Bany Krishnaya, Bakshey in the service of the Jagadavakar [King of Mysore], do give the following agreement:

"Whereas in order to punish Hyder Naick upon condition that an army of 1000 soldiers, 3000 seapoys, 200 troopers and 1000 black horse, 15 guns and 5 mortars, lead, gun powder and other necessary stores of war are sent from Nabob Aneverdy Cawn's court and the punishment of the said Hyder Naick is effected, I agree to pay ten lacks of Rupees to the Circar with the sum of 100,000 monthly for the charges of the above troops according to the particulars hereunder written. I shall deliver up the fort of Dindigal with its districts to the Circar and shall not demand the district of Caroor. When the above troops arrive for the assistance, they are not to molest the inhabitants of our villages and gadys in any respect whatsoever. I shall no ways deviate from this agreement. If the Circar acts contrary thereto, then this agreement is to be of no force. Thus I give this that it may be of service in time of need.

26. *Count. Corres.*, IX. p. 84, No. 142.

“Particulars of the troops: 1000 English soldiers one with another at 20 each per month. 3000 seapoys at 15 each per month. 200 Troopers at 35 per month. 1000 Black Horse at 30 per month. 20 guns and mortars at 500 per month.”

(10) THE MAHRATTAS IN MYSORE.

The story of the Mahrattas in Mysore has its origins in Vijayanagar times. Mahratta families, while they generally sought service under the neighbouring Shāhi States of Bijāpur, Gōlkoṇḍa and Ahmaḍnagar, seem to have been occasionally connected also, in some capacity or other, with the administration of the great Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar in its heyday (1336-1565). From a lithic record of Sadāśiva (1542-1570), dated in 1544²⁷, we learn that a Mahratta nobleman by name Viṭhalēś-varadēva-Mahā-Arasu was a Viceroy of his (*Śrīman Mahāmaṇḍalēśvara Śrī Marāteya Viṭhalēśvara Dēva Mahā-Arasu*) in the Śivanasamudra-sīma, and that his jurisdiction extended over Bangalore, where he was represented by an agent (*Kārya-karta*.)

On the fall of Vijayanagar (1565) and the shifting of the Imperial capital to Penukoṇḍa, direct connection of the Mahrattas with the Hindu Empire of the South almost ceased, and they found increasing opportunities of serving under their Muslim sovereigns (particularly of Bijāpur), and distinguishing themselves as civil and military officers for over one hundred years—a period which was marked in the main by the rapid decline of the Empire under the fourth or the Āravīḍu Dynasty, the gradual rise to prominence of the kingdom of Mysore under the Woḍeyars, and the systematic penetration into the Karnāṭak and far south of the arms of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa. The names of Shāhji, Mādāji, Vēdōji, Anantōji and Bālāji Haibat Rao, among others, loom

large in the history of this period as Mahratta officers taking an active part in the Karnāṭak expeditions under Muslim leaders.

To Shāhji (1594-1664), son of Māloji Bhōnsle, however, definitely belongs the credit of having laid the foundations of the Mahratta power, and begun the first Mahratta settlement, in Mysore. Changing his allegiance alternately to Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur and the Mughal Emperor, that remarkable man, ultimately in 1632, went over to the Adil Shah of Bijāpur. In 1637-1638, he accompanied Raṇadullā Khān on his invasion of the Karnāṭak and about the close of 1638 was placed in charge of Bangalore, taken from Immaḍi Kempe-Gauḍa of Māgaḍi (1569-1655). During the next twenty-five years—interrupted by a short interval of his arrest and imprisonment at Bijāpur (in 1649-1650), Shāhji, while ostensibly attached to the interests of his master, the Bijāpur Sultān, gradually extended his sway over parts of Bangalore and Kōlār districts, ruling them in an independent capacity assisted by Mahratta Brāhmans as officials, and maintaining unimpaired the Hindu traditions of government in the conquered tracts.²⁸ Meantime, about the middle of 1654, the wars of Bijāpur and Gōlkoṇḍa in the Karnāṭak were practically over, the two powers finally accomplishing the division of their conquests in 1656. The Bijāpur-belt of territory to the north of the kingdom of Mysore, under the arrangement effected, went by the designation of *Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Bālagḥāt*, while the territory below the Ghāṭs, almost coterminous with the south-eastern frontier of Mysore, by the designation of *Karnāṭak-Bijāpur-Pāyangḥāt*. Shāhji was continued in charge of the entire tract, being confirmed in the possessions of Bangalore, Hoskōṭe, Kōlār, Doḍballāpur and Sīra as his *Jahgīr*. These

28. *Vide* inscriptions of Shāhji's time, cited below

developments tended to increase the power and prestige of Shāhji locally and we find him in 1657²⁹ referring to himself as *Ajaraka Khān Mahārāja Rājāsri Sāhujī-rājā Sāheb*. With Bangalore, the head-quarters of the *Jahgīr*, as the base of his power in the South and his ancestral fiefs of Poona and Supa in the distant north under his second son Śivāji (the eldest Sambhaji I having died in 1653), Shāhji, in the service of Bijāpur, continued his warlike activities in the Karnāṭak till his own accidental death at Basavāpaṭṇa in January 1664.³⁰

Thereupon Ēkōji (Venkōji), son of Shāhji by his second wife Tukā Bāi Mōhite, stepped into the Mahratta inheritance in Mysore. Indeed there is evidence³¹ of Ēkōji having succeeded to the patrimony as early as 1662, if not 1664. Evidently Shāhji already during his lifetime had nominated him to the *Jahgīr*. Theoretically exercising the powers of a Bijāpur general, Ēkōji stayed in Bangalore till his conquest of Tanjore from the Nāyaka family, and his eventual usurpation of all sovereign authority there in 1675. From hence he threw off his allegiance to Bijāpur, and Tanjore became his head-quarters. Ēkōji's conquest of Tanjore, though a distinct loss to Bijāpur, was a landmark of considerable significance from the Mahratta point of view. With Bangalore as the nucleus of his power, it meant the first step in the advance of the Mahrattas in South India at

29. *E. C.*, IX N1. 69.

30. Shāhji, when he died at Basavāpaṭṇa in January 1664, possessed the fort of Ārni, Porto Novo and the territory of Tanjore. He continued in obedience to Adil Shah who allowed him to retain his acquisitions (Duff, *Mahrattas*, I. 156). In March 1677, Śivāji marched southwards. After reaching Trivadi, Śivāji came to Vellore, which had surrendered previous to his arrival. Carnaticgurrh and two other places—Jagadēva-garh and Mahārājagarh—were reduced. *Vedō Bhāskar*—a Brāhman who had been in charge of Ārni since Shāhji's days—brought up the keys of the fort and tendered his services to Śivāji, by whom he was continued in his command and his two sons taken into the service (*Ibid.*, 218). The story of the Ārni Jaghir remains yet to be written

31. *Ibid.*, X Sd. 47.

just the time when Bijāpur and Gōlkonḍa, hard pressed by the Mughals and the Mahrattas (under Śivāji) in the Deccan, had to retire homeward, leaving their Karnāṭak possessions under their deputies to their own fate.

Even after his conquest of Tanjore, Ēkōji continued to maintain a foothold on the distant *Jahgīr* of Bangalore, while the Mahratta arms under him gradually went about establishing themselves on the frontiers of the growing kingdom of Mysore and proceeded as far as Trichinopoly by 1676. Ēkōji's government of Tanjore since 1675, however, had been far from satisfactory, and this eventually led to Raghunath-Pant, the able confidential minister of Shāhji—then in charge of Ēkōji's heritage in Mysore—organising an expedition to the Karnāṭak under the rising power of Śivāji (half-brother of Ēkōji) from the Deccan in 1677, with a view to securing the kingdom of Tanjore, and perhaps the sovereignty of the entire South, to him. The expedition, while it was on the whole attended with success, left Ēkōji practically master of Tanjore and Śivāji after passing through his ancestral possessions in Mysore returned to the Deccan about April 1678. Incidentally, Śivāji's invasion of the Karnāṭak left the sovereignty of the kingdom of Mysore undisturbed, his progress in that direction in August 1677 (during his march from Gingee) having been definitely arrested by her then ruler, Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar (1673-1704), who, as the natural heir and successor of the Vijayanagar Empire, had asserted his claim to rule from the throne of the Karnāṭaka country as early as 1675, under the titles *Karnāṭaka-Chakravarti* and *Dakṣiṇadik-Chakravarti*.

Mahratta sovereignty in the South, however, tended rapidly to assume a definite shape in the wake of Śivāji's expedition to the Karnāṭak, and more particularly after his death in April 1680. Of that sovereignty, extension of Mahratta power and influence over the length and

breadth of South India, and the establishment of outposts at convenient points, which would enable them to levy and realise their dues (the *Chauth* and *Sardēsmukhi*) from the conquered tracts, were the prime features. Already by 1678 the Mahrattas had been reckoned a force in South India. Besides Bangalore, Gingee, Vellore and Tanjore had become the strongholds of the Mahrattas there. And between 1678-1680 they were extending the sphere of their activities from the Karnātak-Bijāpur-Bālgāṭ in the north up to Trichinopoly in the far south. Further, in keeping with the theory of Mahratta sovereignty, we find³² Sambhāji II, son and successor of Śivāji, assuming the title of Emperor (*Sambhōji Chakravarti*) for the first time in July 1680.

In the realization of their ambition, however, the Mahrattas, during 1680-1686, found themselves drawn into an inevitable conflict with Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar of Mysore, who, as the sole representative of the Vijayanagar Empire in South India, had been since 1673 systematically extending the frontiers of his kingdom at the expense of Madura in the far south and Bijāpur in the north, and in 1682 laid siege to Trichinopoly itself, the objective of southern expansion of Mysore ever since 1642. In that conflict, the Mahrattas, though at first they sustained serious reverses in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam during a diversion of their forces from Trichinopoly in 1682, eventually came out successful, and were in July 1686 obliged to come to terms with Mysore and retire from the south, hard pressed in their homelands by the advance of the Mughal arms on the Deccan.

The withdrawal of the Mahrattas was followed by the fall of Bijāpur (September 1686), the influx of the Mughals into South India and the rapid recovery by

32. *Ibid.*, Mb. 117.

Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar from the effects of the Mahratta wars in Mysore. These circumstances doubtless told heavily on Ēkōji, who found it exceedingly difficult and expensive to maintain Bangalore, the seat of his father's *Jahgīr* in Mysore, from distant Tanjore. Accordingly, early in 1687, he managed to sell it through his *vakīl* to Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar for rupees three lakhs. The place finally passed into the possession of Mysore on July 14, 1687, after nearly fifty years of Mahratta sway there.

Mahratta connection with portions of Bangalore, Kolar and Tumkur districts—which originally formed part of Shāhji's *jahgīr*—however, continued during the closing years of the seventeenth century (1687-1700) and a greater part of the eighteenth, down to 1761. Mahratta armies and irregulars freely passed through these tracts during their struggles with the Mughals in the Karnāṭak (1689-1698). Again, during the renewed bid for supremacy in the South in the eighteenth century (c. 1720-1761), these tracts, with their well-garrisoned outposts, formed the base of operations of the Pēshwas against the kingdom of Mysore and other rivals (like the Nizām and the Nawābs of Arcot) as far as Trichinopoly, and provided a fertile ground for their systematic collection of the *Chauth* and *Sardēśmukhi* in the Karnāṭak and the realisation of Pēshwa Bālāji Bāji Rao's (1740-1761) grand ideal of Hindu Empire (*Hindu-pād-Pādshāhi*). The soaring ambition of Bālāji Rao was unluckily frustrated by the last battle of Pānipat (1761), when under the stress of necessity he had to recall his reserve forces from Mysore for the service of his country and nation; and this contributed not a little to complete the usurpation by Haider Ali of Mysore, followed by his acquisition of Mahratta outposts in rapid succession. Mahratta power in Mysore thus ended as fortuitiously as it had begun, though they never ceased to have an

eye on the kingdom, and sought to maintain diplomatic relations with the court of Seringapatam throughout the regime of Haidar and Tipū (1761-1799); while individual Mahrattas had increasing opportunities for distinguishing themselves as civil and military officers in the State during the period of Restoration and after—from 1799 onwards—a period marked by the decline and fall of the Mahratta Empire in India.

Memorials of Mahratta sway in Mysore extend over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These are invariably lithic inscriptions in Kannaḍa and come from parts of Bangalore, Channapaṭṇa, Hoskōṭe, Nelamangala, Doḍballāpur, Kōlār, Mulbāgal, Chintāmaṇi, Śrīnivāsa-pur, Bāgepalli, Madhugiri and Channagiri taluks. They bear out in an ample measure that the Mahratta domination over this area was something more than its mere temporary occupation by an alien power, and indicate to some extent that it was closely bound up with the well-being of the local populace with whom they had to come into intimate contact in everyday life.

The earliest of these documents, dated November 3, 1637,³³ records the grant of a rent-free land in Hasugūr by the Śrīmanta, the *Dēśakulakarṇi* Sāmanna. The next series of records belong to the time of Shāhji and range from 1647 to 1663. One of these, dated September 29, 1657,³⁴ registers his gift of lands in Lakkūr (Nelamangala taluk) to Bāvanūr Ahammad, for his own merit. Another, dated January 12, 1660,³⁵ refers to his grant of the village of Nāguvalli, in Channapaṭṇa-sthala, as a rent-free estate to Siddalinge Gauḍa. A third, dated October 5, 1660,³⁶ records a gift of land to Antrāji-Paṇḍita (a Mahratta Brāhman official under Shāhji). A

33. *E.C.*, Xsd. 49: *Īvara*, *Kartika* *ba.* 12.

34. *Ibid.*, IX Nl. 69: *Hēvilambi*, *Āṣviṇa* *su.* 2.

35. *Ibid.*, Cp. 26: *Vikari*, *Māgha* *su.* 10.

36. *Ibid.*, XKl. 176: *Śarvārī*, *Āṣviṇa* *su.* 12.

fourth, dated September 1, 1661,³⁷ relates to a grant of dry fields of the sowing capacity of 100½ *Khaṇḍugas* to Byalisi Javiranna. And a fifth, dated May 1, 1663,³⁸ registers a gift of land yielding 6 *Khaṇḍugas* of paddy to one Alambigiri Tippa Setti for having caused the old tank of Hōlūr belonging to Kōlār restored. Again, one of the records, dated March 3, 1647,³⁹ relates to a grant by Sambhāji I (eldest son of Shāhji) of the village of Hanchipur to Channabasappa Waḍēr of the Saji-Maṭha. Another, dated November 5, 1653,⁴⁰ refers to the rent-free gift (*Kaṭṭu-Koḍige*) of the village Koṇḍiganahalli by Kanayāja Paṇḍit, agent of Sambhāji for the border district of Kōlār-sīme. A third, dated October 20, 1654,⁴¹ relates to a grant by the same official of land under the Muduvādi-Mallasamudra tank to Chandaya Tambarahalli Dêpê-Gauḍa for having constructed the tank. A fourth, dated August 16, 1661,⁴² records the construction of a pillar for the service of God Venkaṭeśvara of the Bêvūr hill, in the Maḷūr hōbli of Channapaṭṇa-sṭhala, by Duṇḍōji Haibat Rao (son of Bālāji Haibat Rao), another official under Shāhji. And a fifth, dated March 14, 1662,⁴³ refers to the gift of a rent-free land (*nettaru-Koḍige*) by Bāranāji Rāja, *Havāldār* of Rahadurga under Shāhji, in honour of Sīmangala Chikka-Dēvā's son Timmappa (who fell, perhaps, in a battle). We have, again, a record of Ēkōji's time, dated January 20, 1666,⁴⁴ in which Jayitā Bāi (? daughter-in-law of Shāhji) makes a grant of the Uttūr village in the Kōlār-sīme (belonging to Kōlār-chāvaḍi) as an *agrahāra* to one

37. *M.A.R.* 1923, P. 45, No. 10: *Plava, Bhādrapada* ba. 3.

38. *E.C.*, XK1, 219: *Sōbhakrit, Vaiśākha* su. 5.

39. *Ibid.*, IXDb. 28: *Vyaya, Phalguṇa* su. 7.

40. *Ibid.*, XMb. 154: *Vijaya, Kārtika* ba. 11.

41. *Ibid.*, K1. 193: *Jaya, Āśvīja* ba. 5.

42. *Ibid.*, IX Op. 68: *Plava, Bhādrapada* su. 2.

43. *Ibid.*, X Sd. 47: *Sōbhakrit, Chaitra* su. 5.

44. *Ibid.*, K1. 227: *Vīśvāvasu, Pushya* ba. 10.

Bhāvūji-Pant, son of Virūpāksha-Śankara of Kāśyapa-Gōtra. Another, dated in 1669,⁴⁵ inscribed on the rock to the south of the Mallēśvara temple, Bangalore, registers the grant by Ēkōji, on the application of the “*Mahā-nādu*” of Bangalore (*Bengalūru*), of the village of Mēdara-Ninganahalli as a *mānya* for the God Mallikārjuna of Mallāpura (now *Mallēśwaram*). Among the records of the time of Sambhāji II (son of Śivāji), one, dated July 31, 1680,⁴⁶ communicates an order (*nirūpa*) of his to the *Kārūkūn* of Kōlār regarding the gift to one Venkaṭēsa Śāstri, son of Chennai Bhaṭṭa, of the village Uttanūr-Maḍavāla with all rights. Another, dated January 29, 1685,⁴⁷ relates to the grant of a plot of land of the sowing capacity of half a *Khaṇḍuga* in the Agrahār village, Hoskōṭe taluk, for the worship of God Mādēśvara, by Dēvaiya Nāyak. And a third, dated January 4, 1686,⁴⁸ registers the gift by Malukōji (? son of Sambhāji) of the village of Avalambagiri (Alamgiri), in the Kaivāra-sthala of the Kōlār-sīme, for services to God Tiruvengalanātha.

Among the epigraphs of the eighteenth century, one, dated in April 1727,⁴⁹ refers to the grant by Manukōji-Rāja of land to Haḍakanahalli Baira-Gauḍa as a rent-free estate. Two documents, dated January 15, 1728,⁵⁰ relate to a gift by Anṇāji to Śēshō-Pant for having built a big tank in front of Sulibele, Hoskōṭe taluk. A fourth, dated January 10, 1740,⁵¹ records a grant by Subēdār Yaṇṭāji-Basale to Mari-Gauḍa for a similar service in front of Dāsērahalli, near Vokkalēri, Kōlār taluk. A

45. M.A.R., 1909, P. 25, Para 97: *Saumya*. The village granted is to be identified with Myāḍarahalli in the Yaśvantpur hōbji of the Bangalore taluk (see *List of Villages*, 2).

46. E.C., X Mb. 117: *Raudri*, *Śrāvāṇa* *su.* 15.

47. M.A.R., 1925, P. 27, No. 16: *Raktakshi*, *Māgha* *su.* 5.

48. E.C., X Ct. 54: *Krōḍhana*, *Pushya* *ba.* 5.

49. *Ibid.*, IX Ht. 46: *Plavanga*, *Vaiśākha* *ba.* ?

50. *Ibid.*, Ht. 53 and 55: *Plavanga*, *Māgha* *su.* 15.

51. *Ibid.*, X Kl. 63 (bis): *Siddharthi*, *Pushya* *ba.* 7.

fifth, dated August 28, 1758,⁵² refers to a grant by the Śrīmanta Sāhib (Pēshwa Bālāji Bāji Rao) with the Sār-Jāmīndār, in the presence of the Setṭis of the Sāgar-Pēṭē of Basavāpaṭṇa, to Marilingappa for the office of a *Setṭi*, as a *Pālaki-Umbālī*, of the village of Uḍova belonging to Kole in the Sūlekere-sime. We have also documents dated in 1767,⁵³ and 1775,⁵⁴ registering gifts by Malhāri Rao, Mādhava Rao Ballāl Pradhān and Murāri Rao-Ghōrpaḍe.

Most of the Mahrattas resident in the State to-day are descendants of those who have followed in the wake of Mahratta incursions since 1565 A.D.,⁵⁵ barring those who might have followed the religious leaders belonging to the organized Mutts of Śankara and Madhva between the 14th and 16th centuries. During the period of the earlier Mysore kings, individual Mahrattas—mostly Brāhmans—served in the higher offices of the State. Khaṇḍē Rao, who opposed Haidar in his usurpation of sovereign power in the State, was one such. He was a trusted minister of King Krishṇarāja II. Tōshikhāne Krishṇa Rao, who led the insurrection against Tipū, was the faithful treasury officer of the reigning sovereign. Bisṭōpanth-Bādāmi—the “Bisnapah Pandit” of the *Wellington Despatches*—who commanded the army in the earlier years of the post-Restoration period, was another Mahratta Brāhman whose services were much

52. *Ibid.*, VII (1) Ci. 51: Ś. 1680, *Bahudhānya*, Śrāvāṇa ba. 10. *Pālaki-Umbālī*: A rent-free gift for the dignity attached to a person of being conveyed in a palankeen.

53. *Ibid.*, X Sp. 77, XII Mi. 23-24: *Sarvajit*.

54. *Ibid.*, Pg. 45: *Manmatha*.

55. A series of documents in Marathi and Persian, from Dodballāpur, belonging to the 17th and 18th centuries, in the possession of one of these families—the family of *Sardeshpāṇḍe* Madhava Rao, B.A., B.E., of the Mysore P. W. D.,—have been described in a note in the *Proceedings of The Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XVIII (1942), pp. 269-279. These documents are found to throw a flood of interesting light on the provincial administration of the Karnātic-Bālaghāt during the period.

appreciated by H. H. Śrī Krishnarāja Wodeyar III and the British. When Bāji Rao II fell in 1818 and the Pēshwa's territories were annexed, a number of Mahratta families dependent on him emigrated and sought shelter in Mysore. Krishnarāja Wodeyar III not only gave them asylum but also afforded opportunities for service under him. The continued effect of the influence wielded by these Mahratta families in the State has been the spread of Marāthi language as the language of administration at one time and the spread of Mahratta culture which made active service for the good of the State its primary duty. Whether in the higher administrative or the military walks of life, the Mahrattas have always distinguished themselves by their zeal, hard work, and infinite capacity for taking pains in the interests of common good. Politically they have been in the forefront, their sagacity, alertness and adaptability being well known. At present the Mahrattas in the Mysore State number about 53,000, but this figure does not include Mahratta Brāhmans. They are to be found scattered through the eight districts of the State, but more largely in the Shimoga, Kōlār and Bangalore districts. The Marāthi language is spoken by about 50,000, a number of the Mahratta families having taken to Kannāḍa under local influences. A good part of the Mysore Army—part of the Indian Army of to-day—is manned by the Mahrattas who have always supplied recruits for it. Among the officers are a number of Brāhmans of Mahratta origin, most of whom can trace their descent back to ancestors who won distinction centuries ago in the service of the Mysore kings.

APPENDIX III.

(1) THE EARLY MYSORE ARMY.

The development of military science and equipment is an index of advance of civilization in any nation. Living in times marked by heavy warfare, Mysore could not but have paid some regard to military science as an art. It applied its genius partly to peace and partly to war. Large conquests and attempts at an empire were possible because it felt—in Chikkadēvarāja's time—it had a well-equipped army and more effective weapons than its neighbours. As war plays a large part throughout the period, a short sketch of the military organization as built up by this line of kings is deemed necessary, if we are to appreciate its general cultural advance.

The early Mysore army, which came into being in the time of Rāja Wodeyar (1578-1617), seems to have been composed mostly of armed retainers of the old military class, generally known as the *haḷepaika* warriors (*haḷe* and *paika*, *payka* or *payika*, meaning Old Foot; cf. also *haḷaba*, an individual member of this old class or community). The numerous conquests of Rāja Wodeyar resulted in the formation, towards the close of his reign, of a regular army in Mysore composed generally of the quota of levies furnished by the subjugated Pālegārs, and the institution of the office of Commander-in-chief (*Dalavāi*) to preside over its destiny (see *ante*, vol. I, ch. V). The interstate relations of the time, centring round the rivalry of warring chiefs and states, necessitated the employment of a regular army outside the kingdom without dislocating the normal economy of the State, as the wars of the early rulers of Mysore were not mere raids. They carried with them the duty of organizing the conquered areas (*gaḍi*) by the appointment of a subordinate

executive staff (like the *Thāṇādārs*, *Hōblidārs*, *Ōlekārs*, *Amīls*, etc.) directly under the king. Accordingly, during the time of Chāmarāja Woḍeyar V (1617-1637), the standing army as such had come into being and he is further credited with having erected in Mysore an armoury (*alagina-chāvaḍi*) for the preservation of various kinds of weapons taken from the Pālegārs and for the manufacture and storing of new patterns (*Ibid*, ch. VI). Under Kaṇṭhīrava-Narasarāja Woḍeyar I (1638-1659), the standing army, with the traditional four-fold elements of infantry (*kālālu*), cavalry (*rāvuta*), chariots (*ratha*) and elephants (*gaja*), made its mark during his various campaigns. Seringapatam now became famous no less as the centre of active military life than as the capital of a growing kingdom (*Ibid*, chs. VIII and IX, referring to *K. N. V.* among other sources). The arms and ammunition said to have been stored in the arsenals (*āyudhaśāle*, *jānaśāle*, *maddinamane*) at the forts of Seringapatam and Mysore during the reign afford interesting insight into the nature of warfare of the times. Among the arms were swords (*katti*, *kunta*), daggers (*kaṭhāri*, *bāku*), spears, pikes, lances and javelins (*bhalleya*), shields (*gurāṇi*), cuirasses (*chūri*), clubs (*hingade*), quivers (*battalike*), bows (*siṅgāḍi*), arrows (*bāṇa*, *ambu*), saws (*garagasa*), slings (*monegallu*, *kavaṇe*), springed instruments (*eśeva kīlāyudha*), boar's head mounted on a spike (*śūlavarāhana tale*), thrusting horizontal planks (*nūkuva aḍḍavalage*) and scimitars (*aḍḍāyudha*). Among the ammunitions were cannons (*śataghni*, *pirangi*, *guṇḍu*), muskets, matchlocks and guns (*tupāki*, *kōvi*), these being generally used in battering operations during sieges (*muttige*, *legge*); some of these, especially the cannons, being, it is interesting to note, individually named (as *Rāmabāṇa*, *Bhūta-nātha*, *Lankeya-nīrdhūma-dhāma*, *Hanumanta*, *Chāmuṇḍi*, *Sidḍila-jungūli*, *Mēghanāda*, *Kōṭe Kōlāhala*, *Kali-vīra*-

bhadra, *Lūṭiya-Ranabhairava*, *Miṭina-Ranganātha*, *Rāmachandra*, *Muddukrishṇa*, *Lakshmīramaṇa*, *Nāgarā-mari*, *Ugra-Narasimha*, and so on and so forth). Among other items of arms and ammunition stored in the magazines and actually in use in the warfare of the times were springed steel armour (*jantrada dagale*), cannon balls (*guṇḍu-gallu*), sharp steel blades (*ukkiṇa masedalagu*), heaps of sand (*maḷala rāṣi*), and poisonous crackers (*vishada chīrgolave*, *chēlu bāṇa*, *uripotṭaṇa*) (see *K. N. V.*, II, 67, IV, 86 VI, 15-22, etc., see also and compare *Annals*, I. 79-82).

The Mysore army had had strenuous field work both under Kanṭhīrava Narasarāja Wodeyer I and Dēvarāja Wodeyar (1659-1673), especially in furthering the policy of political expansion of the kingdom of Mysore. The scope of its work, however, became widened during the reign of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar (1673-1704). He had traditions of Empire behind him; his capital had been the seat of the oldest (Vijayanagar) southern governorship; and there is little surprise that the first campaigns undertaken by him secured for him the submission of the leading chiefs up to Madura itself, though their politics had hitherto been zealously individualistic. Nor was the conquest up to Madura entirely a vain one; to be self-sufficing, the kingdom had to enlarge itself. Chikkadēva had to yield to the essential demands of the hour. There can be no doubt that the principal motive of these wars was political protection against the aggressive North, which the policy of Aurangzib made manifest. The Vijayanagar king had proved unequal to the labour and had become a fugitive in other lands. The Mysore army, in these circumstances, grew fairly well in size and composition, though we have no data as to the exact numerical strength of its various component parts. The use of elephants and horses (*gajāśva*) appears to have been increasingly popular in the warfare

of the period as also the employment by the Mysore soldiery of the following among other weapons (*battī sāyudha*, lit. thirty-two kinds of arms): axes (*kutḥāra*), spears, lances and pikes (*sabaḷa*, *bhalya*, *kunta*), swords (*khaḍga*), knives and daggers (*suragi*), javelins (*bhīṇḍivāḷa*), hatchets (*musuṇḍi*), tridents and spikes (*śūla*), missiles and discus (*chakra*), bows and arrows (*chāpa*, *śītimukha*), clubs or maces (*gada*) and hooks (*ankuṣa*) (see *Chikkadēvēndra-vamśāvali*, p. 27). Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar himself, as we have seen (*antevol.* I. p. 502), has been described as the master of the science of arms and the different arts of warfare, and of horsemanship and elephant-riding, and as an expert in the handling of his famous sword *Nandaka*.

With the gradual decline in the personality of the king and the rise to prominence of the *Daḷavāis* in the early part of the eighteenth century, Mysore fast became a military state, ready to keep abreast of the sweeping changes of the times, without, however, radically deviating from the conventions of the previous century. The campaigns of the period afforded attractive opportunities of service to young, active and energetic members of enterprising families carrying military blood in their veins, while the dismemberment of the Mughal Empire and the consequent rivalry between the Nizām and the Mahrattas in the Deccan on the one side and Mysore and the Nawābs of the Karnātic on the other paved the way for the recruitment of the class of fighters known as mercenaries (*paradēśiya baṇṭu*), besides the Mahrattas and the Muslims (*Marāṭa...Turukarapaḍe*) (see *Saund-Kāv.*, V, 113-114; VI, 68-69). Thus the Mysore army under Krishnarāja II, about 1740, was, we note, made up of the following divisions: the body of troops in the king's personal service (*rāja paṇḍina gumpu*); the assemblage of elephants (*kariya stōma*) and chieftains (*dhore dhore-gaḷa stōma*); the concourse of headmen of armed retainers

(*guritanada gondana*); cavalry (*kudure pauju*) and infantry (*kālumandiya gumpu*); champion warriors (*vīra mukkaḷu*); chariots (*rathagaḷu*), archers (*bilu-vidyegāraru*), and the militia from the interior parts (*gaḍi mandī*); the vanguard (*chūṇiya bala*); bearers of lances, spears, javelins, shields and swords (*iṭṭi harige kattigaḷa gondana*); the quota furnished by feudatories (*maṇḍalikara bala*); the corps of Mahrattas (*Marāṭeya gurutina pauju*) and Muslims (*Turukara danḍu*; *Turukara bala*); the assemblage of Paṭhāns (*Paṭabāṇi sandaṇi*; *Mysūru Paṭhāṇaru*), and the mercenaries (*paraḍēṣiya baṇṭu*) (*Ibid.*, IX, 72-74; also V, 112-114; VI, 68-70; VII, 113, etc.). While there is clear evidence as to the continued use of elephants, horses and chariots in the warfare of the period, the indigenous system of fighting with various kinds of weapons adopted by the Mysore military was in full vigour and seems to have attained a high standard of technical perfection, seldom equalled by their compeers on the field. Thus, among the weapons in vogue, prominent mention is made of the following: cudgels and staffs (*danḍa kōdanḍa*), swords (*aṣi*), knives (*kaichūri*), daggers (*kathāri*, *suragi*), maces or clubs (*musula*, *mudgara*), and lances, spears or javelins (*tōmara*, *bhālya*, *sabaḷa*), nearly a dozen types of swords in actual use being especially enumerated, namely, *sāṇagatti* (sword made of whetstone or grindstone), *harigatti* (*harige-katti*, sword in the form of shield), *siri-gatti*, *done-gatti* (sword in the form of quiver), *kongatti* (hooked sword), *Maleyāḷagatti* (the Malabar sword), *shad-gatti*, *kudura-gatti* (sword used on horse-back), *moḷe-gatti* (pointed sword), *vālu-gatti* (sloping or slanting sword), *bēnte-gatti* (sword used in hunting), *jambu-gatti* (elongated sword), and *parangi-katti* (the European sword) (*Ibid.*, III, 110-112). The use of fire-arms by the matchlockmen (*kōvi-kāraru*) is also in evidence about this time, though it had not

completely displaced the bows and arrows (*Ibid*, VII, 42).

The employment of mercenaries and the use of fire-arms came increasingly into vogue in the Mysore army with the Karnātic war of Nawāb Muḥammad Ali Wāḷajah and the projected campaign of Dāḷavāi Karāchūri Nanjarāja for the acquisition of Trichinopoly (1752-1755). Nanjarājaiya, who was so powerful that he was described as the "2nd King of Seringapatam," had under him two detachments of 600 and 400 Europeans commanded respectively by two Portuguese officers Manoel Alves and Bento de Campos (see Peixoto, *Memoirs*, noticed in *M. A. R.*, 1937, pp. 86, 89). The *Bhāshā-Patra* (1758), elsewhere noticed in full, gives us an idea of the nature of the army in Nanjarāja's personal service, when it tells us that he was allowed by King Krishnarāja II the sum of 224,000 *varahas* "for the pay of 700 horse, 2,000 *bārr* (sepoys), 500 Karnātakas (Karnātak sepoy), 500 *janjālu* (field-pieces), 106 guns (*pirangi*), 10 *Parangi* (Europeans), *Kāfer* (*Kāfirs*), *Kāregārs* (manufacturers of arms and ammunition) and others (see *ante*, Ch XII, p. 304, f. n. 123). Haidar was but the heir and pupil of his master Nanjarāja in this respect. He had not only the best of the English and French smiths and carpenters for the preparation of cannon balls and arms (Peixoto, *o. c.*, 87-88), but also systematically employed European officers under him (see *ante* Ch. XII, pp. 305, 306, f. n. 124). Already in 1756, he had in his employ, among others, "200 Europeans" (De La Tour, *o. c.*, I: 57-58). In 1758, we note, Eloy Joze Correa Peixoto, a Portuguese officer and author of the *Memoirs of Hyder Ally* (from 1758 to 1770), entered his service, and in 1759, he was helpful in hastening Nanjarāja's downfall by inducing Bento de Campos, "the Portuguese Commander of the white troops" in the latter's service, to desert him at Mysore (where he had taken refuge) and compelling

Nanjarāja "to capitulate to his vassal" (Haidar) and eventually retire to Koṇanūr (see Peixoto, *o. c.*, 89; also S. N. Sen, *Kanhoji Angria And Other Papers: A Portuguese Account of Haidar Ali*, p. 81). [For a detailed account of the military organization in Mysore from about 1760 onwards, see text *ante* Ch. XII].

A feature of warfare habitually resorted to by the early Mysore army was the cutting off of noses of the fallen and of those taken prisoners on the field of battle, an ancient custom evidently handed down from the Hoysala and Vijayanagar times. We have numerous instances of the employment of this mode of punishment by the Mysore military during the 16th and 17th centuries, especially between the period *c.* 1575-1695 (see *ante*, I. 41, n. 74, 49-50, 53-55, 88, 122, 135, 153-154, 218, 289, 296, 314-315). Foreign writers, to whom this ancient device appeared rather grotesque, if not novel, sometimes exaggerate it (see, for instance, Proenza's reference to "the hunt for noses" in 1657-1659, *Ibid*, 153-154), but the following account of the custom as it obtained in Mysore during the reign of Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar (1673-1704) is worth noting here. "Their custom is not to kill," says a *Fort St. George Consultation*, "but to cut off the noses with the upper lips of their enemies; for which they carry an iron instrument with which they do it very dexterously, and carry away all the noses and lips they despoyle their enemys of, for which they are rewarded by the Naik of Mysore according to the number; and the reward is the greater, if the beard appears upon the upper lip. This way of warfare is very terrible to all that these people engage with, so that none care to meddle with them they being also a resolute people, and have destroyed many that have attempted them, for, though they kill them not outright, yet they die by lingering deaths, if they make not themselves away sooner, as for the most part they do that are so

wounded, the shame and dishonour of it being esteemed greater than the pain and difficulty of subsisting [see J. T. Wheeler, *Early Records of British India*, p. 74, quoting from the *Fort St. George Records: Di. Cons. Bk.* (1679)]. In keeping with this account is the testimony of Dr. John Fryer, who, writing about 1675, records: "The Raja of Saranpatam (Seringapatam) must not be slipped by in silence, because his way of fighting differs from his neighbours; he trains up his soldiers to be expert at a certain instrument to seize on the noses of his enemies with that sleight either in the field or in their camps, that a budget-full of them have been presented to their Lord for a breakfast; a thing because it deforms them, so abashing, that few care to engage with him....." (*Travels in India*, Roe and Fryer, p. 395). Nose-cutting, however, as a feature of Mysorean warfare, persisted through the eighteenth century, though during the latter part of the century, there was a tendency to its being gradually limited in its application as a punishment for certain specific offences, such, for example, as affording of help, communication of intelligence, etc., to the enemy, the latest instance being referable to the year 1796 (see *ante*, II. 146; Kirmāni, *Tipu Sultan*, 200-201; *Mily. Sund.*, XCI. 13-22, etc.). Among other features of early Mysorean warfare, referred to in the earlier pages of this work (*Ibid.*, I. 54, 122, 124, 296, 339; II. 75-77), were night-action and espionage (through *Kallabantaru*; cf. the *Kallars* or "*Caleros*" of European writers), both of which were developed to perfection by and under Haidar Ali in the latter part of the 18th century.

(2) VIJAYANAGAR INFLUENCE ON THE EVOLUTION OF MYSORE.

Mysore was the immediate political and cultural heir of Vijayanagar. We have clear evidence as to the influence

exerted by Vijayanagar on the evolution of Mysore in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rāja Wodeyar's conquest of the Vijayanagar Viceroyalty of Seringapatam (1610) must be reckoned, in this connection, a landmark in itself (see *ante*, I. 60-61), for from this time onward the rulers of Mysore became practically independent of the fast declining Empire of Vijayanagar, though they theoretically acknowledged, in their grants, the Vijayanagar overlordship as *Mahāmaṇḍalēśvara*, *Karta*, etc. The Vijayanagar influence on Mysore politically is, perhaps, best reflected in the gradual use by these rulers of the characteristic Boar seal (*Varāha-mudre*) in their public documents (*Ibid*, 169-171, 224), and the adoption of the following among other distinctive titles of the Vijayanagar sovereigns: *Dharaṇīvarāha*, *Gajabhēṭṭekāra*, *Gaṇḍabhēruṇḍa*, *Mūru-mānneyaragaṇḍa*, *Para-rāya-bhayankara*, *Hindu-Rāya-Suratrāṇa*, *Nānā-varṇa-makuta-maṇḍalikara-gaṇḍa*, etc. (*Ibid*, 66, 94-95, 223-224). There is no doubt, as we have seen, that the titles *Karnāṭaka-Chakravarti*, *Dakṣiṇādīk-Chakravarti* assumed and asserted by Chikkadēvarāja Wodeyar in the latter part of the 17th century (*Ibid*, 289-290) had their origins in and were in reiteration of the old Vijayanagar imperial ideal, an ideal which continued to dominate, if it did not indeed inspire, the Daḷavāis and Haider Ali in the eighteenth century (*Ibid*, II, Chs. VII-XVI).

Culturally, Vijayanagar influence on Mysore is best seen in the planning of the cities of Seringapatam and Mysore (*Ibid*, I. 173-174, n. 70; 176, n. 75; 388-389); the lay-out of the Palace with its numerous chambers (including the Durbar Hall) (*Ibid*, I. 175, n. 71; 176, n. 75; II. 603), court life and etiquette (*Ibid*, I. 180-183, n. 100, 104; 248-249, 391-396), and the organization and conduct of the time-honoured *Mahānavami* (*Nava-rātri*) festival (*Ibid*, I. 68, 186, n. 121; 193, 247, 397; II. 603-604), all which present a striking similarity to

Vijayanagar models. Vijayanagar, however, made by far the most significant cultural contribution to Mysore in the transmission to her of the “Throne” (now adorning the Mysore Palace), that priceless relic of antiquity, on the conquest of Seringapatam by Rāja Woḍeyar in 1610 (*Ibid.*, I. 61). Since this “Throne” is conspicuously mentioned as the “jewelled throne of Śrī-Ranga-Rāya” (*Śrī Ranga-Rāya-maṇiśōbhita-pīṭha*), it was, as we have seen, possibly the same as the one used by the old Vijayanagar monarchs and had been transferred for safety to Seringapatam during the troublous years of the rule of Śrī-Ranga II in Penukoṇḍa (1574-1586), Rāja Woḍeyar only taking possession of it on the conquest of Seringapatam (*Ibid.*, I. 61, n. 97). Further, this “Throne,” which was invariably adorned by the rulers of Mysore from Rāja Woḍeyar onwards, is generally referred to in the records of these rulers (down to the latter part of the eighteenth century) as the “throne of Bhōja” (*Bhōja simhāsana*), “throne of the South” (*Dakṣiṇa-simhāsana*), “throne of Seringapatam” (*Śrīrangapattana-simhāsana*), “throne of Karnāṭa” (*Karnāṭa-simhāsana*) etc. (*Ibid.*, I. 61, 64, 96, 224, n. 51, 232, n. 81); and specifically as the “jewelled throne” (*Ratna-simhāsana*) (*Ibid.*, I. 61, 158, 326, II. 10, 27, 584). It is, perhaps, to this “jewelled throne” of Vijayanagar in its palmy days that Paes, writing about 1520, alludes in the following words:—

“On the dais in the House of Victory, stands a throne of state made thus—it is foursided and flat, with a round top and a hollow in the middle for the seat. As regards the wood work of it, you must know that it is all covered with silk-cloths, and has lions all of gold with many rubies and seed-pearls, and pearls underneath; and round the sides it is all full of golden images of personages, and upon these is much work in gold, with

many precious stones. In the chairs is placed an idol, also of gold, embowered in roses and flowers. On one side of this chair, on the dais below, stands a head dress; this also is made in the same manner; it is upright and as high as a span, the top is rounded; it is all full of pearls and rubies and all other precious stones, and on the top of it is a pearl as large as a nut, which is not quite round. On the other side is an anklet for the foot in the same fashion; it is another state jewel, and is full of large pearls and of many rubies, emeralds and diamonds, and other stones of value; it will be of the thickness of a man's arm. In front of all this at the edge of the dais, resting on a support were some cushions where the king was seated during all these feasts [*i.e.*, *Mahānavami*]" (See Paes' *Narrative* in Sewell's *A Forgotten Empire*, 265). Again, Nuniz's *Chronicle* (c. 1537) briefly refers to the "throne of gold, and precious stones" in Vijayanagar (Sewell, *o.c.*, 377), while Abdur Razaak, who visited the court of Vijayanagar in 1443, during the reign of Dēva Rāya II (1424-1446), speaks of "the throne, which was of extraordinary size, made of gold. and enriched with precious stones of extreme value," and adds: "Before the throne was a square cushion, on the edges of which were sown three rows of pearls" (*Ibid*, 95). In the light of all this data, it is hard to accept Wilks' position, which, as elsewhere noticed (see *ante*, I. 321, n. 178), implies there was no throne at all in Mysore before Chikkadēvarāja's embassy to Aurangzīb in 1699-1700.

(3) THE PARAKALA-MATH.

From the point of view of the growth of Śrī-Vaishṇavism in Mysore and its influence on the Mysore Royal Family, the *Parakāla-Math* has occupied an important place in the social history of Mysore. The

nucleus of the present *Parakāla-Maṭh* at Mysore was probably laid in the reign of Dēvarāja Woḍeyar (1659-1673), with the migration to the court of Seringapatam of Venkaṭa-Varadāchārya (of the celebrated Kōṭikanyā-dānam Tātāchārya family of Śrī-Śaila Vamśa, Royal Preceptors of the Āravīdu Dynasty of Vijayanagar) as the preceptor of Dēvarāja Woḍeyar in the sixties of the seventeenth century (see *ante*, I. 247, n. 151). Tradition, however, ascribes the establishment of the *Maṭh* itself to the reign of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar I (1714-1732) and this is confirmed by the *Tonḍanūr Copperplate Grant* (1722) of that ruler, who refers to himself in it as the disciple of Śrīnivāsa-yatīndra, the *Parakāla-Guru*, whom he is said to have invited from Tirupati to the capital city of Seringapatam and accepted from him the credentials of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism (*Ibid*, II. 29, n. 44-45),

A Ms. Note in Kannāḍa, entitled *Śrī-Parakāla-Maṭhada-Charitra-Sangraha*, specially compiled from the *Maṭh* records by the late Pandit Tiruvallūr Srinivasa Raghavachariar, Honorary Superintendent of the *Parakāla-Maṭh*, gives an account of the 33 *Gurus*, who have graced the Pontifical seat at Tirupati and Mysore from the 14th century A.D. down to the present day, in the following order : (1) Śrī-Pērārulājaiyyar-Brahmatantra-Svatantra-Svāmigaḷu [1287-1387] (2) Śrī Vātsya-Vēdānta-Rāmānuja-Brahmatantra-Svatantra (contemporary of *Yadurāya*, 1399-1423) (3) Śrīnivāsa-Brahmatantra-Svatantra (4) Śrī-Parakāla (5) Śrī-Vēdānta-Rāmānuja (6) Śrīnivāsa-Brahmatantra (7) Śrī-Nārāyaṇa (8) Śrī-Rangarāja (9) Śrī-Brahmatantra-Svatantra (10) Śrī-Yatirāja (11) Śrī-Varada-Brahmatantra-Svatantra (12) Śrī-Parāṅkuśa (13) Śrī-Kavitārkikasimha (14) Śrī-Vēdānta-Yativarya (15) Śrī-Jnānābdi-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (contemporary of *Rāja Woḍeyar*, 1578-1617) (16) Śrī-Vīrarāghava (17)

Śrī-Varada-Vēdānta (18) Śrī-Varāha (19) Śrī-Vēdānta-Lakshmaṇa (contemporary of *Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar*, 1673-1704) (20) Śrī-Varada-Vēdānta-Yōgīndra (21) Śrī-Parakāla (contemporary of *Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar I*, 1714-1732) (22) Śrī-Brahmatantra-Śrīnivāsa-Parakāla (23) Śrī-Vēdānta-Parakāla (contemporary of *Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar II*, 1734-1766) (24) Śrī-Abhinava-Śrīnivāsa-Parakāla (25) Śrī-Rāmānuja-Parakāla (1772-1810) (26) Śrī-Brahmatantra-Ghaṇṭāvatāra-Parakāla (1810-1836) (27) Śrī-Vēdānta-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (1829-1836) (28) Śrīnivāsa-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (1836-1861) (29) Śrīnivāsa-Dēśikēndra-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (1861-1873) (30) Śrī-Ranganātha-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (1873-1885) (31) Śrī-Krishṇa-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (1885-1914) (32) Śrī-Vāgīśa-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (1914-1925) (33) Śrī-Abhinava-Ranganātha-Brahmatantra-Parakāla (since 1925).

The *Note* traces the relations of the Mysore Rulers with the *Maṭh* at Tirupati from the time of Yadu-Rāya, by way of indicating the continuity of the influence of Vaishṇava tradition in the Ruling House. Particularly Yadu-Rāya, Rāja Woḍeyar and Chikkadēvarāja Woḍeyar, among the early rulers of Mysore, are stated to have accepted the *Vaishṇava-Dīkshā* from Nos. 2, 15 and 19 respectively in the above list. Among other matters of interest touched upon in the *Note*, we gather the following: (1) The Patron deity of the *Maṭh* is Śrī-Lakshmi-Hayagrīva-Svāmi. (2) Of the *Gurus* of the 17th-20th centuries enumerated above, Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29 hail from places like Māgaḍi, Pāvugaḍa, Hoḷavana-halli, Mēlkōṭe, Bāgepalli and Dādināyakanapālya in the Mysore State, and Nos. 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32 and 33 from Telugu areas, i.e., Anantapur, Bellary and Chittoor Districts of the Madras Presidency and Gadval and Mānājipet of the Nizām's dominions. (3) The original *Maṭh* at Tirupati, which was known as *Śrī-Brahmatantra-Maṭha* from the

14th century, became popularly styled as *Śrī-Brahma-tantra-Parakāla-Maṭha* under the 21st Pontif Śrī-Parakāla-Svāmi, also known as *Doḍḍa-Parakāla-Svāmi* (after Parakāla, one of the twelve celebrated Śrī-Vaiṣṇava Ālvārs), early in the 18th century. (4) The permanent settlement of the *Parakāla-Maṭh* in Mysore was made by this Pontif in the course of his visit to Seringapatam at the request of Krishṇarāja Wodeyar I (1714-1732), when the latter and the women of the Royal household accepted from him the traditional *Vaiṣṇava-Dīkshā* and got built for him a *Maṭh* near Karīghaṭṭa (to the north-east of Seringapatam) with the necessary endowments. From hence, the *Parakāla-Svāmi* became the Royal preceptor of the Mysore Ruling House. (5) Since then, the *Maṭh* is being successively endowed and patronised by the Mysore Rulers and has been an active centre of spiritual life in Mysore and a living repository of classical learning and culture under the learned Pontifs presiding over the *Maṭh*. (6) Since the early part of the 19th century, the *Maṭh* has been located in the city of Mysore, the old building being renovated and enlarged in 1899, and further improved from time to time.

(4) A NOTE ON HAIDAR'S ANCESTRY.

Of the different versions available regarding the ancestry of Haidar, reference has already been made to that contained in the earliest contemporary authority, the *Haidar-Nāmāh* (1784)¹. According to two Persian memoirs from Hyderabad (c. 1800)², the ancestors of Haidar were respectable inhabitants of Cohir, 28 *Kōś* west from Hyderabad, on the road to Gulbarga, of Shaikh tribe, who held the office of *Coreshi* and *Cazy*. Gulām

1. *Ante*, 205.

2. Noticed in the *Asiatic Annual Register* (1800), pp 1-7.

Dōst Muhammad, Haidar's grandfather, left Cohir due to a family quarrel regarding inheritance, and went to Sira. Poor and needy, he was unemployed for two or three years, but later got the command of 150 men from the Hakīm of Sira (Faujdār), married a daughter of Parsa Munchi, a considerable person of Kōlār, and shifted to Kōlār, where his first son, Futteh Alī, was born. Gulām Dōst Muhammad died soon after, leaving his widow pregnant. A daughter (Khēdija Bānu) was born, while the son (Futteh Alī) was educated in his grandfather's house at Kōlār. He was sometimes called Mīr Futteh Alī. He soon rose to the command of 1500 matchlockmen in the service of the Hakīm of Sira, and held the office of *Naik* (Commander), whence he was called *Futteh Naik*. It was customary for the Hakīm of Sira to pay his troops by giving them assignments on the renters of the districts which were willingly accepted by the military. Futteh Alī got certain mahals of Sira as an assignment for Rs. 1000 due to him from the Faujdār. He married Majedda Bēgum, daughter of Mīr Alī Akbar Khān. When the Bēgum became pregnant, the couple visited the shrine of a celebrated devotee by name Haidar Shah, who predicted that the child would be a son, and ordered them to name him Haidar Alī. Haidar was born in A.H. 1131 (A.D. 1718). Futteh Naik continued to enjoy the command under the Faujdār of Sira, without aspiring to a more elevated station, till the affairs of that district began to fall into extreme confusion, and the Zemindārs withholding the revenues, the troops remained unpaid and dispersed in different directions. Amongst others, Futteh Naik with his corps amounting then to 1000 matchlockmen was taken into the service of the Rāja of Seringapatam in A.H. 1140 (A.D. 1727), when "Dalway Gorachuri Nundoraj" (Daḷavāi Karāchūri Nanjarāja), a man of ability and possessing the entire confidence of his sovereign, was the minister. His vigilance

and fidelity produced a favourable impression on the mind of the Dalavāi regarding him and his corps, and Futteh was preferred to the rest of the army in affairs of trust. Futteh Naik died in A.H. 1151 (A.D. 1738). The Dalavāi, in return for his fidelity, bestowed the command of the corps on his son Mir Hyder Ally, who was henceforth named Haidar Naik, the confidence enjoyed by the father being transferred to the son³.

According to Kirmāpi, the local Persian historian (c. 1798-1802)⁴—who, as he tells us⁵, bases his account on information obtained by search during “two or three years”—in the reign of Muhammad Adil Shah, Sultān of Bijāpur, one Wali Muhammad “of the tribe of Koreish,” a man devoted to religion, compelled by accident, arrived from the neighbourhood of Delhi at Gulbarga. Being a pious man, he was allowed to stay at the Darga or tomb of Hazrat Bunda Nawaz and granted a small monthly allowance. His son Shaikh Muhammad Ali was married to the daughter of a servant of the Darga. On the death of Wali Muhammed, Shaikh Muhammad Ali proceeded to Bijāpur and lived there at Mushaikpura, with his brothers-in-law, who were seven in number. On the invasion of Bijāpur, these seven lost their lives in defending Gulbarga with their master Shaikh Minhaj, described as an Amīr of the Deccan. On this, Shaikh Muhammad Ali and his wife left Bijāpur for good and took up their abode at Kōlār in the Karnātic-Bālaghāt. Shaikh Muhammad Deccani, the chief of this place, under Kāsim Khān, Nawāb of Sira, received him kindly and put him in charge of all his dependents and workmen.

3. The details relating to the career of Futteh Naik from 1727 onwards, as recorded in the memoirs, seem to be improvisations and bear comparison with the other accounts narrated here. Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, referred to above, does not himself appear to have been in the service of the King of Mysore earlier than 1734 and he was definitely *Sarvadhikāri* and *Dalavāi* of Mysore during 1739-1759 (see *Ante*, 65).

4. Kirmāpi *Neshāuni-Hyāuri* (Miles' Translation), 1-23.

5. *Ibid*, Preface, XXIX-XXX.

Shaikh Muhammad Alī, besides discharging his duties under Shaikh Muhammad Deccani, engaged also in the cultivation of the soil and rented fields and gardens. He died at Kōlār in A.H. 1109 (A.D. 1696), leaving four sons, Shaikh Muhammad Ilias, Shaikh Muhammad, Shaikh Muhammad Imām and Futteh Muhammad. Shaikh Ilias succeeded him in his office, while Futteh Muhammad departed first to "Turnamal," modern Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, and from thence to Arcot, where he was, through the influence of Ibrāhim Khān, Killedār of Arcot, introduced to Sādat-ulla-Khān, Nawāb of Arcot. He was appointed to the command of 200 foot and 50 horse and was styled a Jamādār. Muhammad Ilias left his hereditary post at Kōlār and proceeded to join one Saiyid Burhan-ud-dīn, a Peerzada at Tanjore, leaving his wife and son Haidar Sāhib, about 14 years old, at Kōlār. He died at Tanjore in A.H. 1115 (A.D. 1702). Futteh Muhammad married Burhan-ud-dīn's daughter, her brother being Ibrāhim Khān, the Killedār of Arcot. At the same time, Imām Sāhib, Futteh's immediate elder brother, was married to a "niece" of his own wife. Haidar Sāhib entered service in Mysore, being appointed to the command of 100 horse and 200 foot. He was also honoured with the title of *Naik*, an officer or commander of footsoldiers. Futteh rose in service at Arcot and came to command 600 foot, 500 horse and 50 *juzail-burdar* (rocketmen) attached to his command. He distinguished himself in the fight at Gingee between the Nawāb of Arcot and Rāja Tīp Singh. There is a graphic account of the gallant service he rendered in this fight by Kīrmāni. "In this battle," he says, "the Rāja (Tīp Singh), with only fourteen horse, crossed the river of Sukrateerut (Chakratirth) on this side of Futteh Peeth, the river being swollen with the rains, and attacked the army of the Nawaub, consisting of four or five thousand horse and thirteen thousand foot; and stretching forth

the arm of manhood, threw the whole into confusion, and stamped his name indelibly on the page of time by his exceeding bravery, and cutting down his enemies as he advanced, the Rājā arrived with only two horsemen at the Nawaub's elephant, when, at this critical moment, Futteh Muhammad, with his infantry and *juzail-burdar* (rocketmen) formed a circle round the elephant, and at one discharge stretched the Rājā lifeless on the field." For his promptitude on this occasion, Futteh Muhammad was "immediately honoured with the present of an elephant, a standard, and a pair of *nagāras* (or kettle-drums)." On the death of Sādat-ulla-Khān, his nephew Dōst Alī Khān became Nawāb of Arcot. The quarrels that arose subsequently induced Futteh Muhammad to leave Arcot with his family to the Bālāghāt. Leaving his people at Kōlār, he proceeded to Mysore, where he stayed with his nephew Haidar Sāhib. Haidar Sāhib had, by then, established himself well by his amiable disposition and good qualities. Futteh Muhammad was sent for by the King of Mysore and offered service on the same terms as Haidar Sāhib. He was also given the title of "Naik," in recognition of his "personal bravery and prudence in the management of state affairs." But owing to the "quarrels that arose between the king's dependants," Futteh Muhammad, entitled *Sāhib Shujēea* (brave officer), left the king's service and went into retirement. About A.H. 1131 (A.D. 1718), he had a son named Shābāz Sāhib, and two years later, he had another, who was named Wali Muhammad. The latter, however, died when he was only two years old. Shortly after, Futteh Muhammad sought service under Darga Kuḷi Khān, Nawāb of Sira, who appointed him a commander of 400 foot and 100 horse and put him in charge of the fort of Doḍballāpur. His family, so far residing at Kōlār, joined him at that place and remained there for

some time. "In the year 1134 A.H. (A.D. 1721), while he dwelt there," writes Kirmāni, "a son of auspicious presage and exalted good fortune was born to him; who from the glory of his person shed splendour on the lap of the nurse of his time. The Sun being in the sign Aries when he was born, he was named Hydur Ali Khān." Darga Kuḷi Khān was succeeded by Abīd Khān in the Nawābship of Sira. Futteh Muhammad continued in charge of Doḍballāpur. About this time, a confederacy of the rulers of Mysore, Bednūr and others invested Doḍballāpur. They sent Haidar Sāhib Naik, then in the service of the King of Mysore, to demand its surrender. Futteh Muhammad, though the uncle of Haidar Sāhib, refused to be "deceived" and stuck to the "paths of fidelity and the usages of the brave." He at once rejected the demand and gallantly made a sortie and defeated the besiegers in a night attack and "thereby gained a high reputation among his companions and contemporaries." The besiegers were thus compelled to raise the siege and retire. Futteh Muhammad forwarded to Abīd Khān the plunder he had taken from the enemy. Abīd Khān not only complimented him highly on his valour but also sent for him to the capital, Sira, and there "honored him with a *munsab* of 2,000 foot and 500 horse." He also presented him with an elephant, a standard, and a pair of kettle-drums. He was also appointed "to superintend the defence and regulation" of the entire Suba of Sira.

Meanwhile, Darga Kuḷi Khān became Nawāb of Sira for a second time. Futteh Muhammad continued under him in his new office of Superintendent of defence and regulation of Sira. When Darga Kuḷi Khān was slain, Futteh Muhammad served under his son Abdur-Rasūl Khān, until the arrival of Tāhir Muhammad Khān, the successor of Darga Kuḷi Khān, in the office of Nawāb of

Sira. When, in A. H. 1137 (A. D. 1724), Tāhir Khān arrived, Abdur-Rasūl Khān retired to Doḍballāpur, leaving Futteh Muhammad and one Muhammad Khān Punni, an Afghan, as Killedār of the fort of Sira, with instructions to both of these to oppose the new Nawāb.⁶ Tāhir Muhammad was told by Futteh that until their arrears of salary were paid off, they would not yield possession of the fort or the country. Tāhir said he would pay from the day he took over charge and that his predecessor was responsible for the arrears, from whom they should claim whatever was due up to the date of his arrival. Futteh and his confederates and troops refused and they were invested by Tāhir. The besieged put up a gallant defence, repulsing an attack on the fort from its western—Idga—side. Tāhir then shifted his ground and surrounded the fort and town, but he was dislodged from his new position by the continual discharge of arrows and musketry from the besieged. He again shifted to a village—Kumminhalli (Gummanahalli)—about 3 miles to the southwest of the fort. The Killedār—Muhammad Khān Punni—inspired by folly and rashness, as Kirmāni puts it, made a night attack on him, aided by his own and Futteh's troops. Tāhir's troops, however, lay in ambush, and when Punni had pressed on straight to Tāhir's tent and surrendered his elephant, they rushed on them and killed both Punni and Futteh after a hard fight. At the time this event occurred, Futteh's wife and children were still living at Doḍballāpur. On hearing of the death of Futteh, Abbās Kuḷi Khān, son of Darga Kuḷi Khān and chief of Doḍballāpur,⁷ "the

6. Evidently Abdur-Rasūl Khān was superseded in his post and he took vengeance by opposing the incoming Nawāb. This is in keeping with the statement subsequently made by Kirmāni that after repairing to Doḍballāpur, Abdur-Rasūl "proceeded without delay to Hyderabad" evidently to prefer a representation to the Nizām. See note below.

7. Kirmāni mentions "Abbas Kuli Khan" here as the Killedār of Doḍballāpur and not "Abdur Rasul Khan", whom he describes earlier as the son and successor of Darga Kuḷi Khān. See Kirmāni, *o.c.*, 12-13, 16.

tyrannical and hard-hearted man" that he was, "immediately began without cause to persecute and oppress the afflicted and soul-stricken family of Futteh Muhammad, and plundered them of all their property, even to the furniture of the house, clothes, utensils, and the trinkets and jewels of the women." In addition to these cruel proceedings, he seized Futteh's two sons, "Shabaz, about 8 years old, and Hydur Ali Sahib, 3 or 4 years old," and carried them into the fort and "confined them in a *nagāra* or kettle-drum, the head or parchment of which being stretched on the drum, it was beaten, in order that, by the pain and distress of these poor orphans, he might extort more money from their family". By this act of cruelty, Kirmāni adds, "Abbās Kuḷi made himself known to the world as a tyrant and oppressor."

Kirmāni, however, gives another version of the occurrences above narrated. According to this account, it would appear that when Darga Kuḷi Khān was killed, his son Abdur-Rasūl, without the knowledge of the Nizām, wished to obtain the Nawābship of Sira and with that object in view, borrowed Rs. 3 or 4 lakhs from one Muhammad Khān Sulimān Zai, a Sāhukār of Arcot. With this amount, he collected troops for the defence of Sira. Futteh Muhammad also borrowed Rs. 18,000 from the Sāhukārs for paying his troops, though he subsequently "converted" it "to his own use." When Tāhir Khān advanced, Abdur-Rasūl prepared to depart to Doḍballāpur. Sulimān Zai, the banker, objected to his doing so and called on the Killedār not to yield the fort of Sira to Tāhir Khān unless he paid the sums lent. The men of the army claimed their arrears and in the conflict which followed, both the Killedār and Futteh Muhammad lost their

But it should be noted that he also mentions that Abdur-Rasūl Khān, after going to Doḍballāpur, on the advance of Tāhir Khān, "proceeded without delay to Hyderabad" (*Ibid*, 13). What became of him afterwards is not mentioned.

lives. Tāhir Khān entered the town and took possession of it. But the Sāhukār, whose Afghan retainers had also fought against Tāhir Khān and his party, seized the fort and held out for a month, refusing to deliver it over to him until their debts were paid. Meanwhile Asaf Jah, the Nizām, came to know of the situation at Sira, and sent from his own treasury the arrears of pay due to the army and the debts due to the Sāhukār. The disturbances were thus quieted; the keys of the fort were surrendered; and the Sāhukār and his party departed to Arcot. On his way, the Sāhukār saw the position to which Futteh's widow and sons had been reduced. "Moved with compassion for them," Kirmāni writes, "he obtained the release of the women and children." As a wise man, he despatched the former and their dependents only to Seringapatam, "and kept the two brothers, as a security for the money which he had advanced their father (Futteh Muhammad)." Haider Sāhib, the nephew of Futteh, having come to hear of the fate that had overtaken his nephews, "despatched" Rs. 18,000 to the Sāhukār at Arcot and obtained their release. Shābāz and Haider Ali soon after joined their cousin Haider Sāhib at Seringapatam. Haider Sāhib brought them up here with "more tenderness and care than his own (children) and provided for them in a liberal manner." He also taught them, we are told, "the use of arms, and horsemanship, the lance or spear exercise and all the accomplishments of a soldier."⁸

In due course, arriving at the age of discretion, Shābāz, the elder of the two, was married to a lady of his own family. On this, Shābāz, "being a young man of independent spirit, and not wishing to live a life of idleness, and throw the weight of his support on his cousin," took, we are told, a forced leave of his cousin and mother, and, accompanied by his brother, sought service

under Abdul Wāhab Khān, younger brother of Muhammad Alī (of Arcot), who then held the *jāgir* of Chittoor. Abdul Wāhab appointed Shābāz to the command of 1,000 foot and 200 horse, while Haidar Alī was appointed "to the command of the horse."⁹ Some time later, Shābāz fell out with Abdul Wāhab, and, as good luck would have it, Haidar Sāhib, having risen in life and affluence, sent for both his cousins to Seringapatam, where they joined him. They were duly introduced by him to Nanjarājaiya, who appointed each of them to the command of 300 foot and 50 horse. Shortly after, Haidar Sāhib died, and Nanjarājaiya appointed Shābāz to the command of Chikballāpur, which had been so far held by Haidar Sāhib. Shābāz sent to Seringapatam his brother Haidar Alī, with his own and Nanjarājaiya's troops and stationed himself at Chikballāpur with his family. Here his wife died after giving birth to a daughter, whom he later gave in marriage to one Lāla Mean. He also married for a second time "a young lady of his tribe" and by her had two daughters and a son, whom he named Kādir Sāhib. Haidar Alī soon distinguished himself at Seringapatam "with such prudence and discretion" that he won the heart of Nanjarājaiya and Krishnarāja, the king, and excelled in bravery all his compeers "of older standing" at the Royal Court. He came soon to be considered by Nanjarājaiya "the bravest man in the army" and the leader of his troops. Nanjarājaiya favoured and desired his promotion and permitted him to raise revenue enough for the payment of his horse and regular foot and dignified him with the title of Haidar Alī Khān. The intimacy between the two (Nanjarājaiya and Haidar Alī) grew to such an extent that "neither in business nor pleasure" did Nanjarājaiya "ever separate himself from him."¹⁰

9. *Ibid.*, 20-21.

10. *Ibid.*, 22-23.

While the foregoing accounts correct and supplement one another, all the versions to hand, including the later ones, may be reduced to two opposite theories."¹¹ One may be called the orthodox, and the other the heretical theory. In conformity with the former theory, it has been maintained by Col. Wilks (1810),¹² whose opinion on this point has been more or less followed by subsequent writers, that "the first of the family of whom any tradition is preserved was Mohammed Bhelole, a religious person, who came from the *Penjab* (Punjab) to the south, accompanied by (his) two sons, Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Wellee, and settled at the town of Alund in the district of Calburga (Gulbarga), about one hundred and ten miles west and by north, from Hyderabad. He is said to have founded a small mosque, and fakir's *mokan*, by charitable contributions, and to have accumulated some property by this religious speculation. He married his son Mohammed Ali to the daughter of one of the servants of the celebrated mausoleum at Calburga, and Mohammed Wellee into another family in the same neighbourhood. After some time, the expenses of this augmented family being greater than the saint was able to defray, the two sons proceeded to the south in search of any service by which they could procure a subsistence, and were engaged at Sera (Sira), in the capacity of revenue peons, in the department of the collection of the town customs. Futte Mohammed, the son of Mohammed Ali, and the father of Hyder, was born at Sera. In the course of duty, or for some other cause not explained, the two brothers came to Colar, where Mohammed Ali died, and Mohammed Wellee, seizing on all the domestic property, turned

11. The critique that follows is based mainly on the article by "O.H." in the *Madras Review*, Vol. VII, No. 24 (February 1901), pp. 59-61 (now revised.)

12. Wilks, o.c., I. 261-263.

Futte Mohammed and his mother out of doors." A Naik of peons took pity on them and received them into his house and in time enrolled Futte as a peon in his own command. Futte subsequently distinguished himself in the siege of Ganjecottah and was dubbed a *Naik* and gradually rose in rank and consequence under the Subādār of Sira, who subsequently appointed him Faujdār of Kōlār. His first wife was Seydaneer Saheba, the daughter of Burra Saheb, a religious person of Kōlār, who bore him three sons, Wellee Saheb, Ali Saheb and Behlole Saheb. Of his second marriage the following story is related by Wilks.¹³ "A Nevayet of respectable family, from the Concan, was travelling across the peninsula with his wife, one son (Ibrahim Saheb) and two daughters, to Arcot. At Tarrikera, near the borders of Bednore, he was robbed and murdered; and his family in the greatest misery begged their way to the eastward, until their arrival at Colar, where their distress induced the widow to listen to the proposal of Futte Naik to be united to one of her daughters. After this marriage, the rest of the family, relieved from their difficulties, proceeded to Arcot." B.L. Rice follows Wilks in this as in other matters of Mysore History.¹⁴ Lewin Bowring (1893), in his monograph,¹⁵ says that one of Haidar's ancestors named Hassan, who claimed Yahya as his progenitor, left Bagdad and came to Ajmere, in India, where he had a son called Wali Muhammad. This person quarrelled with an uncle, made his way to Gulbarga, in the Deccan, and had a son named Ali Muhammad, who eventually migrated to Kōlār in the eastern part of Mysore and died there leaving four sons, the youngest of whom was Futtah Muhammad, who became Faujdār and received Būdikōṭe as a *jāgir*. He

13. *Ibid.*, 264-266.

14. Rice, *Mysore Gazetteer*, I. 372, 416.

15. L. Bowring, *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* (Rulers of India Series), Preface, pp. 12-13, Note.

married first a Sayyadāni, by whom he had three sons and subsequently two sisters whose father was a Navāyat of the race of Hashim.

Of the other theory, which seems to be nearer the mark, the ruling authority is Col. Miles. He seems to have been very sceptical of the high and noble descent ascribed to Haidar. He says¹⁶ that Haidar "himself was accustomed to claim a descent from the kings of Bejapoor. There appears, however, to be no other ground for his claim than his own assertion; and the Author of this work (Kirmāni), if he had had the slightest pretext for assigning so noble an origin to his hero, would not, I think, have failed to give him the full advantage of it. But the fact is that his origin is very obscure and the term Naik is rather ambiguous." In connection with this Bijāpur origin, Col. Miles, in a supplemental note to his book,¹⁷ gives a translation of a Persian work.¹⁸ The author of this work, after premising that there are many different accounts of Haidar's origin, states that he was himself accustomed to assert that he was derived from the kings of Bijāpur; and that when their government ended, and Sultan Sikandar, the last king of Bijāpur, was killed, he left a son eight years old, who was saved from his enemies and with a few jewels, taken secretly by his mother to Cuddapah, where he remained unknown until he died, leaving a son who entered the service of the Afghans of Cuddapah as did his son also. The last mentioned left two sons who served the Afghans of Cuddapah and Kurnool in the lowest grade of military rank, that of Naik or Corporal of regular infantry. The son of one of these was named Muhammad Naik. His son was Alī Naik and his son Futteh Naik.

16. Miles' translation of Mir Hussain Ali Khān Kirmāni's *Neshauni-Hyḍuri* (History of Hyḍur Naik), Preface, XVII.

17. *Ibid.*, 498.

18. Mirza Ikbal's *Ahwālī Hyḍur Naik*, appended to *Ibid.*

Futteh Naik had two sons, Haidar Naik and Shābāz Naik.¹⁹

The theory of the Koreish origin seems to be based upon grounds the most flimsy. Of the many inherent improbabilities in it, the first seems to be the one regarding the immigration of Futteh's father and uncle into the south. At the time of their alleged advent, Aurangzib had died ; the puppet emperors that succeeded him had begun ascending the tottering Mughal musnad, the disruption of the Mughal Empire was staring, and the general dislocation of society in Hindustan had commenced. In such a state of ferment, every adventurer of fiery spirit and valour made a fortune for himself in India by either setting up a principality for himself on the ruins of the old Mughal possessions or serving for or against the Mughal Emperor as a military commander. Under such circumstances, it is quite past understanding why Haidar's alleged ancestors should not have thought of securing positions of honour and trust in Hindustan but have pitched upon the rather queer course of coming down south for their livelihood in the rather humble position, to put it in the least offensive way, of revenue peons. Again, if they belonged to such august parentage, they would really have been treated with marked respect, with the result that they would either have risen to be the spiritual guides of the local Muhammadans or have become military officers of rank and consequence under the local governments. Indeed, it strikes one that they were more fit for military work than for revenue work in the position of peons.

Wilks himself later on in his work says²⁰ that " the mother-in-law of Futte Naick had been ill received at Arcot, on account of her connection with the Naick ; and

19. *Ibid* in Kirmāni, o.c., 490-494.

20. Wilks, o.c., I. 267.

the family into which she expected to marry her other daughter declined the alliance for the same cause. She therefore joined her son-in-law at Chittoor, and he having in the meantime lost his second wife without issue, took to himself her younger sister as a third." This is rather a striking passage in connection with the account given of the noble descent of Haidar's ancestors. It seems to indicate that Futteh seems to have belonged to a comparatively lower order of Muhammadans than the Navāyat lady whose cause he espoused. If really Futteh belonged to the Koreish tribe, then the Navāyat lady could not, with justification, have been ill received at Arcot and be refused an alliance already agreed upon. For the Navāyats, as their name indicates, are "new-comers" into Hindustan. During the eighth century A. D., owing to the oppression and cruelty of a veritable monster governor of Irak, Hejaj Bin Yusuf, some respectable and opulent Muhammadans departed with their dependents and effects and embarked on ships prepared for their reception in the Persian Gulf. Some of these landed on the Konkan coast and others to the eastward of Cape Comorin: the descendants of the former are Navāyats; of the latter the Lubbe (a modification of Lubbeik) meaning "here I am," indicating attention on being spoken to. The Navāyats preserve the purity of their original blood, remarks Wilks,²¹ by systematically avoiding intermarriage with the Indians and even with the highest Muhammadan families for many centuries after the establishment of the Mussalman dynasties of the Deccan. Certainly the strength of the objection against marrying into a family which had come to India from their original Arab home so recently as Haidar's ancestors had done, would lose a great deal of its weight. The alleged Koreish descent perhaps was first invented to make the marriage of Futteh Naik with

21. See a very interesting note in *Ibid.*, 264-265.

the Navāyat ladies to look as if it were one contracted on terms of equal descent and subsequently to answer the purposes of the high regal position coveted by his still greater son Haidar Alī.

Again, it must be remarked that Haidar's own account of his origin seems to be quite at variance with the theory put forward by the orthodox school. It is certain that, if the alleged account be true, Haidar himself would have claimed and preferred the Koreish descent to the Bijāpur one. But as a matter of fact there is no record of his having done either of these things. On the other hand, it may be pointed out that even his claim had no true foundation to rest upon. He claimed Bijāpur descent for the simple reason that he wanted to rest his usurpation of the Mysore Rāj upon a foundation of right. For Mysore was at one time claimed to be tributary to Bijāpur. And the fact that it depends only upon his own assertion and is not referred to even by the best of his biographers, Hussain Alī Khān Kirmāni, makes us receive it with great caution, if not with positive suspicion. The fact seems to be that, as Lewin Bowring,²² who also shows his disbelief in the august descent of Haidar's ancestors, remarks, "in Hindustan, as elsewhere, when any man of vigour and energy has raised himself to a throne, it is not difficult to find for him a pedigree showing his noble descent, and it is not therefore surprising that native annalists should endeavour to prove that Haidar came from the famous race of Koresh."

So then, it seems clear that neither the august Koreish nor the regal Bijāpur descent of Haidar and his ancestors finds support in facts and consequently both of them are incapable of belief. In investigating the true descent of Haidar, Kōlār and the relations of Haidar's father with it must certainly come in for a great deal of

22. L. Bowring, *o.c.*, Preface, pp. 12-13.

attention. The authorities themselves make Haidar's grandfather come to Kōlār and state that Futteh was born at Kōlār.²³ The local tradition of the indigenous origin of the subject of their biographies seems to have been too great even for them to be quietly passed over in silent contempt. The mausoleum of Haidar Ali's nearest relatives at Kōlār is a standing monument to their connection with the town. It is referred to both by Wilks²⁴ and Buchanan²⁵. But their account being very meagre, the following account of it derived from personal inspection of the mausoleum may be fittingly added here. What is popularly called the *Darga* consists of a number of buildings situated in one spacious compound which has a big tank, originally supplied with water from a lake close by, surrounded by walks of rose trees. Of the several blocks, one is occupied by the official caretakers of the place, while others again are used as kitchens, etc., at the time of the performance of the annual ceremonies. The mausoleum proper itself is a rectangular block of about 29 ft. by 24 ft. with an ordinary terraced roof surmounted, contrary to the usual practices in such cases, by no dome. The walls are built of stones and are covered with a thick coating of lime, perhaps due to renewed official whitewashing. It has neither pillars nor windows, though it has two doorways. The persons who lie buried in it are a dozen in number and include Haidar's grandfather and grandmother, father and mother, an own brother, two step-mothers, four step-brothers and first wife. Haidar himself was to have been buried there but for some untoward circumstances. After "the ever victorious spirit of Haidar," as the Persian biographer writes,

23. But Wilks says he was born at Sera (Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 262).

24. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 263.

25. Buchanan, *Journey from Madras through Mysore, etc.*, I, 193, Diary for 8th July 1800.

"had taken its flight to Paradise," his remains deposited in a large chest filled with aromatics reached Kōlār *en route* to Seringapatam to be buried there in the tomb specially constructed by himself. But by the time the bearers, accompanied evidently by Karīm Shah, the younger son of Haidar, reached Kōlār, the body began to rot, and as the result of a conference held there and then and with the assent of Karīm Shah, preparations were begun to bury him there. But meanwhile Tipū arrived on the spot and gave effect to the dead father's wish to be buried at Seringapatam. So the body was, after the due performance of the usual ceremonies at Kōlār, removed to Seringapatam and lies buried there. Some of the tombs are covered with palls of colours. The biggest of the tombs is 7 ft. by $4\frac{1}{4}$ ft. and the smallest is about $2\frac{1}{6}$ ft. by $1\frac{1}{2}$ ft. Originally certain lands seem to have been set apart by Futteh Ali to meet the annual expenses of the maintenance. But soon after the adjustment of relations of the allies after the Fourth Mysore War in 1799, the lands were resumed by Government and a money-grant of Rs. 3,300 was sanctioned instead.

This then shows sufficiently well the strong ties which bound Haidar and his ancestors to Kōlār. Coupling with what has been already said the fact that the title of "Naik" was bestowed upon Futteh,²⁶ a title which, if he had had the reputation to belong to such noble parentage, would not have been bestowed upon him and even if bestowed he would not, in propriety, have accepted it so calmly and quietly as he in fact seems to have done, we may infer that Haidar's ancestors seemed to have belonged to a locally evolved Muhammadan family at Kōlār, to which must belong the credit of having produced "one of the most remarkable personages who have played their parts on the stage of

26. See Kirmānī, *o. c.*, Preface, XVIII.

Indian History"—without accepting Col. Miles' suggestion, on what appears to be insufficient evidence, that they might belong to a family of Hindu converts to Muhammadanism, who often call themselves Koreish, though it might have the merit of explaining as well Haidar's indulgent policy towards Hindus and Tipū's fanatic outbreaks against them. Suggestions of this kind and stories of the type that he was the son of a cotton cleaner would make Haidar a *parvenu*, one who rose from absolute obscurity, for which there is no ground whatever. At the same time, the attributing of a noble pedigree is not necessary to raise Haidar in our general estimate of his character and greatness.

(5) GUNNERY IN INDIA.

Gun: from original French *mangonne*, a machine for throwing stones in sieges, the first part of the word being misunderstood as *man*, *i.e.*, a man; a general term now applied to almost every species of fire-arms for throwing projectiles by the explosion of gunpowder or other explosive. It indicates any metal tube for throwing missiles with gunpowder, etc., and includes all varieties from the sporting gun and rifle to the heavy cannon of artillery and naval ordnance. A *great gun* indicates a cannon. It really stands for a large piece of ordnance. *Use of gunpowder*: The use of gunpowder as an explosive composed of saltpetre, sulphur and charcoal in varying proportions came into general vogue in India in the 16th century. Whether the use of gunpowder in India is really anterior to the 16th century and whether it was known to it before its use in Europe are still debatable questions. Wilks in a note (*o. c.*, I. 528-530) discusses the question to some extent and states it as his conclusion that "there is no direct evidence of the use of gunpowder in India

until a period long subsequent to its introduction in Europe." Since then, literature on the subject has grown. There is no doubt that the bow and the arrow, the ancient weapon of India, had been, at least on the West Coast of India, successively replaced by the match-lock and the more modern musket; the latter, at the period of Haidar's invasion of Malabar, was in general use on the Malabar Coast, in consequence of the long established intercourse of foreigners with the people of that region.

Almost the first to write on the subject was N. B. Halhed, who served in the E. I. Co.'s service in Bengal. In the preface to his work *A Code of Gentoo Laws* (its full title being *A Code of Gentoo Laws or Ordinations of the Pandits, from a Persian Translation*), published in 1776, he remarked at page 57 that "the word fire-arms is literally Sanskrit *Agnee Aster*, a weapon of fire; they describe the first species of it to have been a kind of dart or arrow tipped with fire and discharged upon the enemy from a *bamboo*." The significance of this description will be more strikingly perceived when we remember that the English word *cannon* literally means a *tube* or *barrel* (being derived from French *cannon*, a tube, barrel; *cannon*, an augmentative from Latin *canna*, a cane or reed). Halhed adverts to a passage in Quintus Curtius, which mentions missile fire having been employed in the defence of a place attacked by Alexander. Wilks says that he was unable to trace the passage either in Quintus Curtius or Arrian. But he adds that Philostratus (Lib. ii. ch. 14) introduces in a dialogue between King Phraotes and Appoloneus Tyaneus, an account of the Oxydraci, "of which nation were the wise men who conversed with Alexander"; "they inhabit," says Phraotes, "the country between the Hyphasis and Ganges, which Alexander never penetrated, and never would have been able to conquer, for

they fight with prodigious tempests and thunderbolts, being themselves accounted sacred and beloved by the Gods." Hercules and Bacchus, it is added, were both repulsed by that people, who allowed them to approach their fortress, and then beat them back with thunders and fiery tempests. As to the arguments drawn by Halhed from the names of the ancient instruments described in the Indian poems, *agnee aster* (the instrument of fire), Col. Wilks seems disposed to reject them rather summarily. "If I have been rightly instructed regarding the passages scattered through the *Ramayan*, which describe the action of these instruments, they are entirely fabulous. The *agnee aster*, the fire of which cannot be extinguished, may, plausibly enough, be put for the Greek fire, but the *Brama aster*, or *astrum*, a weapon formed by magical process from a blade of grass, when once discharged, cannot cease motion until it has hit its object. The *baunum* (arrow in some of the spoken dialects at this time) is also the name for the modern Indian war-rocket; but however various and fabulous, the twang of Rama's bow always announces the flight of the *baunum*. The argument amounts to this, that the effects of gunpowder may have been the foundation of these fables; but to this are opposed the following considerations:—(1) No vestige of fire-arms, or of instruments discharged by gunpowder, is to be found in the Indian sculptures (to be seen in every part of India) which represent the war of the *Ramayan*, or any other war; the bow and arrow, the spear (the Indian *bullum* and Latin *pilum*) and sword, being the only weapons described. (2) The Persian and Tartar conquerors of later periods, particularly Chingeez Khan, whose operations are minutely described, make no mention of a circumstance which would necessarily have excited the greatest astonishment; and so far as I have been able to examine the question, there is no

direct evidence of the use of gunpowder in India, until a period long subsequent to its introduction in Europe." As to the argument drawn from sculpture, it is met by Dr. Gustav Oppert, as will be seen from a later part of this Appendix. It is enough to observe here that the remarks of both Halhed and Wilks appear to have been forgotten by later writers, who revived interest in the subject many years later. Mr. D. MacRitchie, in his *Gypsies of India*, suggested that the Gypsies brought the use of artillery into Europe. Mr. R. W. Irvine, i.c.s., in his *Army of the Indian Moghuls*, replied stating that the history of the fire-arm in India "seems to prove, on the contrary, that it was introduced there from Europe." He has also said that "to the end of the Moghul period the fire-arm in ordinary use was the matchlock" (p. 105), too wide a remark that has been hotly contested by a writer in the *Hindustan Review* for April 1918 (Vol. XXXVII, No. 224). According to Sir Henry Seton-Karr, fire-arms are said to have been first used in European warfare in the 14th century, the hand-gun having come into practical use in 1446 and being of very rude construction (see *Ency. Brit.*, 11th Edn., Vol. XII, 717, Art. "Gun").

The question whether gunpowder was known in India before it was *discovered* in Europe is one of less importance perhaps to-day, as Dr. Hodgkinson, F.R.S., F.C.S., the writer of the article on gunpowder in the 11th edition of the *Ency. Brit.* (p. 723), says that "it is probably quite incorrect to speak of the *discovery* of gunpowder. From modern researches it seems more likely and more just to think of it as a thing that has developed, passing through many stages mainly of improvement, but some undoubtedly retrograde. There really is not sufficient evidence on which to pin down its invention to one man, or probably to one nation. As Lieut. Col. H. W. L. Hime (*Gunpowder and Ammunition*,

1904) says, the invention of gunpowder was impossible until the properties of nearly pure saltpetre had become known." In Europe, the honour has been associated with two names in particular, Berthhold Schwartz, a German monk, and Friar Bacon. It is not known when Schwartz lived. He invented the first fire-arms, and as nothing was known of an inventor of gunpowder, it was perhaps considered justifiable, according to one authority, to give him the credit thereof. The year 1354 is sometimes mentioned as the date of his invention of powder, but considering there can be no doubt as to the manufacture in England of gunpowder and cannon in 1344, that we have authentic information of guns in France in 1338 and in Florence in 1326, and that an Oxford Ms. of 1325 gives an illustration of a gun, Schwartz must have lived long before 1354 to have been the inventor of gunpowder or guns. Roger Bacon belongs to the 13th century. In 1242, he referred to an explosive mixture as known before his time and employed for "diversion, producing a noise like thunder and flashes like lightning." He speaks of saltpetre as a violent explosive, but there is no doubt that he knew it was not a self-explosive substance, but only so when mixed with other substances. Bacon evidently was in possession of an explosive which was a considerable advance on mere incendiary compositions. But he does not appear to have been aware of the projecting power of gunpowder. He knew that it exploded, and that, perhaps, people might be blown up or frightened by it; more cannot be said. That is the conclusion come to by Col. Hime in his work. Hime is also of opinion that Bacon blundered upon gunpowder whilst playing with some incendiary composition, in which he employed his comparatively pure saltpetre instead of a crude nitrum. Dutens, in his *Enquiry into the Origin of Discoveries attributed to Moderns*, sets down many

passages from old authors in support of his view that a composition of the nature of gunpowder was not unknown to the ancients. Col. Hime's arguments go to show, in the view of Hodgkinson, that these compositions could only have been of the incendiary type and not real explosive. His arguments seem to apply not only to the Greeks but also to the Arabs, Hindus and Chinese. It is now conceded freely—and Hime's arguments support this view—that incendiary compositions, some perhaps containing nitre, mostly, however, simply combustible substances as sulphur, naphtha, resins, etc., were employed and projected both for defence and offence, *but they were projected or blown by engines and not by themselves*. It is quite inconceivable, remarks Hodgkinson, that a real propelling explosive should have been known in the time of Alexander the Great or much later, and not have immediately taken its proper place. Hime, in a chapter discussing this question of explosives amongst the Hindus, says: "It is needless to enlarge the list of quotations: incendiaries pursued much the same course in upper India as in Greece and Arabia." No trustworthy evidence, it is added, of an explosive in India is to be found until the 21st of April 1526, the date of the decisive battle of Panipat, in which Ibrahim, Sultān of Delhi, was killed and his army routed by Baber, the Mughal, who possessed both great and small fire-arms. The employment of rockets "wildfire" incendiary composition, it is also conceded, is undoubtedly of very old date in India, but the names given to pieces of artillery under the Mughal conqueror of Hindustan point to a European, or at least to a Turkish origin, and we know for certain that Europeans (Portuguese and others) were retained in the service of Akbar and Aurangzib. The composition of present day Chinese gunpowder being almost identical with that employed in Europe, it is

inferred that the knowledge of it was obtained by the Chinese in all probability from Western sources. In the writings of Bacon, there is no mention of guns or the use of powder as a propellant but merely as an explosive and destructive power. Owing perhaps to this obscurity centred round the early history of gunpowder, its employment as a propelling agent has been ascribed to the Moors or Saracens.

So far as India is concerned, the Portuguese came in there as the pioneers of European nations in 1498. Even before their arrival, guns were in common use in India, as is mentioned by Faria-e-Souza. He has proved that *Manjanik* was used in India in 1371. When Vasco Da Gama entered into Calicut, there was a procession and one of the Nairs carried a *caliver* which he fired off at intervals (Elliot, *History of India*, VI, 467). As to the evidence of sculptures, there is a stone *maṇḍap* in the temple of Ādi Jagannāth in Madura, on the walls of which are figures of some soldiers carrying in their arms small fire-arms. On the walls of the 5th story of the temple of Śārangapāṇi at Kumbakonam are standing figures of soldiers, in front of the king (in a chariot), carrying small fire-arms in their hands. Similarly in the *Śata-stambha-maṇḍap* at Conjeeveram will be seen a trooper on horseback and a footsoldier aiming at the enemy with his fire-arms. In the precincts of the Brihadiśvara temple at Tanjore, figures of sepoy with small carbines can be seen, while on the pillars of the *sabhā-maṇḍap* of a celebrated Śiva temple near Coimbatore, there is a figure of a soldier with a gun. None of these temples is older than about 5 or 6 hundred years. Dr. Gustav Oppert, in his book "On the Weapons, Army organizations, etc., of the Hindus", observes: "We should never lose sight of the fact that new subjects are not introduced in the architectural designs of the principal figures in any ecclesiastical building. No architect,

no one who erects a sacred pagoda at his own cost, will dare to represent in the chief carving of a conspicuous part of a building..... a subject which is new and with which his countrymen were not familiar in times of yore or which are not mentioned in the *Śilpa-Śāstra*, or the works of art" (Gustav Oppert, *o. c.*, 78-79). From a controversy between Dr. Oppert and W. F. Sinclair, it appears that the former holds that "Europeans did not apply flints or firelocks to guns before the 17th century, but the Hindus did (see *Indian Antiquary*, September 1878)." Dr. Oppert quotes the 136th verse of the *Śukranīti* and translates: "the brush at the vent carries stone and powder and has a machinery which produces fire when striking." He further says, "in the sixth book of the *Nītiprakāśika* are enumerated all the articles which a king should take with him when setting out for a military expedition." After mentioning all sorts of provisions and arms, reference is also made in the 51st *śloka* to the "cotton of the silk-cotton tree and iron joined with flint." Dr. Oppert has proved his dictum that India is the home of gunpowder and fire-arms. Johann Beckmann also, in his "History of Inventions and Discoveries," is "more than ever inclined to accede to the opinion of those who believe that gunpowder was invented in India, and brought by the Saracens from Africa to the Europeans, who, however, improved the preparation of it and found out different ways of employing it in war as well as small arms and cannons." "So far as the use of fire-arms is concerned," he adds, "*Śukranīti*, *Nītiprakāśa*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* and *Agnipurāṇa* may be consulted".

Coming to more modern times, the *Tuzak-i-Bābari* mentions that as early as the age of Baber (16th cent.) not only matchlocks but other guns were much in use. In the later Mughal period, artillery was much improved and good guns were certainly used. In the *Ain-i-Akbari*,

we find that Akbar improved the matchlock, called *tufang*. The *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* refers to the presence of heavy guns on the eve of the battle between Humāyūn and Sher Khān, each of which required 8 pairs of bullocks for drawing. "Stone balls," we read, "were of no use in these, but the shots were of molten brass and weighed 5,000 *miskals* and the cost of each was 200 *miskals* of silver. They would strike anything that was visible at the distance of a *parusang*." In the 37th year of Akbar's reign, there were in the small but renowned fort of Junagarh in Surat "100 guns, some of which discharged balls of one *man* (maund) and a half and these they fired several times daily." In the *Akbar-Nāma*, we have a description of the fort of Asir, which is stated to have contained the following: "of pieces of artillery (*zarb-zan*) small and great, there were more than 1,300, besides some which were disused. The balls varied in weight from nearly two *mans* to a *sir* (seer) or half of *sir*. There were great numbers of mortars (*hukka-dan*) and also many *Manjāniks*, each of which threw stones of 1,000 or 2,000 *mans*. On every bastion there were large iron cauldrons, in each of which 20 or 30 *mans* of oil could be boiled and poured down upon the assailants in case of assault. No account was taken of the muskets and there were large chambers full of powder." Similarly we have the evidence of *Shahjahān-Nāma* of Ināyat Khān and *Jauhar-Samsam* of M. M. Sadiki relating to the use of gunpowder and fire-arms of various sizes during the time of the later Mughals.

Foreign influence, particularly Portuguese, began, however, to make itself felt on the warfare in the Deccan and the South (especially in regard to the use of fire-arms) from the early part of the 16th century onwards. Krishnadēvarāya, the Vijayanagar King (1509-1530), employed a Portuguese officer, Christovao de Figueredo, during the siege of Raichūr (1520); to help with the

musqueteers he had brought, to open fire on Ismail Adil Shah's forces who exposed themselves on the fort-wall, "in such a way that he slew many, the Moors being careless and free from fear, as men who up to then had never seen men killed with fire-arms nor with such other weapons" (see *Mys. Gaz.*, II-iii. 1845, quoting the Portuguese Chronicle of Nuniz). Ismail Adil Shah himself and his successors seem to have copied what Krishnarāya did in the matter of the use of fire-arms. Among his more famous successors were Ibrahim I (Feb. 1535 to 1557), Alī I (1557-1580), Ibrahim II (1580-1626), Muhammad (1626-1656), Alī II (1656-1659) and Sikandar (1659-1686). Muhammad was a great builder, his tomb being the famous Boli Gumbuz (the Dome of Speech) at Bijāpur, which still attracts thousands of visitors yearly. The Dome is 198 feet high and contains a most perfect whispering gallery and the tomb is perhaps the most effective building in appearance in all Bijāpur to-day. Muhammad also built Asar Mahār, the next building of importance, about a mile from the present Bijāpur Railway Station. What is of direct interest to us is a bastion here, near what is locally called the Fateh Gate, on the southern side. This towers ahead and is known as the *Landa-Kasāb*. On it is the largest gun in Bijāpur and since it is in a place rather rarely visited, it has been overlooked and the *Malik-i-Maidan* here is considered the largest. The bastion was built in 1609 by one Hazrat Shah during the reign of Ibrahim II. It was evidently completed, according to an inscription, in 1662, in Sikandar's reign, having been in construction for 53 years! What is of note is that the *Landa-Kasāb* seems the most formidable in construction and armament of all the bastions on the southern side, as, in addition to the large iron gun mentioned above, two other pieces of artillery were mounted on it, one of which, resembling a modern mortar,

still lies on it. Against this bastion, Aurangzīb, in 1686, seems to have directed the whole fire of his artillery and pitted it with shot-marks. Little damage was done to the tower itself, but a breach was made in the curtain-wall close by, which rendered the place untenable. Both guns seem to have been struck more than once and the larger one lies dismounted, probably from a shot which struck it near the muzzle. Another gun is at the Sherki Burj (Lion Bastion), so called from the figures of two lions on it. Here is the big gun of Bijāpur called *Malik-i-Maidan*, or "Lord of the Field." It was cast at Ahmadnagar by a Turkish officer in 1549. His name—Muhammad Bin Hasan Rumi—is inscribed on it, while two other inscriptions are also to be found on it, one of these, the one nearest the mouth, having been added by Aurangzīb when he took the city. How far the Portuguese helped the Bijāpur Sultans in gunnery we do not know, but there is no doubt they employed Portuguese in their service for long as artillery and other officers in the army. The Fateh Gate of the city was guarded in the olden days by two of the strongest bastions, one being the *Landa-Kasāb* and the other being still known as the *Feringhi-Burj*, having been built by a Portuguese general of Ali Adil Shah I (1557-1580). In the citadel of the old rock-fortress at Raichūr can be seen a curious old gun 21 feet long. The breach is blown away, so that the structure of the gun can be easily perceived. It is formed of twelve longitudinal iron bars, each about eleven inches square, bound together by two wrought iron coils. The gun was evidently mounted on to the citadel for defence purposes and its make-up would seem to show that it should belong to the 17th century. Its existence may be set down to the Bijāpur Sultāns, who later held possession of the place. The above are examples of old guns made in India under Portuguese influence.

We have already noted the reference to matchlocks (*kōvi*), gun (*śataghni*, *tupāki*, *pirangi*) and gunpowder (*maddu*) in Mysore during the warfare of the 17th century (see p. 739 *supra*). About the middle of the 18th century, Mysore, in the wake of the Vijayanagar traditions, was the foremost to keep abreast of the times, especially in regard to the modernisation of the army and the modes of warfare. To Karāchuri Nanjarāja, the Dalavāi, belongs the credit of having "spared no cost for enlisting sepoys with *Europe arms*" and "drawn together a body of at least 2,000 besides 4 companies of topasses" during the siege of Trichinopoly in 1753 (see p. 146 *supra*, citing Fort. St. Geo. *Mily. Cons.*). Haidar walked in the footsteps of his master and patron Dalavāi Nanjarāja in this regard, though he was shrewd enough to place cavalry above artillery as an effective factor in the warfare of the time, particularly in the trial of strength with his English rivals. This was reversed by Tipū, with results disastrous to Mysore.

(6) THE STANDING ARMY OF MYSORE UNDER HAIDAR.

We have no figures as to the exact numerical strength of the standing army of Mysore in the early years of Haidar's regime as *Sarvādhikāri*. According to Wilks (1810), Haidar's forces in 1767 were made up of 12,860 cavalry, 18,000 infantry and 49 guns; and the Nizām's 30,000 cavalry, 10,000 infantry and 60 guns, the confederate forces making in all 42,860 cavalry, 28,000 infantry and 109 guns as against 1,030 cavalry, 5,800 infantry and 16 guns of the English, including 1,000 cavalry of Nawāb Muhammad Ali (Wilks quoting Col. Smith's letter, *o.c.*, I. 569, f.n.). According to Robson (1786), who actually took part in the war of 1767-1769 against Haidar, the Mysore army under Haidar was, in

1767, made up of 12,000 black horse, 800 Mughal horse, 60 European Hussars, one battalion of Topasses consisting of 1000 men, 5,000 grenadier sepoys, 8000 battalion sepoys (all armed with European muskets and bayonets), 4000 matchlockmen and rocketmen, and 49 pieces of cannon, while Nizām Alī joined Haidar with 30,000 horse, 10,000 sepoys and peons and a great number of rocket men, 60 pieces of cannon and an immense train of "luty-wallas" (Looty-Wallahs) or freebooters, and the English had two regiments of Europeans (8000 men fit for duty), 7 battalions of sepoys (800 men in each), a corps of artillery, about 500 black horse of the Nawāb of Arcot and 30 European horse commanded by Lieutenant Robson himself (Robson, *Life of Hyder Ally*, 42). A *Fort St. George* record gives the following figures as to the forces of Mysore in 1767: "70,000 men, 50 heavy artillery, 50 medium artillery, and 100 field-pieces" (*Mily. Cons.*, XXVI. 66, Joseph Smith to *Fort St. George*, January 22, 1767). Another speaks of Haidar having at Bangalore "10,000 sepoys, 6,000 black horse, 400 French and Portuguese troopers, 10 large guns and mortars, and 10 camel loads of rockets" (*Ibid*, XXVII. 736, *Consultation* dated August 11, 1767). Again, Chevalier St. Lubin, writing from Haidar's camp in 1767, gives the following account of the Mysore forces: "47 pieces of cannon from 32 to 2 pounds, manned by 180 Europeans, divided into 4 companies; one regiment of 400 Portuguese; one regiment of 400 Topasses, 4 battalions of grenadier sepoys, 800 each with European officers; about 10,000 other sepoys and 500 Polygar peons, 55 European Huzzars and dragoons, 600 coffres with coats of mail, helmets and quilted drawers, mounted on horseback, 500 Mogul or Persian cavalry, 20,000 ordinary black horse, with the Subah's army consisting of 30,000 horse, 5 to 6000 sepoys and 50 pieces of cannon. Haidar Ali's troops are pretty well-armed and well supplied with

ammunition" (*Ibid*, 958-960). According to De La Tour (1784), who was intimately connected with Mysore as Haidar's Commandant of Europeans, Haidar's forces in 1767 were estimated at 180 or 2,00,000 men, of whom 25,000 were cavalry. Of this, after providing for the garrisoning of forts, he led 50 to 55,000 men against the English. Of this, 18,000 were cavalry, about 8,000 Moplahs, Pindaris and others. The infantry consisted of 20,000 Topasses or sepoy with 16,000 good firelocks; the rest of the infantry were Carnates (Karnātic men) or Calerots (Kallars), armed with matchlocks and lances. The Europeans numbered 750 men, divided into two companies of dragoons or Hussars, 250 cannoners, and the officers and serjeants dispersed among the regiments of grenadiers and Topasses (De La Tour, *Ayder Ali*, II. 6-8). The contemporary local chronicle *Haid. Nām.* (1784) is silent as to Haidar's forces in 1767, though it speaks of him as having in the camp at Caveripatam, in 1768, 20,000 *bār* sepoy, 10,000 horse and 10,000 irregulars (*ahashām*) with Nizām Alī's 60,000 horse and 80,000 foot, pitted against 4000 Alemāni troops and 20,000 *bār* sepoy of Nawāb Muhammad Alī (*Haid. Nām.*, ff. 41).

De La Tour's figures for 1767, given as they are from the Mysore side, seem by far the most acceptable as representing the strength of the regular standing army of Mysore (including the garrisoning, frontier-guarding and fighting forces), though the data from other sources, indicated above, may be taken to relate, as elsewhere pointed out (see *ante*, p. 375, n. 279), to the actual forces present or supposed to be present on a particular battle-field and not to the army as a whole maintained by Haidar. The general military position of Mysore by about the latter part of 1770 is, perhaps, best reflected by the contemporary Peixoto, another European officer serving under Haidar, when he writes thus: "Haidar's whole force at present consists of 15,000 fire-arms,

12,000 horse, 2,000 rocket boys, 60,000 matchlocks, and 250 Europeans of all nations, divided amongst the infantry, cavalry and artillery" (Peixoto, *Memoirs*, 154, 159). Obviously the figure for the numerical strength of the forces of Mysore seems to have fluctuated from about two lakhs in 1767 to about one lakh in 1770, due to loss in war and other causes, so that the standing army of Mysore under Haidar, in normal times, does not seem to have exceeded a lakh.

APPENDIX IV.

(1) ON HAIDAR'S POSITION AS REGENT.

Wilks hardly specifies Haidar's constitutional position in Mysore from 1761 onwards, though even he, in one place in his work, *tacitly implies* that Haidar was still the *servant* of the King of Mysore in supreme authority. Thus, referring to the completion of Haidar's usurpation, he writes, "The arrangements consequent on the usurpation occupied upwards of two months, and Hyder, having appointed his brother-in-law, Mukhdoom Aly Khan, Killedar of Seringapatam with a garrison of his most trusty troops, *took leave of the Raja with the usual formalities* early in September (1761) and proceeded towards Bangalore where other events demanded his presence" (Wilks, *o. c.*, I. 486). Haidar's position as the Regent or *Sarvādhikāri* of Mysore has been set out in full elsewhere in the course of this work, with the necessary references (see *Ante* pp. 255-256, 280-290 *supra*). For the nearest parallel, we must turn to England. In English History, we read of the Barons assuming authority to appoint guardians and councils of Regency during the minority of a newly ascended monarch. Thus, for Henry III the Barons appointed William Marshall, Earl of Pembroke, as *Rector Regis et Regni*, together with a small assistant council. For Richard II a council of Regency was provided by the joint action of the young king himself and the magnates. On the accession of Edward V, his father's councillors assumed the power and appointed Richard, Duke of Gloucester, as Protector. When a reigning king provided for his succession, Parliament chose subsequently to alter his arrangements, as in the case of the arrangements made by Henry V and Henry VIII. All modern

provisions for a regency are of course made by Act of Parliament.

(2) Sources of Mysore History of the Usurpation
Period, 1761-1799.

For the history of Mysore during the usurpation period (1761-1799), Wilks' *Historical Sketches of the South of India in an attempt to trace the History of Mysoor* (2 vols. 1810) is the main source of information. Wilks lived too close to the times of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan and he generally writes from direct knowledge of materials to which he had ready access (and which he does not always cite), and from the testimony of others who actually witnessed or took part in the events he describes. While Wilks' work thus forms an indispensable authority for the period, it is more, as its title itself indicates, "an attempt to trace the History of Mysoor" than a detailed history of the kingdom. Indeed, "the characters of Haidar and Tipu and their history," as Sir Murray Hammick has recently observed, "were the chief interests for him in his book, and this fact perhaps hindered him from looking at certain episodes of the period from the point of view of the Ruling Family, to which Haidar in the main and Tipu during part of his sway, paid formal homage" (see *Note on Col. Mark Wilks* in the 1930 edition of Wilks' *Mysoor*, vol. I. p. xii). A critical and comparative study of the sources now available to us enables us to develop the history of the period from this broader standpoint, along modern lines, correcting and supplementing Wilks wherever necessary.

Among these, Mir Hussain Ali Khan Kirmāni's *History of Hydur Naik and Tipu Sultan* (also styled *Neshauni-Hyduri*, written in Persian and completed in the early years of the 19th century, and translated into English

and first published in 1842 by Col. W. Miles) and the anonymous work *Haidar-Nāmāh*, a manuscript *Bakhar* in Kannada completed in 1784, occupy the foremost place as representing the genuine chronicles of the times of Haidar and Tipū from the local point of view. Both these sources are invaluable authorities for tracing the main currents of the history of the period, internal and external, though Kirmāṇi writes from the Muslim point of view and the author of the *Haidar-Nāmāh*, who narrates from direct knowledge, is partial to Haidar and at times glosses over facts inconvenient to his patron. What make Kirmāṇi particularly valuable is the special note he strikes in regard to the Trichinopoly episode. This is confirmed by the *Fort St. George Records* as set out in the text of this work in the appropriate places. Col. Miles remarks in a note in his Preface at p. XVI: "Except with regard to Trichinopoly, it (the History of Kirmāṇi) is generally consistent with Orme's account to 1760." Kirmāṇi (at pp. 244-247) describes how Muhammad Alī obtained Mysore's help while besieged at Trichinopoly, and how he thus "gained the victory over his enemies" and later how the Mysore Chief was obliged to leave Trichinopoly "by the violation of the Treaty made with him by Muhammad Alī" (p. 245). Also, how after taking Pondicherry through English aid, Muhammad Alī plundered the Mansabdārs and Jāgīrdārs of the Arcot Subāh and "raised the standard of independence, and rebelled against the Nizam of Hyderabad;" how the Nizām thought of displacing Muhammad Alī with the aid of Haidar and thus taking possession of the Karnātic for himself. The Nizām is said to have written to Haidar "setting forth that a body of English merchants, through the medium of the rebellious souba of the Karnātic, had taken into their heads the vain desire of chieftainship and rule, and had fearlessly raised the standard of usurpation in that quarter." He

concludes that Haidar joined the Nizām with his forces to Adoni and with Basālat Jang, the Nizām's brother, went towards Madras. Kīrmāni, however, notes that "another historian" has given a different version of this affair. According to this historian, he says, Muhammad Alī got "perplexed and uneasy" when he heard of the "prowess and discipline of the Nawab's (Haidar's) troop, and the promptitude of his military equipments," and regarding that his (Haidar's) rise would mean his own fall and "moreover apprehensive that the affair of Trichinopoly, where he had so grossly violated his faith, still rankled like a thorn in the breast of the Nawab, and God forbid, lest he should consequently turn his views towards Arcot, and with the energy of Khodadad, seize his country and wealth," Muhammad Alī induced the English, his friends, to send a vakīl to Hyderabad and persuade the Nizām to take the conquest of Bālaghāt. "His secret plan was, if possible, to take Mysore, if Haidar was unprepared, and retain it; if not, join him and operate advantageously in the destruction of his rebel Soubadār" (*i.e.*, Muhammad Alī).

Both the accounts make it plain that Haidar vowed vengeance against Muhammad Alī for the treachery he had played in the matter of the surrender of Trichinopoly to Mysore. In the campaign of Haidar that ended with the Treaty of Mangalore (March 11, 1784), Tipū, according to Kīrmāni, marched his army into "Tanjore and Trichinopoly (*Nathurnuggur*) (p. 418). His soldiers plundered Tanjore. Then he "spurred the steed of his plans and projects towards *Nathurnuggur*" (*i.e.*, Trichinopoly). He is said to have appointed *amīls* and independent *Killedārs* and large garrisons to various places in Trichinopoly area (such as Ariyalūr, Udaiyar-pālayam, etc.) and plundered Śrīrangam, Jambukēśvaram, etc. Tipū then left towards Kalicote (Calicut) and joined his father (p. 420). Haidar, "with

the intention to reduce as many of the *parganas* and towns of that (Trichinopoly) country under his own authority as he possibly could," marched to Trichinopoly and despatched his horse in front. Tipū and Lally were appointed to the western side of Trichinopoly (p. 424) and Saiyid Sāhib was despatched with infantry to conquer the country of Tanjore and Trichinopoly (*Nathurnuggar*) (p. 430). [See Vol. III, Chap. V of this work, for a more detailed treatment of this subject with special reference to Kīrmāni among other sources.]

This apart, while the chronological accuracy of the *Haidar-Nāmāh* for the affairs of the period 1761-1782 is undoubted, the *Śaka* dates for the events invariably tallying with the A.D. dates, Kīrmāni generally appears more as a verbose writer than as an accurate historian, for he adopts an ornate style with an exuberance of similies and metaphors, and the *Hijira* dates he gives for the events do not always tally with the A.D. dates. Nevertheless Kīrmāni seems to show in his narrative some acquaintance with earlier sources of information. He has, however, to be used with caution, making due allowance for literary flourishes and checking his dates with reference to other sources.

Eloy Joze Correa Peixoto's unpublished *Memoirs of Hyder Ally* (1770), M.M. De La Tour's *Ayder Ali* (1784) and Captain Francis Robson's *Life of Hyder Ally* (1786), among the contemporary European accounts of the life and times of Haidar, so far available, are next of considerable value for the history of Haidar's period of office as the Regent and Generalissimo of Mysore (1761-1782). Robson and De La Tour are, in particular, contemporary authorities for the war of 1767-1769, in which they both took part. (*The First Mysore War* ending with the *Treaty of Madras*, 1769). Col. Wilks refers to De La Tour in his work (I. 587) in a foot-note. From a single statement of his, Col. Wilks draws an adverse inference against

him and his general credibility as a recorder of what he saw or heard. This seems rather hard on him. Though he has to be used, like many other writers of his period, with due care, he supplies many details which others do not even hint at, much less refer to or describe. Robson is not referred to by Wilks, though Sir Murray Hammick, the Editor of his work, mentions him in his foot-notes (e.g., I. 549, 587 *et seq*). While Robson, the English writer who was a Lieutenant in Col. Smith's army, generally writes from the English point of view, Peixoto, the Portuguese writer, and De La Tour, the French writer, who were European officers under Haidar, show an intimate acquaintance with the affairs of Mysore during the period they served respectively under him. Their writings, which add to the information derived from other sources, are, however, to be used with caution, as they are sometimes prone to exaggerate and record from hearsay. The *Memoirs of Hyder Aly Khan and Tippoo Sultan* appended to Major Charles Stewart's *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of Tippoo Sultan* (1809), though slightly earlier in point of date than Wilks' work, are brief but uncritical accounts compiled mostly from unsifted materials, and hence require to be approached with prudence.

Among other European sources, Adrian Moens' *Memorandum* (1781) embodying an account of *Haidar Ali* (published in *Selections from the Records of the Madras Government—Dutch Records*, No. 13) is of some value as throwing interesting light on Haidar's relations with Malabar and Travancore down to 1781, though it is not wholly trustworthy. Captain Innes Munro's *A Narrative of Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast* (1789) contains a firsthand account of the early phases of the war of 1780-1784 (The *Second Mysore War*) from the English point of view by one who personally took part in it against Haidar, and forms an

admirable supplement to other sources. Lieut. Col. William Fullarton's *A View of English Interests in India* (1787) and the *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* (1788) by an officer of Col. Baillie's detachment, are of value as throwing sidelights on the war in its later phases, down to the conclusion of the *Treaty of Mangalore* (1784). Lt. Col. William Kirkpatrick's *Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan* (1811), generally a work of considerable interest from the point of view of the administration of Tipū, contains also invaluable material for the political history of the early years of Tipū's regime down to 1786. The *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. III (1937), published by the Government of Bombay, is of inestimable value as containing documents throwing a flood of light on the diplomatic background of the war of 1790-1792 (*The Third Mysore War*) ending with the *Definitive Treaty of Seringapatam* (1792), while Lieut. Roderick Mackenzie's *A Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultaun* (2 Vols, 1793-1794), Major Dirom's *A Narrative of the Campaign in India, which terminated the War with Tippoo Sultan* (1793) and Lieut. Edward Moor's *Narrative of Operations of Captain Little's Detachment*, etc. (1794), are equally valuable sources for the different phases of that war. For the war which terminated with the fall of Seringapatam and the death of Tipū Sultān (*The Fourth Mysore War*, 1799), Col. Alexander Beatson's *A View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultaun* (1800) forms an excellent authority.

Among the documents, the *Letters* published in the volumes of the *Selections from the Peshwa Daftar* (Nos. 29, 35 to 38) are of value for the Mysore-Mahratta relations down to about 1780, while those published in the volumes of the *Calendar of Persian Correspondence* (Nos. 1 to 6) are useful for the Mysore-Karnātic-cum-English relations down to 1785. The select extracts

from the manuscript volumes of *Military Consultations*, *Secret Consultations*, *Country Correspondence*, *Tellicherry Factory Records* (*Diaries and Letters Received*), *Military Sundries*, *Despatches to England*, etc., of the *Fort St. George Records*, preserved in the *Madras Record Office*, and the documents published or referred to in the *Selections from Letters, Despatches, etc., in the Bombay Secretariat* (Maratha Series), *Press List of Records of the Foreign Department of the Government of India*, etc., are of unique interest as adding to our direct knowledge of the affairs of the period down to 1799 from the Mysore point of view, while the documents published in C. U. Aitchison's *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnads* (Vol. IX, 1909) and the *Mysore State Papers* (Vol. I, 1920) give us an insight into the *Mysore Treaties* and the *Rāṇa Correspondence* which led to the restoration of the kingdom of Mysore to the Mysore Royal Family in 1799.

APPENDIX V.

(1) THE STORY OF THE CONQUEST OF BEDNŪR.

Basappa Nāyaka II of Ikṣkēri or Keḷadi died in 1754 and of what followed, we have several versions. Among these are the following with their probable dates: *Haidar-Nāmāh* (1784); De La Tour (1784); Robson (1786); Kirmāṇi (1800); *Keḷadi-Nripa-Vijayam* (1800-1804); and Wilks (1810). These different versions are briefly set down below.

The story as told in the "Haidar-Nāmāh": The earliest contemporary version is to be found in the *Haidar-Nāmāh*. This work introduces us to the episode immediately after the conquest of Chitaldrug. During Haidar's stay in Chitaldrug, we are told, he made known to the Pāḷegār, Medekere Nāyaka, the following: "Before we set out on this expedition against you, we wrote to the state of Bednūr, seeking their assistance in accordance with the terms of their agreement with Mysore (*karāru*). Great irregularity having prevailed in Bednūr, our *harkārs* demanded a reply from Dewān Nanjaiya and Nirvāṇaiya. The latter directed a negative reply being given, while the scribe insisted on some lame excuse being pleaded. Thereupon Dafēdār Bhadrana-Timma of the Gollar community said that it was ill-becoming on their part to write like that to a person like Haidar, who, having lately superseded the king of Mysore, had succeeded to the headship of that State itself (*samsthānādhipati*). At this the scribe became exasperated and bawled out: "'If Gollars become councillors or advisers on matters of State, why should we be here?' Taking him at his word, the authorities of Bednūr have accordingly sent me an ill-mannered reply

(*kīlu vakkane*). Moreover a woman is administering that State now, and much looseness prevails there. What do you say now?" Whereupon Medekere Nāyaka represented as follows: "The last king of Bednūr adopted a person by name Channabasappa Nāyaka and installed him on the throne. On the old king's death, his queen Virammāji (*Rāṇi Virammāji*), having contracted an intimacy with one Nimbaiya, bestowed on him the office of *Sarvādhikāri* or Chief Minister. Disgusted with this state of affairs, Channabasappa Nāyaka manouvred to get Nimbaiya's connection with the Bednūr palace severed. Not tolerating this, Virammāji, one day, during the act of shampooing through a professional athlete (*jetṭiya kaiyinda yenne vattuvāga*), had Channabasappa treacherously strangled by the neck and buried in a pit (*kritrimadinda Channabasappa Nāyakana koraḷu hisukisi guṇiyalli hāki*). Then Virammāji had another boy adopted. Since then she has been as usual conducting the administration in close association with Nimbaiya. Krishnappa Nāyaka of Kallakere has been one of the administrative officers there (*kārubāri*). The old officers of State (*haḷabas*) have fallen to the background; even Daḷavāi Virābhadra Nāyaka has been removed from power. There is no strength or vigour in the army. As regards Channabasappa Nāyaka, further, it was found, his life had not completely gone out (*pūrā prāṇa hōgiralilla*) when he was buried. He rebreathed and rose up from the pit (*usurutirugi guṇiyinda eddu bandu*). Since then he has been living with me in Chitaldrug. The kingship of Bednūr must be secured for him." Haidar said in reply that he would do so. Accordingly he sent for the Pretender, that false Rāja who had been resurrected (*ā sūllu mātina Gaibu rāja nembavana karasi bhēti tegedu koṇḍu*), and, accompanied by him and Medekere Nāyaka, proceeded on an expedition to Nagar (*Haid-Nām.*, ff. 26-27).

It will be seen here that the son adopted by Basappa Nāyaka II is suggested to have tried to get rid of Nimbaiya; that Virammāji therefore tried to get rid of him; and that he escaped with his life from the grave, having yet a little life in him, and that he had been in the custody of the Pālegār of Chitaldrug, who espoused his cause with Haidar, who agreed to do so and started on his expedition. There is, however, no reference in this version to either the second adopted son or to the murder being an accomplished fact, though the author of the *Haidar-Nāmāh* does not evince any belief in the story of the rising from the grave and suggests that the man introduced by the Pālegār was only a pretender—that false Rāja who was brought into existence for the purpose of the insurrection.

De La Tour's Version: According to De La Tour, "the son of the Queen of Canara had escaped from Rana Bidnoor (*i.e.*, Bednūr), capital of that kingdom, and came to the Suba (*i.e.*, Haidar) at Bisnagar (*i.e.*, Basavāpaṭṇa)¹, to implore his assistance, that his mother might be compelled to put him in possession of the kingdom of his ancestors—the regency of which she had held since the death of her husband, the late king, and father of young prince, and still retained it, though her son had arrived at the age prescribed by law for him to take charge of the government himself." De La Tour adds that "the young prince" was "favorably received, and his mother was cited, by an ambassador of Haidar, to appear before the Suba (*i.e.*, himself) at a time fixed. This woman, who possessed a degree of courage unusual

1. Basavāpaṭṇa described by De La Tour as the "kingdom of Bisnagar or Bassapatam." See as to this identification, p. 427, *l.n.* 101 *supra*. Basavāpaṭṇa is now a ruined village in the N. W. of Chaunagiri. Originally the seat of the Basavāpaṭṇa chiefs, afterwards known as the Tarikere Pālegārs, it was taken by the Bednūr chief about the middle of the 17th century. The Mahrattas then got possession and Haidar wrested it from them in or about 1762.

in her sex, and who, from the anarchy that had long reigned in the Mogol's empire, was habituated to despise the orders of the emperor and his officers, replied to the ambassador of Haidar, that she was queen, and knew no superior. On this answer, which Hyder expected, war was determined on against the queen." (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 81-82). It is clear from this version that Channabasava, the son adopted by Basappa Nāyaka II, chafed under the restraints put upon him by Rāpi Virammāji despite his approaching the age at which he could succeed to the throne, and escaped from her control and sought Haidar's aid at Basavāpaṭṇa, and Haidar, in his capacity of Nawāb of Sira, called Virammāji to explain her conduct. She refused and war followed. It will be seen that De La Tour mentions only Channabasappa, the first adopted son, and makes no reference either to the second adopted son or the pretender.

Robson's Narrative: According to Robson, it would seem that Basappa Nāyaka II had, at his death, nominated his (adopted) son Channabasappa, aged then about nine years, to succeed him on the throne.² He was duly installed and his name made use of in all matters relative to the State. This continued for nearly a year, when, it is stated, the Queen (Virammāji) formed a design against the young Rāja's life, in favour of her brother.³ But a "friend" of the late Rāja, Basappa

2. Robson, *Life of Hyder Ally*, 28-32. Robson gives the name of the son as "Chinavas Appiah," which is a corrupted form of "Chinnabasappa." He had evidently been adopted *before* he was "appointed," as Robson says, to "succeed him in the government." Robson was, it is clear, not aware of his adoption.

3. The name of the "brother" referred to is not mentioned by Robson. That he was identical with Virammāji's maternal uncle's son—Sōmaśekhara III—there can be no doubt, for he was a cousin of the Rāpi and young enough—being but an infant to be treated as her son and taken in adoption. He was, according to other sources, the youngest son of her maternal uncle Channabasappa.

Nāyaka II, however, stood in the way.⁴ He evidently made overtures to the neighbouring Pālegār of Chitaldrug and contrived to patch up an arrangement with him for securing the life of Channabasappa. Robson says that this "friend of the Rajah" found means "to remove him from court, (*i.e.*, Rāṇi Vīrammāji's court) and sent him secretly to the care" of the Pālegār of Chitaldrug. Here he remained in safety for eight years,⁵ to the time of Haidar's conquest of Chitaldrug. "It was here," says Robson, "Hyder received the first impression of recovering the Biddenoor country; the reinstating the young Rajah being the most favourable circumstance, and the most conducive to his secret design. A plan was now formed between the young Rajah, Hyder, and the Polligar Chief, to re-establish the Rajah in his country, for which service it was stipulated that Hyder should receive, besides a valuable present, forty lakhs of rupees for the expence of the undertaking, and he swore, without reserve, to the faithful performance of the treaty."

According to Robson, the first adopted son was saved by a friend of Basappa Nāyaka II and was despatched to the Pālegār of Chitaldrug, who negotiated a treaty with Haidar for his restoration on certain terms. This version suggests that the adoptee was saved *before* any attempt on his life was actually made on him by Vīrammāji's

4. Robson styles him "*the* friend of the Rajah" but he mentions no name. He must have been interested in Channabasappa, the adoptee. Otherwise, he would not have taken the extreme step he took of opening up negotiations with the Pālegār of Chitaldrug, the hereditary enemy of Bednūr. Was he Lingappa of Mūghidare, who was imprisoned by the Rāṇi Vīrammāji at Kumsi and later escaped from imprisonment and helped Haidar?
5. Channabasappa's age at the time of Haidar's invasion was, according to Wilks, 17. Robson agrees with him, for if he was 9 years old, as he says, at the time of his succession, and if within "near a year" he was sent away from Bednūr to Chitaldrug, and he was there eight years in hiding, he would have been just nearing 18 at the time his cause was taken up by Haidar.

agents. The story of the *jettî* seems thus entirely discounted.

Kîrmânî's Version : Kîrmânî suggests neither two adoptions nor the rise of a pretender (Kîrmânî, *o.c.*, 128-132). According to him (*Ibid*), Vîrammâjî had "lately formed an illicit connection with a slave"—he means a mean subordinate—and the country, with all its fertility and riches, like the eyes of the blind, had become totally deprived of light, while the hearts of the people, by the tyranny and oppression of the dissolute Râni, was sorely afflicted; that the sounds of complaint and grief were heard in every street and market; that on all sides, thieves and robbers laid hold on the property of the poor; that the men were ashamed of obeying their ruler, and had shut themselves up in their houses, and the women, licentious, fearless, and drunk with the wine of immodesty, ornamenting their hair, and (painting) their faces, gave themselves up to sensuality, and the men had no power to correct or reprove, even the women of their own families; and that, they gave themselves up to dalliance in the open streets and markets, and walked about in eager expectation of their lovers. Truly, if rulers noted for want of sense be appointed to govern and protect a country, what hopes of comfort or safety can be entertained by their subjects? It appeared, therefore, improper that the government of such a fine province should be held by such a person, and that a bad woman should govern so beautiful and fertile a country was unreasonable; besides this, she had rebelled against (Sira) government." Thus reported, according to Kîrmânî, the news-writers of Haidar to him about the state of affairs at Bednûr (*Ibid*, 126). The Râni, according to him, had set such a bad example that everyone in her country—man and woman—had gone wrong and that the Râni had so far gone as to be unfit to rule so beautiful a country. And then—according to

Kirmāṇi—the news-writers intimated that “there was a man (it was said), a descendant of the chiefs of that country (*i.e.*, Bednūr); but he was void of sense and intelligence—for, notwithstanding he had laboured hard and schemed much, in the hope to obtain the chief authority, he could effect nothing” (*Ibid*, 129). This reference to the “descendant of the chiefs of that country” seems a reference to Channabasappa Nāyaka, the adopted son of Basappa Nāyaka II, who evidently, according to this version, had not only laboured and schemed but also had failed in all his attempts to get back his rights established. Later, it is stated by Kirmāṇi (*Ibid*, 130) that Haidar, having learnt all this about Bednūr from the news-writers, sent “searching spies and able intelligencers” to “collect correct information” respecting the government of Bednūr, and that from the “full and distinct account” he received from them, he saw action was necessary. And then, when Haidar reached Chitaldrug, matters were evidently so arranged—through the agency of these very spies and intelligencers—that the “descendant of the chiefs of that country” came into touch with him. “About this time also,” Kirmāṇi writes, “the person who was ambitious of obtaining the government of Bednore, and who, as has been already stated, desired an opportunity to establish his claim, had sought refuge in Chitaldroog, and, under the auspicious star of his good fortune, was introduced to the Nawaub (Haidar Alī). This person promised and engaged, through the medium of the Chief of Chitaldroog, to gird his loins in the service of the Nawaub; and stated that he considered the service of that victorious Chief as an honor to his house; and that he entreated the Nawaub to proceed quickly to the punishment of the Rāṇi, whose government was a display of caprice, and who, like a man, galloped over the field of license, and extinguish the torch of her immodesty with the water of the sword, and

give to the world (the people of which had their lives on their lips from her oppression and tyranny) comfort, consolation, a new life. Seeing that the appearance of things was conformable to his hopes and wishes, the Nawaub Bahadūr agreed to the prayer of this man..... marched towards Nuggur (*i.e.*, Bednūr) " (*Ibid*, 131). The person referred to here by Kīrmāṇi should be identified with the person mentioned by him earlier, whom we have identified already with Channabasappā, the son adopted by Basappa Nāyaka II. This would suggest that he was alive at the time of Haidar's invasion and that it was he who repaired to Haidar and sought his aid against Vīrammāji, his adopted mother. The reasons advanced by him against his adopted mother were first of all that she had formed an illicit liason and had set a bad example to her subjects who had gone wrong in their morals on account of her, and that her government was "a display of caprice" and oppressive and tyrannous. There is no mention by Kīrmāṇi of either the second adoptee or the pretender who personated so cunningly the first adoptee and was in turn deceived by Haidar. The "man" mentioned by Kīrmāṇi is identified by De La Tour also with the first adopted son of Basappa Nāyaka II.⁶ That De La Tour makes mention of only the son adopted by Basappa Nāyaka II will be clear from the context in which his name appears in his *History* (De La Tour, *o.c.*, I. 81).

The story as told in the "Keḷadi-Nripa-Vijayam": According to this work, it is clear that Channabasava died on July 8, 1757, how it is not stated. Within 17 days of his death, Vīrammāji took in adoption Śōmaśekhara III,⁷ and put him on the throne. He was

6. This identification by De La Tour was first noted by Col. Miles in his translation of Kīrmāṇi, see Kīrmāṇi, *o.c.*, 131, f.n. q.

7. According to this work, Channabasappa died on July 18, 1757 (*Īṣvara, Śrāvāṇa* *su.* 2). His rule lasted for 8 years, from 1754 to 1757. Śōmaśekhara III was put on the throne on August 14, 1757 (*Īṣvara, Śrāvāṇa* *ba.* 5). See *Ke. N. V.* 217-218.

evidently an infant and this facilitated the continuance of her own rule, at least until her nominee came of age. As mentioned in the text of this work, he was the youngest son of her maternal uncle Channa-Virappa, who was the Paṭṭana-Seṭṭi or the leading merchant of Bankapur. The *Keladi-Nripa-Vijayam* makes no mention of the pretender and does not give any indication of how Channabasappa came by his end. Nor does it furnish any details of the war that led to the final defeat and death of Rāni Virammāji. Linganna-Kavi, the author of the work, stops rather abruptly his narrative, with the curt statement that Virammāji and Sōmasēkhara ruled for five years and six months from *Īśvara, Śrāvāṇa ba. 5* to *Chītrabhānu, Māgha śu. 5* (1757-1763), when the kingdom (of Bednūr) ceased to exist. And with it, he adds, "here ends the kingdom of the Śivabhaktas" (*Ke. N. V.*, 223). It may, however, be inferred that these details are omitted by Linganna-Kavi for the obvious reason that they do not pertain to the object of his narrative, which was to chronicle the deeds of charity done by the kings of Keladi, who were pious devotees of Śiva.

Wilks' Version: According to Wilks, Basappa Nāyaka II left as his heir an adopted son named Channa-Basappa Nāyaka, about 17 years of age, under the guardianship of his widow Rāni Virammāji, until he should himself have attained sufficient experience. The Rāni—so this version runs—had formed a connection of shameless publicity with a person named Nimbaiya, evidently a subordinate of hers. The notoriety and public scandal of this attachment had drawn animadversions from the young Rāja (Channa-Basappa Nāyaka III), and the lovers had found it expedient, in 1757, to remove this rude observer by employing a *jeṭṭi* (a professional athlete) while shampooing him in his bath, to dislocate his neck and destroy him. In his place, they

selected an adopted infant to fill the throne. Thus passed some five years, when a pretender started in the land announcing himself as Channabasappa, saved by an artifice of the *jetṭi*, concealed in his house for five years and escaped in time to implore the protection of his neighbours in the recovery of his patrimony. This is the story told by Wilks.⁸ It postulates two adoptions, one by Basappa Nāyaka II at or before his death, and another by Virammāji after his death, besides bringing into being a pretender, who seeks to palm himself off as the person adopted by Basappa Nāyaka II.

We have set out above the different versions relating to what befell Channabasava, the adopted son of Basappa Nāyaka II. The point for determination is whether he really survived the attempt on his life said to have been made by or at the instance of Rāpi Virammāji, Queen of Bednūr. Whether Virammāji got rid of him herself or instigated some one else to get rid of him, need not detain us for any length of time, as it may be granted that in any event it would have been to her interest if he were put out of the way. Where versions relating to a historical event differ, as in the present case, a mere interpretation of sources may not help to solve the most important problem. It is necessary to compare the oldest preserved versions with their descriptions and to judge how far their character agrees or disagrees with the descriptions given in the later ones. Only then would we perceive the typical qualities of the writers and the circumstances under which the later developments came about. Such a confronting of versions, earlier and later, would help us to know the character of the versions developed by the

8. Wilks, *o.c.*, I. 502-503. Wilks does not quote his authority. But his version is probably based on what Badr-u-Zamān, whom he mentions later, should have narrated to him (*Ibid.*, 509, f. n.). Wilks' version has been given above nearly in his own words.

different writers⁹. Applying this principle of interpretation, we see that the version appearing in the *Haidar-Nāmāh*, which is the earliest known, barring that of De La Tour, which is secondary in character and value, suggests that Channabasappa did not die as the result of the attempt made on him and was saved and made his way to the Chitaldrug Pālegār, who protected him safely until he got Haidar to take up his cause. The author of the *Haidar-Nāmāh*, however, does not seem to believe in the story of his having been saved. And for that very reason he calls the man introduced by the Chitaldrug Pālegār "that pretender who was known as the Gaibu Rāja." De La Tour's version represents Channabasava as meeting Haidar in person at Basavāpaṭṇa and requesting his aid against his adopted mother Virammāji, who had kept him out of his kingdom, though he was of age to assume charge of it. This makes a further departure which is not confirmed by any other version, especially the meeting of Haidar at Basavāpaṭṇa, while there is a total omission of the name of the Chitaldrug Pālegār, which several other versions mention in this connection. This version, therefore, seems farther away from the actual truth. Robson's version, though two years later in point of date, seems nearest the truth in certain particulars. It represents Channabasava as having been saved from the hands of the Rāṇi, even before any attempt was made on him and that by a friend of his adopted father. This makes the long story of the *jetṭi* being employed by the Rāṇi to do away with him nothing but an invention just like the other one that represents him as having been buried alive mistakenly as dead and as having later escaped from the grave with life to the Chitaldrug Pālegār, who later introduced him to Haidar.

9. See, on this point of methodology, J. Prusek in *Archiv Orientalia*, Vol. X, 3, December 1938,

It is possible that these latter versions, which we see in the full blown form in Wilks, were stories current from the earliest days, which, in due course, came to oust the true story, of which probably we have the simplest form in Robson. Seeing the inimical attitude of the Rāṇi, a friend of the father of Channabasava quietly managed to secure and send him away to the Chitaldrug Pālegār, who later made him a political catspaw in his own interests. This version would make Channabasava live until after he meets Haidar, in which case the inference would follow that though the story was current that he had died long back, he was actually alive and had come to claim his kingdom in company with Haidar, his restorer. This has the merit of reconciling all the versions which represent Channabasava as both escaping from the Rāṇi's clutches and meeting, after some years of hidden life, Haidar in his camp and asking for his aid against the Rāṇi. Kirmāṇi's version, which, as might be expected, is graphic to a degree, is entirely in keeping with this view of the matter. It represents Channabasava not only as living but as a live individual visiting Haidar and as having a long conversation with him and promising "to gird his loins in the service of the Nawaub." But the *Keladi-Nripa-Vijayam* represents Channabasava as having died on July 8, 1757, and states that on this event occurring, Rāṇi Virammāji took in adoption her maternal uncle's son in his place and carried on the administration in his name. How to reconcile the death, so definitely mentioned, with the representation in the other sources that Channabasava either escaped from the Rāṇi's hands, or from the grave to which he had been consigned, or from the Jeṭṭi's murderous deed to the Chitaldrug Pālegār? It is quite possible that the Rāṇi believed that he had been done away with, agreeably to the stories made current at the time, and the author of the *Keladi-Nripa-Vijayam* believed in it and set

down the date of his alleged death, the day fixed being the one on which he was alleged to have died, while actually he had been saved from the alleged unfriendly clutches of the Rāṇi and sent away out of her sight by the friend of his adopted father, and from hiding later resurrected to wreak his vengeance on the Rāṇi with the aid of Haidar. From the point of view suggested above, it would follow that all the versions which represent Channabasava as living at the time of Haidar, contain a measure of truth in them; that the *Haidar-Nāmāh's* disbelief in the identity of the so-called pretender with Channabasava, the actual adoptee of Basappa Nāyaka II, was either a natural or an assumed one, more probably the former than the latter, though it suited Haidar's purposes very well; and that the statement made by the author of the *Keḷadi-Nripa-Vijayam* was one set down in the honest belief that Channabasava had died—as was possibly given out at the time—when he, with the aid of his father's friend, left the Rāṇi's protection.

(2) TIRUNĀL.

Tirunāl: a Tamil word, literally meaning *holy day*. From and after the memorable reign of Krishṇadēvarāya, the Vijayanagar King (1509-1530), Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism grew in strength throughout the Vijayanagar kingdom (see *Mys. Gaz.*, II. iii. 1908-24, 2009, 2097-2101, etc.). One result of this advance of Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism was the importation of Tamil words into Telugu, the home language of the kings, which also spread throughout the length and breadth of the Peninsula, including the Tamil and Kannaḍa Districts. Another result was that Tamil words came to be freely used in popular conversation, with the further consequence that they came into vogue even in the literature of the day. Thus, Allasāni Pedda-nārya, the court-poet of Krishṇarāya, uses this very word *Tirunāl* in a well-known verse in the introductory

portion of his famous poem *Manucharitramu*. The passage runs as follows: *simha bhūdhara Tirunāḷlakum ḍigu sura prakarambulu* (I. 39). The word *Tirunāḷ* was likewise adopted into the Kannada language, when describing the festival days connected with temples. See, for instance, reference to *Gajendra-Tirunāḷ* (ante, I. 185-186) and *Nanjarāja-Tirunāḷ* (ante, p. 597 of this Vol.), etc. Even earlier incorporation of Tamil words has been traced. Thus, in *Kāsikhaṇḍam* 2 (180), the word *Unnamale* is used for *Apṭakuchāmba*, and *Annāmale* for *Aruṇāchalam*; similarly the words *mannāse* and *ponnāse* in the same versè. In *Mārkaṇḍēya-Purāṇam*, we have the word *Avisāli*, a Tamil word signifying "a woman who has gone wrong." In the *Āmukta-mālyada* of Krishṇarāya, we have many Tamil words freely used. The following examples may be quoted:—*Poraviḷamgāya* (II. 97); *Āḷuvāru* (II. 94); *Munnāvāru* (V. 92); *Pentiruvadi* (IV. 30); *Tēdu* in the sense "to search," "to desire" or "to wish for"; *Pānyāramu* indicating "cakes"; *Oḍamē* (ornament); *Sāvi* (key); *Sāpāḍi* (having eaten); *Moramu* (the bamboo container in which sweepings are gathered for throwing out, generally used in households); and *Nanju* (poison), are other words found in the *Āmukta-mālyada* (see Vēdam Venkataraya Sastri's Edition, pp. 51-52, for a more detailed note on the subject). Similarly, the continued absorption of Tamil words from Śrī-Vaiṣṇava hagiology and religion into Kannada literature and inscriptions has to be explained, such absorption being both natural and necessary from the point of view of Śrī-Vaiṣṇava religious practices taken over. We may conclude this short note by quoting a popular Telugu song of unknown date—referring to *Tirunāḷ*—which runs as follows: *sannabīyam danchi danchi | sanchi ninda pōsi pōsi | Kanchi Tirunāḷ chūḍa pōtē pōtē | sanchi pōyerā, Ō! Rāghavā | sanchi pōyerā,*

Ō ! *Rāghavā* ||. This may be translated literally thus: Pound and pound the best rice; Fill and fill the sack; Witnessing the *Tirunāl*. at Kanchi, the sacks are gone, Oh! *Rāghava*! The sacks are gone, Oh! *Rāghava*! (The reference to *Kanchi* here is to Conjeeveram, the famous Śrī-Vaishṇava temple, not far from Madras; *Rāghava* is the presiding deity at Tiruvallūr, the well-known Śrī-Vaishṇava temple, between Madras and Arkonam).

(3) ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIAN POWERS IN THE 18TH CENTURY.

If Mysore found in the Mahrattas a serious competitor to the sovereignty of the South of India in the 17th century (see *Ante* Vol. I. Appendix PP. 570-574), both these powers found themselves confronted in their objective by the Nizāmate of the Deccan on the one hand and the Nāzimate or Nawābship of Arcot on the other in the 18th century. During the period following the death of Aurangzīb and the succession of weaklings to the Mughal Empire (down to 1748), centrifugal tendencies began to manifest themselves. The sovereignty of the Central Government at Delhi was in a nebulous state. The suzerainty of the Imperial Mughal was more nominal than real and the component parts of the Empire, fighting for their existence, sought to establish their sovereignty, each in its own way. A loose term, the word sovereignty in the 18th century carried with it the right on the part of a superior power to demand a monetary consideration from a less powerful neighbour. This, as understood at the time, was *not literally tribute* paid regularly by a chief or potentate to an organised power, but a "levy", "contribution", "indemnity", exacted at the point of the sword, as is connoted by the terms *chauth*, *sardēshmukhi*, *pēshkāsh*, *khandāne*, etc., met with in contemporary literature.

The Nizām, the new-comer on the stage of the Deccan politics of the 18th century, was originally the Mughal *Subādār* of the Deccan and as such its virtual ruler. The Deccan was reckoned in Akbar's time one of the *subahs* of the Mughal Empire.¹ At the head of each *subah* there was a *Subādār* or Governor, assisted by a *Dewan* (or Finance Minister) and a *Faujdār* (or head of the local militia). The *Subādār* had full civil and military control over the province and maintained a court modelled on that of the Mughal sovereign himself.² Each *subah* was subdivided into a number of *sarkārs*, each *sarkār* being split up into a number of *pargānas*, and each *pargana* was made up of a number of villages, each with its own local government. When Aurangzib died in 1707, Chinkilich Khān, better known as Asaf Jah, returned to his province of the Deccan, and became independent of Delhi about 1724. Nādir Shah invaded Delhi in 1739 and one result of it was that the office of *Subādār* of the Deccan became in every way hereditary.³ Asaf Jah established himself at Hyderabad and from there was supposed to control the vast territory which extended

1. Under Akbar, the *subahs* were 15 in number; later the three *subahs* in the Deccan were added to them. Under Aurangzib, the number of *subahs* were raised from three to six in the Deccan and from 15 to 18 in the north as the result of certain re-arrangements carried out in connection with the fixing of the territorial limits of the older provinces.
2. For a detailed account of the duties of these provincial officers, see V. A. Smith, *Akbar the Great Moghul*, 390 *et seq.*
3. It is said, indeed, that Nādir Shah in his treaty with Muhammad Shah made a stipulation that all the *subādārships* should be made hereditary in the families which possessed them at that time. It is suggested that he did this at the instance of Asaf Jah, who is said to have invited him to invade India in revenge for the "affront put on him by Muhammad Shah." It has also been suggested that this article was "doubtless a stroke of politics in the Persian conqueror to divide the forces of an Empire whose strength was sufficiently established in the army of 120,000 men assembled to oppose him; and which under an Emperor of another disposition, might revenge the insult sustained by him" (De La Tour, *o.c.*, 1-2). Dow's *Hindustan* gives many stories which were current about the causes of the invasion of Nādir Shah. According to them, Nādir Shah was invited to India by Asaf Jah and Sādat Khān. See Elphinstone, *o.c.*, 720, f.n. 32.

from the Gulf of Cambay to Bengal together with the peninsular courts from Cambay to the Gulf of Bengal. This area was reckoned a third part of the Mughal Empire and comprised many really independent kingdoms and states, which had neither been conquered by the Mughals nor over which they had ever even pretended to hold sway. These included nominally the territories occupied by the Mahrattas, who not only disputed Mughal sovereignty but were also allowed to levy *chauth* and *sardēshmukhi* by the Emperor Aurangzīb, a practice continued by Asaf Jah; the kingdom of Ikkēri, which made up the whole of the Kanara country; Cochin, Malabar and Travancore, into all which countries the Mughal army had never penetrated owing to the physical difficulties presented by them; Mysore, only the outer fringes of which had been so far touched in the wake of Bijāpur forces; and the extreme South of India beyond Trichinopoly, comprising the Madura and Tinnevely countries, over which the assertion of authority had been so far found all but impossible. The so-called "subjection" to the Mughal power was thus entirely nominal for the most part. This did not, however, prevent pretensions to suzerainty on the part of the Nizām when the break-up of the Mughal Empire became general. Nor did it prevent his claim to nominate persons to the several *sarkārs* forming the *subahs*, though this right to nominate was originally subject to confirmation by the Mughal Emperor. The headship of these *sarkārs* was not hereditary and had always been made by the provincial *subādār* concerned. Included among these in the Deccan was the Nawābship of Arcot, to which both the Nizām and the successors of Muhammad Shah, the Mughal Emperor, asserted their right in later times. This was the basis on which the fight to the Karnātic between the rival Nawābs and their supporters came to be sustained from about 1740,

when Dōst Alī, the then Nawāb, was attacked and killed in an invasion of the Mahrattas. The Nawābship of Arcot, though not hereditary, had been in his family for some time. Added to it, he had a number of persons belonging to his family and holding under him near about Arcot the charge of small *sarkārs* such as Vellore, Wandiwash, etc. The Nawāb of Arcot also pretended to claim the overlordship of Tanjore, Madura and Tinnevely and other places further south, which actually never recognised his claims.

It was in this state of affairs that two foreign nations (*i.e.*, the English and the French) sought to establish themselves in South India, pretending to help the local powers to settle their own differences while prejudicing the rights of third parties [like Mysore. This was particularly so on the termination of the war in the Karnātic and the conclusion of the truce between the English and the French in 1753. A conference was held at Sadras on 3rd January 1754, when a dispute arose between the two European powers as to the origin and relative validity of the patents (*sanads*) of the respective Indian claimants, Nawāb Muhammad Alī and the Nizām Salābat Jang (whose cause they espoused), to the suzerainty of the Karnātic and the Deccan. The following passage from Orme on this topic, though long, is pertinent and speaks for itself :—

“The English deputies,” writes Orme, “opened the conference by proposing as the basis of the negotiation, that Mahomed Ally should be acknowledged Nabob of the Carnatic, with the same authority as had ever been possessed by any former Nabob; and that the king of Tanjore should be guaranteed in the peaceable possession of his kingdom. The French then produced their ideas of a basis, and the whole of their terms together: their basis implied the acknowledgment of Salabad Jing as the soubah of the Deccan, and the immediate release of

the French prisoners taken during the war: the English, in return for their acquiescence to these two articles, were to be exempted from the ground-rent of Madras, a small fine formerly paid to the Government of Arcot; they were to keep possession of the country of Ponomalee; and some establishment was to be made for Mahomed Ally after his difference with the Mysorean concerning Trichinopoly was conciliated. It was impossible to have made proposals more directly opposite; for by acknowledging Salabad Jing without restrictions, the French would become arbiters of the fate of the English in the Carnatic, as they would of the French, if Mahomed Ally was acknowledged; so that each side required of the other to give up everything before they had well begun to treat of anything. However the business did not stop, and the French deputies produced seven patents, which they called their authorities for interfering as they had done, in the affairs of the Mogul Government, and for making the present demands; two of these were patents from Murzafa Jing, one appointing Mr. Dupleix commander in all the countries from the river Kristna to the sea, the other, Chunda Saheb governor of the Carnatic; four were from Salabad Jing, two confirming the two foregoing, another giving the countries of Arcot and Trichinopoly to Mr. Dupleix after the death of Chunda Saheb; the other appointing Mortiz Ally of Vellore, lieutenant under Mr. Dupleix in these countries; the seventh and last piece, which the French called the most authentic, was a letter from the Great Mogul, confirming all that Salabad Jing had done in favour of Mr. Dupleix and his allies. The French deputies then asked what titles the English had to produce; who replied that they consisted of patents from Nazir Jing, Gazi-o-din Khan, and the Great Mogul, appointing Mahomed Ally Nabob of the Carnatic; here again was a

flat contradiction, and of such a nature as could not be adjusted without sending the deputies to Delhi. The French, notwithstanding, insisted that the titles should be examined; and being told that the Nabob's were at Trichinopoly, desired that they might be immediately sent for; nevertheless they in the meantime delivered copies of their own to be scrutinized by the English deputies. But Mr. Saunders, convinced that this examination would multiply discussions, without removing any of the suspicions and objections which prevailed with both sides on the validity of the adversary's titles, came close to the point, and ordered his deputies to propose that the English and French should be put in possession of lands of equal value in such different parts of the province as might prevent future disputes; that the commerce of the two Companies in the Carnatic should be established on equal terms of advantage; that security should be given to the Mysoreans for such a sum of money as upon an equitable adjustment of their account might appear to be due to them; that a pension should be assigned to Rajah Saheb, the son of Chunda Saheb, and that the French prisoners should be released; provided Mr. Dupleix would acknowledge Mahomed Ally Nabob of the Carnatic. These proposals left the French superior by the whole of their possessions to the northward, which were of much greater value than what the English would have been content to take, subject to an equality with them in the Carnatic; a moderation which would have been inconsistent with the continual success of the English arms, if the expences of the war had not already greatly hurt the commercial interests of the East India Company, restrained, by their charter, from enlarging their capital. The acknowledgment of Mahomed Ally appeared the only difficulty in Mr. Saunders' proposal; but even this might be removed by the English acknowledging Salabad Jing, on condition that he would

confirm Mahomed Ally in the Nabobship; and that the French would likewise agree to concur equally with the English in supporting this prince in his government. But Mr. Dupleix was so intoxicated by his connexions with Salabad Jing, and his notions of his own authority in the Carnatic, that he rejected Mr. Saunders' proposal with disdain. It was now no longer possible to mistake his views, or to doubt that he had any other intention than to leave the English in possession of a fortieth part of the territories dependent on Arcot, on condition that they would tamely suffer him to keep and govern all the rest with absolute sovereignty. Big with these ideas, he ordered his deputies to insist strenuously on the validity of his titles; and whilst they were explaining the various events which had led their nation to the acquisition of such important prerogatives, the English deputies discovered that the Mogul's letter to Mr. Dupleix wanted the usual signature, which is a seal engraved with his name and titles, and stamped with ink at the head of the patent. They likewise observed that the seal impressed on the wax which had secured the cover of the letter, appeared by the date to be thirty-three years old, and consequently belonged to a former emperor. These defects naturally gave them many suspicions, which were much confirmed, when, on desiring an explanation from the French deputies, they immediately recalled all their papers, giving for a reason, that they would not submit them to any farther examination before the Nabob's patents were produced. This in reality was no reason at all; they, however, consulted Mr. Dupleix on the objections made to the Mogul's letter, who replied that the piece he had delivered to them was only a duplicate, to which the writer in the secretary's office at Delhi might have thought it needless to affix the seal of signature, and that with the same negligence the first seal which came to hand might have

been taken up by him to seal the cover; but that the original brought by the Mogul's officer deputed from Delhi, had the seal of signature affixed to it, which was dated in the first year of the reign of the late emperor Hamed Schah (Muhammad Shah); and that the letter itself was dated in the fifth year of his reign, the same in which it was received. It now became necessary to examine the original, and to enquire whether it was the custom in the secretary's office at Delhi to pay so little attention to duplicates; but Mr. Saunders and the English deputies thought that what they had already seen and heard was a sufficient proof that the copy was a forgery, and concluded the same of the original, and the rest of the French papers; the French deputies nevertheless persisted to defend the authenticity of them; and lest the abrupt manner in which they had withdrawn them from farther examination should be interpreted as a proof that they themselves knew their pieces could not stand the test, they now gave another reason for this part of their conduct, alleging that they had recalled them only for fear copies should be taken in order to direct Mahomed Ally in making out those patents he had promised to produce. The blundering apology exposed their cause more than any remarks which their adversaries had hitherto made; for it was a tacit acknowledgment, that they themselves were convinced of the possibility of forging patents with so much dexterity that the artifice could not be detected. It might have been asked, by what means they arrived at this conviction; and the English deputies might have added, as the natural consequences of this principle laid down by their adversaries, that if Mahomed Ally could avail himself of such arts, Mr. Dupleix might have made use of them likewise: this argument, however, was not produced, either because it did not occur, because it would have exploded the pretensions arising from patents

on both sides: but this the English ought to have wished, since it would have reduced the conference to a plan of equality, which would give them a right to demand an equal share of the countries to the northward, or to insist that the French should relinquish them; after which the English might have consented to recede from this demand, on condition that Mr. Dupleix should acknowledge Mahomed Ally in the Carnatic; but arguments have very little influence in treaties, and both sides had already made use of such sharp invectives on the conduct of their adversaries during the war, that it was manifest neither had any hopes of bringing about a reconciliation. Thus the conference broke up on the eleventh day after it began, leaving both sides more exasperated than ever." ⁴

This apart, the English, as subsequent events showed (*vide* Vol. III of this work), knew from the beginning the fundamental weakness of the position of Nawāb Muhammad Ali in his claims to the Nawābship of Arcot and the sovereignty—alleged or real—of the South. In espousing his cause, they came into conflict with

4. Orme, *Indostan*, I. 337-341. Wilks gives a telling summary of the above episode thus: "In January 1754, the deputies appointed by both parties met at the intermediate and neutral Dutch settlement of Sadras. The discussions commenced with unfolding their mutual projects: the English contending for the acknowledgment of Mahomed Ali as Nabob of Arcot, and the guarantee of the Raja of Tanjore; and the French, for the acknowledgment of Salabat Jung as Soubadar of the Deekan, and the rejection of Mohanmed Ali as Nabob of Arcot. It was plain from the commencement, that the views of the parties could never be brought to coincide; but they began most gravely to discuss the legal titles of their several Soubadars and Nabobs on which these respective projects were founded, and to produce the authenticated instruments of investiture; all of them supported, as usual, by the mandates of the Mogul. Public discussion could scarcely have assumed more indelicate shapes than arose from the scrutiny of seals, official forms, signatures and dates, and reciprocal accusations of forgery; and the conferences broke up in eleven days from their commencement, after the expenditure of much paper, infinite rancour, and very distinguished ingenuity on both sides (Wilks, o. c. I. 376).

Mysore, whom, as we have seen, the Nawāb had grossly wronged by the violation of his solemnly contracted treaty obligations in regard to the cession of Trichinopoly. By gradually superseding the Nawāb and establishing themselves as a political power in South India in the latter half of the 18th century, and by a system of diplomatic relations with the other Indian powers of the time (*i.e.*, the Nizām and the Mahrattas), the English not only came in the way of the legitimate aspirations of Mysore in the south (namely, the acquisition of Trichinopoly) but also eventually succeeded, in the closing years of the century, in overthrowing the formidable power of that kingdom, which had, in the wake of the Vijayanagar Empire, sought to extend its sway over a greater part of South India, from the Krishna in the north as far as Rāmēśvaram in the far south. That is the key-note of South Indian History of the 18th century, the ultimate success of a foreign power slowly and steadily profiting by the differences between the Indian powers of the time.



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Page	Line	Remarks
26, n. 29	3	For "Ch. XII" read "Ch. XV."
29, n. 44	3	Add at the end:—"For a note on the Parakāla Math in Mysore, <i>vide</i> Appendix III—(3)."
68, n. 3	2	For "Ch. XII" read "Ch. XIV."
69, n. 6	14	Add at the end:—"Literary works refer to him as Nanjarāja (see Ch. XV below)."
69, n. 7	3	For "Ch. XIII" read "Ch. XV, p. 605, n. 6."
70, n. 9	1	} For "Ch. XIII" read "Ch. XV."
74, n. 20	5	
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164	7	For "Saunders's" read "Saunders'."
(from top)		
182, n. 124	11	For "Ch. XIII" read "Ch. XV"
192, n. 32	...	Add at the end.—"Compare also Prof. A Martineau's <i>Bussy in the Deccan</i> , noticed in Appendix II—(7)."
202, n. 77	3	For "Ch. XII" read "Ch. XIV."
206, n. 2	...	Add at the end:—"For a detailed notice or other accounts bearing on Haider's ancestry, see Appendix III—(4)."
216	9	For "Yakoob Sāhib" read "Khoob Sāhib."
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225, n. 114	1	For "Ch. XII" read "Ch. XIV."
228	12-13 (from top)	Delete "and spent the rest of his life."
263, n. 7	1	} For "Appendix III" read "Appendix III—(4)"
271, n. 17	9	
286, n. 77	1	For "I. 279" read "I. 510."
286, n. 79	1	For " <i>Ibid</i> , 279-280" read " <i>Ibid</i> , 510-511."
286, n. 79	3	For " <i>Ibid</i> , 281" read " <i>Ibid</i> ."
287, n. 80	14	Insert in the middle:—"Robson notes Haider's office of Minister and General (Robson, <i>o. c.</i> , 16)."

Page	Line	Remarks
287, n. 80	29	For "tho" read "the."
287, n. 80	30	For "Appendix IV" read "Appendix IV--(1)."
304, n. 128	Last line	For "Appendix III" read "Appendix III--(5)."
337, n. 213	1	Insert:—"cf. the <i>Zukhm-Putty</i> of Tipū's period. See Kirkpatrick, <i>Letters</i> , No. CXVII, 151."
375, n. 279	13	For "Appendix III" read "Appendix III--(6)."
388	14-15 (from top)	For "A parallelism in point" read "the parallel case of Zenobia."
397, n. 22	At the end	For "Appendix IV" read "Appendix IV--(2)."
410, n. 50	2	For "Appendix III" read "Appendix III--(4)."
431	2 (from top)	For "Medakere Nāyaka" read "Hiriya Medakere Nāyaka."
431	6 (from top)	For "on 24th March 1748" read "in February 1749."
454, n. 174	...	For "Appendix V" read "Appendix V--(1)".
476	14 (from top)	For "herioc" read "heroic".
488, n. 234	5	For "88" read "28".
496	Marginal heading	For "May 36, 17-64" read "May 3-6, 1764".
509, n. 286	...	Add at the end:—"Another recent writer, Prof. A. C. Banerjee, writing mostly from the Mahratta point of view, hardly takes adequate notice of Wilks, Kirmāpi and the <i>Haider-Nāmāh</i> , so far as the Mysore-Mahratta relations are concerned (see A. C. Banerjee, <i>Peshwa Madhav Rao I</i> , pp. 41-60)."
791	...	Add new para at the end:—"As the publication of this work is nearing completion, we read of <i>A Persian Manuscript History of Mysore</i> , said to have been found in a collection of books presented by Mr. Muhammad Abba Sait, M.L.C., Mysore, to the Idāra-e-Adabiyāt-e-Urdū, Hyderabad (Deccan). This manuscript, hitherto unnoticed and most probably unknown also, forms the subject of an article under

Page	Line	Remarks
		<p>the above caption by Mr. Abdul Qadir Sarvari, M.A., LL.B., in the <i>Half-Yearly Journal of the Mysore University</i> (New Series), Vol. V. No. 1 (September 1944), pp. 23-40. The manuscript purports to deal with the history of Mysore from the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar I (1714-1732) to the death of Tipū Sultān. It bears no date and its authorship is nowhere mentioned in the text. From internal evidence, it seems to have been composed in the early part of the 19th century during the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar III (1799-1869). A further examination of the contents of this manuscript as now brought out by Mr. Sarvari shows that the manuscript is decidedly later than the <i>Haider-Nāmāh</i> and Kirmānī's <i>Nishānī-Hyādurī</i> and <i>Tipū Sultān</i> and is perhaps slightly posterior also to Wilks' <i>History</i> (1810). The events are recounted without strict regard to chronological accuracy. Hardly any dates are mentioned and the narrative is loose, scrappy, vague and defective in many places, though it embodies bits of useful information here and there by way of supplementing other sources. The manuscript no doubt forms a secondary source of information on the period (c. 1725-1799) and has to be used with caution and discrimination."</p>
504	First line: Section (2) on <i>Tirunāl</i> .	<p>Add at the end :—"This word has been incorporated also into the Malayālam language. In this language it is borne as a title by successive kings of Travancore, thus: <i>Chittirai Tirunāl</i>, <i>Kārtika Tirunāl</i>, etc. In this connection, it means <i>holy day of the star under which the king was born</i>. Dr. Gundert, in his <i>Malayālam-English Dictionary</i>, gives the following meanings under <i>Tirunāl</i> :—feast; the birth-day of the king. He also gives various combinations of the word, such as <i>Tirunāl-sattu</i>, meaning the king's <i>jātakam</i>; also the day of his death; <i>Tirunāl-piṇḍam</i>, meaning obsequies, etc."</p>